Merge "SEPolicy: Add game sysprop read access for system_app" into main
diff --git a/Android.bp b/Android.bp
index 6c8fa2a..88107cc 100644
--- a/Android.bp
+++ b/Android.bp
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
// policy and subsequent removal of CIL policy that should not be exported.
se_policy_conf {
name: "reqd_policy_mask.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: reqd_mask_policy,
installable: false,
}
@@ -138,6 +139,7 @@
//
se_policy_conf {
name: "pub_policy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
product_public_policy +
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@
se_policy_conf {
name: "system_ext_pub_policy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
reqd_mask_policy,
@@ -175,6 +178,7 @@
se_policy_conf {
name: "plat_pub_policy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
reqd_mask_policy,
installable: false,
@@ -195,6 +199,7 @@
// currently being attributized.
se_policy_conf {
name: "plat_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy,
installable: false,
@@ -210,6 +215,7 @@
// userdebug_plat_policy.conf - the userdebug version plat_sepolicy.cil
se_policy_conf {
name: "userdebug_plat_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy,
build_variant: "userdebug",
@@ -260,6 +266,7 @@
// policy which will ship with the device. System_ext policy is not attributized
se_policy_conf {
name: "system_ext_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
@@ -280,6 +287,7 @@
// which will ship with the device. Product policy is not attributized
se_policy_conf {
name: "product_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
@@ -348,6 +356,7 @@
// policy and the platform public policy files in order to use checkpolicy.
se_policy_conf {
name: "vendor_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
product_public_policy +
@@ -389,6 +398,7 @@
// policy and the platform public policy files in order to use checkpolicy.
se_policy_conf {
name: "odm_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
product_public_policy +
@@ -598,6 +608,7 @@
// policy for recovery
se_policy_conf {
name: "recovery_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
@@ -634,6 +645,7 @@
//////////////////////////////////
se_policy_conf {
name: "general_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy,
build_variant: "user",
@@ -650,6 +662,7 @@
//////////////////////////////////
se_policy_conf {
name: "base_plat_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy,
build_variant: "user",
@@ -675,6 +688,7 @@
se_policy_conf {
name: "base_product_sepolicy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
@@ -704,6 +718,7 @@
se_policy_conf {
name: "base_plat_pub_policy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
reqd_mask_policy,
build_variant: "user",
@@ -723,6 +738,7 @@
se_policy_conf {
name: "base_product_pub_policy.conf",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
product_public_policy +
@@ -770,6 +786,7 @@
se_neverallow_test {
name: "sepolicy_neverallows",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
srcs: plat_public_policy +
plat_private_policy +
system_ext_public_policy +
@@ -816,3 +833,45 @@
"-p $(location :precompiled_sepolicy) && " +
"touch $(out)",
}
+
+//////////////////////////////////
+// TestDevTypeViolations can't run on old devices (V or before)
+//////////////////////////////////
+
+soong_config_module_type {
+ name: "dev_type_test_genrule",
+ module_type: "genrule",
+ config_namespace: "ANDROID",
+ bool_variables: ["CHECK_DEV_TYPE_VIOLATIONS"],
+ properties: ["cmd"],
+}
+
+dev_type_test_genrule {
+ name: "sepolicy_dev_type_test",
+ srcs: [
+ ":plat_file_contexts",
+ ":vendor_file_contexts",
+ ":system_ext_file_contexts",
+ ":product_file_contexts",
+ ":odm_file_contexts",
+ ":precompiled_sepolicy",
+ ],
+ tools: ["sepolicy_tests"],
+ out: ["sepolicy_dev_type_test"],
+ soong_config_variables: {
+ CHECK_DEV_TYPE_VIOLATIONS: {
+ cmd: "$(location sepolicy_tests) " +
+ "-f $(location :plat_file_contexts) " +
+ "-f $(location :vendor_file_contexts) " +
+ "-f $(location :system_ext_file_contexts) " +
+ "-f $(location :product_file_contexts) " +
+ "-f $(location :odm_file_contexts) " +
+ "-p $(location :precompiled_sepolicy) " +
+ "-t TestDevTypeViolations && " +
+ "touch $(out)",
+ conditions_default: {
+ cmd: "touch $(out)",
+ },
+ },
+ },
+}
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index 5ce31d2..63b74aa 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -94,13 +94,6 @@
$(strip $(foreach type, $(1), $(foreach file, $(addsuffix /$(type), $(2)), $(sort $(wildcard $(file))))))
endef
-# Builds paths for all policy files found in BOARD_VENDOR_SEPOLICY_DIRS.
-# $(1): the set of policy name paths to build
-build_vendor_policy = $(call build_policy, $(1), $(PLAT_VENDOR_POLICY) $(BOARD_VENDOR_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
-
-# Builds paths for all policy files found in BOARD_ODM_SEPOLICY_DIRS.
-build_odm_policy = $(call build_policy, $(1), $(BOARD_ODM_SEPOLICY_DIRS))
-
sepolicy_build_files := security_classes \
initial_sids \
access_vectors \
@@ -247,6 +240,7 @@
# genrule modules aren't installable, so LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES doesn't work.
# Instead, use LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_DEPENDENCIES with intermediate output
LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_DEPENDENCIES += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,sepolicy_test)/sepolicy_test
+LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_DEPENDENCIES += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,sepolicy_dev_type_test)/sepolicy_dev_type_test
LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES += \
$(addprefix treble_sepolicy_tests_,$(PLATFORM_SEPOLICY_COMPAT_VERSIONS)) \
@@ -465,21 +459,14 @@
# Note: That a newline file is placed between each file_context file found to
# ensure a proper build when an fc file is missing an ending newline.
-local_fc_files := $(call build_policy, file_contexts, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+local_fc_files := $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,plat_file_contexts)/plat_file_contexts
ifdef HAS_SYSTEM_EXT_SEPOLICY_DIR
-local_fc_files += $(call build_policy, file_contexts, $(SYSTEM_EXT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
+local_fc_files += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,system_ext_file_contexts)/system_ext_file_contexts
endif
ifdef HAS_PRODUCT_SEPOLICY_DIR
-local_fc_files += $(call build_policy, file_contexts, $(PRODUCT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
-endif
-
-ifneq ($(filter address,$(SANITIZE_TARGET)),)
- local_fc_files += $(wildcard $(addsuffix /file_contexts_asan, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)))
-endif
-ifneq (,$(filter userdebug eng,$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT)))
- local_fc_files += $(wildcard $(addsuffix /file_contexts_overlayfs, $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY)))
+local_fc_files += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,product_file_contexts)/product_file_contexts
endif
###########################################################
@@ -506,10 +493,10 @@
# it gathers LOCAL_FILE_CONTEXTS from product_MODULES
file_contexts.modules.tmp := $(intermediates)/file_contexts.modules.tmp
-device_fc_files := $(call build_vendor_policy, file_contexts)
+device_fc_files += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,vendor_file_contexts)/vendor_file_contexts
ifdef BOARD_ODM_SEPOLICY_DIRS
-device_fc_files += $(call build_odm_policy, file_contexts)
+device_fc_files += $(call intermediates-dir-for,ETC,odm_file_contexts)/odm_file_contexts
endif
file_contexts.device.tmp := $(intermediates)/file_contexts.device.tmp
@@ -573,8 +560,6 @@
#################################
-build_vendor_policy :=
-build_odm_policy :=
build_policy :=
built_sepolicy :=
built_sepolicy_neverallows :=
diff --git a/apex/Android.bp b/apex/Android.bp
index 21054fc..04fd5f6 100644
--- a/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/apex/Android.bp
@@ -205,11 +205,10 @@
],
}
-filegroup {
+file_contexts {
name: "com.android.virt-file_contexts",
- srcs: [
- "com.android.virt-file_contexts",
- ],
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
+ srcs: ["com.android.virt-file_contexts"],
}
filegroup {
diff --git a/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
index afe9f51..78720aa 100644
--- a/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
+++ b/apex/com.android.virt-file_contexts
@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@
/bin/fd_server u:object_r:fd_server_exec:s0
/bin/virtmgr u:object_r:virtualizationmanager_exec:s0
/bin/virtualizationservice u:object_r:virtualizationservice_exec:s0
-/bin/vfio_handler u:object_r:vfio_handler_exec:s0
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ /bin/vfio_handler u:object_r:vfio_handler_exec:s0
+')
diff --git a/build/soong/Android.bp b/build/soong/Android.bp
index 83b31b4..0abfdf6 100644
--- a/build/soong/Android.bp
+++ b/build/soong/Android.bp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"build_files.go",
"cil_compat_map.go",
"compat_cil.go",
+ "flags.go",
"mac_permissions.go",
"policy.go",
"selinux.go",
diff --git a/build/soong/compat_cil.go b/build/soong/compat_cil.go
index 1f7901b..baad413 100644
--- a/build/soong/compat_cil.go
+++ b/build/soong/compat_cil.go
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
// current policy.
func compatTestFactory() android.SingletonModule {
f := &compatTestModule{}
+ f.AddProperties(&f.properties)
android.InitAndroidModule(f)
android.AddLoadHook(f, func(ctx android.LoadHookContext) {
f.loadHook(ctx)
@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@
type compatTestModule struct {
android.SingletonModuleBase
+ properties struct {
+ // Default modules for conf
+ Defaults []string
+ }
compatTestTimestamp android.ModuleOutPath
}
@@ -157,6 +162,10 @@
":se_build_files{.reqd_mask}",
},
Installable: proptools.BoolPtr(false),
+ }, &struct {
+ Defaults []string
+ }{
+ Defaults: f.properties.Defaults,
})
ctx.CreateModule(policyCilFactory, &nameProperties{
diff --git a/build/soong/flags.go b/build/soong/flags.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1aebac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/build/soong/flags.go
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package selinux
+
+import (
+ "android/soong/android"
+)
+
+type flagsProperties struct {
+ // List of flags to be passed to M4 macro.
+ Flags []string
+}
+
+type flaggableModule interface {
+ android.Module
+ flagModuleBase() *flaggableModuleBase
+ getBuildFlags(ctx android.ModuleContext) map[string]string
+}
+
+type flaggableModuleBase struct {
+ properties flagsProperties
+}
+
+func initFlaggableModule(m flaggableModule) {
+ base := m.flagModuleBase()
+ m.AddProperties(&base.properties)
+}
+
+func (f *flaggableModuleBase) flagModuleBase() *flaggableModuleBase {
+ return f
+}
+
+// getBuildFlags returns a map from flag names to flag values.
+func (f *flaggableModuleBase) getBuildFlags(ctx android.ModuleContext) map[string]string {
+ ret := make(map[string]string)
+ for _, flag := range android.SortedUniqueStrings(f.properties.Flags) {
+ if val, ok := ctx.Config().GetBuildFlag(flag); ok {
+ ret[flag] = val
+ }
+ }
+ return ret
+}
diff --git a/build/soong/policy.go b/build/soong/policy.go
index 0793e2a..9d87275 100644
--- a/build/soong/policy.go
+++ b/build/soong/policy.go
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
func init() {
android.RegisterModuleType("se_policy_conf", policyConfFactory)
+ android.RegisterModuleType("se_policy_conf_defaults", policyConfDefaultFactory)
android.RegisterModuleType("se_policy_cil", policyCilFactory)
android.RegisterModuleType("se_policy_binary", policyBinaryFactory)
}
@@ -93,6 +94,8 @@
type policyConf struct {
android.ModuleBase
+ android.DefaultableModuleBase
+ flaggableModuleBase
properties policyConfProperties
@@ -100,12 +103,35 @@
installPath android.InstallPath
}
+var _ flaggableModule = (*policyConf)(nil)
+
// se_policy_conf merges collection of policy files into a policy.conf file to be processed by
// checkpolicy.
func policyConfFactory() android.Module {
c := &policyConf{}
c.AddProperties(&c.properties)
+ initFlaggableModule(c)
android.InitAndroidArchModule(c, android.DeviceSupported, android.MultilibCommon)
+ android.InitDefaultableModule(c)
+ return c
+}
+
+type policyConfDefaults struct {
+ android.ModuleBase
+ android.DefaultsModuleBase
+}
+
+// se_policy_conf_defaults provides a set of properties that can be inherited by other
+// se_policy_conf_defaults modules. A module can use the properties from a se_policy_conf_defaults
+// using `defaults: ["<:default_module_name>"]`. Properties of both modules are merged (when
+// possible) by prepending the default module's values to the depending module's values.
+func policyConfDefaultFactory() android.Module {
+ c := &policyConfDefaults{}
+ c.AddProperties(
+ &policyConfProperties{},
+ &flagsProperties{},
+ )
+ android.InitDefaultsModule(c)
return c
}
@@ -216,6 +242,7 @@
return findPolicyConfOrder(srcs[x].Base()) < findPolicyConfOrder(srcs[y].Base())
})
+ flags := c.getBuildFlags(ctx)
rule.Command().Tool(ctx.Config().PrebuiltBuildTool(ctx, "m4")).
Flag("--fatal-warnings").
FlagForEachArg("-D ", ctx.DeviceConfig().SepolicyM4Defs()).
@@ -234,6 +261,7 @@
FlagWithArg("-D target_requires_insecure_execmem_for_swiftshader=", strconv.FormatBool(ctx.DeviceConfig().RequiresInsecureExecmemForSwiftshader())).
FlagWithArg("-D target_enforce_debugfs_restriction=", c.enforceDebugfsRestrictions(ctx)).
FlagWithArg("-D target_recovery=", strconv.FormatBool(c.isTargetRecovery())).
+ Flags(flagsToM4Macros(flags)).
Flag("-s").
Inputs(srcs).
Text("> ").Output(conf)
@@ -242,10 +270,6 @@
return conf
}
-func (c *policyConf) DepsMutator(ctx android.BottomUpMutatorContext) {
- // do nothing
-}
-
func (c *policyConf) GenerateAndroidBuildActions(ctx android.ModuleContext) {
if !c.installable() {
c.SkipInstall()
diff --git a/build/soong/selinux.go b/build/soong/selinux.go
index 5fbe01eb..f811231 100644
--- a/build/soong/selinux.go
+++ b/build/soong/selinux.go
@@ -40,3 +40,13 @@
return android.PathForModuleOut(ctx, ctx.Config().DeviceName()).Join(ctx, paths...)
}
+
+// flagsToM4Macros converts given map to a list of M4's -D parameters to guard te files and contexts
+// files.
+func flagsToM4Macros(flags map[string]string) []string {
+ flagMacros := []string{}
+ for _, flag := range android.SortedKeys(flags) {
+ flagMacros = append(flagMacros, "-D target_flag_"+flag+"="+flags[flag])
+ }
+ return flagMacros
+}
diff --git a/build/soong/selinux_contexts.go b/build/soong/selinux_contexts.go
index b053c7a..5cc9c70 100644
--- a/build/soong/selinux_contexts.go
+++ b/build/soong/selinux_contexts.go
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
import (
"fmt"
"io"
- "os"
"github.com/google/blueprint"
"github.com/google/blueprint/proptools"
@@ -59,6 +58,8 @@
type selinuxContextsModule struct {
android.ModuleBase
+ android.DefaultableModuleBase
+ flaggableModuleBase
properties selinuxContextsProperties
seappProperties seappProperties
@@ -68,6 +69,8 @@
installPath android.InstallPath
}
+var _ flaggableModule = (*selinuxContextsModule)(nil)
+
var (
reuseContextsDepTag = dependencyTag{name: "reuseContexts"}
syspropLibraryDepTag = dependencyTag{name: "sysprop_library"}
@@ -76,6 +79,7 @@
func init() {
pctx.HostBinToolVariable("fc_sort", "fc_sort")
+ android.RegisterModuleType("contexts_defaults", contextsDefaultsFactory)
android.RegisterModuleType("file_contexts", fileFactory)
android.RegisterModuleType("hwservice_contexts", hwServiceFactory)
android.RegisterModuleType("property_contexts", propertyFactory)
@@ -155,13 +159,35 @@
&m.properties,
&m.seappProperties,
)
+ initFlaggableModule(m)
android.InitAndroidArchModule(m, android.DeviceSupported, android.MultilibCommon)
+ android.InitDefaultableModule(m)
android.AddLoadHook(m, func(ctx android.LoadHookContext) {
m.selinuxContextsHook(ctx)
})
return m
}
+type contextsDefaults struct {
+ android.ModuleBase
+ android.DefaultsModuleBase
+}
+
+// contexts_defaults provides a set of properties that can be inherited by other contexts modules.
+// (file_contexts, property_contexts, seapp_contexts, etc.) A module can use the properties from a
+// contexts_defaults using `defaults: ["<:default_module_name>"]`. Properties of both modules are
+// erged (when possible) by prepending the default module's values to the depending module's values.
+func contextsDefaultsFactory() android.Module {
+ m := &contextsDefaults{}
+ m.AddProperties(
+ &selinuxContextsProperties{},
+ &seappProperties{},
+ &flagsProperties{},
+ )
+ android.InitDefaultsModule(m)
+ return m
+}
+
func (m *selinuxContextsModule) selinuxContextsHook(ctx android.LoadHookContext) {
// TODO: clean this up to use build/soong/android/variable.go after b/79249983
var srcs []string
@@ -245,10 +271,12 @@
inputsWithNewline = append(inputsWithNewline, input, newlineFile)
}
+ flags := m.getBuildFlags(ctx)
rule.Command().
Tool(ctx.Config().PrebuiltBuildTool(ctx, "m4")).
Text("--fatal-warnings -s").
FlagForEachArg("-D", ctx.DeviceConfig().SepolicyM4Defs()).
+ Flags(flagsToM4Macros(flags)).
Inputs(inputsWithNewline).
FlagWithOutput("> ", builtContext)
@@ -289,8 +317,8 @@
}
func (m *selinuxContextsModule) buildFileContexts(ctx android.ModuleContext, inputs android.Paths) android.Path {
- if m.properties.Fc_sort == nil {
- m.properties.Fc_sort = proptools.BoolPtr(true)
+ if m.properties.Remove_comment == nil {
+ m.properties.Remove_comment = proptools.BoolPtr(true)
}
return m.buildGeneralContexts(ctx, inputs)
}
@@ -309,7 +337,7 @@
return m.buildGeneralContexts(ctx, inputs)
}
-func (m *selinuxContextsModule) checkVendorPropertyNamespace(ctx android.ModuleContext, inputs android.Paths) android.Paths {
+func (m *selinuxContextsModule) checkVendorPropertyNamespace(ctx android.ModuleContext, input android.Path) android.Path {
shippingApiLevel := ctx.DeviceConfig().ShippingApiLevel()
ApiLevelR := android.ApiLevelOrPanic(ctx, "R")
@@ -350,37 +378,33 @@
}
}
- var ret android.Paths
- for _, input := range inputs {
- cmd := rule.Command().
- BuiltTool("check_prop_prefix").
- FlagWithInput("--property-contexts ", input).
- FlagForEachArg("--allowed-property-prefix ", proptools.ShellEscapeList(allowedPropertyPrefixes)). // contains shell special character '$'
- FlagForEachArg("--allowed-context-prefix ", allowedContextPrefixes)
+ cmd := rule.Command().
+ BuiltTool("check_prop_prefix").
+ FlagWithInput("--property-contexts ", input).
+ FlagForEachArg("--allowed-property-prefix ", proptools.ShellEscapeList(allowedPropertyPrefixes)). // contains shell special character '$'
+ FlagForEachArg("--allowed-context-prefix ", allowedContextPrefixes)
- if !ctx.DeviceConfig().BuildBrokenVendorPropertyNamespace() {
- cmd.Flag("--strict")
- }
-
- out := pathForModuleOut(ctx, "namespace_checked").Join(ctx, input.String())
- rule.Command().Text("cp -f").Input(input).Output(out)
- ret = append(ret, out)
+ if !ctx.DeviceConfig().BuildBrokenVendorPropertyNamespace() {
+ cmd.Flag("--strict")
}
+
+ out := pathForModuleOut(ctx, ctx.ModuleName()+"_namespace_checked")
+ rule.Command().Text("cp -f").Input(input).Output(out)
rule.Build("check_namespace", "checking namespace of "+ctx.ModuleName())
- return ret
+ return out
}
func (m *selinuxContextsModule) buildPropertyContexts(ctx android.ModuleContext, inputs android.Paths) android.Path {
// vendor/odm properties are enforced for devices launching with Android Q or later. So, if
// vendor/odm, make sure that only vendor/odm properties exist.
+ builtCtxFile := m.buildGeneralContexts(ctx, inputs)
+
shippingApiLevel := ctx.DeviceConfig().ShippingApiLevel()
ApiLevelQ := android.ApiLevelOrPanic(ctx, "Q")
if (ctx.SocSpecific() || ctx.DeviceSpecific()) && shippingApiLevel.GreaterThanOrEqualTo(ApiLevelQ) {
- inputs = m.checkVendorPropertyNamespace(ctx, inputs)
+ builtCtxFile = m.checkVendorPropertyNamespace(ctx, builtCtxFile)
}
- builtCtxFile := m.buildGeneralContexts(ctx, inputs)
-
var apiFiles android.Paths
ctx.VisitDirectDepsWithTag(syspropLibraryDepTag, func(c android.Module) {
i, ok := c.(interface{ CurrentSyspropApiFile() android.OptionalPath })
@@ -429,23 +453,39 @@
func (m *selinuxContextsModule) buildSeappContexts(ctx android.ModuleContext, inputs android.Paths) android.Path {
neverallowFile := pathForModuleOut(ctx, "neverallow")
- ret := pathForModuleOut(ctx, m.stem())
+ ret := pathForModuleOut(ctx, "checkseapp", m.stem())
+ // Step 1. Generate a M4 processed neverallow file
+ flags := m.getBuildFlags(ctx)
+ m4NeverallowFile := pathForModuleOut(ctx, "neverallow.m4out")
rule := android.NewRuleBuilder(pctx, ctx)
- rule.Command().Text("(grep").
+ rule.Command().
+ Tool(ctx.Config().PrebuiltBuildTool(ctx, "m4")).
+ Flag("--fatal-warnings").
+ FlagForEachArg("-D", ctx.DeviceConfig().SepolicyM4Defs()).
+ Flags(flagsToM4Macros(flags)).
+ Inputs(android.PathsForModuleSrc(ctx, m.seappProperties.Neverallow_files)).
+ FlagWithOutput("> ", m4NeverallowFile)
+
+ rule.Temporary(m4NeverallowFile)
+ rule.Command().
+ Text("( grep").
Flag("-ihe").
Text("'^neverallow'").
- Inputs(android.PathsForModuleSrc(ctx, m.seappProperties.Neverallow_files)).
- Text(os.DevNull). // to make grep happy even when Neverallow_files is empty
+ Input(m4NeverallowFile).
Text(">").
Output(neverallowFile).
- Text("|| true)") // to make ninja happy even when result is empty
+ Text("|| true )") // to make ninja happy even when result is empty
+ // Step 2. Generate a M4 processed contexts file
+ builtCtx := m.buildGeneralContexts(ctx, inputs)
+
+ // Step 3. checkseapp
rule.Temporary(neverallowFile)
checkCmd := rule.Command().BuiltTool("checkseapp").
FlagWithInput("-p ", android.PathForModuleSrc(ctx, proptools.String(m.seappProperties.Sepolicy))).
FlagWithOutput("-o ", ret).
- Inputs(inputs).
+ Input(builtCtx).
Input(neverallowFile)
if m.shouldCheckCoredomain(ctx) {
diff --git a/build/soong/sepolicy_neverallow.go b/build/soong/sepolicy_neverallow.go
index fc47ab3..6e159e9 100644
--- a/build/soong/sepolicy_neverallow.go
+++ b/build/soong/sepolicy_neverallow.go
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
}
type neverallowTestProperties struct {
+ // Default modules for conf
+ Defaults []string
+
// Policy files to be tested.
Srcs []string `android:"path"`
}
@@ -79,6 +82,10 @@
Srcs: n.properties.Srcs,
Build_variant: proptools.StringPtr("user"),
Installable: proptools.BoolPtr(false),
+ }, &struct {
+ Defaults []string
+ }{
+ Defaults: n.properties.Defaults,
})
sepolicyAnalyzeConf := n.sepolicyAnalyzeConfModuleName()
@@ -89,6 +96,10 @@
Build_variant: proptools.StringPtr("user"),
Exclude_build_test: proptools.BoolPtr(true),
Installable: proptools.BoolPtr(false),
+ }, &struct {
+ Defaults []string
+ }{
+ Defaults: n.properties.Defaults,
})
}
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index 44c3243..49481bd 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
"android.hardware.broadcastradio.IBroadcastRadio/amfm": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.broadcastradio.IBroadcastRadio/dab": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.bluetooth.IBluetoothHci/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.bluetooth.finder.IBluetoothFinder/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.camera.provider.ICameraProvider/internal/0": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.camera.provider.ICameraProvider/virtual/0": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.cas.IMediaCasService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@
"android.hardware.input.processor.IInputProcessor/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.ir.IConsumerIr/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.light.ILights/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.macsec.IMacsecPskPlugin/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.media.c2.IComponentStore/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.media.c2.IComponentStore/software": []string{"libcodec2-aidl-fuzzer"},
"android.hardware.memtrack.IMemtrack/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -114,9 +116,12 @@
"android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM1": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM2": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM3": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.security.authgraph.IAuthGraphKeyExchange/nonsecure": []string{"android.hardware.authgraph-service.nonsecure_fuzzer"},
"android.hardware.security.dice.IDiceDevice/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper/nonsecure": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.sensors.ISensors/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -142,6 +147,7 @@
"android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default": []string{"libsensorserviceaidl_fuzzer"},
"android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.frameworks.vibrator.IVibratorControlService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.se.omapi.ISecureElementService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.system.net.netd.INetd/default": []string{"netd_hw_service_fuzzer"},
@@ -174,6 +180,7 @@
"android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService": []string{"gatekeeperd_service_fuzzer"},
"android.system.composd": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
// TODO(b/294158658): add fuzzer
+ "android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.system.virtualizationservice": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.system.virtualizationservice_internal.IVfioHandler": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"ambient_context": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -307,10 +314,10 @@
"logd": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"looper_stats": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"lpdump_service": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
- "mdns": []string{"mdns_service_fuzzer"},
+ "mdns": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"media.aaudio": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
- "media.audio_flinger": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
- "media.audio_policy": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "media.audio_flinger": []string{"audioflinger_aidl_fuzzer"},
+ "media.audio_policy": []string{"audiopolicy_aidl_fuzzer"},
"media.camera": []string{"camera_service_aidl_fuzzer"},
"media.camera.proxy": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"media.log": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -392,6 +399,7 @@
"search": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"search_ui": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"secure_element": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "security_state": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"sec_key_att_app_id_provider": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"selection_toolbar": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"sensorservice": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -444,6 +452,7 @@
"translation": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"transparency": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"trust": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "tv_ad": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"tv_interactive_app": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"tv_input": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"tv_tuner_resource_mgr": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
@@ -460,7 +469,7 @@
"vibrator_manager": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"virtualdevice": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"virtualdevice_native": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
- "virtual_camera_service": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "virtual_camera": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"virtual_touchpad": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"voiceinteraction": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"vold": []string{"vold_native_service_fuzzer"},
diff --git a/compat/Android.bp b/compat/Android.bp
index 9768eb1..2c6239f 100644
--- a/compat/Android.bp
+++ b/compat/Android.bp
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@
se_compat_test {
name: "sepolicy_compat_test",
+ defaults: ["se_policy_conf_flags_defaults"],
}
se_build_files {
diff --git a/contexts/Android.bp b/contexts/Android.bp
index ca51847..464c772 100644
--- a/contexts/Android.bp
+++ b/contexts/Android.bp
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
file_contexts {
name: "plat_file_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
product_variables: {
address_sanitize: {
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@
file_contexts {
name: "plat_file_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
stem: "plat_file_contexts",
product_variables: {
@@ -98,31 +100,37 @@
file_contexts {
name: "vendor_file_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":file_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":file_contexts_files{.vendor}",
],
soc_specific: true,
+ fc_sort: true,
}
file_contexts {
name: "vendor_file_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":file_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":file_contexts_files{.vendor}",
],
stem: "vendor_file_contexts",
recovery: true,
+ fc_sort: true,
}
file_contexts {
name: "system_ext_file_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
}
file_contexts {
name: "system_ext_file_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
stem: "system_ext_file_contexts",
recovery: true,
@@ -130,12 +138,14 @@
file_contexts {
name: "product_file_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
product_specific: true,
}
file_contexts {
name: "product_file_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
stem: "product_file_contexts",
recovery: true,
@@ -143,36 +153,44 @@
file_contexts {
name: "odm_file_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.odm}"],
device_specific: true,
+ fc_sort: true,
}
file_contexts {
name: "odm_file_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":file_contexts_files{.odm}"],
stem: "odm_file_contexts",
recovery: true,
+ fc_sort: true,
}
hwservice_contexts {
name: "plat_hwservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":hwservice_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
}
hwservice_contexts {
name: "system_ext_hwservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":hwservice_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
}
hwservice_contexts {
name: "product_hwservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":hwservice_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
product_specific: true,
}
hwservice_contexts {
name: "vendor_hwservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":hwservice_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":hwservice_contexts_files{.vendor}",
@@ -183,17 +201,20 @@
hwservice_contexts {
name: "odm_hwservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":hwservice_contexts_files{.odm}"],
device_specific: true,
}
property_contexts {
name: "plat_property_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":property_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
}
property_contexts {
name: "plat_property_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":property_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
stem: "plat_property_contexts",
recovery: true,
@@ -201,6 +222,7 @@
property_contexts {
name: "system_ext_property_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":property_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
recovery_available: true,
@@ -208,6 +230,7 @@
property_contexts {
name: "product_property_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":property_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
product_specific: true,
recovery_available: true,
@@ -215,6 +238,7 @@
property_contexts {
name: "vendor_property_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":property_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":property_contexts_files{.vendor}",
@@ -226,6 +250,7 @@
property_contexts {
name: "odm_property_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":property_contexts_files{.odm}"],
device_specific: true,
recovery_available: true,
@@ -233,11 +258,13 @@
service_contexts {
name: "plat_service_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":service_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
}
service_contexts {
name: "plat_service_contexts.recovery",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":service_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
stem: "plat_service_contexts",
recovery: true,
@@ -245,6 +272,7 @@
service_contexts {
name: "system_ext_service_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":service_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
recovery_available: true,
@@ -252,6 +280,7 @@
service_contexts {
name: "product_service_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":service_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
product_specific: true,
recovery_available: true,
@@ -259,6 +288,7 @@
service_contexts {
name: "vendor_service_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":service_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":service_contexts_files{.vendor}",
@@ -270,6 +300,7 @@
service_contexts {
name: "odm_service_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":service_contexts_files{.odm}",
],
@@ -279,23 +310,27 @@
keystore2_key_contexts {
name: "plat_keystore2_key_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":keystore2_key_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
}
keystore2_key_contexts {
name: "system_keystore2_key_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":keystore2_key_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
}
keystore2_key_contexts {
name: "product_keystore2_key_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":keystore2_key_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
product_specific: true,
}
keystore2_key_contexts {
name: "vendor_keystore2_key_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":keystore2_key_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":keystore2_key_contexts_files{.vendor}",
@@ -306,12 +341,14 @@
seapp_contexts {
name: "plat_seapp_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":seapp_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
sepolicy: ":precompiled_sepolicy",
}
seapp_contexts {
name: "system_ext_seapp_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":seapp_contexts_files{.system_ext_private}"],
neverallow_files: [":seapp_contexts_files{.plat_private}"],
system_ext_specific: true,
@@ -320,6 +357,7 @@
seapp_contexts {
name: "product_seapp_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [":seapp_contexts_files{.product_private}"],
neverallow_files: [
":seapp_contexts_files{.plat_private}",
@@ -331,6 +369,7 @@
seapp_contexts {
name: "vendor_seapp_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":seapp_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":seapp_contexts_files{.vendor}",
@@ -347,6 +386,7 @@
seapp_contexts {
name: "odm_seapp_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":seapp_contexts_files{.odm}",
],
@@ -361,6 +401,7 @@
vndservice_contexts {
name: "vndservice_contexts",
+ defaults: ["contexts_flags_defaults"],
srcs: [
":vndservice_contexts_files{.plat_vendor}",
":vndservice_contexts_files{.vendor}",
diff --git a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
index 287f754..54dc1f3 100644
--- a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
+++ b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@
/dev/gnss10 gnss_device
/dev/graphics graphics_device
/dev/graphics/test graphics_device
+/dev/hidraw0 hidraw_device
+/dev/hidraw1 hidraw_device
/dev/hw_random hw_random_device
/dev/hwbinder hwbinder_device
/dev/input input_device
@@ -280,6 +282,8 @@
/dev/zero zero_device
/dev/__properties__ properties_device
/dev/__properties__/property_info property_info
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override properties_device
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info property_info
/linkerconfig linkerconfig_file
/linkerconfig/test linkerconfig_file
@@ -536,6 +540,8 @@
/vendor/framework/test vendor_framework_file
/system/vendor/framework vendor_framework_file
/system/vendor/framework/test vendor_framework_file
+/vendor/etc/avf/microdroid vendor_microdroid_file
+/vendor/etc/avf/microdroid/test vendor_microdroid_file
/vendor/apex vendor_apex_file
/vendor/apex/test vendor_apex_file
diff --git a/flagging/Android.bp b/flagging/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b61b41d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/flagging/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2023 The Android Open Source Project
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// This file contains a list of flags for sepolicy.
+se_policy_conf_defaults {
+ name: "se_policy_conf_flags_defaults",
+ srcs: [":sepolicy_flagging_macros"],
+ flags: ["RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT"],
+}
+
+contexts_defaults {
+ name: "contexts_flags_defaults",
+ srcs: [":sepolicy_flagging_macros"],
+ neverallow_files: [":sepolicy_flagging_macros"], // for seapp_contexts
+ flags: ["RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT"],
+}
+
+filegroup {
+ name: "sepolicy_flagging_macros",
+ srcs: ["te_macros"],
+}
diff --git a/flagging/te_macros b/flagging/te_macros
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3464502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/flagging/te_macros
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+####################################
+# is_flag_enabled(flag, rules)
+# SELinux rules which apply only if given feature is turned on
+define(`is_flag_enabled', `ifelse(target_flag_$1, `true', `$2')')
+
+####################################
+# is_flag_disabled(flag, rules)
+# SELinux rules which apply only if given feature is turned off
+define(`is_flag_disabled', `ifelse(target_flag_$1, `true', , `$2')')
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts b/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
index e483237..046f20f 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@
/dev/vsock u:object_r:vsock_device:s0
/dev/zero u:object_r:zero_device:s0
/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override u:object_r:properties_device:s0
/dev/__properties__/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
#############################
# Linker configuration
#
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/init.te b/microdroid/system/private/init.te
index 2dbf495..896590d 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/init.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/init.te
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@
# /dev/__null__ node created by init.
allow init tmpfs:chr_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
-# /dev/__properties__
+# /dev/__properties__ and /dev/__properties__/appcompat_override
allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
allow init property_type:file { append create getattr map open read relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
-# /dev/__properties__/property_info
+# /dev/__properties__/property_info and /dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info
allow init properties_device:file create_file_perms;
allow init property_info:file relabelto;
# /dev/socket
@@ -435,7 +435,3 @@
# PRNG seeder daemon socket is created and listened on by init before forking.
allow init prng_seeder:unix_stream_socket { create bind listen };
-
-# Workaround for test failures (b/306516077)
-# We get a denial for this on VM boot, but the denial is correct.
-dontaudit init device:file relabelto;
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_payload.te b/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_payload.te
index 5d4a73c..e4315a2 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_payload.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/microdroid_payload.te
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
allow microdroid_payload encryptedstore_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow microdroid_payload encryptedstore_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Payload can access devices labeled as payload accessible.
+allow microdroid_payload payload_accessible_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
# Never allow microdroid_payload to connect to vsock
neverallow microdroid_payload self:vsock_socket connect;
diff --git a/microdroid/system/public/device.te b/microdroid/system/public/device.te
index 1a64b62..dfae6f9 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/public/device.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/public/device.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
type null_device, dev_type;
type open_dice_device, dev_type;
type owntty_device, dev_type;
+type payload_accessible_device, dev_type;
type properties_device, dev_type;
type properties_serial, dev_type;
type property_info, dev_type;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/attributes b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/attributes
index 77143a3..fe50b0d 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/attributes
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/attributes
@@ -13,4 +13,5 @@
# All SDK sandbox domains
attribute sdk_sandbox_all;
-
+# The SDK sandbox domains for the current SDK level.
+attribute sdk_sandbox_current;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index 069d06a..201c565 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -82,4 +82,5 @@
hal_can_controller_service
zoned_block_device
future_pm_prop
+ vfio_device
))
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/property_contexts b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/property_contexts
index 2c7557f..da0ea5b 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/property_contexts
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/property_contexts
@@ -1426,9 +1426,6 @@
# Hostname for the remote provisioning server a device should communicate with
remote_provisioning.hostname u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact string
-# Indicates the system should use rkpd instead of RemoteProvisioner
-remote_provisioning.enable_rkpd u:object_r:remote_prov_prop:s0 exact bool
-
# Broadcast boot stages, which keystore listens to
keystore.boot_level u:object_r:keystore_listen_prop:s0 exact int
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
index d45da88..bb15057 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
@@ -3,89 +3,7 @@
###
### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
### for targetSdkVersion=34.
-type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
net_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
app_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
-
-# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
-# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
-allow sdk_sandbox_34 {
- activity_service
- activity_task_service
- appops_service
- audio_service
- audioserver_service
- batteryproperties_service
- batterystats_service
- cameraserver_service
- connectivity_service
- connmetrics_service
- deviceidle_service
- display_service
- dropbox_service
- ephemeral_app_api_service
- font_service
- game_service
- gpu_service
- graphicsstats_service
- hardware_properties_service
- hint_service
- imms_service
- input_method_service
- input_service
- IProxyService_service
- ipsec_service
- launcherapps_service
- legacy_permission_service
- light_service
- locale_service
- media_communication_service
- mediadrmserver_service
- mediaextractor_service
- mediametrics_service
- media_projection_service
- media_router_service
- mediaserver_service
- media_session_service
- memtrackproxy_service
- midi_service
- netpolicy_service
- netstats_service
- network_management_service
- notification_service
- package_service
- permission_checker_service
- permission_service
- permissionmgr_service
- platform_compat_service
- power_service
- procstats_service
- radio_service
- registry_service
- restrictions_service
- rttmanager_service
- search_service
- selection_toolbar_service
- sensor_privacy_service
- sensorservice_service
- servicediscovery_service
- settings_service
- speech_recognition_service
- statusbar_service
- storagestats_service
- surfaceflinger_service
- telecom_service
- tethering_service
- textclassification_service
- textservices_service
- texttospeech_service
- thermal_service
- translation_service
- tv_iapp_service
- tv_input_service
- uimode_service
- vcn_management_service
- webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb531ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the audit sdk sandbox security policy for
+### the set of restrictions proposed for the next SDK level.
+###
+### The sdk_sandbox_audit domain has the same rules as the
+### sdk_sandbox_current domain and additional auditing rules
+### for the accesses we are considering forbidding in the upcoming
+### sdk_sandbox_next domain.
+type sdk_sandbox_audit, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+
+# Auditallow rules for accesses that are currently allowed but we
+# might remove in the future.
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ cameraserver_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ radio_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:file rw_file_perms;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55e5bc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for the current SDK level.
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_current {
+ activity_service
+ activity_task_service
+ appops_service
+ audio_service
+ audioserver_service
+ batteryproperties_service
+ batterystats_service
+ cameraserver_service
+ connectivity_service
+ connmetrics_service
+ deviceidle_service
+ display_service
+ dropbox_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ font_service
+ game_service
+ gpu_service
+ graphicsstats_service
+ hardware_properties_service
+ hint_service
+ imms_service
+ input_method_service
+ input_service
+ IProxyService_service
+ ipsec_service
+ launcherapps_service
+ legacy_permission_service
+ light_service
+ locale_service
+ media_communication_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ mediaextractor_service
+ mediametrics_service
+ media_projection_service
+ media_router_service
+ mediaserver_service
+ media_session_service
+ memtrackproxy_service
+ midi_service
+ netpolicy_service
+ netstats_service
+ network_management_service
+ notification_service
+ package_service
+ permission_checker_service
+ permission_service
+ permissionmgr_service
+ platform_compat_service
+ power_service
+ procstats_service
+ radio_service
+ registry_service
+ restrictions_service
+ rttmanager_service
+ search_service
+ selection_toolbar_service
+ sensor_privacy_service
+ sensorservice_service
+ servicediscovery_service
+ settings_service
+ speech_recognition_service
+ statusbar_service
+ storagestats_service
+ surfaceflinger_service
+ telecom_service
+ tethering_service
+ textclassification_service
+ textservices_service
+ texttospeech_service
+ thermal_service
+ translation_service
+ tv_iapp_service
+ tv_input_service
+ uimode_service
+ vcn_management_service
+ webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/seapp_contexts b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/seapp_contexts
index 4454bd7..8f3cae9 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/prebuilts/api/34.0/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
# fromRunAs (boolean)
# isIsolatedComputeApp (boolean)
# isSdkSandboxNext (boolean)
+# isSdkSandboxAudit (boolean)
#
# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
# An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
@@ -48,9 +49,19 @@
# with user=_isolated. This selector should not be used unless it is intended
# to provide isolated processes with relaxed security restrictions.
#
+# The sdk_sandbox_next and sdk_sandbox_audit domains are special domains for the
+# SDK sandbox process. sdk_sandbox_next defines the set of restrictions proposed
+# for the upcoming dessert release. sdk_sandbox_audit uses the same restrictions
+# as the current dessert release, with additional auditing rules for the accesses
+# we are considering forbidding in the upcoming release.
+#
# isSdkSandboxNext=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
# sdk_sandbox_next sepolicy applied to them.
#
+# isSdkSandboxAudit=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_audit sepolicy applied to them.
+# An unspecified isSdkSandboxAudit defaults to false.
+#
# Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
# (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
# seapp_context_cmp()).
@@ -171,6 +182,7 @@
user=_isolated isIsolatedComputeApp=true domain=isolated_compute_app levelFrom=user
user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox_34 type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxNext=true domain=sdk_sandbox_next type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxAudit=true domain=sdk_sandbox_audit type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index adb3a61..32d73dd 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@
early_boot_ended
get_attestation_key
get_auth_token
+ get_last_auth_time
get_state
list
lock
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index 19cb2e0..09f222b 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@
# Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox_all)
+# Allow apps to communicate via binder with virtual camera service.
+binder_call(appdomain, virtual_camera)
+
# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index ea10df5..5ea924a 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -295,3 +295,6 @@
# anon_inode usages like userfaultfd and io_uring. This prevents us from
# creating a more fine-grained neverallow policy for each anon_inode usage.
neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:anon_inode *;
+
+# Do not allow untrusted app access to hidraw devices.
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps hidraw_device:chr_file *;
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index e3869cd..46cea8e 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
# Interaction between the app_zygote and its children.
allow app_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
+allow app_zygote properties_device:dir mounton;
+
# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
dontaudit app_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
diff --git a/private/attributes b/private/attributes
index 77143a3..fe50b0d 100644
--- a/private/attributes
+++ b/private/attributes
@@ -13,4 +13,5 @@
# All SDK sandbox domains
attribute sdk_sandbox_all;
-
+# The SDK sandbox domains for the current SDK level.
+attribute sdk_sandbox_current;
diff --git a/private/bootanim.te b/private/bootanim.te
index 2b3c807..f63a230 100644
--- a/private/bootanim.te
+++ b/private/bootanim.te
@@ -18,3 +18,6 @@
# Allow accessing /data/misc/bootanim
r_dir_file(bootanim, bootanim_data_file)
+
+# Allow accessing vendor apex for EGL/GLES
+allow bootanim vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/bug_map b/private/bug_map
index f35fbca..3a78a40 100644
--- a/private/bug_map
+++ b/private/bug_map
@@ -19,7 +19,10 @@
mediaprovider cache_file blk_file b/77925342
mediaprovider mnt_media_rw_file dir b/77925342
mediaprovider shell_data_file dir b/77925342
+mediaprovider_app device_config_media_native_prop file b/308043377
mediaswcodec ashmem_device chr_file b/142679232
+nfc device_config_media_native_prop file b/308043377
+platform_app device_config_media_native_prop file b/308043377
platform_app nfc_data_file dir b/74331887
platform_app system_data_file dir b/306090533
system_server overlayfs_file file b/142390309
@@ -30,4 +33,4 @@
untrusted_app untrusted_app netlink_route_socket b/155595000
vold system_data_file file b/124108085
zygote untrusted_app_25 process b/77925912
-zygote labeledfs filesystem b/170748799
+zygote labeledfs filesystem b/170748799
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index ea4ed5d..352aecf 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -88,4 +88,5 @@
hal_can_controller_service
zoned_block_device
future_pm_prop
+ vfio_device
))
diff --git a/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
index 69902d8..2c9961d 100644
--- a/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
@@ -9,16 +9,29 @@
dtbo_block_device
ota_build_prop
snapuserd_log_data_file
+ fwk_vibrator_control_service
+ hal_authgraph_service
+ hal_secretkeeper_service
hal_codec2_service
+ hal_macsec_service
+ hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service
hal_threadnetwork_service
+ hidraw_device
virtual_camera_service
ot_daemon_service
+ pm_archiving_enabled_prop
remote_auth_service
+ security_state_service
+ setupwizard_mode_prop
sysfs_sync_on_suspend
+ tv_ad_service
threadnetwork_service
device_config_aconfig_flags_prop
proc_memhealth
virtual_device_native_service
next_boot_prop
binderfs_logs_stats
+ drm_forcel3_prop
+ proc_percpu_pagelist_high_fraction
+ vendor_microdroid_file
))
diff --git a/private/coredomain.te b/private/coredomain.te
index f9b47df..5442ea3 100644
--- a/private/coredomain.te
+++ b/private/coredomain.te
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
get_prop(coredomain, radio_control_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, rollback_test_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, setupwizard_prop)
+get_prop(coredomain, setupwizard_mode_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, sqlite_log_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, storagemanager_config_prop)
get_prop(coredomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@
-apexd
-init
-ueventd
- -vfio_handler
+ is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `-vfio_handler')
-vold
} sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/crash_dump.te b/private/crash_dump.te
index 6cc1828..27baaff 100644
--- a/private/crash_dump.te
+++ b/private/crash_dump.te
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@
allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Allow crash dump to read bootstrap libraries
+allow crash_dump system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump system_bootstrap_lib_file:file r_file_perms;
+
# Read Vendor APEX directories
allow crash_dump vendor_apex_metadata_file:dir { getattr search };
diff --git a/private/crosvm.te b/private/crosvm.te
index afcaa3d..ed89b87 100644
--- a/private/crosvm.te
+++ b/private/crosvm.te
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# Let crosvm read the composite disk images (virtualizationservice_data_file), APEXes
# (staging_data_file), APKs (apk_data_file and shell_data_file where the latter is for test apks in
-# /data/local/tmp), and instance.img (app_data_file).
+# /data/local/tmp), instance.img (app_data_file), and microdroid vendor image (vendor_microdroid_file).
# Allow crosvm to read the instance image of the service VM saved in apex_virt_data_file.
# Note that the open permission is not given as the files are passed as file descriptors.
allow crosvm {
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
apex_compos_data_file
apex_virt_data_file
shell_data_file
+ vendor_microdroid_file
}:file { getattr read ioctl lock };
# Allow searching the directory where the composite disk images are.
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@
# These types are not required for crosvm, but the access is granted to globally in domain.te
# thus should be exempted here.
-vendor_configs_file
+ -vendor_microdroid_file
-vndk_sp_file
-vendor_task_profiles_file
}:file *;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 0861fa5..2f107dd 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -610,6 +610,7 @@
-vendor_apex_file
-vendor_apex_metadata_file
-vendor_configs_file
+ -vendor_microdroid_file
-vendor_service_contexts_file
-vendor_framework_file
-vendor_idc_file
diff --git a/private/dumpstate.te b/private/dumpstate.te
index 18924ca..1faedb4 100644
--- a/private/dumpstate.te
+++ b/private/dumpstate.te
@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@
# Allow dumpstate to talk to automotive_display_service over binder
binder_call(dumpstate, automotive_display_service)
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to virtual_camera service over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, virtual_camera)
+
+# Allow dumpstate to talk to ot_daemon service over binder
+binder_call(dumpstate, ot_daemon)
+
# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
get_prop(dumpstate, boottime_prop)
@@ -67,6 +73,8 @@
mediatranscoding
statsd
netd
+ virtual_camera
+ ot_daemon
}:process signal;
# Only allow dumpstate to dump Keystore on debuggable builds.
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 2d9b30d..3cfbaf0 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -1,4 +1,25 @@
###########################################
+# Entries in this file describe the security context associated with a file
+# path. They are used when building the device image, to include the security
+# context within the extended file attributes of the file system. They are also
+# used at runtime when calling restorecon.
+#
+# Entries are merged with other file_contexts from other partitions (e.g.,
+# vendor or odm, see the full list at libselinux/src/android/android.c).
+#
+# The entries are evaluated by the following rules:
+# - Static entries (that is, not using regular expressions) are always
+# evaluated first.
+# - The first matching entry is used.
+# - Entries are evaluated from the bottom to the top.
+#
+# Based on these rules, it is recommended that the less specific entries appear
+# first. For instance:
+# /dev(/.*)? u:object_r:device:s0
+# /dev/block(/.*)? u:object_r:block_device:s0
+# /dev/block/my_dev u:object_r:my_dev:s0
+#
+
# Root
/ u:object_r:rootfs:s0
@@ -106,6 +127,7 @@
/dev/fuse u:object_r:fuse_device:s0
/dev/gnss[0-9]+ u:object_r:gnss_device:s0
/dev/graphics(/.*)? u:object_r:graphics_device:s0
+/dev/hidraw[0-9]+ u:object_r:hidraw_device:s0
/dev/hw_random u:object_r:hw_random_device:s0
/dev/hwbinder u:object_r:hwbinder_device:s0
/dev/input(/.*)? u:object_r:input_device:s0
@@ -200,7 +222,9 @@
/dev/xt_qtaguid u:object_r:qtaguid_device:s0
/dev/zero u:object_r:zero_device:s0
/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override u:object_r:properties_device:s0
/dev/__properties__/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
#############################
# Linker configuration
#
@@ -389,6 +413,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/cgroups\.json u:object_r:vendor_cgroup_desc_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/task_profiles\.json u:object_r:vendor_task_profiles_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/etc/avf/microdroid(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_microdroid_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)? u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
@@ -739,16 +764,7 @@
# Expanded data files
#
/mnt/expand u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
-# CAREFUL: the two system_data_file patterns below can't be replaced with one
-# pattern "/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)?", since SELinux would prioritize that over
-# "/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user". This is because when a path is matched by two
-# patterns that contain regex meta-characters, SELinux just chooses the longer
-# pattern (or the later pattern if the patterns are the same length), rather
-# than the pattern containing fewer regex meta-characters. Splitting the
-# pattern into "/mnt/expand/[^/]+" and "/mnt/expand/[^/]+/.*" works around this
-# problem, except for 1-character filenames which we aren't using.
-/mnt/expand/[^/]+ u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
-/mnt/expand/[^/]+/.* u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)? u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
# /mnt/expand/..../app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 17db46a..41c60df 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
genfscon proc /sys/vm/min_free_order_shift u:object_r:proc_min_free_order_shift:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/watermark_boost_factor u:object_r:proc_watermark_boost_factor:s0
genfscon proc /sys/vm/watermark_scale_factor u:object_r:proc_watermark_scale_factor:s0
+genfscon proc /sys/vm/percpu_pagelist_high_fraction u:object_r:proc_percpu_pagelist_high_fraction:s0
genfscon proc /timer_list u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
genfscon proc /timer_stats u:object_r:proc_timer:s0
genfscon proc /tty/drivers u:object_r:proc_tty_drivers:s0
diff --git a/private/init.te b/private/init.te
index 67e5561..9d3a2c3 100644
--- a/private/init.te
+++ b/private/init.te
@@ -123,7 +123,3 @@
-vm_manager_device_type
-port_device
}:chr_file setattr;
-
-# Workaround for test failures (b/306516077)
-# We get a denial for this on boot, but the denial is correct.
-dontaudit init device:file relabelto;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app_all.te b/private/isolated_app_all.te
index 189d064..1ffcabe 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app_all.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app_all.te
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
dontaudit isolated_app_all shell_data_file:dir search;
+# Allow to read (but not open) staged apks.
+allow isolated_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file { read getattr };
+
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
diff --git a/private/keystore.te b/private/keystore.te
index 73961ac..b81ccfa 100644
--- a/private/keystore.te
+++ b/private/keystore.te
@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@
# talk to keymint
hal_client_domain(keystore, hal_keymint)
+# Ignore keystore attempts to access the AVF RKP Hal but keystore is not suppose to
+# access it.
+# TODO(b/312427637): Investigate the reason and fix the denial.
+dontaudit keystore hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service:service_manager { find };
+
# This is used for the ConfirmationUI async callback.
allow keystore platform_app:binder call;
diff --git a/private/network_stack.te b/private/network_stack.te
index 84c8d4d..8e09be8 100644
--- a/private/network_stack.te
+++ b/private/network_stack.te
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
binder_call(network_stack, netd);
# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
-# TODO: Remove this permission when 4.9 kernel is deprecated.
allow network_stack self:key_socket create;
# Java's Os.close() in libcore/luni/src/main/java/libcore/io/BlockGuardOs.java;l=100
# calls if (fd.isSocket$()) if (isLingerSocket(fd)) ...
diff --git a/private/ot_daemon.te b/private/ot_daemon.te
index 1021fd9..457e1bf 100644
--- a/private/ot_daemon.te
+++ b/private/ot_daemon.te
@@ -29,3 +29,10 @@
binder_use(ot_daemon)
add_service(ot_daemon, ot_daemon_service)
binder_call(ot_daemon, system_server)
+
+# Allow OT daemon to write to statsd
+unix_socket_send(ot_daemon, statsdw, statsd)
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+allow ot_daemon dumpstate:fd use;
+allow ot_daemon dumpstate:fifo_file write;
diff --git a/private/property.te b/private/property.te
index e1b42a0..ff0b693 100644
--- a/private/property.te
+++ b/private/property.te
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
system_internal_prop(keystore_listen_prop)
system_internal_prop(last_boot_reason_prop)
system_internal_prop(localization_prop)
+system_internal_prop(logd_auditrate_prop)
system_internal_prop(lower_kptr_restrict_prop)
system_internal_prop(net_464xlat_fromvendor_prop)
system_internal_prop(net_connectivity_prop)
@@ -605,6 +606,12 @@
neverallow {
domain
-init
+ -vendor_init
+} setupwizard_mode_prop:property_service set;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
} setupwizard_prop:property_service set;
# ro.product.property_source_order is useless after initialization of ro.product.* props.
@@ -704,3 +711,10 @@
-system_app
-device_as_webcam
} usb_uvc_enabled_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -vendor_init
+} pm_archiving_enabled_prop:property_service set;
+
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 6c81c03..4166c55 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
logd. u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
persist.logd. u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
ro.logd. u:object_r:logd_prop:s0
+persist.logd.audit.rate u:object_r:logd_auditrate_prop:s0
persist.logd.security u:object_r:device_logging_prop:s0
persist.logd.logpersistd u:object_r:logpersistd_logging_prop:s0
logd.logpersistd u:object_r:logpersistd_logging_prop:s0
@@ -338,6 +339,10 @@
ro.virtual_ab.io_uring.enabled u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
ro.virtual_ab.compression.threads u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
ro.virtual_ab.batch_writes u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact bool
+# OEMs can set this prop at build time to configure how many seconds to delay
+# merge after installing a Virtual AB OTA. The default behavior is to start
+# merge immediately.
+ro.virtual_ab.merge_delay_seconds u:object_r:virtual_ab_prop:s0 exact int
snapuserd.ready u:object_r:snapuserd_prop:s0 exact bool
snapuserd.proxy_ready u:object_r:snapuserd_prop:s0 exact bool
snapuserd.test.dm.snapshots u:object_r:snapuserd_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -618,6 +623,7 @@
bluetooth.core.le.vendor_capabilities.enabled u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
bluetooth.sco.disable_enhanced_connection u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+bluetooth.core.le.dsa_transport_preference u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact string
persist.nfc.debug_enabled u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.nfc.vendor_debug_enabled u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -827,6 +833,7 @@
drm.64bit.enabled u:object_r:mediadrm_config_prop:s0 exact bool
media.mediadrmservice.enable u:object_r:mediadrm_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.drm.forcel3.enabled u:object_r:drm_forcel3_prop:s0 exact bool
drm.service.enabled u:object_r:drm_service_config_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -861,9 +868,8 @@
persist.libc.debug.gwp_asan. u:object_r:gwp_asan_prop:s0 prefix string
# shell-only props for ARM memory tagging (MTE).
-arm64.memtag. u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 prefix string
-persist.arm64.memtag.default u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 exact string
-persist.arm64.memtag.app_default u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 exact string
+arm64.memtag. u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 prefix string
+persist.arm64.memtag. u:object_r:arm64_memtag_prop:s0 prefix string
net.redirect_socket_calls.hooked u:object_r:socket_hook_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -1132,9 +1138,11 @@
ro.product.device_for_attestation u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 exact string
ro.product.manufacturer_for_attestation u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 exact string
-# GRF property for the first api level of the vendor partition
+# Vendor API level properties for the vFRC and GRF
ro.board.first_api_level u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
ro.board.api_level u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.board.api_frozen u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.llndk.api_level u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
ro.vendor.api_level u:object_r:build_vendor_prop:s0 exact int
# Boot image build props set by /{second_stage_resources/,}boot/etc/build.prop
@@ -1284,6 +1292,7 @@
wifi.concurrent.interface u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
wifi.direct.interface u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
wifi.interface u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact string
+wifi.interface. u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 prefix string
wlan.driver.status u:object_r:wifi_hal_prop:s0 exact enum ok unloaded
ro.boot.wificountrycode u:object_r:wifi_config_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -1429,6 +1438,8 @@
ro.cpuvulkan.version u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact int
+ro.vulkan.apex u:object_r:graphics_config_prop:s0 exact string
+
# surfaceflinger-settable
graphics.display.kernel_idle_timer.enabled u:object_r:surfaceflinger_display_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -1479,6 +1490,8 @@
ro.setupwizard.rotation_locked u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
ro.setupwizard.wifi_on_exit u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.setupwizard.mode u:object_r:setupwizard_mode_prop:s0 exact string
+
setupwizard.enable_assist_gesture_training u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
setupwizard.feature.avoid_duplicate_tos u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
setupwizard.feature.baseline_setupwizard_enabled u:object_r:setupwizard_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -1594,5 +1607,9 @@
# Properties for sensor service
sensors.aosp_low_power_sensor_fusion.maximum_rate u:object_r:sensors_config_prop:s0 exact uint
-# Propertues for game manager service
+# Properties for game manager service
persist.graphics.game_default_frame_rate.enabled u:object_r:game_manager_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Properties for app archiving
+pm.archiving.enabled u:object_r:pm_archiving_enabled_prop:s0 exact bool
+
diff --git a/private/rkpd_app.te b/private/rkpd_app.te
index 509a96e..e7809e9 100644
--- a/private/rkpd_app.te
+++ b/private/rkpd_app.te
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
# RKPD needs to be able to call the remote provisioning HALs
hal_client_domain(rkpdapp, hal_keymint)
+hal_client_domain(rkpdapp, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf)
# Grant access to certain system properties related to RKP
get_prop(rkpdapp, device_config_remote_key_provisioning_native_prop)
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
index d45da88..bb15057 100644
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
@@ -3,89 +3,7 @@
###
### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
### for targetSdkVersion=34.
-type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
net_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
app_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
-
-# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
-# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
-allow sdk_sandbox_34 {
- activity_service
- activity_task_service
- appops_service
- audio_service
- audioserver_service
- batteryproperties_service
- batterystats_service
- cameraserver_service
- connectivity_service
- connmetrics_service
- deviceidle_service
- display_service
- dropbox_service
- ephemeral_app_api_service
- font_service
- game_service
- gpu_service
- graphicsstats_service
- hardware_properties_service
- hint_service
- imms_service
- input_method_service
- input_service
- IProxyService_service
- ipsec_service
- launcherapps_service
- legacy_permission_service
- light_service
- locale_service
- media_communication_service
- mediadrmserver_service
- mediaextractor_service
- mediametrics_service
- media_projection_service
- media_router_service
- mediaserver_service
- media_session_service
- memtrackproxy_service
- midi_service
- netpolicy_service
- netstats_service
- network_management_service
- notification_service
- package_service
- permission_checker_service
- permission_service
- permissionmgr_service
- platform_compat_service
- power_service
- procstats_service
- radio_service
- registry_service
- restrictions_service
- rttmanager_service
- search_service
- selection_toolbar_service
- sensor_privacy_service
- sensorservice_service
- servicediscovery_service
- settings_service
- speech_recognition_service
- statusbar_service
- storagestats_service
- surfaceflinger_service
- telecom_service
- tethering_service
- textclassification_service
- textservices_service
- texttospeech_service
- thermal_service
- translation_service
- tv_iapp_service
- tv_input_service
- uimode_service
- vcn_management_service
- webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb531ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the audit sdk sandbox security policy for
+### the set of restrictions proposed for the next SDK level.
+###
+### The sdk_sandbox_audit domain has the same rules as the
+### sdk_sandbox_current domain and additional auditing rules
+### for the accesses we are considering forbidding in the upcoming
+### sdk_sandbox_next domain.
+type sdk_sandbox_audit, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+
+# Auditallow rules for accesses that are currently allowed but we
+# might remove in the future.
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ cameraserver_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ radio_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:file rw_file_perms;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55e5bc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for the current SDK level.
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_current {
+ activity_service
+ activity_task_service
+ appops_service
+ audio_service
+ audioserver_service
+ batteryproperties_service
+ batterystats_service
+ cameraserver_service
+ connectivity_service
+ connmetrics_service
+ deviceidle_service
+ display_service
+ dropbox_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ font_service
+ game_service
+ gpu_service
+ graphicsstats_service
+ hardware_properties_service
+ hint_service
+ imms_service
+ input_method_service
+ input_service
+ IProxyService_service
+ ipsec_service
+ launcherapps_service
+ legacy_permission_service
+ light_service
+ locale_service
+ media_communication_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ mediaextractor_service
+ mediametrics_service
+ media_projection_service
+ media_router_service
+ mediaserver_service
+ media_session_service
+ memtrackproxy_service
+ midi_service
+ netpolicy_service
+ netstats_service
+ network_management_service
+ notification_service
+ package_service
+ permission_checker_service
+ permission_service
+ permissionmgr_service
+ platform_compat_service
+ power_service
+ procstats_service
+ radio_service
+ registry_service
+ restrictions_service
+ rttmanager_service
+ search_service
+ selection_toolbar_service
+ sensor_privacy_service
+ sensorservice_service
+ servicediscovery_service
+ settings_service
+ speech_recognition_service
+ statusbar_service
+ storagestats_service
+ surfaceflinger_service
+ telecom_service
+ tethering_service
+ textclassification_service
+ textservices_service
+ texttospeech_service
+ thermal_service
+ translation_service
+ tv_iapp_service
+ tv_input_service
+ uimode_service
+ vcn_management_service
+ webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index bc68209..957d005 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
# fromRunAs (boolean)
# isIsolatedComputeApp (boolean)
# isSdkSandboxNext (boolean)
+# isSdkSandboxAudit (boolean)
#
# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
# An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
@@ -49,10 +50,30 @@
# to provide isolated processes with relaxed security restrictions.
# An unspecified isIsolatedComputeApp defaults to false.
#
+# The sdk_sandbox_next and sdk_sandbox_audit domains are special domains for the
+# SDK sandbox process. sdk_sandbox_next defines the set of restrictions proposed
+# for the upcoming dessert release. sdk_sandbox_audit uses the same restrictions
+# as the current dessert release, with additional auditing rules for the accesses
+# we are considering forbidding in the upcoming release.
+#
+# The sdk_sandbox_next and sdk_sandbox_audit domains are special domains for the
+# SDK sandbox process. sdk_sandbox_next defines the set of restrictions proposed
+# for the upcoming dessert release. sdk_sandbox_audit uses the same restrictions
+# as the current dessert release, with additional auditing rules for the accesses
+# we are considering forbidding in the upcoming release.
+#
# isSdkSandboxNext=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
# sdk_sandbox_next sepolicy applied to them.
# An unspecified isSdkSandboxNext defaults to false.
#
+# isSdkSandboxAudit=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_audit sepolicy applied to them.
+# An unspecified isSdkSandboxAudit defaults to false.
+#
+# isSdkSandboxAudit=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_audit sepolicy applied to them.
+# An unspecified isSdkSandboxAudit defaults to false.
+#
# Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
# (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
# seapp_context_cmp()).
@@ -161,7 +182,6 @@
user=_app seinfo=platform name=com.android.traceur domain=traceur_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=system seinfo=platform domain=system_app type=system_app_data_file
user=system seinfo=platform isPrivApp=true name=com.android.DeviceAsWebcam domain=device_as_webcam type=system_app_data_file levelFrom=all
-user=system seinfo=platform isPrivApp=true name=com.android.virtualcamera domain=virtual_camera type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
user=bluetooth seinfo=bluetooth domain=bluetooth type=bluetooth_data_file
user=network_stack seinfo=network_stack domain=network_stack type=radio_data_file
user=nfc seinfo=platform domain=nfc type=nfc_data_file
@@ -174,6 +194,7 @@
user=_isolated isIsolatedComputeApp=true domain=isolated_compute_app levelFrom=user
user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox_34 type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxNext=true domain=sdk_sandbox_next type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxAudit=true domain=sdk_sandbox_audit type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/service.te b/private/service.te
index 861afb3..2f5241c 100644
--- a/private/service.te
+++ b/private/service.te
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
type ambient_context_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type attention_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type bg_install_control_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type bg_install_control_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type compos_service, service_manager_type;
type communal_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type dynamic_system_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
type statsmanager_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type tracingproxy_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type transparency_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type vfio_handler_service, service_manager_type;
+
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ type vfio_handler_service, service_manager_type;
+')
+
type uce_service, service_manager_type;
type wearable_sensing_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index a1fb06b..091ab99 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default u:object_r:fwk_altitude_service:s0
android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default u:object_r:fwk_stats_service:s0
android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default u:object_r:fwk_sensor_service:s0
+android.frameworks.vibrator.IVibratorControlService/default u:object_r:fwk_vibrator_control_service:s0
android.hardware.audio.core.IConfig/default u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
# 'default' IModule is equivalent to 'primary' in HIDL
android.hardware.audio.core.IModule/default u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@
android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint.IFingerprint/default u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_service:s0
android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint.IFingerprint/virtual u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_service:s0
android.hardware.bluetooth.IBluetoothHci/default u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_service:s0
+android.hardware.bluetooth.finder.IBluetoothFinder/default u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_service:s0
android.hardware.bluetooth.audio.IBluetoothAudioProviderFactory/default u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
android.hardware.broadcastradio.IBroadcastRadio/amfm u:object_r:hal_broadcastradio_service:s0
android.hardware.broadcastradio.IBroadcastRadio/dab u:object_r:hal_broadcastradio_service:s0
@@ -51,6 +53,7 @@
android.hardware.input.processor.IInputProcessor/default u:object_r:hal_input_processor_service:s0
android.hardware.ir.IConsumerIr/default u:object_r:hal_ir_service:s0
android.hardware.light.ILights/default u:object_r:hal_light_service:s0
+android.hardware.macsec.IMacsecPskPlugin/default u:object_r:hal_macsec_service:s0
android.hardware.media.c2.IComponentStore/default u:object_r:hal_codec2_service:s0
android.hardware.media.c2.IComponentStore/software u:object_r:hal_codec2_service:s0
android.hardware.memtrack.IMemtrack/default u:object_r:hal_memtrack_service:s0
@@ -89,8 +92,10 @@
android.hardware.radio.voice.IRadioVoice/slot2 u:object_r:hal_radio_service:s0
android.hardware.radio.voice.IRadioVoice/slot3 u:object_r:hal_radio_service:s0
android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.authgraph.IAuthGraphKeyExchange/nonsecure u:object_r:hal_authgraph_service:s0
android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintDevice/default u:object_r:hal_keymint_service:s0
android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/default u:object_r:hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.keymint.IRemotelyProvisionedComponent/avf u:object_r:hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service:s0
android.hardware.gatekeeper.IGatekeeper/default u:object_r:hal_gatekeeper_service:s0
android.hardware.security.secureclock.ISecureClock/default u:object_r:hal_secureclock_service:s0
android.hardware.security.sharedsecret.ISharedSecret/default u:object_r:hal_sharedsecret_service:s0
@@ -120,6 +125,8 @@
android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM1 u:object_r:hal_secure_element_service:s0
android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM2 u:object_r:hal_secure_element_service:s0
android.hardware.secure_element.ISecureElement/SIM3 u:object_r:hal_secure_element_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper/default u:object_r:hal_secretkeeper_service:s0
+android.hardware.security.secretkeeper.ISecretkeeper/nonsecure u:object_r:hal_secretkeeper_service:s0
android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default u:object_r:keystore_service:s0
android.system.net.netd.INetd/default u:object_r:system_net_netd_service:s0
android.system.suspend.ISystemSuspend/default u:object_r:hal_system_suspend_service:s0
@@ -150,7 +157,9 @@
android.service.gatekeeper.IGateKeeperService u:object_r:gatekeeper_service:s0
android.system.composd u:object_r:compos_service:s0
android.system.virtualizationservice u:object_r:virtualization_service:s0
-android.system.virtualizationservice_internal.IVfioHandler u:object_r:vfio_handler_service:s0
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ android.system.virtualizationservice_internal.IVfioHandler u:object_r:vfio_handler_service:s0
+')
ambient_context u:object_r:ambient_context_service:s0
app_binding u:object_r:app_binding_service:s0
app_hibernation u:object_r:app_hibernation_service:s0
@@ -368,6 +377,7 @@
search_ui u:object_r:search_ui_service:s0
secure_element u:object_r:secure_element_service:s0
sec_key_att_app_id_provider u:object_r:sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:s0
+security_state u:object_r:security_state_service:s0
selection_toolbar u:object_r:selection_toolbar_service:s0
sensorservice u:object_r:sensorservice_service:s0
sensor_privacy u:object_r:sensor_privacy_service:s0
@@ -420,6 +430,7 @@
translation u:object_r:translation_service:s0
transparency u:object_r:transparency_service:s0
trust u:object_r:trust_service:s0
+tv_ad u:object_r:tv_ad_service:s0
tv_interactive_app u:object_r:tv_iapp_service:s0
tv_input u:object_r:tv_input_service:s0
tv_tuner_resource_mgr u:object_r:tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service:s0
@@ -434,6 +445,7 @@
vcn_management u:object_r:vcn_management_service:s0
vibrator u:object_r:vibrator_service:s0
vibrator_manager u:object_r:vibrator_manager_service:s0
+virtual_camera u:object_r:virtual_camera_service:s0
virtualdevice u:object_r:virtual_device_service:s0
virtualdevice_native u:object_r:virtual_device_native_service:s0
virtual_touchpad u:object_r:virtual_touchpad_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index aa6bef8..f32395e 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@
allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
+# Allow shell to read microdroid vendor image
+r_dir_file(shell, vendor_microdroid_file)
+
# Allow shell to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml and the vendor apexes
allow shell apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
allow shell vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
@@ -156,6 +159,8 @@
# Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable
# property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization).
set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop)
+# adjust SELinux audit rates
+set_prop(shell, logd_auditrate_prop)
# adjust is_loggable properties
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
# logpersist script
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 720bb7f..31e10bb 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
set_prop(system_app, usb_control_prop)
set_prop(system_app, usb_prop)
set_prop(system_app, log_tag_prop)
+set_prop(system_app, drm_forcel3_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_app, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
auditallow system_app net_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app usb_control_prop:property_service set;
@@ -117,7 +118,8 @@
# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
dontaudit system_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
-# Ignore access to zram when Debug.getMemInfo is called.
+# Ignore access to memory properties for Settings.
+dontaudit system_app proc_pagetypeinfo:file r_file_perms;
dontaudit system_app sysfs_zram:dir search;
allow system_app keystore:keystore2_key {
@@ -166,6 +168,9 @@
# Settings app reads ro.usb.uvc.enabled
get_prop(system_app, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
+# Settings and Launcher apps read pm.archiving.enabled
+get_prop(system_app, pm_archiving_enabled_prop)
+
###
### Neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index efdeff4..474a7b6 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@
binder_call(system_server, statsd)
binder_call(system_server, storaged)
binder_call(system_server, update_engine)
+binder_call(system_server, virtual_camera)
binder_call(system_server, vold)
binder_call(system_server, logd)
binder_call(system_server, wificond)
@@ -306,6 +307,7 @@
# Use HALs
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_audio)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authgraph)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_codec2)
@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power_stats)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_rebootescrow)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_sensors)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tetheroffload)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_thermal)
@@ -385,6 +388,7 @@
mediatuner
netd
sdcardd
+ servicemanager
statsd
surfaceflinger
vold
@@ -477,6 +481,8 @@
allow system_server rtc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server uhid_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow system_server hidraw_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow system_server hidraw_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# write access to ALSA interfaces (/dev/snd/*) needed for MIDI
allow system_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
@@ -927,6 +933,9 @@
allow system_server sysfs_zram:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_zram:file rw_file_perms;
+# Read /sys/fs/selinux/policy
+allow system_server kernel:security read_policy;
+
add_service(system_server, system_server_service);
allow system_server artd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server audioserver_service:service_manager find;
@@ -979,6 +988,7 @@
change_user
clear_ns
clear_uid
+ get_last_auth_time
lock
pull_metrics
reset
@@ -1180,6 +1190,9 @@
allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
# in order to invoke side effect of close() on such a socket calling synchronize_rcu()
allow system_server self:key_socket create;
+# Java's Os.close() in libcore/luni/src/main/java/libcore/io/BlockGuardOs.java;l=100
+# calls if (fd.isSocket$()) if (isLingerSocket(fd)) ...
+dontaudit system_server self:key_socket getopt;
# Allow system_server to start clatd in its own domain and kill it.
domain_auto_trans(system_server, clatd_exec, clatd)
diff --git a/private/vfio_handler.te b/private/vfio_handler.te
index 1b553e9..963809e 100644
--- a/private/vfio_handler.te
+++ b/private/vfio_handler.te
@@ -1,35 +1,37 @@
-# vfio_handler is a helper service for VFIO tasks, like binding platform devices to VFIO driver.
-# vfio_handler is separate from virtualizationservice as VFIO tasks require root.
-type vfio_handler, domain, coredomain;
-type vfio_handler_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ # vfio_handler is a helper service for VFIO tasks, like binding platform devices to VFIO driver.
+ # vfio_handler is separate from virtualizationservice as VFIO tasks require root.
+ type vfio_handler, domain, coredomain;
+ type vfio_handler_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
-# When init runs a file labelled with vfio_handler_exec, run it in the vfio_handler domain.
-init_daemon_domain(vfio_handler)
+ # When init runs a file labelled with vfio_handler_exec, run it in the vfio_handler domain.
+ init_daemon_domain(vfio_handler)
-# Let the vfio_handler domain register the vfio_handler_service with ServiceManager.
-add_service(vfio_handler, vfio_handler_service)
+ # Let the vfio_handler domain register the vfio_handler_service with ServiceManager.
+ add_service(vfio_handler, vfio_handler_service)
-# Let the vfio_handler domain use Binder.
-binder_use(vfio_handler)
+ # Let the vfio_handler domain use Binder.
+ binder_use(vfio_handler)
-# Allow vfio_handler to check if VFIO is supported
-allow vfio_handler vfio_device:chr_file getattr;
-allow vfio_handler vfio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+ # Allow vfio_handler to check if VFIO is supported
+ allow vfio_handler vfio_device:chr_file getattr;
+ allow vfio_handler vfio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
-# Allow vfio_handler to bind/unbind platform devices
-allow vfio_handler sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow vfio_handler sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
+ # Allow vfio_handler to bind/unbind platform devices
+ allow vfio_handler sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
+ allow vfio_handler sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
-# Allow vfio_handler to write to VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationservice.
-allow vfio_handler virtualizationservice:fd use;
-allow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file write;
+ # Allow vfio_handler to write to VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationservice.
+ allow vfio_handler virtualizationservice:fd use;
+ allow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file write;
-# vfio_handler can only use fd from virtualizationservice, and can't open files itself
-neverallow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file { open create };
+ # vfio_handler can only use fd from virtualizationservice, and cannot open files itself
+ neverallow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file { open create };
-# Allow vfio_handler to search /dev/block for accessing dtbo.img
-allow vfio_handler block_device:dir search;
-allow vfio_handler dtbo_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+ # Allow vfio_handler to search /dev/block for accessing dtbo.img
+ allow vfio_handler block_device:dir search;
+ allow vfio_handler dtbo_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
-# Only vfio_handler can add vfio_handler_service
-neverallow { domain -vfio_handler } vfio_handler_service:service_manager add;
+ # Only vfio_handler can add vfio_handler_service
+ neverallow { domain -vfio_handler } vfio_handler_service:service_manager add;
+') # is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT)
diff --git a/private/virtual_camera.te b/private/virtual_camera.te
index 765a59f..4c4ac7a 100644
--- a/private/virtual_camera.te
+++ b/private/virtual_camera.te
@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@
# hal_server_domain(virtual_camera, hal_camera) macro but only the rules that
# we actually need from halserverdomain and hal_camera_server:
binder_use(virtual_camera)
+binder_call(virtual_camera, cameraserver)
+binder_call(virtual_camera, system_server)
+
+
+# Allow virtualCamera to call apps via binder.
+binder_call(virtual_camera, appdomain)
# Allow virtual_camera to use fd from apps
allow virtual_camera { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
@@ -18,3 +24,14 @@
# Allow virtual_camera to map graphic buffers
hal_client_domain(virtual_camera, hal_graphics_allocator)
+
+# Allow virtual_camera to use GPU
+allow virtual_camera gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow virtual_camera gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# For collecting bugreports.
+allow virtual_camera dumpstate:fd use;
+allow virtual_camera dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
+# Needed for permission checks.
+allow virtual_camera permission_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/virtualizationmanager.te b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
index d6f0e19..40d95c6 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationmanager.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
@@ -94,6 +94,13 @@
allow virtualizationmanager shell_data_file:file open;
')
+# Allow virtualizationmanager to read microdroid related files in vendor partition
+r_dir_file(virtualizationmanager, vendor_microdroid_file)
+
+# Do not allow writing vendor_microdroid_file from any process.
+neverallow { domain recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')') } vendor_microdroid_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+neverallow { domain recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')') } vendor_microdroid_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
# Allow reading files under /proc/[crosvm pid]/, for collecting CPU & memory usage inside VM.
r_dir_file(virtualizationmanager, crosvm);
diff --git a/private/virtualizationservice.te b/private/virtualizationservice.te
index 93cd04c..e17797e 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationservice.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationservice.te
@@ -15,9 +15,15 @@
# Let the virtualizationservice domain register the virtualization_service with ServiceManager.
add_service(virtualizationservice, virtualization_service)
-# Let virtualizationservice find and communicate with vfio_handler.
-allow virtualizationservice vfio_handler_service:service_manager find;
-binder_call(virtualizationservice, vfio_handler)
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ # Let virtualizationservice find and communicate with vfio_handler.
+ allow virtualizationservice vfio_handler_service:service_manager find;
+ binder_call(virtualizationservice, vfio_handler)
+')
+
+# Allow the virtualizationservice domain to serve a remotely provisioned component for
+# pVM remote attestation.
+hal_server_domain(virtualizationservice, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf)
# Allow calling into the system server to find "permission_service".
binder_call(virtualizationservice, system_server)
@@ -97,5 +103,7 @@
-virtualizationservice
}:process setrlimit;
-# Only virtualizationservice can communicate to vfio_handler
-neverallow { domain -virtualizationservice -servicemanager } vfio_handler:binder call;
+is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_AVF_ENABLE_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT, `
+ # Only virtualizationservice can communicate to vfio_handler
+ neverallow { domain -virtualizationservice -servicemanager } vfio_handler:binder call;
+')
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 0556950..7b05af2 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow webview_zygote properties_device:dir mounton;
+
# Send unsolicited message to system_server
unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index 788dafe..4815ecc 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
user_profile_data_file
# /storage/emulated/$userId/Android/{data,obb}
media_rw_data_file
+ # /dev/__properties__
+ properties_device
}:dir { mounton search };
# Traverse /data_mirror to get to the above directories while their normal paths
diff --git a/public/app.te b/public/app.te
index a45149f..b539913 100644
--- a/public/app.te
+++ b/public/app.te
@@ -110,9 +110,6 @@
apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
- apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
- { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
-neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
@@ -139,11 +136,15 @@
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# access tmp apk files
-neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app }
+neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
+ apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
+ { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
+
+neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_all -platform_app -priv_app -isolated_app_all }
{ apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir_file_class_set *;
-neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
-neverallow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all isolated_app_all } { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ devfile_class_set dir fifo_file lnk_file sock_file } *;
+neverallow { untrusted_app_all isolated_app_all } { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
# Access to factory files.
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index d2b2cc1..759b773 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@
hal_attribute(atrace);
hal_attribute(audio);
hal_attribute(audiocontrol);
+hal_attribute(authgraph);
hal_attribute(authsecret);
hal_attribute(bluetooth);
hal_attribute(bootctl);
@@ -364,6 +365,7 @@
hal_attribute(keymint);
hal_attribute(light);
hal_attribute(lowpan);
+hal_attribute(macsec);
hal_attribute(memtrack);
hal_attribute(neuralnetworks);
hal_attribute(nfc);
@@ -374,6 +376,8 @@
hal_attribute(power_stats);
hal_attribute(rebootescrow);
hal_attribute(remoteaccess);
+hal_attribute(secretkeeper);
+hal_attribute(remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf);
hal_attribute(secure_element);
hal_attribute(sensors);
hal_attribute(telephony);
diff --git a/public/device.te b/public/device.te
index 4a824c9..f842d33 100644
--- a/public/device.te
+++ b/public/device.te
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
type properties_device, dev_type;
type properties_serial, dev_type;
type property_info, dev_type;
+type hidraw_device, dev_type;
# All devices have a uart for the hci
# attach service. The uart dev node
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index bed0d7d..ec8b247 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -337,10 +337,6 @@
allow domain apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
allow domain apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-# Allow everyone to read media server-configurable flags, so that libstagefright can be
-# configured using server-configurable flags
-get_prop(domain, device_config_media_native_prop)
-
###
### neverallow rules
###
@@ -440,6 +436,10 @@
neverallow * init:binder *;
neverallow * vendor_init:binder *;
+# Binderfs logs contain sensitive information about other processes.
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -vendor_init userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') } { binderfs_logs binderfs_logs_proc }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -vendor_init -system_server } binderfs_logs_stats:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
# Don't allow raw read/write/open access to block_device
# Rather force a relabel to a more specific type
neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery } block_device:blk_file { open read write };
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index c52ca15..549e6c6 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@
# Allow dumpstate to call dump() on specific hals.
dump_hal(hal_audio)
dump_hal(hal_audiocontrol)
+dump_hal(hal_authgraph)
dump_hal(hal_authsecret)
dump_hal(hal_bluetooth)
dump_hal(hal_broadcastradio)
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@
dump_hal(hal_power)
dump_hal(hal_power_stats)
dump_hal(hal_rebootescrow)
+dump_hal(hal_secretkeeper)
dump_hal(hal_sensors)
dump_hal(hal_thermal)
dump_hal(hal_vehicle)
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 9496c02..01143f7 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
type proc_min_free_order_shift, fs_type, proc_type;
type proc_kpageflags, fs_type, proc_type;
type proc_watermark_boost_factor, fs_type, proc_type;
+type proc_percpu_pagelist_high_fraction, fs_type, proc_type;
# proc, sysfs, or other nodes that permit configuration of kernel usermodehelpers.
type usermodehelper, fs_type, proc_type;
type sysfs_usermodehelper, fs_type, sysfs_type;
@@ -254,6 +255,9 @@
# Type for all vendor public libraries for system. These libs should only be exposed to
# system. ABI stability of these libs is vendor's responsibility.
type vendor_public_framework_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Type for all microdroid related files in the vendor partition.
+# Files having this type should be read-only.
+type vendor_microdroid_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
# Input configuration
type vendor_keylayout_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
diff --git a/public/hal_authgraph.te b/public/hal_authgraph.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f053cb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_authgraph.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+binder_call(hal_authgraph_client, hal_authgraph_server)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_authgraph, hal_authgraph_service)
+binder_call(hal_authgraph_server, servicemanager)
+
+allow hal_authgraph_server tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_authgraph_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_codec2.te b/public/hal_codec2.te
index f05e00a..60cda48 100644
--- a/public/hal_codec2.te
+++ b/public/hal_codec2.te
@@ -26,3 +26,7 @@
allow hal_codec2_client ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+# codec2 aidl graphic buffer allocation waitable object
+allow hal_codec2_server su:fifo_file read;
+allow hal_codec2_server mediaserver:fifo_file read;
+allow hal_codec2_server untrusted_app_all:fifo_file read;
diff --git a/public/hal_drm.te b/public/hal_drm.te
index 34ca0b2..0ee0c5f 100644
--- a/public/hal_drm.te
+++ b/public/hal_drm.te
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
# Permit reading device's serial number from system properties
get_prop(hal_drm_server, serialno_prop)
+# Permit reading force L3 system property
+get_prop(hal_drm_server, drm_forcel3_prop)
# Read files already opened under /data
allow hal_drm system_data_file:file { getattr read };
diff --git a/public/hal_macsec.te b/public/hal_macsec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27225db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_macsec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Binder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
+binder_call(hal_macsec_client, hal_macsec_server)
+binder_call(hal_macsec_server, hal_macsec_client)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_macsec, hal_macsec_service)
+
+binder_use(hal_macsec_server)
diff --git a/public/hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf.te b/public/hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cc7ce5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# allow binder connection from client to server
+binder_call(hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_client, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_server)
+
+# allow client to find the service, allow server to register the service
+hal_attribute_service(hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf, hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service)
+
+# allow binder communication from server to service_manager
+binder_use(hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_server)
diff --git a/public/hal_secretkeeper.te b/public/hal_secretkeeper.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..359159f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_secretkeeper.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Domains for the Secretkeeper HAL, which provides secure (tamper evident, rollback protected)
+# storage of secrets guarded by DICE policies.
+binder_call(hal_secretkeeper_client, hal_secretkeeper_server)
+
+hal_attribute_service(hal_secretkeeper, hal_secretkeeper_service)
+
+binder_use(hal_secretkeeper_server)
+binder_use(hal_secretkeeper_client)
+
+# The Secretkeeper HAL service needs to communicate with a trusted application running
+# in the TEE, which is represented by the tee_device permission.
+allow hal_secretkeeper_server tee_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_vibrator.te b/public/hal_vibrator.te
index c902495..6909ff2 100644
--- a/public/hal_vibrator.te
+++ b/public/hal_vibrator.te
@@ -12,3 +12,6 @@
# vibrator sysfs rw access
allow hal_vibrator sysfs_vibrator:file rw_file_perms;
allow hal_vibrator sysfs_vibrator:dir search;
+
+# Allow HAL vibrator to control some parameters of a vibration, such as scaling.
+allow hal_vibrator fwk_vibrator_control_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index e552ec2..29dd42d 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
allow init property_type:file { append create getattr map open read relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
-# /dev/__properties__/property_info
+# /dev/__properties__/property_info and /dev/__properties/appcompat_override/property_info
allow init properties_device:file create_file_perms;
allow init property_info:file relabelto;
# /dev/event-log-tags
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 67463a5..b072b5b 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
system_restricted_prop(device_config_surface_flinger_native_boot_prop)
system_restricted_prop(device_config_vendor_system_native_prop)
system_restricted_prop(device_config_vendor_system_native_boot_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(drm_forcel3_prop)
system_restricted_prop(fingerprint_prop)
system_restricted_prop(gwp_asan_prop)
system_restricted_prop(hal_instrumentation_prop)
@@ -103,7 +104,6 @@
system_restricted_prop(vold_status_prop)
system_restricted_prop(vts_status_prop)
-
compatible_property_only(`
# DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
system_restricted_prop(config_prop)
@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@
system_vendor_config_prop(dck_prop)
system_vendor_config_prop(tuner_config_prop)
system_vendor_config_prop(usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(setupwizard_mode_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(pm_archiving_enabled_prop)
# Properties with no restrictions
system_public_prop(adbd_config_prop)
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index e018e40..acbaf4d 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
type diskstats_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type display_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type domain_verification_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type color_display_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type color_display_service, app_api_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type external_vibrator_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type file_integrity_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type font_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@
type fwk_altitude_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type fwk_stats_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type fwk_sensor_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fwk_vibrator_control_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type game_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type gfxinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type gnss_time_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -212,6 +213,7 @@
type search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type search_ui_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type security_state_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type selection_toolbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sensorservice_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sensor_privacy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -242,6 +244,7 @@
type timezonedetector_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type translation_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type trust_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type tv_ad_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type tv_iapp_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type tv_input_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type tv_tuner_resource_mgr_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -279,6 +282,7 @@
type hal_audio_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_audiocontrol_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
+type hal_authgraph_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_authsecret_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_bluetooth_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_bootctl_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
@@ -306,6 +310,7 @@
type hal_ivn_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_keymint_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_light_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
+type hal_macsec_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_memtrack_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_neuralnetworks_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_nfc_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
@@ -315,8 +320,10 @@
type hal_radio_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_rebootescrow_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_remoteaccess_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
+type hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_avf_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_remotelyprovisionedcomponent_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_sensors_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
+type hal_secretkeeper_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_secureclock_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_secure_element_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
type hal_sharedsecret_service, protected_service, hal_service_type, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index 2887740..a893cdb 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
typeattribute su hal_oemlock_client;
typeattribute su hal_power_client;
typeattribute su hal_rebootescrow_client;
+ typeattribute su hal_secretkeeper_client;
typeattribute su hal_secure_element_client;
typeattribute su hal_sensors_client;
typeattribute su hal_telephony_client;
diff --git a/public/update_engine.te b/public/update_engine.te
index f879013..6f79902 100644
--- a/public/update_engine.te
+++ b/public/update_engine.te
@@ -73,3 +73,7 @@
allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
')
+
+# Allow determining filesystems available on system.
+# Needed for checking if overlayfs is enabled
+allow update_engine proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests.py b/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests.py
index 3c51b67..ab01745 100644
--- a/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests.py
+++ b/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests.py
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@
Matcher = Is | Glob | Regex
@dataclass
-class AllowRead:
- """Rule checking if scontext can read the entity"""
+class AllowPerm:
+ """Rule checking if scontext has 'perm' to the entity"""
tclass: str
scontext: set[str]
+ perm: str
@dataclass
@@ -71,7 +72,12 @@
pass
-Rule = AllowRead | ResolveType
+Rule = AllowPerm | ResolveType
+
+
+# Helper for 'read'
+def AllowRead(tclass, scontext):
+ return AllowPerm(tclass, scontext, 'read')
def match_path(path: str, matcher: Matcher) -> bool:
@@ -89,17 +95,17 @@
"""Returns error message if scontext can't read the target"""
errors = []
match rule:
- case AllowRead(tclass, scontext):
+ case AllowPerm(tclass, scontext, perm):
# Test every source in scontext(set)
for s in scontext:
te_rules = list(pol.QueryTERule(scontext={s},
tcontext={tcontext},
tclass={tclass},
- perms={'read'}))
+ perms={perm}))
if len(te_rules) > 0:
continue # no errors
- errors.append(f"Error: {path}: {s} can't read. (tcontext={tcontext})")
+ errors.append(f"Error: {path}: {s} can't {perm}. (tcontext={tcontext})")
case ResolveType():
if tcontext not in pol.GetAllTypes(False):
errors.append(f"Error: {path}: tcontext({tcontext}) is unknown")
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@
(Glob('./etc/vintf/*.xml'), AllowRead('file', {'servicemanager', 'apexd'})),
# ./ and apex_manifest.pb
(Is('./apex_manifest.pb'), AllowRead('file', {'linkerconfig', 'apexd'})),
- (Is('./'), AllowRead('dir', {'linkerconfig', 'apexd'})),
+ (Is('./'), AllowPerm('dir', {'linkerconfig', 'apexd'}, 'search')),
# linker.config.pb
(Is('./etc/linker.config.pb'), AllowRead('file', {'linkerconfig'})),
]
diff --git a/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests_test.py b/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests_test.py
index 6e719ed..3fee43d 100644
--- a/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests_test.py
+++ b/tests/apex_sepolicy_tests_test.py
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
self.assert_error('./etc/linker.config.pb u:object_r:vendor_file:s0',
r'Error: .*linkerconfig.* can\'t read')
self.assert_error('./ u:object_r:apex_data_file:s0',
- r'Error: .*linkerconfig.* can\'t read')
+ r'Error: .*linkerconfig.* can\'t search')
def test_unknown_label(self):
self.assert_error('./bin/hw/foo u:object_r:foo_exec:s0',
diff --git a/tests/check_prop_prefix.py b/tests/check_prop_prefix.py
index 68511ce..13a7b99 100644
--- a/tests/check_prop_prefix.py
+++ b/tests/check_prop_prefix.py
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
print('%d violations found:' % len(violations))
print('\n'.join(violations))
print('******************************')
- print('%s contains properties which are not properly namespaced.' % args.property_contexts)
+ print("vendor's and odm's property_contexts MUST use ONLY vendor-prefixed properties.")
print('This is enforced by VTS, so please fix such offending properties.')
if args.allowed_property_prefix:
print('Allowed property prefixes for %s: %s' % (args.property_contexts, args.allowed_property_prefix))
diff --git a/tests/policy.py b/tests/policy.py
index 8fc2ef7..98133b7 100644
--- a/tests/policy.py
+++ b/tests/policy.py
@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@
# DoNotMatchPrefix have the attribute Attr.
# For example assert that all types in /sys, and not in /sys/kernel/debugfs
# have the sysfs_type attribute.
- def AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(self, MatchPrefix, DoNotMatchPrefix, Attr):
+ def AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(self, MatchPrefix, DoNotMatchPrefix, Attr, ExcludedTypes = []):
# Query policy for the types associated with Attr
- TypesPol = self.QueryTypeAttribute(Attr, True)
+ TypesPol = self.QueryTypeAttribute(Attr, True) | set(ExcludedTypes)
# Search file_contexts to find paths/types that should be associated with
# Attr.
PathTypes = self.__GetTypesAndFilesByFilePathPrefix(MatchPrefix, DoNotMatchPrefix)
diff --git a/tests/sepolicy_tests.py b/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
index 4ef161b..7a341cb 100644
--- a/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
+++ b/tests/sepolicy_tests.py
@@ -265,6 +265,22 @@
"\"-isolated_app_all\". Violations are shown as the following: \n") + ret
return ret
+def TestDevTypeViolations(pol):
+ exceptions = [
+ "/dev/socket",
+ ]
+ exceptionTypes = [
+ "boringssl_self_test_marker", # /dev/boringssl/selftest
+ "cgroup_rc_file", # /dev/cgroup.rc
+ "dev_cpu_variant", # /dev/cpu_variant:{arch}
+ "fscklogs", # /dev/fscklogs
+ "properties_serial", # /dev/__properties__/properties_serial
+ "property_info", # /dev/__properties__/property_info
+ "runtime_event_log_tags_file", # /dev/event-log-tags
+ ]
+ return pol.AssertPathTypesHaveAttr(["/dev"], exceptions,
+ "dev_type", exceptionTypes)
+
###
# extend OptionParser to allow the same option flag to be used multiple times.
# This is used to allow multiple file_contexts files and tests to be
@@ -298,6 +314,7 @@
"TestCoredomainViolations",
"TestViolatorAttributes",
"TestIsolatedAttributeConsistency",
+ "TestDevTypeViolations",
]
def do_main(libpath):
@@ -366,6 +383,10 @@
if options.test is None or "TestIsolatedAttributeConsistency" in options.test:
results += TestIsolatedAttributeConsistency(test_policy)
+ # dev type test won't be run as default
+ if options.test and "TestDevTypeViolations" in options.test:
+ results += TestDevTypeViolations(pol)
+
if len(results) > 0:
sys.exit(results)
diff --git a/tools/check_seapp.c b/tools/check_seapp.c
index 21bc87a..02882af 100644
--- a/tools/check_seapp.c
+++ b/tools/check_seapp.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
{ .name = "minTargetSdkVersion", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_uint },
{ .name = "fromRunAs", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
{ .name = "isIsolatedComputeApp", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+ { .name = "isSdkSandboxAudit", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
{ .name = "isSdkSandboxNext", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
/*Outputs*/
{ .name = "domain", .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_domain },
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index efe0b71..2790ef4 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service\.btlinux u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_btlinux_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth-service.default u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth\.finder-service\.default u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face@1\.[0-9]+-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.fingerprint@2\.1-service u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_default_exec:s0
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.light@2\.0-service-lazy u:object_r:hal_light_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.lights-service\.example u:object_r:hal_light_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.lowpan@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_lowpan_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.macsec-service u:object_r:hal_macsec_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.c2-default-service u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.memtrack@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_memtrack_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.memtrack-service.example u:object_r:hal_memtrack_default_exec:s0
@@ -97,7 +99,9 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors-service(\.multihal)? u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element-service.example u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.authgraph-service\.nonsecure u:object_r:hal_authgraph_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.keymint-service u:object_r:hal_keymint_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.security\.secretkeeper-service.nonsecure u:object_r:hal_secretkeeper_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tetheroffload-service\.example u:object_r:hal_tetheroffload_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.thermal@1\.[01]-service u:object_r:hal_thermal_default_exec:s0
@@ -125,6 +129,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.wifi-service-lazy u:object_r:hal_wifi_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/hostapd u:object_r:hal_wifi_hostapd_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/wpa_supplicant u:object_r:hal_wifi_supplicant_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/wpa_supplicant_macsec u:object_r:wpa_supplicant_macsec_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/install-recovery\.sh u:object_r:vendor_install_recovery_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/ot-rcp u:object_r:ot_rcp_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/vndservicemanager u:object_r:vndservicemanager_exec:s0
@@ -168,7 +173,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hardware\.graphics\.mapper@4\.0\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hardware\.renderscript@1\.0\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hidl\.memory\.token@1\.0\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
-/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hidl\.memory@1\.0-impl\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw/android\.hidl\.memory@1\.0-impl\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hidl\.memory@1\.0\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/android\.hidl\.safe_union@1\.0\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/libRSCpuRef\.so u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_authgraph_default.te b/vendor/hal_authgraph_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1676cca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_authgraph_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_authgraph_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_authgraph_default, hal_authgraph)
+
+type hal_authgraph_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_authgraph_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te b/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
index ab474d6..4b4ee46 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
init_daemon_domain(hal_drm_clearkey_aidl)
hal_server_domain(hal_drm_clearkey_aidl, hal_drm)
+allow hal_drm_clearkey_aidl mediacodec:fd use;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_macsec_default.te b/vendor/hal_macsec_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19b3d16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_macsec_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type hal_macsec_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_macsec_default, hal_macsec)
+
+type hal_macsec_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_macsec_default)
+
+# Allow registering with service manager.
+binder_call(hal_macsec_default, servicemanager)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_secretkeeper_default.te b/vendor/hal_secretkeeper_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50f4ac1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_secretkeeper_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_secretkeeper_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_secretkeeper_default, hal_secretkeeper)
+
+type hal_secretkeeper_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_secretkeeper_default)
diff --git a/vendor/wpa_supplicant_macsec.te b/vendor/wpa_supplicant_macsec.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b90ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/wpa_supplicant_macsec.te
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# wpa supplicant macsec or equivalent
+type wpa_supplicant_macsec, domain;
+type wpa_supplicant_macsec_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(wpa_supplicant_macsec)
+
+net_domain(wpa_supplicant_macsec)
+
+# Allow wpa_supplicant to configure nl80211
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec proc_net_type:file write;
+
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant wpa_supplicant_macsec priv_sock_ioctls.
+allowxperm wpa_supplicant_macsec self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+
+r_dir_file(wpa_supplicant_macsec, sysfs_type)
+r_dir_file(wpa_supplicant_macsec, proc_net_type)
+
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec self:global_capability_class_set { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec cgroup_v2:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+allow wpa_supplicant_macsec self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
+allowxperm wpa_supplicant_macsec self:packet_socket ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls priv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
+
+binder_use(wpa_supplicant_macsec)
+hal_client_domain(wpa_supplicant_macsec, hal_macsec)
+
