blob: b5b799330e5216c87d875d4f8c6d90c7dda7379f [file] [log] [blame]
# init switches to init domain (via init.rc).
type init, domain;
# init is unconfined.
allow init self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
# Run helpers from / or /system without changing domain.
# We do not include exec_type here since generally those
# should always involve a domain transition.
allow init rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
allow init system_file:file execute_no_trans;
# Running e2fsck or mkswap via fs_mgr.
allow init dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
# Mounting filesystems.
# Only allow relabelto for types used in context= mount options,
# which should all be assigned the contextmount_type attribute.
# This can be done in device-specific policy via type or typeattribute
# declarations.
allow init fs_type:filesystem ~relabelto;
allow init unlabeled:filesystem ~relabelto;
allow init contextmount_type:filesystem relabelto;
# Allow read-only access to context= mounted filesystems.
allow init contextmount_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow init contextmount_type:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
# restorecon /adb_keys or any other rootfs files to a more specific type.
allow init rootfs:file relabelfrom;
# restorecon and restorecon_recursive calls from init.rc files.
# system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
# init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
# we just allow all file types except /system files here.
allow init {file_type -system_file -exec_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow init sysfs_type:{ dir file lnk_file } relabelto;
# Unlabeled file access for upgrades from 4.2.
allow init unlabeled:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
allow init unlabeled:notdevfile_class_set { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
# Create /data/security from init.rc post-fs-data.
allow init security_file:dir { create setattr };
# setprop selinux.reload_policy 1 from init.rc post-fs-data.
allow init security_prop:property_service set;
# Reload policy upon setprop selinux.reload_policy 1.
r_dir_file(init, security_file)
allow init kernel:security load_policy;
# Any operation that can modify the kernel ring buffer, e.g. clear
# or a read that consumes the messages that were read.
allow init kernel:system syslog_mod;
# Set usermodehelpers and /proc security settings.
allow init usermodehelper:file rw_file_perms;
allow init proc_security:file rw_file_perms;
# Transitions to seclabel processes in init.rc
domain_trans(init, rootfs, adbd)
domain_trans(init, rootfs, healthd)
domain_trans(init, rootfs, recovery)
domain_trans(init, shell_exec, shell)
domain_trans(init, rootfs, ueventd)
domain_trans(init, rootfs, watchdogd)
# Certain domains need LD_PRELOAD passed from init.
# For now, allow it to most domains.
# TODO: scope this down.
allow init { domain -lmkd }:process noatsecure;
# Support "adb shell stop"
allow init domain:process sigkill;
# Init creates keystore's directory on boot, and walks through
# the directory as part of a recursive restorecon.
allow init keystore_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
allow init keystore_data_file:file { getattr };
# Init creates /data/local/tmp at boot
allow init shell_data_file:dir { open create read getattr setattr search };
allow init shell_data_file:file { getattr };
# Use setexeccon(), setfscreatecon(), and setsockcreatecon().
# setexec is for services with seclabel options.
# setfscreate is for labeling directories and socket files.
# setsockcreate is for labeling local/unix domain sockets.
allow init self:process { setexec setfscreate setsockcreate };
# Create /data/property and files within it.
allow init property_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow init property_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Set any property.
allow init property_type:property_service set;
# Run "ifup lo" to bring up the localhost interface
allow init self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
# This line seems suspect, as it should not really need to
# set scheduling parameters for a kernel domain task.
allow init kernel:process setsched;
### neverallow rules
# The init domain is only entered via setcon from the kernel domain,
# never via an exec-based transition.
neverallow { domain -kernel} init:process dyntransition;
neverallow domain init:process transition;
neverallow init { file_type fs_type }:file entrypoint;