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// Copyright 2015-2016 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! Verification of RSA signatures.
use super::{parse_public_key, RsaParameters, N, PUBLIC_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_LEN};
use crate::{
arithmetic::{bigint, montgomery::Unencoded},
bits, cpu, digest, error,
limb::LIMB_BYTES,
sealed, signature,
};
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Key {
pub n: bigint::Modulus<N>,
pub e: bigint::PublicExponent,
pub n_bits: bits::BitLength,
}
impl Key {
pub fn from_modulus_and_exponent(
n: untrusted::Input,
e: untrusted::Input,
n_min_bits: bits::BitLength,
n_max_bits: bits::BitLength,
e_min_value: u64,
) -> Result<Self, error::KeyRejected> {
// This is an incomplete implementation of NIST SP800-56Br1 Section
// 6.4.2.2, "Partial Public-Key Validation for RSA." That spec defers
// to NIST SP800-89 Section 5.3.3, "(Explicit) Partial Public Key
// Validation for RSA," "with the caveat that the length of the modulus
// shall be a length that is specified in this Recommendation." In
// SP800-89, two different sets of steps are given, one set numbered,
// and one set lettered. TODO: Document this in the end-user
// documentation for RSA keys.
// Step 3 / Step c for `n` (out of order).
let (n, n_bits) = bigint::Modulus::from_be_bytes_with_bit_length(n)?;
// `pkcs1_encode` depends on this not being small. Otherwise,
// `pkcs1_encode` would generate padding that is invalid (too few 0xFF
// bytes) for very small keys.
const N_MIN_BITS: bits::BitLength = bits::BitLength::from_usize_bits(1024);
// Step 1 / Step a. XXX: SP800-56Br1 and SP800-89 require the length of
// the public modulus to be exactly 2048 or 3072 bits, but we are more
// flexible to be compatible with other commonly-used crypto libraries.
assert!(n_min_bits >= N_MIN_BITS);
let n_bits_rounded_up =
bits::BitLength::from_usize_bytes(n_bits.as_usize_bytes_rounded_up())
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| error::KeyRejected::unexpected_error())?;
if n_bits_rounded_up < n_min_bits {
return Err(error::KeyRejected::too_small());
}
if n_bits > n_max_bits {
return Err(error::KeyRejected::too_large());
}
// Step 2 / Step b.
// Step 3 / Step c for `e`.
let e = bigint::PublicExponent::from_be_bytes(e, e_min_value)?;
// If `n` is less than `e` then somebody has probably accidentally swapped
// them. The largest acceptable `e` is smaller than the smallest acceptable
// `n`, so no additional checks need to be done.
// XXX: Steps 4 & 5 / Steps d, e, & f are not implemented. This is also the
// case in most other commonly-used crypto libraries.
Ok(Self { n, e, n_bits })
}
}
impl signature::VerificationAlgorithm for RsaParameters {
fn verify(
&self,
public_key: untrusted::Input,
msg: untrusted::Input,
signature: untrusted::Input,
) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let (n, e) = parse_public_key(public_key)?;
verify_rsa_(
self,
(
n.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input(),
e.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input(),
),
msg,
signature,
)
}
}
impl sealed::Sealed for RsaParameters {}
macro_rules! rsa_params {
( $VERIFY_ALGORITHM:ident, $min_bits:expr, $PADDING_ALGORITHM:expr,
$doc_str:expr ) => {
#[doc=$doc_str]
///
/// Only available in `alloc` mode.
pub static $VERIFY_ALGORITHM: RsaParameters = RsaParameters {
padding_alg: $PADDING_ALGORITHM,
min_bits: bits::BitLength::from_usize_bits($min_bits),
};
};
}
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA1_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
1024,
&super::padding::RSA_PKCS1_SHA1_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 1024-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-1.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA1_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
2048,
&super::padding::RSA_PKCS1_SHA1_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-1.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA256_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
1024,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 1024-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-256.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
2048,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-256.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384,
2048,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-384.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512,
2048,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-512.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_1024_8192_SHA512_FOR_LEGACY_USE_ONLY,
1024,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 1024-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-512.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PKCS1_3072_8192_SHA384,
3072,
&super::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 3072-8192 bits,
PKCS#1.5 padding, and SHA-384.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PKCS1_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA256,
2048,
&super::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PSS padding, and SHA-256.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PSS_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA384,
2048,
&super::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PSS padding, and SHA-384.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PSS_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
rsa_params!(
RSA_PSS_2048_8192_SHA512,
2048,
&super::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
"Verification of signatures using RSA keys of 2048-8192 bits,
PSS padding, and SHA-512.\n\nSee \"`RSA_PSS_*` Details\" in
`ring::signature`'s module-level documentation for more details."
);
/// Low-level API for the verification of RSA signatures.
///
/// When the public key is in DER-encoded PKCS#1 ASN.1 format, it is
/// recommended to use `ring::signature::verify()` with
/// `ring::signature::RSA_PKCS1_*`, because `ring::signature::verify()`
/// will handle the parsing in that case. Otherwise, this function can be used
/// to pass in the raw bytes for the public key components as
/// `untrusted::Input` arguments.
//
// There are a small number of tests that test this directly, but the
// test coverage for this function mostly depends on the test coverage for the
// `signature::VerificationAlgorithm` implementation for `RsaParameters`. If we
// change that, test coverage for `verify_rsa()` will need to be reconsidered.
// (The NIST test vectors were originally in a form that was optimized for
// testing `verify_rsa` directly, but the testing work for RSA PKCS#1
// verification was done during the implementation of
// `signature::VerificationAlgorithm`, before `verify_rsa` was factored out).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RsaPublicKeyComponents<B: AsRef<[u8]> + core::fmt::Debug> {
/// The public modulus, encoded in big-endian bytes without leading zeros.
pub n: B,
/// The public exponent, encoded in big-endian bytes without leading zeros.
pub e: B,
}
impl<B: Copy> Copy for RsaPublicKeyComponents<B> where B: AsRef<[u8]> + core::fmt::Debug {}
impl<B: Clone> Clone for RsaPublicKeyComponents<B>
where
B: AsRef<[u8]> + core::fmt::Debug,
{
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
Self {
n: self.n.clone(),
e: self.e.clone(),
}
}
}
impl<B> RsaPublicKeyComponents<B>
where
B: AsRef<[u8]> + core::fmt::Debug,
{
/// Verifies that `signature` is a valid signature of `message` using `self`
/// as the public key. `params` determine what algorithm parameters
/// (padding, digest algorithm, key length range, etc.) are used in the
/// verification.
pub fn verify(
&self,
params: &RsaParameters,
message: &[u8],
signature: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let _ = cpu::features();
verify_rsa_(
params,
(
untrusted::Input::from(self.n.as_ref()),
untrusted::Input::from(self.e.as_ref()),
),
untrusted::Input::from(message),
untrusted::Input::from(signature),
)
}
}
pub(crate) fn verify_rsa_(
params: &RsaParameters,
(n, e): (untrusted::Input, untrusted::Input),
msg: untrusted::Input,
signature: untrusted::Input,
) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let max_bits = bits::BitLength::from_usize_bytes(PUBLIC_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_LEN)?;
// XXX: FIPS 186-4 seems to indicate that the minimum
// exponent value is 2**16 + 1, but it isn't clear if this is just for
// signing or also for verification. We support exponents of 3 and larger
// for compatibility with other commonly-used crypto libraries.
let Key { n, e, n_bits } = Key::from_modulus_and_exponent(n, e, params.min_bits, max_bits, 3)?;
// The signature must be the same length as the modulus, in bytes.
if signature.len() != n_bits.as_usize_bytes_rounded_up() {
return Err(error::Unspecified);
}
// RFC 8017 Section 5.2.2: RSAVP1.
// Step 1.
let s = bigint::Elem::from_be_bytes_padded(signature, &n)?;
if s.is_zero() {
return Err(error::Unspecified);
}
// Step 2.
let m = bigint::elem_exp_vartime(s, e, &n);
let m = m.into_unencoded(&n);
// Step 3.
let mut decoded = [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_LEN];
let decoded = fill_be_bytes_n(m, n_bits, &mut decoded);
// Verify the padded message is correct.
let m_hash = digest::digest(params.padding_alg.digest_alg(), msg.as_slice_less_safe());
untrusted::Input::from(decoded).read_all(error::Unspecified, |m| {
params.padding_alg.verify(&m_hash, m, n_bits)
})
}
/// Returns the big-endian representation of `elem` that is
/// the same length as the minimal-length big-endian representation of
/// the modulus `n`.
///
/// `n_bits` must be the bit length of the public modulus `n`.
fn fill_be_bytes_n(
elem: bigint::Elem<N, Unencoded>,
n_bits: bits::BitLength,
out: &mut [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_LEN],
) -> &[u8] {
let n_bytes = n_bits.as_usize_bytes_rounded_up();
let n_bytes_padded = ((n_bytes + (LIMB_BYTES - 1)) / LIMB_BYTES) * LIMB_BYTES;
let out = &mut out[..n_bytes_padded];
elem.fill_be_bytes(out);
let (padding, out) = out.split_at(n_bytes_padded - n_bytes);
assert!(padding.iter().all(|&b| b == 0));
out
}