| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 1997, 2005, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. |
| * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. |
| * |
| * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it |
| * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as |
| * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this |
| * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided |
| * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. |
| * |
| * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT |
| * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or |
| * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License |
| * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that |
| * accompanied this code). |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version |
| * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, |
| * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
| * |
| * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA |
| * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any |
| * questions. |
| */ |
| |
| package java.lang; |
| |
| import java.security.*; |
| import java.util.Enumeration; |
| import java.util.Hashtable; |
| import java.util.StringTokenizer; |
| |
| /** |
| * This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission |
| * contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but |
| * no actions list; you either have the named permission |
| * or you don't. |
| * |
| * <P> |
| * The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The |
| * naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. |
| * Also, an asterisk |
| * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to |
| * signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" or "*" is valid, |
| * "*loadLibrary" or "a*b" is not valid. |
| * <P> |
| * The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names, |
| * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows |
| * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission. |
| * <P> |
| * |
| * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name, |
| * what the target allows,and associated risks"> |
| * <tr> |
| * <th>Permission Target Name</th> |
| * <th>What the Permission Allows</th> |
| * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>createClassLoader</td> |
| * <td>Creation of a class loader</td> |
| * <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant. |
| * Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class |
| * loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system. |
| * These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection |
| * domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the |
| * classes the permissions for that domain.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>getClassLoader</td> |
| * <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling |
| * class)</td> |
| * <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the |
| * class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because |
| * having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to |
| * load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker |
| * would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>setContextClassLoader</td> |
| * <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td> |
| * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions |
| * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system |
| * class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow |
| * code to change which context class loader is used |
| * for a particular thread, including system threads.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td> |
| * <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td> |
| * <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions |
| * when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system |
| * class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow |
| * a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used |
| * to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>closeClassLoader</td> |
| * <td>Closing of a ClassLoader</td> |
| * <td>Granting this permission allows code to close any URLClassLoader |
| * that it has a reference to.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>setSecurityManager</td> |
| * <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one) |
| * </td> |
| * <td>The security manager is a class that allows |
| * applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager |
| * permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by |
| * installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager, |
| * thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original |
| * security manager.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>createSecurityManager</td> |
| * <td>Creation of a new security manager</td> |
| * <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may |
| * disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>getenv.{variable name}</td> |
| * <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td> |
| * <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the |
| * existence, of a particular environment variable. This is |
| * dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>exitVM.{exit status}</td> |
| * <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status</td> |
| * <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack |
| * by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt. |
| * Note: The "exitVM.*" permission is automatically granted to all code |
| * loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications |
| * to terminate themselves. Also, the "exitVM" permission is equivalent to |
| * "exitVM.*".</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>shutdownHooks</td> |
| * <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td> |
| * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown |
| * hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>setFactory</td> |
| * <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket, |
| * or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td> |
| * <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation |
| * for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory. |
| * An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data |
| * stream.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>setIO</td> |
| * <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td> |
| * <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams. |
| * An attacker may change System.in to monitor and |
| * steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream, |
| * which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>modifyThread</td> |
| * <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread |
| * <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>, |
| * <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>, |
| * <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt> |
| * methods</td> |
| * <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of |
| * any thread in the system.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>stopThread</td> |
| * <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code> |
| * method</td> |
| * <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is |
| * already granted permission to access that thread. |
| * This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by |
| * killing existing threads.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>modifyThreadGroup</td> |
| * <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup |
| * <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>, |
| * <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>, |
| * and <code>suspend</code> methods</td> |
| * <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and |
| * set their run priority.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>getProtectionDomain</td> |
| * <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td> |
| * <td>This allows code to obtain policy information |
| * for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information |
| * does not compromise the security of the system, it does give |
| * attackers additional information, such as local file names for |
| * example, to better aim an attack.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>getFileSystemAttributes</td> |
| * <td>Retrieval of file system attributes</td> |
| * <td>This allows code to obtain file system information such as disk usage |
| * or disk space available to the caller. This is potentially dangerous |
| * because it discloses information about the system hardware |
| * configuration and some information about the caller's privilege to |
| * write files.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>readFileDescriptor</td> |
| * <td>Reading of file descriptors</td> |
| * <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated |
| * with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file |
| * contains confidential data.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>writeFileDescriptor</td> |
| * <td>Writing to file descriptors</td> |
| * <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated |
| * with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow |
| * malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up |
| * your entire disk.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td> |
| * <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td> |
| * <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code |
| * libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and |
| * does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td> |
| * <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's |
| * <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls |
| * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td> |
| * <td>This gives code access to classes in packages |
| * to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code |
| * may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise |
| * security in the system.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td> |
| * <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class |
| * loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls |
| * the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td> |
| * <td>This grants code permission to define a class |
| * in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious |
| * code with this permission may define rogue classes in |
| * trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>, |
| * for example.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td> |
| * <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td> |
| * <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public, |
| * protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or |
| * methods. Although the code would have |
| * access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not |
| * have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able |
| * to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code |
| * may use this information to better aim an attack. |
| * Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields |
| * in the class. This could be dangerous if |
| * the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or |
| * access the fields because |
| * it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods |
| * and fields. |
| </td> |
| * </tr> |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>queuePrintJob</td> |
| * <td>Initiation of a print job request</td> |
| * <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer, |
| * or simply waste paper.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>getStackTrace</td> |
| * <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td> |
| * <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of |
| * another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the |
| * execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td> |
| * <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread |
| * terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td> |
| * <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious |
| * uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination |
| * of a thread</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>preferences</td> |
| * <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the |
| * java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root |
| * which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the |
| * Preferences persistent backing store.) </td> |
| * <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the |
| * preferences backing store if the user running the code has |
| * sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store. |
| * The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem |
| * directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * |
| * <tr> |
| * <td>usePolicy</td> |
| * <td>Granting this permission disables the Java Plug-In's default |
| * security prompting behavior.</td> |
| * <td>For more information, refer to Java Plug-In's guides, <a href= |
| * "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/security.html"> |
| * Applet Security Basics</a> and <a href= |
| * "../../../technotes/guides/plugin/developer_guide/rsa_how.html#use"> |
| * usePolicy Permission</a>.</td> |
| * </tr> |
| * </table> |
| * |
| * @see java.security.BasicPermission |
| * @see java.security.Permission |
| * @see java.security.Permissions |
| * @see java.security.PermissionCollection |
| * @see java.lang.SecurityManager |
| * |
| * |
| * @author Marianne Mueller |
| * @author Roland Schemers |
| */ |
| |
| public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission { |
| |
| private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L; |
| |
| /** |
| * Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name. |
| * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as |
| * "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk |
| * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to |
| * signify a wildcard match. |
| * |
| * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. |
| * |
| * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. |
| * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. |
| */ |
| |
| public RuntimePermission(String name) |
| { |
| super(name); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name. |
| * The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the |
| * actions String is currently unused and should be null. |
| * |
| * @param name the name of the RuntimePermission. |
| * @param actions should be null. |
| * |
| * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>. |
| * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty. |
| */ |
| |
| public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions) |
| { |
| super(name, actions); |
| } |
| } |