blob: d5c9193d3d037fad09b18c451a18bd34cf223662 [file] [log] [blame]
# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
# This occurs when the process crashes.
# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
# tests (b/114136122)
domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
# necessary SELinux permissions.
get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap({
domain
-bpfloader
-init
-kernel
-keystore
-llkd
-logd
-logpersist
-recovery
-recovery_persist
-recovery_refresh
-ueventd
-vendor_init
-vold
})')
# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
# zygote is excluded as system-wide profiling could end up with it
# (unexpectedly) holding an open fd across a fork.
userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
domain
-bpfloader
-init
-kernel
-keystore
-llkd
-logd
-logpersist
-recovery
-recovery_persist
-recovery_refresh
-ueventd
-vendor_init
-vold
-zygote
})')
# Path resolution access in cgroups.
allow domain cgroup:dir search;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
allow domain cgroup_v2:dir search;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:dir w_dir_perms;
allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain task_profiles_api_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
# Read access to sdkextensions props
get_prop(domain, module_sdkextensions_prop)
# Read access to bq configuration values
get_prop(domain, bq_config_prop);
# For now, everyone can access core property files
# Device specific properties are not granted by default
not_compatible_property(`
# DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
')
compatible_property_only(`
# DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_test_prop)
get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
')
# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
allow domain kernel:key search;
# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
allow domain fsverity_init:key search;
# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow domain su:key search;
')
# Allow access to linkerconfig file
allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-vold
userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
-dumpstate
userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
-storaged
-system_server
} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
neverallow { domain -priv_app -gmscore_app } *:keystore2_key gen_unique_id;
neverallow { domain -system_server } *:keystore2_key use_dev_id;
neverallow { domain -system_server } keystore:keystore2 { clear_ns lock reset unlock };
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vendor_init
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
# Disallow direct access by other processes.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
###
# Services should respect app sandboxes
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
-installd # creation of sandbox
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
# directories.
neverallow {
domain
-adbd
-appdomain
-app_zygote
-dexoptanalyzer
-installd
-iorap_inode2filename
-iorap_prefetcherd
-profman
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
-runas
-system_server
-viewcompiler
-zygote
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
-installd
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
-app_zygote
-installd
-iorap_prefetcherd
-rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
-installd # creation of sandbox
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
neverallow {
domain
-installd
} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
# the files.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -installd -iorap_inode2filename -priv_app } staging_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_app -system_server -apexd -kernel -installd -iorap_inode2filename -priv_app } staging_data_file:file *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
# except for `link` and `unlink`.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
{ append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain # for oemfs
-bootanim # for oemfs
-recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
# we want to avoid. See
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
#
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
with_asan(`-asan_extract')
-iorap_prefetcherd
-shell
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
-system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
-app_zygote
-webview_zygote
-zygote
userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
} {
file_type
-system_file_type
-system_lib_file
-system_linker_exec
-vendor_file_type
-exec_type
-postinstall_file
}:file execute;
# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vendor_init
} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;
# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
neverallow {
domain
-init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
-zygote
-installd
-postinstall_dexopt
-cppreopts
-dex2oat
-otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow {
domain
-init
-installd
-postinstall_dexopt
-cppreopts
-dex2oat
-zygote
-otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
# Only authorized processes should be writing to /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art as it
# contains boot class path and system server AOT artifacts following an ART APEX Mainline update.
neverallow {
domain
# art processes
-odrefresh
-odsign
# others
-apexd
-init
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} apex_art_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow {
domain
# art processes
-odrefresh
-odsign
# others
-apexd
-init
-vold_prepare_subdirs
} apex_art_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
# Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
neverallow {
domain
-appdomain
} {
data_file_type
-apex_art_data_file
-dalvikcache_data_file
-system_data_file # shared libs in apks
-apk_data_file
}:file no_x_file_perms;
# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
apexd
dnsmasq
dumpstate
init
installd
userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
lmkd
migrate_legacy_obb_data
netd
postinstall_dexopt
recovery
rss_hwm_reset
sdcardd
tee
ueventd
uncrypt
vendor_init
vold
vold_prepare_subdirs
zygote
}')
neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
# denials. Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
# this list should be a superset of the one above.
neverallow ~{
dac_override_allowed
iorap_inode2filename
iorap_prefetcherd
traced_perf
traced_probes
heapprofd
} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
# sdcard_type / vfat is exempt as a larger set of domains need
# this capability, including device-specific domains.
neverallow {
domain
-apexd
recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')')
-init
-kernel
-otapreopt_chroot
-recovery
-update_engine
-vold
-zygote
} { fs_type -sdcard_type }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
neverallow {
domain
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
-kernel
-gsid
-init
-recovery
-ueventd
-healthd
-uncrypt
-tee
-hal_bootctl_server
-fastbootd
} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
# Limit directory operations that doesn't need to do app data isolation.
neverallow {
domain
-init
-installd
-zygote
} mirror_data_file:dir *;
# This property is being removed. Remove remaining access.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:file read;
# Only core domains are allowed to access package_manager properties
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } pm_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -coredomain } pm_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;
# Kprobes should only be used by adb root
neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } debugfs_kprobes:file *;
# On TREBLE devices, most coredomains should not access vendor_files.
# TODO(b/71553434): Remove exceptions here.
full_treble_only(`
neverallow {
coredomain
-appdomain
-bootanim
-crash_dump
-heapprofd
userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
-init
-iorap_inode2filename
-iorap_prefetcherd
-kernel
-traced_perf
-ueventd
} vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms open };
')
# Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
full_treble_only(`
neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
domain
-coredomain
-appdomain
-socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
}, {
coredomain
-logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
-netd # netdomain needs this
-mdnsd # netdomain needs this
userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
-init
-tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
});
')
full_treble_only(`
# Do not allow system components access to /vendor files except for the
# ones allowed here.
neverallow {
coredomain
# TODO(b/37168747): clean up fwk access to /vendor
-crash_dump
-init # starts vendor executables
-iorap_inode2filename
-iorap_prefetcherd
-kernel # loads /vendor/firmware
-heapprofd
userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
-shell
-system_executes_vendor_violators
-traced_perf # library/binary access for symbolization
-ueventd # reads /vendor/ueventd.rc
-vold # loads incremental fs driver
} {
vendor_file_type
-same_process_hal_file
-vendor_app_file
-vendor_apex_file
-vendor_configs_file
-vendor_service_contexts_file
-vendor_framework_file
-vendor_idc_file
-vendor_keychars_file
-vendor_keylayout_file
-vendor_overlay_file
-vendor_public_framework_file
-vendor_public_lib_file
-vendor_task_profiles_file
-vndk_sp_file
}:file *;
')
# mlsvendorcompat is only for compatibility support for older vendor
# images, and should not be granted to any domain in current policy.
# (Every domain is allowed self:fork, so this will trigger if the
# intsersection of domain & mlsvendorcompat is not empty.)
neverallow domain mlsvendorcompat:process fork;
# Only init and otapreopt_chroot should be mounting filesystems on locations
# labeled system or vendor (/product and /vendor respectively).
neverallow { domain -init -otapreopt_chroot } { system_file_type vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;
# Only allow init and vendor_init to read/write mm_events properties
# NOTE: dumpstate is allowed to read any system property
neverallow {
domain
-init
-vendor_init
-dumpstate
} mm_events_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
# Allow the tracing daemon and callstack sampler to use kallsyms to symbolize
# kernel traces. Addresses are not disclosed, they are repalced with symbol
# names (if available). Traces don't disclose KASLR.
neverallow {
domain
-init
userdebug_or_eng(`-profcollectd')
-vendor_init
-traced_probes
-traced_perf
} proc_kallsyms:file { open read };