Merge "Update seapp_contexts with isIsolatedComputeApp selector"
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index f13c23c..f706339 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
"android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.sensors.ISensors/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.soundtrigger3.ISoundTriggerHw/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.tetheroffload.IOffload/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.thermal.IThermal/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.tv.hdmi.cec.IHdmiCec/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.tv.hdmi.connection.IHdmiConnection/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/domain.te b/microdroid/system/private/domain.te
index 13e359a..4251a9e 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/domain.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/domain.te
@@ -363,16 +363,13 @@
# These partitions are intended to be read-only and must never be
# modified. Doing so would violate important Android security guarantees
# and invalidate dm-verity signatures.
-neverallow {
- domain
- with_asan(`-asan_extract')
-} {
+neverallow domain {
system_file_type
vendor_file_type
exec_type
}:dir_file_class_set { create write setattr relabelfrom append unlink link rename };
-neverallow { domain -kernel with_asan(`-asan_extract') } { system_file_type vendor_file_type exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
+neverallow { domain -kernel } { system_file_type vendor_file_type exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
# Don't allow mounting on top of /system files or directories
neverallow * exec_type:dir_file_class_set mounton;
@@ -445,7 +442,6 @@
-init
-vendor_init
-toolbox # TODO(b/141108496) We want to remove toolbox
- with_asan(`-asan_extract')
} system_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
#
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_manager.te b/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_manager.te
index a5b71f0..51372ad 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_manager.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_manager.te
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@
# Allow microdroid_manager to start encryptedstore binary
domain_auto_trans(microdroid_manager, encryptedstore_exec, encryptedstore)
+# Microdroid Manager needs read related permission for syncing encrypted storage fs
+allow microdroid_manager encryptedstore_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
# Allow microdroid_manager to run kexec to load crashkernel
domain_auto_trans(microdroid_manager, kexec_exec, kexec)
@@ -123,6 +126,9 @@
# Allow microdroid_manager to write kmsg_debug (stdio_to_kmsg).
allow microdroid_manager kmsg_debug_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
+# Read tombstone_transmit_status_prop to wait for initialization of tombstone_transmit
+get_prop(microdroid_manager, tombstone_transmit_status_prop)
+
# Domains other than microdroid can't write extra_apks
neverallow { domain -microdroid_manager -init -vendor_init } extra_apk_file:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow { domain -microdroid_manager -init -vendor_init } extra_apk_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/property.te b/microdroid/system/private/property.te
index d983775..1bbe2a9 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/property.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/property.te
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
system_internal_prop(ctl_tombstoned_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(tombstone_transmit_status_prop)
system_restricted_prop(boot_status_prop)
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts b/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
index 0d5786c..235ab14 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
@@ -161,3 +161,9 @@
persist.device_config.runtime_native_boot. u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop:s0 prefix
apexd.payload_metadata.path u:object_r:apexd_payload_metadata_prop:s0 exact string
+
+tombstone_transmit.init_done u:object_r:tombstone_transmit_status_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# tombstone_transmit.start starts tombstone_transmit after creating a directory
+# assigning the same label as ctl.start$tombstone_transmit
+tombstone_transmit.start u:object_r:ctl_tombstone_transmit_prop:s0 exact bool
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/tombstone_transmit.te b/microdroid/system/private/tombstone_transmit.te
index 1887654..4f2b5ab 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/tombstone_transmit.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/tombstone_transmit.te
@@ -8,3 +8,9 @@
allow tombstone_transmit tombstone_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
allow tombstone_transmit self:{ vsock_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# allow tombstone_transmit to notify its initialization
+set_prop(tombstone_transmit, tombstone_transmit_status_prop)
+
+# Only tombstone_transmit can set its status
+neverallow { domain -init -tombstone_transmit } tombstone_transmit_status_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
index cf9ea02..c5837f9 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
-type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
type accessibility_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/platform_app.te b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/platform_app.te
index 6112ae0..b40f6b9 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/platform_app.te
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@
auditallow platform_app proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
+# Allow writing and removing wmshell protolog in /data/misc/wmtrace.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ allow platform_app wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow platform_app wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
+')
+
allow platform_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index 6cd8c4e..adb3a61 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -789,3 +789,10 @@
integrity
confidentiality
}
+
+class io_uring
+{
+ override_creds
+ sqpoll
+ cmd
+}
diff --git a/private/adbd.te b/private/adbd.te
index 48fa849..d72d5b1 100644
--- a/private/adbd.te
+++ b/private/adbd.te
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
# Create and use network sockets.
net_domain(adbd)
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(adbd, mdnsd, mdnsd)
# Access /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0
allow adbd functionfs:dir search;
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index 8838782..c8f455b 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
r_dir_file({
appdomain
-ephemeral_app
- -isolated_app
+ -isolated_app_all
-platform_app
-priv_app
-shell
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
auditallow {
appdomain
-ephemeral_app
- -isolated_app
+ -isolated_app_all
-platform_app
-priv_app
-shell
@@ -149,53 +149,53 @@
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Read/write visible storage
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
#logd access
control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
-use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
+use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
-use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
+use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox })
# For app fuse.
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
-pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_client)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_manager)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, display_vsync)
+pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, performance_client)
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
-pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
+pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox }, bufferhub_client)
# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
-allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
+allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
@@ -221,8 +221,8 @@
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -259,11 +259,11 @@
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
# App sandbox file accesses.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
# Traverse into expanded storage
allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# TextClassifier
-r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
+r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, textclassifier_data_file)
# Access to OEM provided data and apps
allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@
full_treble_only(`
# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
- allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
+ allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } vendor_file:dir { open read };
')
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
@@ -368,9 +368,9 @@
# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
# They need that to render the standard UI.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;
# Use the Binder.
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
-binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
+binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, gpuservice)
# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
@@ -403,10 +403,10 @@
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
@@ -435,21 +435,21 @@
allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_audio:fd use;
# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_camera:fd use;
# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
-allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
+allow {appdomain -isolated_app_all} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
# TODO: switch to meminfo service
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@
# from read-only locations.
neverallow {
bluetooth
- isolated_app
+ isolated_app_all
nfc
radio
shared_relro
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 6231623..ea10df5 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
ephemeral_app
isolated_app
+ isolated_app_all
+ isolated_compute_app
mediaprovider
mediaprovider_app
untrusted_app
@@ -265,3 +267,31 @@
-mediaprovider
-mediaprovider_app
} { userdebug_or_eng_prop }:file read;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted app to access /dev/socket/mdnsd since U. The socket is
+# used to communicate to the mdnsd responder. The mdnsd responder will be
+# replaced by a java implementation which is integrated into the system server.
+# For untrusted apps running with API level 33-, they still have access to
+# /dev/socket/mdnsd for backward compatibility.
+neverallow {
+ all_untrusted_apps
+ -untrusted_app_25
+ -untrusted_app_27
+ -untrusted_app_29
+ -untrusted_app_30
+ -untrusted_app_32
+} mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow {
+ all_untrusted_apps
+ -untrusted_app_25
+ -untrusted_app_27
+ -untrusted_app_29
+ -untrusted_app_30
+ -untrusted_app_32
+} mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted apps to use anonymous inodes. At the moment,
+# type transitions are the only way to distinguish between different
+# anon_inode usages like userfaultfd and io_uring. This prevents us from
+# creating a more fine-grained neverallow policy for each anon_inode usage.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:anon_inode *;
diff --git a/private/artd.te b/private/artd.te
index c887258..ef54d8c 100644
--- a/private/artd.te
+++ b/private/artd.te
@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@
# Read access to primary dex'es on writable partitions
# ({/data,/mnt/expand/<volume-uuid>}/app/...).
+# Also allow creating the "oat" directory before restorecon.
allow artd mnt_expand_file:dir { getattr search };
-r_dir_file(artd, apk_data_file)
+allow artd apk_data_file:dir { rw_dir_perms create setattr relabelfrom };
+allow artd apk_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read access to vendor APKs ({/vendor,/odm}/{app,priv-app}/...).
r_dir_file(artd, vendor_app_file)
@@ -46,8 +48,8 @@
# Read/write access to all compilation artifacts generated on device for apps'
# primary dex'es. (/data/dalvik-cache/..., /data/app/.../oat/..., etc.)
-allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow artd dalvikcache_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
# Read access to the ART APEX data directory.
# Needed for reading the boot image generated on device.
diff --git a/private/bpfdomain.te b/private/bpfdomain.te
index ada65ae..7c8f5c0 100644
--- a/private/bpfdomain.te
+++ b/private/bpfdomain.te
@@ -19,3 +19,7 @@
# so let's allow all bpffs_type's instead,
# this will keep things working even if this is fixed.
allow bpfdomain bpffs_type:lnk_file read;
+
+# Needed for //frameworks/libs/net:
+# common/native/bpf_headers/include/bpf/WaitForProgsLoaded.h
+get_prop(bpfdomain, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
diff --git a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
index 321e938..d79d2f8 100644
--- a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.cil
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
;; mapping file compiles with vendor policies without exported_audio_prop type.
(typeattribute exported_audio_prop_28_0)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 28.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (accessibility_service_28_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (account_service_28_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (activity_service_28_0) true)
diff --git a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.compat.cil
index 2e85b23..783950c 100644
--- a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.compat.cil
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 28.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 28.0 vendors.
+;;
+
(typeattribute vendordomain)
(typeattributeset vendordomain ((and (domain) ((not (coredomain))))))
(allowx vendordomain dev_type (ioctl blk_file ((range 0x0000 0xffff))))
diff --git a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
index e7ddf48..7213f95 100644
--- a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 28.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
index 5dba020..7315687 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
(type sysfs_mac_address)
(type wificond_service)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 29.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (accessibility_service_29_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (account_service_29_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (activity_service_29_0) true)
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.compat.cil
index ccd9d1a..0bb2ae8 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.compat.cil
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 29.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 29.0 vendors.
+;;
+
(typeattribute vendordomain)
(typeattributeset vendordomain ((and (domain) ((not (coredomain))))))
(allow vendordomain self (netlink_route_socket (nlmsg_readpriv)))
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index 1079046..e40888d 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 29.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
diff --git a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.cil b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.cil
index 44044fb..83d83ff 100644
--- a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.cil
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
(typeattribute binder_in_vendor_violators)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 30.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (DockObserver_service_30_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (IProxyService_service_30_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (accessibility_service_30_0) true)
diff --git a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.compat.cil
index 97c5874..b8bd755 100644
--- a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.compat.cil
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 30.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 30.0 vendors.
+;;
+
(typeattribute vendordomain)
(typeattributeset vendordomain ((and (domain) ((not (coredomain))))))
diff --git a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
index ba0a494..0a3d2e9 100644
--- a/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/30.0/30.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 30.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
diff --git a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.cil b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.cil
index 0e90912..b0df314 100644
--- a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.cil
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
(type vr_hwc)
(type vr_hwc_exec)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 31.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (DockObserver_service_31_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (IProxyService_service_31_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (aac_drc_prop_31_0) true)
diff --git a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.compat.cil
index 628abfc..787c92a 100644
--- a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.compat.cil
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-;; This file can't be empty.
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 31.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 31.0 vendors.
+;;
diff --git a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
index a5a3475..0e39f3e 100644
--- a/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/31.0/31.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 31.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
diff --git a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.cil b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.cil
index 3672436..171f0ad 100644
--- a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.cil
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
(type vr_hwc)
(type vr_hwc_exec)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 32.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (DockObserver_service_32_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (IProxyService_service_32_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (aac_drc_prop_32_0) true)
diff --git a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.compat.cil
index 628abfc..00ac11f 100644
--- a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.compat.cil
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-;; This file can't be empty.
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 32.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 32.0 vendors.
+;;
diff --git a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
index d810e0a..ec2a16d 100644
--- a/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/32.0/32.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 32.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
index 2f8887b..56da496 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
(type wpantund_service)
(type zoneinfo_data_file)
+;; mapping information from ToT policy's types to 33.0 policy's types.
(expandtypeattribute (DockObserver_service_33_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (IProxyService_service_33_0) true)
(expandtypeattribute (aac_drc_prop_33_0) true)
@@ -2489,7 +2490,10 @@
(typeattributeset untrusted_app_27_33_0 (untrusted_app_27))
(typeattributeset untrusted_app_29_33_0 (untrusted_app_29))
(typeattributeset untrusted_app_30_33_0 (untrusted_app_30))
-(typeattributeset untrusted_app_33_0 (untrusted_app))
+(typeattributeset untrusted_app_33_0
+ ( untrusted_app
+ untrusted_app_32
+))
(typeattributeset update_engine_33_0 (update_engine))
(typeattributeset update_engine_data_file_33_0 (update_engine_data_file))
(typeattributeset update_engine_exec_33_0 (update_engine_exec))
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.compat.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.compat.cil
index 628abfc..53ee8ff 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.compat.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.compat.cil
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-;; This file can't be empty.
+;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and 33.0 vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on 33.0 vendors.
+;;
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index 11bff79..ee67ab1 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
-;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
+;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in 33.0 policy. Thus, we do not need to map
+;; these types to previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
(typeattributeset new_objects
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
adaptive_haptics_prop
apex_ready_prop
artd
+ bt_device
credential_service
device_config_camera_native_prop
device_config_memory_safety_native_prop
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
hal_cas_service
hal_remoteaccess_service
hal_secure_element_service
+ hal_tetheroffload_service
hal_thermal_service
hal_usb_gadget_service
hal_tv_input_service
@@ -30,6 +32,7 @@
hal_wifi_service
healthconnect_service
hypervisor_restricted_prop
+ isolated_compute_app
keystore_config_prop
ntfs
permissive_mte_prop
@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@
timezone_metadata_prop
tuner_config_prop
tuner_server_ctl_prop
+ usb_uvc_enabled_prop
virtual_face_hal_prop
virtual_fingerprint_hal_prop
hal_gatekeeper_service
@@ -48,4 +52,6 @@
hal_confirmationui_service
hal_fastboot_service
hal_can_controller_service
+ zoned_block_device
+ future_pm_prop
))
diff --git a/private/coredomain.te b/private/coredomain.te
index 55f715d..96ce488 100644
--- a/private/coredomain.te
+++ b/private/coredomain.te
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@
coredomain
-appdomain
-artd
+ -dex2oat
+ -dexoptanalyzer
-idmap
-init
-installd
@@ -112,6 +114,8 @@
coredomain
-appdomain
-artd
+ -dex2oat
+ -dexoptanalyzer
-idmap
-init
-installd
diff --git a/private/credstore.te b/private/credstore.te
index c410d76..434808f 100644
--- a/private/credstore.te
+++ b/private/credstore.te
@@ -10,3 +10,8 @@
# credstore needs to get keys from the remotely provisioned pool
allow credstore remotelyprovisionedkeypool_service:service_manager find;
+allow credstore keystore:keystore2 get_attestation_key;
+
+# credstore needs to get keys from the RKPD
+get_prop(credstore, remote_prov_prop)
+allow credstore remote_provisioning_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/crosvm.te b/private/crosvm.te
index c682bb5..aae8323 100644
--- a/private/crosvm.te
+++ b/private/crosvm.te
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
# Let crosvm receive file descriptors from VirtualizationService.
allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fd use;
-# Allow sending VirtualizationService the failure reason from the VM via pipe.
+# Allow sending VirtualizationService the failure reason and console/log from the VM via pipe.
allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file write;
# Let crosvm read the composite disk images (virtualizationservice_data_file), APEXes
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@
# when the vm is created by the `vm` tool) and handed over to crosvm as FD.
allow crosvm shell_data_file:file write;
+# crosvm tries to read serial device, including the write-only pipe from virtualizationmanager (to
+# forward console/log to the host logcat).
+# crosvm only needs write permission, so dontaudit read
+dontaudit crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file read;
+
# Don't allow crosvm to open files that it doesn't own.
# This is important because a malicious application could try to start a VM with a composite disk
# image referring by name to files which it doesn't have permission to open, trying to get crosvm to
diff --git a/private/dex2oat.te b/private/dex2oat.te
index 2ce2459..ea9ab9c 100644
--- a/private/dex2oat.te
+++ b/private/dex2oat.te
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
# Access /vendor/framework
allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:dir { getattr search };
allow dex2oat vendor_framework_file:file { getattr open read map };
+# Access /vendor/overlay
+r_dir_file(dex2oat, vendor_overlay_file);
allow dex2oat tmpfs:file { read getattr map };
@@ -59,6 +61,9 @@
# Allow dex2oat to use file descriptors passed from privileged programs.
allow dex2oat { artd installd odrefresh odsign }:fd use;
+# Allow dex2oat to read the /proc filesystem for CPU features, etc.
+allow dex2oat proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
+
##################
# A/B OTA Dexopt #
##################
diff --git a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
index 8eb1d29..ca715c1 100644
--- a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
+++ b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
# package manager.
allow dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file { getattr read map };
+# dexoptanalyzer checks the DM files next to dex files. We don't need this check
+# for secondary dex files, but it's not harmful. Just deny it and ignore it.
+dontaudit dexoptanalyzer { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir search;
+
# Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index e0ba975..f726b1f 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
get_prop(domain, surfaceflinger_prop)
get_prop(domain, telephony_status_prop)
get_prop(domain, timezone_prop)
-get_prop({domain -untrusted_app_all -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, userdebug_or_eng_prop)
+get_prop({domain -untrusted_app_all -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app }, userdebug_or_eng_prop)
get_prop(domain, vendor_socket_hook_prop)
get_prop(domain, vndk_prop)
get_prop(domain, vold_status_prop)
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@
# traced_probes.te.
} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
neverallow {
- isolated_app
+ isolated_app_all
ephemeral_app
priv_app
sdk_sandbox
diff --git a/private/fastbootd.te b/private/fastbootd.te
index d93ee42..7dc1741 100644
--- a/private/fastbootd.te
+++ b/private/fastbootd.te
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
hal_client_domain(fastbootd, hal_fastboot)
')
-# io_uring_setup needs ipc_lock and permission to operate anon inodes
+# This capability allows fastbootd to circumvent memlock rlimits while using
+# io_uring. An Alternative would be to up the memlock rlimit for the fastbootd service.
allow fastbootd self:capability ipc_lock;
-
-allow fastbootd self:anon_inode create_file_perms;
+io_uring_use(fastbootd)
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index e33469f..776c8e5 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
type storaged_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# /data/misc/wmtrace for wm traces
-type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type wm_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
# /data/misc/a11ytrace for accessibility traces
type accessibility_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 632e069..4c3f108 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
/dev/audio.* u:object_r:audio_device:s0
/dev/binder u:object_r:binder_device:s0
/dev/block(/.*)? u:object_r:block_device:s0
+/dev/block/by-name/zoned_device u:object_r:zoned_block_device:s0
/dev/block/dm-[0-9]+ u:object_r:dm_device:s0
/dev/block/loop[0-9]* u:object_r:loop_device:s0
/dev/block/vd[a-z][0-9]* u:object_r:vd_device:s0
@@ -223,7 +224,6 @@
/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
/system/bin/prng_seeder u:object_r:prng_seeder_exec:s0
/system/bin/charger u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
-/system/bin/canhalconfigurator(-aidl)? u:object_r:canhalconfigurator_exec:s0
/system/bin/e2fsdroid u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
/system/bin/mke2fs u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
/system/bin/e2fsck -- u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
@@ -373,7 +373,6 @@
/system/bin/simpleperf u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
/system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
-/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
/system/bin/snapuserd u:object_r:snapuserd_exec:s0
/system/bin/odsign u:object_r:odsign_exec:s0
/system/bin/vehicle_binding_util u:object_r:vehicle_binding_util_exec:s0
@@ -493,6 +492,9 @@
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hidl_lazy_test_server u:object_r:hidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/hidl_lazy_cb_test_server u:object_r:hidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_service_exec:s0
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/canhalconfigurator(-aidl)? u:object_r:canhalconfigurator_exec:s0
+
/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/lib(64)?(/.*)? u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
#############################
diff --git a/private/gpuservice.te b/private/gpuservice.te
index 76a2370..8388e89 100644
--- a/private/gpuservice.te
+++ b/private/gpuservice.te
@@ -59,9 +59,6 @@
# Needed for enabling bpf programs and accessing bpf maps (read-only and read/write).
allow gpuservice bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
-# Needed for getting a prop to ensure bpf programs loaded.
-get_prop(gpuservice, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
-
add_service(gpuservice, gpu_service)
# Only uncomment below line when in development
diff --git a/private/installd.te b/private/installd.te
index 9673cfd..7615c92 100644
--- a/private/installd.te
+++ b/private/installd.te
@@ -47,7 +47,10 @@
allow installd staging_data_file:file unlink;
allow installd staging_data_file:dir { open read remove_name rmdir search write getattr };
-allow installd { dex2oat dexoptanalyzer }:process { sigkill signal };
+allow installd { dex2oat dexoptanalyzer }:process signal;
+
+# installd kills subprocesses if they time out.
+allow installd { dex2oat dexoptanalyzer profman }:process sigkill;
# Allow installd manage dirs in /data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox
allow installd sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 828ffb1..7230844 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
###
-### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
+### isolated_apps.
###
-### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
-### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+### This file defines the rules for isolated apps that does not wish to use
+### service managers and does not require extra computational resources.
###
typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
app_domain(isolated_app)
+isolated_app_domain(isolated_app)
-# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file { append read write getattr lock map };
+allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
# permitted.
allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
-allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
-allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
-allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
-# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
-# tool is broken.
-# b/20150694
-# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
-allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
-
# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
-# neverallow rules below.
+# neverallow rules in isolated_app_all attribute.
# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
allow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock map };
@@ -47,17 +35,6 @@
# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
-# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:fd use;
-# Notify app_zygote of child death.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:process sigchld;
-# Inherit logd write socket.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
-
-# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
-# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
-dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
-
# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
@@ -66,88 +43,3 @@
# debuggable.
can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
-
-#####
-##### Neverallow
-#####
-
-# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
-neverallow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file open;
-
-# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
-# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
-# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
-neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
-neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
-neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
-neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
-neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
-# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
-neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
-
-# b/17487348
-# Isolated apps can only access three services,
-# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
-neverallow isolated_app {
- service_manager_type
- -activity_service
- -display_service
- -webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
-# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
-neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
-
-# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
-neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
-neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
-
-# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
-# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
-neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir ~getattr;
-neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
-neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
-neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
-
-# Do not allow USB access
-neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
-
-# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
-neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
-
-# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
-# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
-neverallow isolated_app {
- sysfs_type
- -sysfs_devices_system_cpu
- -sysfs_transparent_hugepage
- -sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
- -sysfs_fs_incfs_features
-}:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
-# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
-# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
-# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
-# be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
- socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
- key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
- netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
- netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
- netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
- netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
- netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
- netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
- netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
- rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
- bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
- ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
- qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
-} create;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app_all.te b/private/isolated_app_all.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb9da6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/isolated_app_all.te
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+###
+### isolated_app_all.
+###
+### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
+###
+### This file defines the rules shared by all isolated apps. An "isolated
+### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
+### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+###
+
+# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
+allow isolated_app_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file { append read write getattr lock map };
+
+allow isolated_app_all activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_app_all display_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
+# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
+# tool is broken.
+# b/20150694
+# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
+allow isolated_app_all self:process ptrace;
+
+# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
+allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:fd use;
+# Notify app_zygote of child death.
+allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:process sigchld;
+# Inherit logd write socket.
+allow isolated_app_all app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
+
+# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
+# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
+dontaudit isolated_app_all shell_data_file:dir search;
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
+neverallow isolated_app_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file open;
+
+# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
+# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
+# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
+neverallow isolated_app_all anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow isolated_app_all anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
+neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
+neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } *:hwservice_manager *;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
+neverallow isolated_app_all vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
+
+# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
+# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
+neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } *:service_manager ~find;
+
+# b/17487348
+# Isolated apps can only access three services,
+# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
+neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } {
+ service_manager_type
+ -activity_service
+ -display_service
+ -webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
+neverallow isolated_app_all gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
+
+# Do not allow isolated_apps access to /cache
+neverallow isolated_app_all cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow isolated_app_all cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
+
+# Do not allow isolated_app_all to access external storage, except for files passed
+# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
+neverallow isolated_app_all { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir ~getattr;
+neverallow isolated_app_all { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
+neverallow isolated_app_all { sdcard_type fuse }:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
+neverallow isolated_app_all { sdcard_type fuse }:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
+
+# Do not allow USB access
+neverallow isolated_app_all { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
+
+# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
+neverallow isolated_app_all webview_zygote:sock_file write;
+
+# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app_all can access. This is important
+# for controlling isolated_app_all attack surface.
+# TODO (b/266555480): The permission should be guarded by compliance test.
+# Remove the negation for member domains when refactorization is done.
+neverallow { isolated_app_all -isolated_compute_app } {
+ sysfs_type
+ -sysfs_devices_system_cpu
+ -sysfs_transparent_hugepage
+ -sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_apps (b/28417852)
+ -sysfs_fs_incfs_features
+}:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
+# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
+# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
+# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
+# be compiled into the Android kernel.
+neverallow isolated_app_all { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
+ socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
+ key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
+ netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
+ netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
+ netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
+ netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
+ netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
+ netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
+ netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
+ rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
+ bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
+ ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
+ qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
+} create;
diff --git a/private/isolated_compute_app.te b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c6d570
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+###
+### isolated_compute_apps.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for isolated apps that requires the permission
+### to gather data with service manager and require computational resources to
+### improve the performance to process data under a sandbox. This
+### isolated_compute_app restricts data egress to protect the privacy.
+###
+### TODO(b/266923392): Clean rules for isolated_compute_app characteristics
+###
+type isolated_compute_app, domain;
+
+typeattribute isolated_compute_app coredomain;
+
+app_domain(isolated_compute_app)
+isolated_app_domain(isolated_compute_app)
+
+allow isolated_compute_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_compute_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_compute_app content_capture_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_compute_app device_state_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_compute_app speech_recognition_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Enable access to hardware services for camera functionalilites
+hal_client_domain(isolated_compute_app, hal_allocator)
+hwbinder_use(isolated_compute_app)
+
+# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
+# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(isolated_compute_app)
+
+# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
+# debuggable.
+can_profile_heap(isolated_compute_app)
+can_profile_perf(isolated_compute_app)
+
+#####
+##### Neverallow
+#####
+
+# Do not allow isolated_compute_app to access hardware service except for the
+# ones necessary for camera service.
+# TODO (b/266555480): The permission should be guarded by compliance test.
+# Remove the negation for member domains when refactorization is done.
+# neverallow isolated_compute_app {
+# hwservice_manager_type
+# -hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice
+# -hal_graphics_mapper_hwservice
+# -hidl_allocator_hwservice
+# -hidl_manager_hwservice
+# -hidl_memory_hwservice
+# }:hwservice_manager *;
diff --git a/private/netd.te b/private/netd.te
index 4aa288b..ae43e47 100644
--- a/private/netd.te
+++ b/private/netd.te
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
set_prop(netd, netd_stable_secret_prop)
get_prop(netd, adbd_config_prop)
-get_prop(netd, bpf_progs_loaded_prop)
get_prop(netd, hwservicemanager_prop)
get_prop(netd, device_config_netd_native_prop)
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index f14e52d..46abb16 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@
auditallow platform_app proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
+# Allow writing and removing wmshell protolog in /data/misc/wmtrace.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ allow platform_app wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+ allow platform_app wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
+')
+
allow platform_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/property.te b/private/property.te
index dee6369..5383300 100644
--- a/private/property.te
+++ b/private/property.te
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@
neverallow domain system_and_vendor_property_type:{file property_service} *;
neverallow {
- # Only init and the remote provisioner can set the ro.remote_provisioning.* props
+ # Only init and the remote provisioner can set the remote_provisioning props
domain
-init
-remote_prov_app
@@ -681,3 +681,9 @@
domain
-init
} log_file_logger_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -vendor_init
+} usb_uvc_enabled_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index f208e52..f3c8d55 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -573,6 +573,7 @@
bluetooth.core.le.inquiry_scan_interval u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact uint
bluetooth.core.le.inquiry_scan_window u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact uint
+bluetooth.core.le.vendor_capabilities.enabled u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
bluetooth.sco.disable_enhanced_connection u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.nfc.debug_enabled u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -592,21 +593,32 @@
ro.hdmi.cec.source.send_standby_on_sleep u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact enum to_tv broadcast none
ro.hdmi.cec.source.playback_device_action_on_routing_control u:object_r:hdmi_config_prop:s0 exact enum none wake_up_only wake_up_and_send_active_source
-pm.dexopt.ab-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.cmdline u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.disable_bg_dexopt u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact bool
-pm.dexopt.downgrade_after_inactive_days u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
-pm.dexopt.first-boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.inactive u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install-fast u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install-bulk u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install-bulk-downgraded u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary-downgraded u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
-pm.dexopt.shared u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.bg-dexopt.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+pm.dexopt.first-boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.first-boot.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+pm.dexopt.boot-after-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.boot-after-ota.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+pm.dexopt.boot-after-mainline-update u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.boot-after-mainline-update.concurrency u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+
+pm.dexopt.post-boot u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.ab-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.cmdline u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.inactive u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-fast u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-downgraded u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+pm.dexopt.install-bulk-secondary-downgraded u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+
+pm.dexopt.shared u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
+
+pm.dexopt.disable_bg_dexopt u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact bool
+pm.dexopt.downgrade_after_inactive_days u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact int
+
+pm.dexopt. u:object_r:future_pm_prop:s0 prefix
ro.apk_verity.mode u:object_r:apk_verity_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -1356,6 +1368,12 @@
remote_provisioning.strongbox.rkp_only u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact bool
remote_provisioning.tee.rkp_only u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact bool
+# Hostname for the remote provisioning server a device should communicate with
+remote_provisioning.hostname u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# Indicates the system should use rkpd instead of RemoteProvisioner
+remote_provisioning.enable_rkpd u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact bool
+
# Broadcast boot stages, which keystore listens to
keystore.boot_level u:object_r:keystore_listen_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -1483,3 +1501,6 @@
# Adaptive haptics settings property
vibrator.adaptive_haptics.enabled u:object_r:adaptive_haptics_prop:s0 exact string
+
+# UVC Gadget property
+ro.usb.uvc.enabled u:object_r:usb_uvc_enabled_prop:s0 exact bool
diff --git a/private/remote_prov_app.te b/private/remote_prov_app.te
index f49eb63..d5f8e3f 100644
--- a/private/remote_prov_app.te
+++ b/private/remote_prov_app.te
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
# The app needs access to properly build a DeviceInfo package for the verifying server
get_prop(remote_prov_app, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+# if rkpd is enabled, remote provisioner is a noop
+get_prop(remote_prov_app, device_config_remote_key_provisioning_native_prop)
+
allow remote_prov_app {
app_api_service
mediametrics_service
diff --git a/private/rkpd_app.te b/private/rkpd_app.te
index 21f9b0c..2d25540 100644
--- a/private/rkpd_app.te
+++ b/private/rkpd_app.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
# Grant access to certain system properties related to RKP
get_prop(rkpdapp, device_config_remote_key_provisioning_native_prop)
+get_prop(rkpdapp, remote_prov_prop)
# Grant access to the normal services that are available to all apps
allow rkpdapp app_api_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/runas_app.te b/private/runas_app.te
index c1b354a..a5f47f4 100644
--- a/private/runas_app.te
+++ b/private/runas_app.te
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
r_dir_file(runas_app, untrusted_app_all)
# Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
-allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
+allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace sigkill signal sigstop };
allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
# Allow executing system image simpleperf without a domain transition.
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 7fdd962..e3ee026 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@
user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms.* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms:* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gsf domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
-user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=32 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=34 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=32 domain=untrusted_app_32 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=30 domain=untrusted_app_30 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app_29 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=28 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
diff --git a/private/security_classes b/private/security_classes
index 0d3cc80..99f947f 100644
--- a/private/security_classes
+++ b/private/security_classes
@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@
class perf_event
+class io_uring
+
# Introduced in https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59438b46471ae6cdfb761afc8c9beaf1e428a331
class lockdown
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index a144db1..8de1d42 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default u:object_r:hal_sharedsecret_service:s0
android.hardware.sensors.ISensors/default u:object_r:hal_sensors_service:s0
android.hardware.soundtrigger3.ISoundTriggerHw/default u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
+android.hardware.tetheroffload.IOffload/default u:object_r:hal_tetheroffload_service:s0
android.hardware.thermal.IThermal/default u:object_r:hal_thermal_service:s0
android.hardware.tv.hdmi.cec.IHdmiCec/default u:object_r:hal_tv_hdmi_cec_service:s0
android.hardware.tv.hdmi.connection.IHdmiConnection/default u:object_r:hal_tv_hdmi_connection_service:s0
diff --git a/private/snapuserd.te b/private/snapuserd.te
index 1be5a5e..797a6c2 100644
--- a/private/snapuserd.te
+++ b/private/snapuserd.te
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
allow snapuserd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow snapuserd self:capability ipc_lock;
-
# Allow snapuserd to reach block devices in /dev/block.
allow snapuserd block_device:dir search;
@@ -54,4 +52,12 @@
-init
} snapuserd_prop:property_service set;
-allow snapuserd self:anon_inode create_file_perms;
+# Allow to read/write/create OTA metadata files
+allow snapuserd metadata_file:dir search;
+allow snapuserd ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow snapuserd ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# This capability allows snapuserd to circumvent memlock rlimits while using
+# io_uring. An Alternative would be to up the memlock rlimit for the snapuserd service.
+allow snapuserd self:capability ipc_lock;
+io_uring_use(snapuserd)
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index 26c781b..91e9aba 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
allow surfaceflinger video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow surfaceflinger video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+# Access the secure heap.
+allow surfaceflinger dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
# Create and use netlink kobject uevent sockets.
allow surfaceflinger self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 3b92c0f..9116058 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@
# Settings app reads ro.oem_unlock_supported
get_prop(system_app, oem_unlock_prop)
+# Settings app reads ro.usb.uvc.enabled
+get_prop(system_app, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
+
# Allow system apps to act as Perfetto producers.
perfetto_producer(system_app)
diff --git a/private/technical_debt.cil b/private/technical_debt.cil
index fcd4fe7..069bb10 100644
--- a/private/technical_debt.cil
+++ b/private/technical_debt.cil
@@ -7,27 +7,27 @@
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Allocator HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_allocator_client;
+; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_allocator_client;
; typeattribute hal_allocator_client halclientdomain;
-(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_allocator_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
(typeattributeset halclientdomain (hal_allocator_client))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of OMX-related services
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps and SDK sandboxes, are clients of Drm-related services
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app) (sdk_sandbox)))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_drm_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (or (isolated_app_all) (sdk_sandbox)))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Configstore HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_client;
-(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_configstore_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_configstore_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Graphics Allocator HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Cas HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_cas_client;
-(typeattributeset hal_cas_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_cas_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_cas_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
; Domains hosting Camera HAL implementations are clients of Allocator HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Neuralnetworks HAL
; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_neuralnetworks_client;
-(typeattributeset hal_neuralnetworks_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
+; typeattribute { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_neuralnetworks_client;
+(typeattributeset hal_neuralnetworks_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
; TODO(b/112056006): move these to mapping files when/if we implement 'versioned' attributes.
; Rename untrusted_app_visible_* to untrusted_app_visible_*_violators.
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index 56e44db..d0f9b24 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
### Untrusted apps.
###
### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
-### targetSdkVersion >= 32.
+### targetSdkVersion >= 34.
###
### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
### placed in this selinux domain.
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@
allow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:fd use;
allow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file write;
-neverallow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { open create };
\ No newline at end of file
+neverallow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { open create };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
index 4235d7e..2c0391f 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_25.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -52,3 +52,10 @@
# allow sending RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} messages.
allow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
auditallow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
+
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_25, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ auditallow untrusted_app_25 mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+ auditallow untrusted_app_25 mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
index c747af1..163803a 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_27.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -40,3 +40,10 @@
# allow sending RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} messages.
allow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
auditallow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
+
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_27, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ auditallow untrusted_app_27 mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+ auditallow untrusted_app_27 mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_29.te b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
index 03f3334..758ed23 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_29.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
@@ -19,3 +19,9 @@
allow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
auditallow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_29, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ auditallow untrusted_app_29 mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+ auditallow untrusted_app_29 mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_30.te b/private/untrusted_app_30.te
index 569c300..830106d 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_30.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_30.te
@@ -21,3 +21,9 @@
allow untrusted_app_30 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
auditallow untrusted_app_30 self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_30, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ auditallow untrusted_app_30 mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+ auditallow untrusted_app_30 mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_32.te b/private/untrusted_app_32.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..643c122
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_32.te
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+###
+### Untrusted apps.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### 31 < targetSdkVersion <= 33.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_32 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_32)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_32)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_32)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_32)
+
+# Allow webview to access fd shared by sdksandbox for experiments data
+# TODO(b/229249719): Will not be supported in Android U
+allow untrusted_app_32 sdk_sandbox_data_file:fd use;
+allow untrusted_app_32 sdk_sandbox_data_file:file write;
+
+neverallow untrusted_app_32 sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { open create };
+
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_32, mdnsd, mdnsd)
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ auditallow untrusted_app_32 mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
+ auditallow untrusted_app_32 mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+')
diff --git a/private/virtualizationservice.te b/private/virtualizationservice.te
index 28982bc..561e778 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationservice.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationservice.te
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
# Let the virtualizationservice domain register the virtualization_service with ServiceManager.
add_service(virtualizationservice, virtualization_service)
+# Allow calling into the system server to find "permission_service".
+binder_call(virtualizationservice, system_server)
+allow virtualizationservice permission_service:service_manager find;
+
# Let virtualizationservice remove memlock rlimit of virtualizationmanager. This is necessary
# to mlock VM memory and page tables.
allow virtualizationservice self:capability sys_resource;
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 5509813..4897be5 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@
# All third party apps (except isolated_app and ephemeral_app)
attribute untrusted_app_all;
+# All apps with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+attribute isolated_app_all;
+
# All domains used for apps with network access.
attribute netdomain;
diff --git a/public/device.te b/public/device.te
index 1bb386f..ead7fbc 100644
--- a/public/device.te
+++ b/public/device.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
type hwbinder_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type vndbinder_device, dev_type;
type block_device, dev_type;
+type bt_device, dev_type;
type camera_device, dev_type;
type dm_device, dev_type;
type dm_user_device, dev_type;
@@ -94,6 +95,9 @@
# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions
type userdata_block_device, dev_type;
+# Zoned block device.
+type zoned_block_device, dev_type;
+
# Cache block device mounted on /cache.
# Documented at https://source.android.com/devices/bootloader/partitions
type cache_block_device, dev_type;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 79e62d0..56c3142 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -537,6 +537,14 @@
neverallow { domain -coredomain -vendor_init } exported_pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
')
+# New "pm.dexopt." sysprops should be explicitly listed as exported_pm_prop.
+neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -vendor_init } future_pm_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -vendor_init } future_pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# ART may introduce new sysprops. SELinux denials due to reading new sysprops on
+# old platforms shouldn't be regarded as a problem.
+dontaudit domain future_pm_prop:file read;
+
neverallow { domain -init } aac_drc_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -init } build_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -init } userdebug_or_eng_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/public/e2fs.te b/public/e2fs.te
index 20f70d9..8dcf0cc 100644
--- a/public/e2fs.te
+++ b/public/e2fs.te
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
allow e2fs userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow e2fs metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow e2fs dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow e2fs zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm e2fs { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device dm_device }:blk_file ioctl {
BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD BLKPBSZGET BLKDISCARDZEROES BLKROGET BLKREPORTZONE BLKRESETZONE
};
diff --git a/public/fsck.te b/public/fsck.te
index 4fb3817..1a74ba8 100644
--- a/public/fsck.te
+++ b/public/fsck.te
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fsck zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow fsck system_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
')
diff --git a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
index 7ef27113..35a19de 100644
--- a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
+++ b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
allow hal_graphics_allocator ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow hal_graphics_allocator dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+# Access the secure heap
+allow hal_graphics_allocator dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
# allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
allow hal_graphics_allocator self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_tetheroffload.te b/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
index cf51723..c9553dc 100644
--- a/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
+++ b/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
binder_call(hal_tetheroffload_server, hal_tetheroffload_client)
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_tetheroffload, hal_tetheroffload_hwservice)
+hal_attribute_service(hal_tetheroffload, hal_tetheroffload_service)
+
+binder_use(hal_tetheroffload_server)
# allow the client to pass the server already open netlink sockets
allow hal_tetheroffload_server hal_tetheroffload_client:netlink_netfilter_socket { getattr read setopt write };
diff --git a/public/hal_usb_gadget.te b/public/hal_usb_gadget.te
index 45bfdbe..c0df9a9 100644
--- a/public/hal_usb_gadget.te
+++ b/public/hal_usb_gadget.te
@@ -14,3 +14,6 @@
allow hal_usb_gadget_server functionfs:dir { read search };
allow hal_usb_gadget_server functionfs:file read;
allow hal_usb_gadget_server proc_interrupts:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Read access to ro.usb.uvc.enabled
+get_prop(hal_usb_gadget_server, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
diff --git a/public/net.te b/public/net.te
index 31c9c45..aa30b62 100644
--- a/public/net.te
+++ b/public/net.te
@@ -21,6 +21,3 @@
# Talks to netd via fwmarkd socket.
unix_socket_connect(netdomain, fwmarkd, netd)
-
-# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
-unix_socket_connect(netdomain, mdnsd, mdnsd)
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index 9b8fdb0..e3ea1cb 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
type netd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
net_domain(netd)
+# Connect to mdnsd via mdnsd socket.
+unix_socket_connect(netd, mdnsd, mdnsd)
# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls.
allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index c0a3a6e..0cde294 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@
system_vendor_config_prop(zygote_config_prop)
system_vendor_config_prop(dck_prop)
system_vendor_config_prop(tuner_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
# Properties with no restrictions
system_public_prop(adbd_config_prop)
@@ -208,6 +209,7 @@
system_public_prop(exported_bluetooth_prop)
system_public_prop(exported_overlay_prop)
system_public_prop(exported_pm_prop)
+system_public_prop(future_pm_prop)
system_public_prop(ffs_control_prop)
system_public_prop(framework_status_prop)
system_public_prop(gesture_prop)
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 443a4f7..154ebb9 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
type hal_secure_element_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_sharedsecret_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_system_suspend_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
+type hal_tetheroffload_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_thermal_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_tv_hdmi_cec_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_tv_hdmi_connection_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index 11041b6..63805de 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -176,8 +176,6 @@
dontaudit su $1_userfaultfd:anon_inode *;
# Other domains may not use userfaultfd anon_inodes created by this domain.
neverallow { domain -$1 } $1_userfaultfd:anon_inode *;
-# This domain may not use userfaultfd anon_inodes created by other domains.
-neverallow $1 ~$1_userfaultfd:anon_inode *;
')
####################################
@@ -235,6 +233,13 @@
')
#####################################
+# isolated_app_domain(domain)
+# Allow a base set of permissions required for all isolated apps.
+define(`isolated_app_domain', `
+typeattribute $1 isolated_app_all;
+')
+
+#####################################
# net_domain(domain)
# Allow a base set of permissions required for network access.
define(`net_domain', `
@@ -1043,3 +1048,21 @@
allow $1 apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1 apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
')
+
+####################################
+# io_uring_use(domain)
+# Allow domain to create/use io_uring.
+define(`io_uring_use', `
+# Set up a type_transition to "io_uring" named anonymous inode object.
+type $1_iouring;
+type_transition $1 $1:anon_inode $1_iouring "[io_uring]";
+# Allow domain to create/use io_uring anon_inode.
+allow $1 $1_iouring:anon_inode { create map read write };
+allow $1 self:io_uring sqpoll;
+# Other domains may not use iouring anon_inodes created by this domain.
+neverallow { domain -$1 } $1_iouring:anon_inode *;
+# io_uring checks for CAP_IPC_LOCK to determine whether or not to track
+# memory usage per uid against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. This can lead folks to
+# grant CAP_IPC_LOCK to silence avc denials, which is undesireable.
+dontaudit $1 self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
+')
diff --git a/public/untrusted_app.te b/public/untrusted_app.te
index 0a67614..a4ee6f5 100644
--- a/public/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/public/untrusted_app.te
@@ -17,9 +17,12 @@
###
# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
-# targetSdkVersion >= 32.
+# targetSdkVersion >= 34.
type untrusted_app, domain;
# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# 31 < targetSdkVersion <= 33.
+type untrusted_app_32, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
# 29 < targetSdkVersion <= 31.
type untrusted_app_30, domain;
# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index 41f95d3..209bf49 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -227,6 +227,9 @@
allow vold userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold userdata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
+# Access zoned block device.
+allow vold zoned_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+
# Access metadata block device used for encryption meta-data.
allow vold metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm vold metadata_block_device:blk_file ioctl BLKSECDISCARD;
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy_generate_compat.py b/tools/sepolicy_generate_compat.py
index ca5ae91..cd61c9a 100644
--- a/tools/sepolicy_generate_compat.py
+++ b/tools/sepolicy_generate_compat.py
@@ -29,9 +29,13 @@
"""This tool generates a mapping file for {ver} core sepolicy."""
temp_dir = ''
-compat_cil_template = ";; This file can't be empty.\n"
-ignore_cil_template = """;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced that have no
-;; analogue in older policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
+mapping_cil_footer = ";; mapping information from ToT policy's types to %s policy's types.\n"
+compat_cil_template = """;; complement CIL file for compatibility between ToT policy and %s vendors.
+;; will be compiled along with other normal policy files, on %s vendors.
+;;
+"""
+ignore_cil_template = """;; new_objects - a collection of types that have been introduced with ToT policy
+;; that have no analogue in %s policy. Thus, we do not need to map these types to
;; previous ones. Add here to pass checkapi tests.
(type new_objects)
(typeattribute new_objects)
@@ -484,16 +488,17 @@
f.write(';; types removed from current policy\n')
f.write('\n'.join(f'(type {x})' for x in sorted(target_removed_types)))
f.write('\n\n')
+ f.write(mapping_cil_footer % args.target_version)
f.write(mapping_file_cil.unparse())
with open(target_compat_file, 'w') as f:
logging.info('writing %s' % target_compat_file)
- f.write(compat_cil_template)
+ f.write(compat_cil_template % (args.target_version, args.target_version))
with open(target_ignore_file, 'w') as f:
logging.info('writing %s' % target_ignore_file)
f.write(ignore_cil_template %
- ('\n '.join(sorted(target_ignored_types))))
+ (args.target_version, '\n '.join(sorted(target_ignored_types))))
finally:
logging.info('Deleting temporary dir: {}'.format(temp_dir))
shutil.rmtree(temp_dir)
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index b21302c..f167e65 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.automotive\.remoteaccess@V1-(.*)-service u:object_r:hal_remoteaccess_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service\.btlinux u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_btlinux_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth-service.default u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face@1\.[0-9]+-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.fingerprint@2\.1-service u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_default_exec:s0
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.dice-service\.non-secure-software u:object_r:hal_dice_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.keymint-service u:object_r:hal_keymint_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tetheroffload-service\.example u:object_r:hal_tetheroffload_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.thermal@1\.[01]-service u:object_r:hal_thermal_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.thermal-service\.example u:object_r:hal_thermal_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.cec@1\.[01]-service u:object_r:hal_tv_cec_default_exec:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te b/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
index 01d60db..efa75a7 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_bluetooth_default.te
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
type hal_bluetooth_default, domain;
hal_server_domain(hal_bluetooth_default, hal_bluetooth)
+allow hal_bluetooth_default bt_device:chr_file { open read write };
+allow hal_bluetooth_default self:bluetooth_socket { create bind read write };
+
type hal_bluetooth_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(hal_bluetooth_default)
