| # Add hal_codec2_hwservice to mediaswcodec_server |
| allow mediaswcodec_server hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find }; |
| allow mediaswcodec_server hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager add; |
| |
| # Allow mediaswcodec_server access to composer sync fences |
| allow mediaswcodec_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use; |
| |
| allow mediaswcodec_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms; |
| allow mediaswcodec_server hal_camera:fd use; |
| |
| crash_dump_fallback(mediaswcodec_server) |
| |
| # Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that mediaswcodec_server never |
| # directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge |
| # between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd |
| # via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro. |
| allow mediaswcodec_server bufferhubd:fd use; |
| |
| binder_call(mediaswcodec_server, hal_omx_client) |
| binder_call(hal_omx_client, mediaswcodec_server) |
| |
| ### |
| ### neverallow rules |
| ### |
| |
| # mediaswcodec_server should never execute any executable without a |
| # domain transition |
| neverallow mediaswcodec_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans; |
| |
| # The goal of the mediaserver/codec split is to place media processing code into |
| # restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited |
| # permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio |
| # hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera |
| # hardware/content. Etc. |
| # |
| # Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited |
| # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network. |
| # Lengthier explanation here: |
| # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html |
| neverallow mediaswcodec_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *; |
