private/untrusted_app_all.te - platform/system/sepolicy - Git at Google

 ###
 ### Untrusted_app_all.
 ###
 ### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except
 ### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps,
 ### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps).
 ### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
 ### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
 ### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
 ### directory).  The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
 ### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
 ### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
 ### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
 ### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
 ### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
 ### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
 ### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
 ### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
 ### seapp_contexts.
 ###
 ### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
 ### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te.

 # Legacy text relocations
 allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;

 # Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
 # to their sandbox directory and then execute.
 allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };

 # ASEC
 allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 # Execute libs in asec containers.
 allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };

 # Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
 # running "adb install foo.apk".
 # TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
 # Figure out a way to remove these rules.
 allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

 # Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps
 # for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail
 allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read };

 # untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
 # upon traceur to pass a file descriptor
 neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *;
 neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };

 # Allow to read staged apks.
 allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr};

 # Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
 # Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
 # cropping or taking user photos.
 allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };

 #
 # Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
 # This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
 #

 # Access to /data/media.
 allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;

 # Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
 # TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
 allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

 # allow cts to query all services
 allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;

 allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
 allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;

 # Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
 # in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
 # data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
   allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 ')

 # gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
 allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;

 # Cts: HwRngTest
 allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
 allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;

 # Allow apps to view preloaded media content
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search;

 # Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can
 # be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves.
 # TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating  a special type for /vendor/app installed
 # apps.
 allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search };
 allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute };
 allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };

 # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
 # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
 allow untrusted_app_all traced:fd use;
 allow untrusted_app_all traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
 unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_all, traced_producer, traced)

 # allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
 allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket {
         connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };

 # Allow the allocation and use of ptys
 # Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
 create_pty(untrusted_app_all)

 # This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions.
 dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read;

 # These have been disallowed since Android O.
 # For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial.
 dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read;
 dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read;
 dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read;
	###
	### Untrusted_app_all.
	###
	### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except
	### apps which target the v2 security sandbox (ephemeral_app for instant apps,
	### untrusted_v2_app for fully installed v2 apps).
	### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
	### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
	### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
	### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
	### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
	### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
	### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this
	### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
	### that are not signed by the platform key. To move
	### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
	### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
	### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
	### seapp_contexts.
	###
	### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also
	### added to untrusted_v2_app.te and ephemeral_app.te.

	# Legacy text relocations
	allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;

	# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
	# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
	allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };

	# ASEC
	allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	# Execute libs in asec containers.
	allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };

	# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
	# running "adb install foo.apk".
	# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
	# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
	allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

	# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps
	# for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail
	allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read };

	# untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend
	# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor
	neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *;
	neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };

	# Allow to read staged apks.
	allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr};

	# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
	# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
	# cropping or taking user photos.
	allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };

	#
	# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
	# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
	#

	# Access to /data/media.
	allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;

	# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
	# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
	allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

	# allow cts to query all services
	allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;

	allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
	allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;

	# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
	# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
	# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
	userdebug_or_eng(`
	allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	')

	# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
	allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;

	# Cts: HwRngTest
	allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
	allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;

	# Allow apps to view preloaded media content
	allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search;

	# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can
	# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves.
	# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed
	# apps.
	allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search };
	allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { open getattr read execute };
	allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };

	# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
	# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
	allow untrusted_app_all traced:fd use;
	allow untrusted_app_all traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map };
	unix_socket_connect(untrusted_app_all, traced_producer, traced)

	# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
	# modify them other than to connect
	allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket {
	connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };

	# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
	# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
	create_pty(untrusted_app_all)

	# This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions.
	dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read;

	# These have been disallowed since Android O.
	# For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial.
	dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read;
	dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read;
	dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read;