blob: ae8d7fd9a8f97b6ff9943f657541ea8195646d4e [file] [log] [blame]
### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
type appdomain_tmpfs, file_type;
# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
allow appdomain self:process execmem;
allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;
# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Notify zygote of death;
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
allow appdomain tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;
# Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
# For AppFuse.
allow appdomain vold:fd use;
# Communication with other apps via fifos
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
# App sandbox file accesses.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -mlstrustedsubject } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file create_file_perms;
# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
# Traverse into expanded storage
allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# TextClassifier
r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app }, textclassifier_data_file)
# Access to OEM provided data and apps
allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
# Execute the shell or other system executables.
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;
not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')
# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
# For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } vendor_file:dir { open read };
# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app }, vendor_app_file)
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app } vendor_app_file:file execute;
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)
# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
# for vendor provided libraries.
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)
# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };
# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };
# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };
# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };
# Read icon file (opened by system).
allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };
# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
# and the rules below.
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
# domain socket.
# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
# creation).
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;
# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };
# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)
# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir { search write add_name };
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
# % adb shell am set-watch-heap 1048576
# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
# debuggable builds only.
allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
# /proc/net access.
# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
# individual .te files.
}, proc_net_type)
# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
auditallow {
} proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
# They need that to render the standard UI.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Use the Binder.
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app }, gpuservice)
# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
# are examined.
allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
# Read and write /data/data/ files passed over Binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Read/write visible storage
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain apk_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
# /data/resource-cache
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# logd access
control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app })
# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } keystore:keystore2 get_state;
use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app })
allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };
# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_audio:fd use;
# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_camera:fd use;
# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
allow {appdomain -isolated_app} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;
# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
# TODO: switch to meminfo service
allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
# For app fuse.
allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_client)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_manager)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, display_vsync)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, performance_client)
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app }, bufferhub_client)
### CTS-specific rules
# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;
# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;
# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
### Neverallow rules
### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
# Superuser capabilities.
# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm. network stack app requires net_admin.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -network_stack } self:capability_class_set *;
# Block device access.
neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# Access to any of the following character devices.
neverallow appdomain {
}:chr_file { read write };
# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
{ read write };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
{ read write };
neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
} *;
# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
# of rooting vulns in the past.
neverallow appdomain domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
# Unix domain sockets.
neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# produce stack traces. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# inspect stack traces for live lock conditions.
neverallow {
} appdomain:process ptrace;
# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;
# signal access to non-app domains.
# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
# All others prohibited.
# -perfetto is to allow shell (which is an appdomain) to kill perfetto
# (see private/shell.te).
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain -perfetto }:process
{ sigkill sigstop signal };
# Write to rootfs.
neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to /system.
neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to entrypoint executables.
neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
# that should be writable by apps.
neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to various other parts of /data.
neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -shell }
{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { domain -credstore -init } credstore_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
neverallow appdomain
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# access tmp apk files
neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app }
{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
# Access to factory files.
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
# Write to various pseudo file systems.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow appdomain
proc:dir_file_class_set write;
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
neverallow appdomain kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
neverallow appdomain {
}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
neverallow {
-shell # bugreport
} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowed domains.
# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
neverallow {
} { bluetooth_audio_hal_prop bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop bluetooth_prop exported_bluetooth_prop }:file create_file_perms;
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;
# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;
# Apps may not read /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6}. These files leak information across the
# application boundary. VPN apps may use the ConnectivityManager.getConnectionOwnerUid() API to
# perform UID lookups.
neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_net_tcp_udp:file *;
# Apps cannot access bootstrap files. The bootstrap files are only for
# extremely early processes (like init, etc.) which are started before
# the runtime APEX is activated and Bionic libs are provided from there.
# If app process accesses (or even load/execute) the bootstrap files,
# it might cause problems such as ODR violation, etc.
neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:file
{ open read write append execute execute_no_trans map };
neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir
{ open read getattr search };
# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)