| :mod:`ssl` --- TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects | |
| ================================================= | |
| .. module:: ssl | |
| :synopsis: TLS/SSL wrapper for socket objects | |
| .. moduleauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com> | |
| .. sectionauthor:: Bill Janssen <bill.janssen@gmail.com> | |
| .. index:: single: OpenSSL; (use in module ssl) | |
| .. index:: TLS, SSL, Transport Layer Security, Secure Sockets Layer | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.6 | |
| **Source code:** :source:`Lib/ssl.py` | |
| -------------- | |
| This module provides access to Transport Layer Security (often known as "Secure | |
| Sockets Layer") encryption and peer authentication facilities for network | |
| sockets, both client-side and server-side. This module uses the OpenSSL | |
| library. It is available on all modern Unix systems, Windows, Mac OS X, and | |
| probably additional platforms, as long as OpenSSL is installed on that platform. | |
| .. note:: | |
| Some behavior may be platform dependent, since calls are made to the | |
| operating system socket APIs. The installed version of OpenSSL may also | |
| cause variations in behavior. For example, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 come with | |
| openssl version 1.0.1. | |
| .. warning:: | |
| Don't use this module without reading the :ref:`ssl-security`. Doing so | |
| may lead to a false sense of security, as the default settings of the | |
| ssl module are not necessarily appropriate for your application. | |
| This section documents the objects and functions in the ``ssl`` module; for more | |
| general information about TLS, SSL, and certificates, the reader is referred to | |
| the documents in the "See Also" section at the bottom. | |
| This module provides a class, :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, which is derived from the | |
| :class:`socket.socket` type, and provides a socket-like wrapper that also | |
| encrypts and decrypts the data going over the socket with SSL. It supports | |
| additional methods such as :meth:`getpeercert`, which retrieves the | |
| certificate of the other side of the connection, and :meth:`cipher`,which | |
| retrieves the cipher being used for the secure connection. | |
| For more sophisticated applications, the :class:`ssl.SSLContext` class | |
| helps manage settings and certificates, which can then be inherited | |
| by SSL sockets created through the :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` method. | |
| Functions, Constants, and Exceptions | |
| ------------------------------------ | |
| .. exception:: SSLError | |
| Raised to signal an error from the underlying SSL implementation (currently | |
| provided by the OpenSSL library). This signifies some problem in the | |
| higher-level encryption and authentication layer that's superimposed on the | |
| underlying network connection. This error is a subtype of | |
| :exc:`socket.error`, which in turn is a subtype of :exc:`IOError`. The | |
| error code and message of :exc:`SSLError` instances are provided by the | |
| OpenSSL library. | |
| .. attribute:: library | |
| A string mnemonic designating the OpenSSL submodule in which the error | |
| occurred, such as ``SSL``, ``PEM`` or ``X509``. The range of possible | |
| values depends on the OpenSSL version. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. attribute:: reason | |
| A string mnemonic designating the reason this error occurred, for | |
| example ``CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED``. The range of possible | |
| values depends on the OpenSSL version. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: SSLZeroReturnError | |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when trying to read or write and | |
| the SSL connection has been closed cleanly. Note that this doesn't | |
| mean that the underlying transport (read TCP) has been closed. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: SSLWantReadError | |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket | |
| <ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs | |
| to be received on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be | |
| fulfilled. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: SSLWantWriteError | |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised by a :ref:`non-blocking SSL socket | |
| <ssl-nonblocking>` when trying to read or write data, but more data needs | |
| to be sent on the underlying TCP transport before the request can be | |
| fulfilled. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: SSLSyscallError | |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when a system error was encountered | |
| while trying to fulfill an operation on a SSL socket. Unfortunately, | |
| there is no easy way to inspect the original errno number. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: SSLEOFError | |
| A subclass of :exc:`SSLError` raised when the SSL connection has been | |
| terminated abruptly. Generally, you shouldn't try to reuse the underlying | |
| transport when this error is encountered. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. exception:: CertificateError | |
| Raised to signal an error with a certificate (such as mismatching | |
| hostname). Certificate errors detected by OpenSSL, though, raise | |
| an :exc:`SSLError`. | |
| Socket creation | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The following function allows for standalone socket creation. Starting from | |
| Python 2.7.9, it can be more flexible to use :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` | |
| instead. | |
| .. function:: wrap_socket(sock, keyfile=None, certfile=None, server_side=False, cert_reqs=CERT_NONE, ssl_version={see docs}, ca_certs=None, do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, ciphers=None) | |
| Takes an instance ``sock`` of :class:`socket.socket`, and returns an instance | |
| of :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, a subtype of :class:`socket.socket`, which wraps | |
| the underlying socket in an SSL context. ``sock`` must be a | |
| :data:`~socket.SOCK_STREAM` socket; other socket types are unsupported. | |
| For client-side sockets, the context construction is lazy; if the | |
| underlying socket isn't connected yet, the context construction will be | |
| performed after :meth:`connect` is called on the socket. For | |
| server-side sockets, if the socket has no remote peer, it is assumed | |
| to be a listening socket, and the server-side SSL wrapping is | |
| automatically performed on client connections accepted via the | |
| :meth:`accept` method. :func:`wrap_socket` may raise :exc:`SSLError`. | |
| The ``keyfile`` and ``certfile`` parameters specify optional files which | |
| contain a certificate to be used to identify the local side of the | |
| connection. See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more | |
| information on how the certificate is stored in the ``certfile``. | |
| The parameter ``server_side`` is a boolean which identifies whether | |
| server-side or client-side behavior is desired from this socket. | |
| The parameter ``cert_reqs`` specifies whether a certificate is required from | |
| the other side of the connection, and whether it will be validated if | |
| provided. It must be one of the three values :const:`CERT_NONE` | |
| (certificates ignored), :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` (not required, but validated | |
| if provided), or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` (required and validated). If the | |
| value of this parameter is not :const:`CERT_NONE`, then the ``ca_certs`` | |
| parameter must point to a file of CA certificates. | |
| The ``ca_certs`` file contains a set of concatenated "certification | |
| authority" certificates, which are used to validate certificates passed from | |
| the other end of the connection. See the discussion of | |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the | |
| certificates in this file. | |
| The parameter ``ssl_version`` specifies which version of the SSL protocol to | |
| use. Typically, the server chooses a particular protocol version, and the | |
| client must adapt to the server's choice. Most of the versions are not | |
| interoperable with the other versions. If not specified, the default is | |
| :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`; it provides the most compatibility with other | |
| versions. | |
| Here's a table showing which versions in a client (down the side) can connect | |
| to which versions in a server (along the top): | |
| .. table:: | |
| ======================== ========= ========= ========== ========= =========== =========== | |
| *client* / **server** **SSLv2** **SSLv3** **SSLv23** **TLSv1** **TLSv1.1** **TLSv1.2** | |
| ------------------------ --------- --------- ---------- --------- ----------- ----------- | |
| *SSLv2* yes no yes no no no | |
| *SSLv3* no yes yes no no no | |
| *SSLv23* no yes yes yes yes yes | |
| *TLSv1* no no yes yes no no | |
| *TLSv1.1* no no yes no yes no | |
| *TLSv1.2* no no yes no no yes | |
| ======================== ========= ========= ========== ========= =========== =========== | |
| .. note:: | |
| Which connections succeed will vary depending on the version of | |
| OpenSSL. For example, before OpenSSL 1.0.0, an SSLv23 client | |
| would always attempt SSLv2 connections. | |
| The *ciphers* parameter sets the available ciphers for this SSL object. | |
| It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format | |
| <https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER-LIST-FORMAT>`_. | |
| The parameter ``do_handshake_on_connect`` specifies whether to do the SSL | |
| handshake automatically after doing a :meth:`socket.connect`, or whether the | |
| application program will call it explicitly, by invoking the | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method. Calling | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` explicitly gives the program control over the | |
| blocking behavior of the socket I/O involved in the handshake. | |
| The parameter ``suppress_ragged_eofs`` specifies how the | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.read` method should signal unexpected EOF from the other end | |
| of the connection. If specified as :const:`True` (the default), it returns a | |
| normal EOF (an empty bytes object) in response to unexpected EOF errors | |
| raised from the underlying socket; if :const:`False`, it will raise the | |
| exceptions back to the caller. | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7 | |
| New optional argument *ciphers*. | |
| Context creation | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| A convenience function helps create :class:`SSLContext` objects for common | |
| purposes. | |
| .. function:: create_default_context(purpose=Purpose.SERVER_AUTH, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None) | |
| Return a new :class:`SSLContext` object with default settings for | |
| the given *purpose*. The settings are chosen by the :mod:`ssl` module, | |
| and usually represent a higher security level than when calling the | |
| :class:`SSLContext` constructor directly. | |
| *cafile*, *capath*, *cadata* represent optional CA certificates to | |
| trust for certificate verification, as in | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations`. If all three are | |
| :const:`None`, this function can choose to trust the system's default | |
| CA certificates instead. | |
| The settings are: :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`, :data:`OP_NO_SSLv2`, and | |
| :data:`OP_NO_SSLv3` with high encryption cipher suites without RC4 and | |
| without unauthenticated cipher suites. Passing :data:`~Purpose.SERVER_AUTH` | |
| as *purpose* sets :data:`~SSLContext.verify_mode` to :data:`CERT_REQUIRED` | |
| and either loads CA certificates (when at least one of *cafile*, *capath* or | |
| *cadata* is given) or uses :meth:`SSLContext.load_default_certs` to load | |
| default CA certificates. | |
| .. note:: | |
| The protocol, options, cipher and other settings may change to more | |
| restrictive values anytime without prior deprecation. The values | |
| represent a fair balance between compatibility and security. | |
| If your application needs specific settings, you should create a | |
| :class:`SSLContext` and apply the settings yourself. | |
| .. note:: | |
| If you find that when certain older clients or servers attempt to connect | |
| with a :class:`SSLContext` created by this function that they get an error | |
| stating "Protocol or cipher suite mismatch", it may be that they only | |
| support SSL3.0 which this function excludes using the | |
| :data:`OP_NO_SSLv3`. SSL3.0 is widely considered to be `completely broken | |
| <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POODLE>`_. If you still wish to continue to | |
| use this function but still allow SSL 3.0 connections you can re-enable | |
| them using:: | |
| ctx = ssl.create_default_context(Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH) | |
| ctx.options &= ~ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3 | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.10 | |
| RC4 was dropped from the default cipher string. | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.13 | |
| ChaCha20/Poly1305 was added to the default cipher string. | |
| 3DES was dropped from the default cipher string. | |
| .. function:: _https_verify_certificates(enable=True) | |
| Specifies whether or not server certificates are verified when creating | |
| client HTTPS connections without specifying a particular SSL context. | |
| Starting with Python 2.7.9, :mod:`httplib` and modules which use it, such as | |
| :mod:`urllib2` and :mod:`xmlrpclib`, default to verifying remote server | |
| certificates received when establishing client HTTPS connections. This | |
| default verification checks that the certificate is signed by a Certificate | |
| Authority in the system trust store and that the Common Name (or Subject | |
| Alternate Name) on the presented certificate matches the requested host. | |
| Setting *enable* to :const:`True` ensures this default behaviour is in | |
| effect. | |
| Setting *enable* to :const:`False` reverts the default HTTPS certificate | |
| handling to that of Python 2.7.8 and earlier, allowing connections to | |
| servers using self-signed certificates, servers using certificates signed | |
| by a Certicate Authority not present in the system trust store, and servers | |
| where the hostname does not match the presented server certificate. | |
| The leading underscore on this function denotes that it intentionally does | |
| not exist in any implementation of Python 3 and may not be present in all | |
| Python 2.7 implementations. The portable approach to bypassing certificate | |
| checks or the system trust store when necessary is for tools to enable that | |
| on a case-by-case basis by explicitly passing in a suitably configured SSL | |
| context, rather than reverting the default behaviour of the standard library | |
| client modules. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.12 | |
| .. seealso:: | |
| * `CVE-2014-9365 <http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-9365>`_ | |
| -- HTTPS man-in-the-middle attack against Python clients using default settings | |
| * :pep:`476` -- Enabling certificate verification by default for HTTPS | |
| * :pep:`493` -- HTTPS verification migration tools for Python 2.7 | |
| Random generation | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 | |
| OpenSSL has deprecated :func:`ssl.RAND_pseudo_bytes`, use | |
| :func:`ssl.RAND_bytes` instead. | |
| .. function:: RAND_status() | |
| Return ``True`` if the SSL pseudo-random number generator has been seeded | |
| with 'enough' randomness, and ``False`` otherwise. You can use | |
| :func:`ssl.RAND_egd` and :func:`ssl.RAND_add` to increase the randomness of | |
| the pseudo-random number generator. | |
| .. function:: RAND_egd(path) | |
| If you are running an entropy-gathering daemon (EGD) somewhere, and *path* | |
| is the pathname of a socket connection open to it, this will read 256 bytes | |
| of randomness from the socket, and add it to the SSL pseudo-random number | |
| generator to increase the security of generated secret keys. This is | |
| typically only necessary on systems without better sources of randomness. | |
| See http://egd.sourceforge.net/ or http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ for sources | |
| of entropy-gathering daemons. | |
| Availability: not available with LibreSSL and OpenSSL > 1.1.0 | |
| .. function:: RAND_add(bytes, entropy) | |
| Mix the given *bytes* into the SSL pseudo-random number generator. The | |
| parameter *entropy* (a float) is a lower bound on the entropy contained in | |
| string (so you can always use :const:`0.0`). See :rfc:`1750` for more | |
| information on sources of entropy. | |
| Certificate handling | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| .. function:: match_hostname(cert, hostname) | |
| Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`) matches the given *hostname*. The rules | |
| applied are those for checking the identity of HTTPS servers as outlined | |
| in :rfc:`2818` and :rfc:`6125`, except that IP addresses are not currently | |
| supported. In addition to HTTPS, this function should be suitable for | |
| checking the identity of servers in various SSL-based protocols such as | |
| FTPS, IMAPS, POPS and others. | |
| :exc:`CertificateError` is raised on failure. On success, the function | |
| returns nothing:: | |
| >>> cert = {'subject': ((('commonName', 'example.com'),),)} | |
| >>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.com") | |
| >>> ssl.match_hostname(cert, "example.org") | |
| Traceback (most recent call last): | |
| File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module> | |
| File "/home/py3k/Lib/ssl.py", line 130, in match_hostname | |
| ssl.CertificateError: hostname 'example.org' doesn't match 'example.com' | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. function:: cert_time_to_seconds(cert_time) | |
| Return the time in seconds since the Epoch, given the ``cert_time`` | |
| string representing the "notBefore" or "notAfter" date from a | |
| certificate in ``"%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y %Z"`` strptime format (C | |
| locale). | |
| Here's an example: | |
| .. doctest:: newcontext | |
| >>> import ssl | |
| >>> timestamp = ssl.cert_time_to_seconds("Jan 5 09:34:43 2018 GMT") | |
| >>> timestamp | |
| 1515144883 | |
| >>> from datetime import datetime | |
| >>> print(datetime.utcfromtimestamp(timestamp)) | |
| 2018-01-05 09:34:43 | |
| "notBefore" or "notAfter" dates must use GMT (:rfc:`5280`). | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.9 | |
| Interpret the input time as a time in UTC as specified by 'GMT' | |
| timezone in the input string. Local timezone was used | |
| previously. Return an integer (no fractions of a second in the | |
| input format) | |
| .. function:: get_server_certificate(addr, ssl_version=PROTOCOL_SSLv23, ca_certs=None) | |
| Given the address ``addr`` of an SSL-protected server, as a (*hostname*, | |
| *port-number*) pair, fetches the server's certificate, and returns it as a | |
| PEM-encoded string. If ``ssl_version`` is specified, uses that version of | |
| the SSL protocol to attempt to connect to the server. If ``ca_certs`` is | |
| specified, it should be a file containing a list of root certificates, the | |
| same format as used for the same parameter in :func:`wrap_socket`. The call | |
| will attempt to validate the server certificate against that set of root | |
| certificates, and will fail if the validation attempt fails. | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.9 | |
| This function is now IPv6-compatible, and the default *ssl_version* is | |
| changed from :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv3` to :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` for | |
| maximum compatibility with modern servers. | |
| .. function:: DER_cert_to_PEM_cert(DER_cert_bytes) | |
| Given a certificate as a DER-encoded blob of bytes, returns a PEM-encoded | |
| string version of the same certificate. | |
| .. function:: PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(PEM_cert_string) | |
| Given a certificate as an ASCII PEM string, returns a DER-encoded sequence of | |
| bytes for that same certificate. | |
| .. function:: get_default_verify_paths() | |
| Returns a named tuple with paths to OpenSSL's default cafile and capath. | |
| The paths are the same as used by | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_default_verify_paths`. The return value is a | |
| :term:`named tuple` ``DefaultVerifyPaths``: | |
| * :attr:`cafile` - resolved path to cafile or ``None`` if the file doesn't exist, | |
| * :attr:`capath` - resolved path to capath or ``None`` if the directory doesn't exist, | |
| * :attr:`openssl_cafile_env` - OpenSSL's environment key that points to a cafile, | |
| * :attr:`openssl_cafile` - hard coded path to a cafile, | |
| * :attr:`openssl_capath_env` - OpenSSL's environment key that points to a capath, | |
| * :attr:`openssl_capath` - hard coded path to a capath directory | |
| Availability: LibreSSL ignores the environment vars | |
| :attr:`openssl_cafile_env` and :attr:`openssl_capath_env` | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. function:: enum_certificates(store_name) | |
| Retrieve certificates from Windows' system cert store. *store_name* may be | |
| one of ``CA``, ``ROOT`` or ``MY``. Windows may provide additional cert | |
| stores, too. | |
| The function returns a list of (cert_bytes, encoding_type, trust) tuples. | |
| The encoding_type specifies the encoding of cert_bytes. It is either | |
| :const:`x509_asn` for X.509 ASN.1 data or :const:`pkcs_7_asn` for | |
| PKCS#7 ASN.1 data. Trust specifies the purpose of the certificate as a set | |
| of OIDS or exactly ``True`` if the certificate is trustworthy for all | |
| purposes. | |
| Example:: | |
| >>> ssl.enum_certificates("CA") | |
| [(b'data...', 'x509_asn', {'1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1', '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'}), | |
| (b'data...', 'x509_asn', True)] | |
| Availability: Windows. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. function:: enum_crls(store_name) | |
| Retrieve CRLs from Windows' system cert store. *store_name* may be | |
| one of ``CA``, ``ROOT`` or ``MY``. Windows may provide additional cert | |
| stores, too. | |
| The function returns a list of (cert_bytes, encoding_type, trust) tuples. | |
| The encoding_type specifies the encoding of cert_bytes. It is either | |
| :const:`x509_asn` for X.509 ASN.1 data or :const:`pkcs_7_asn` for | |
| PKCS#7 ASN.1 data. | |
| Availability: Windows. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| Constants | |
| ^^^^^^^^^ | |
| .. data:: CERT_NONE | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` | |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode (the default), no | |
| certificates will be required from the other side of the socket connection. | |
| If a certificate is received from the other end, no attempt to validate it | |
| is made. | |
| See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below. | |
| .. data:: CERT_OPTIONAL | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` | |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode no certificates will be | |
| required from the other side of the socket connection; but if they | |
| are provided, validation will be attempted and an :class:`SSLError` | |
| will be raised on failure. | |
| Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to | |
| be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a | |
| value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. | |
| .. data:: CERT_REQUIRED | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_mode`, or the ``cert_reqs`` | |
| parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. In this mode, certificates are | |
| required from the other side of the socket connection; an :class:`SSLError` | |
| will be raised if no certificate is provided, or if its validation fails. | |
| Use of this setting requires a valid set of CA certificates to | |
| be passed, either to :meth:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations` or as a | |
| value of the ``ca_certs`` parameter to :func:`wrap_socket`. | |
| .. data:: VERIFY_DEFAULT | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags`. In this mode, certificate | |
| revocation lists (CRLs) are not checked. By default OpenSSL does neither | |
| require nor verify CRLs. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: VERIFY_CRL_CHECK_LEAF | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags`. In this mode, only the | |
| peer cert is check but non of the intermediate CA certificates. The mode | |
| requires a valid CRL that is signed by the peer cert's issuer (its direct | |
| ancestor CA). If no proper has been loaded | |
| :attr:`SSLContext.load_verify_locations`, validation will fail. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: VERIFY_CRL_CHECK_CHAIN | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags`. In this mode, CRLs of | |
| all certificates in the peer cert chain are checked. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: VERIFY_X509_STRICT | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags` to disable workarounds | |
| for broken X.509 certificates. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: VERIFY_X509_TRUSTED_FIRST | |
| Possible value for :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags`. It instructs OpenSSL to | |
| prefer trusted certificates when building the trust chain to validate a | |
| certificate. This flag is enabled by default. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.10 | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_TLS | |
| Selects the highest protocol version that both the client and server support. | |
| Despite the name, this option can select "TLS" protocols as well as "SSL". | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.13 | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv23 | |
| Alias for ``PROTOCOL_TLS``. | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 Use ``PROTOCOL_TLS`` instead. | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv2 | |
| Selects SSL version 2 as the channel encryption protocol. | |
| This protocol is not available if OpenSSL is compiled with the | |
| ``OPENSSL_NO_SSL2`` flag. | |
| .. warning:: | |
| SSL version 2 is insecure. Its use is highly discouraged. | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 OpenSSL has removed support for SSLv2. | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_SSLv3 | |
| Selects SSL version 3 as the channel encryption protocol. | |
| This protocol is not be available if OpenSSL is compiled with the | |
| ``OPENSSL_NO_SSLv3`` flag. | |
| .. warning:: | |
| SSL version 3 is insecure. Its use is highly discouraged. | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 | |
| OpenSSL has deprecated all version specific protocols. Use the default | |
| protocol with flags like ``OP_NO_SSLv3`` instead. | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_TLSv1 | |
| Selects TLS version 1.0 as the channel encryption protocol. | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 | |
| OpenSSL has deprecated all version specific protocols. Use the default | |
| protocol with flags like ``OP_NO_SSLv3`` instead. | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1 | |
| Selects TLS version 1.1 as the channel encryption protocol. | |
| Available only with openssl version 1.0.1+. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 | |
| OpenSSL has deprecated all version specific protocols. Use the default | |
| protocol with flags like ``OP_NO_SSLv3`` instead. | |
| .. data:: PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2 | |
| Selects TLS version 1.2 as the channel encryption protocol. This is the | |
| most modern version, and probably the best choice for maximum protection, | |
| if both sides can speak it. Available only with openssl version 1.0.1+. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. deprecated:: 2.7.13 | |
| OpenSSL has deprecated all version specific protocols. Use the default | |
| protocol with flags like ``OP_NO_SSLv3`` instead. | |
| .. data:: OP_ALL | |
| Enables workarounds for various bugs present in other SSL implementations. | |
| This option is set by default. It does not necessarily set the same | |
| flags as OpenSSL's ``SSL_OP_ALL`` constant. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| Prevents an SSLv2 connection. This option is only applicable in | |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from | |
| choosing SSLv2 as the protocol version. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_SSLv3 | |
| Prevents an SSLv3 connection. This option is only applicable in | |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from | |
| choosing SSLv3 as the protocol version. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_TLSv1 | |
| Prevents a TLSv1 connection. This option is only applicable in | |
| conjunction with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from | |
| choosing TLSv1 as the protocol version. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | |
| Prevents a TLSv1.1 connection. This option is only applicable in conjunction | |
| with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from choosing TLSv1.1 as | |
| the protocol version. Available only with openssl version 1.0.1+. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_TLSv1_2 | |
| Prevents a TLSv1.2 connection. This option is only applicable in conjunction | |
| with :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23`. It prevents the peers from choosing TLSv1.2 as | |
| the protocol version. Available only with openssl version 1.0.1+. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE | |
| Use the server's cipher ordering preference, rather than the client's. | |
| This option has no effect on client sockets and SSLv2 server sockets. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | |
| Prevents re-use of the same DH key for distinct SSL sessions. This | |
| improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources. | |
| This option only applies to server sockets. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE | |
| Prevents re-use of the same ECDH key for distinct SSL sessions. This | |
| improves forward secrecy but requires more computational resources. | |
| This option only applies to server sockets. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OP_NO_COMPRESSION | |
| Disable compression on the SSL channel. This is useful if the application | |
| protocol supports its own compression scheme. | |
| This option is only available with OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: HAS_ALPN | |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for the *Application-Layer | |
| Protocol Negotiation* TLS extension as described in :rfc:`7301`. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.10 | |
| .. data:: HAS_ECDH | |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for Elliptic Curve-based | |
| Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This should be true unless the feature was | |
| explicitly disabled by the distributor. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: HAS_SNI | |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for the *Server Name | |
| Indication* extension (as defined in :rfc:`4366`). | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: HAS_NPN | |
| Whether the OpenSSL library has built-in support for *Next Protocol | |
| Negotiation* as described in the `NPN draft specification | |
| <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. When true, | |
| you can use the :meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` method to advertise | |
| which protocols you want to support. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES | |
| List of supported TLS channel binding types. Strings in this list | |
| can be used as arguments to :meth:`SSLSocket.get_channel_binding`. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION | |
| The version string of the OpenSSL library loaded by the interpreter:: | |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION | |
| 'OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009' | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7 | |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO | |
| A tuple of five integers representing version information about the | |
| OpenSSL library:: | |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_INFO | |
| (0, 9, 8, 11, 15) | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7 | |
| .. data:: OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER | |
| The raw version number of the OpenSSL library, as a single integer:: | |
| >>> ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER | |
| 9470143L | |
| >>> hex(ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) | |
| '0x9080bfL' | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7 | |
| .. data:: ALERT_DESCRIPTION_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE | |
| ALERT_DESCRIPTION_INTERNAL_ERROR | |
| ALERT_DESCRIPTION_* | |
| Alert Descriptions from :rfc:`5246` and others. The `IANA TLS Alert Registry | |
| <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-6>`_ | |
| contains this list and references to the RFCs where their meaning is defined. | |
| Used as the return value of the callback function in | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_servername_callback`. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: Purpose.SERVER_AUTH | |
| Option for :func:`create_default_context` and | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.load_default_certs`. This value indicates that the | |
| context may be used to authenticate Web servers (therefore, it will | |
| be used to create client-side sockets). | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. data:: Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH | |
| Option for :func:`create_default_context` and | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.load_default_certs`. This value indicates that the | |
| context may be used to authenticate Web clients (therefore, it will | |
| be used to create server-side sockets). | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| SSL Sockets | |
| ----------- | |
| SSL sockets provide the following methods of :ref:`socket-objects`: | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.accept()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.bind()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.close()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.connect()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.fileno()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.getpeername()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockname()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.getsockopt()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.setsockopt()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.gettimeout()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.settimeout()`, | |
| :meth:`~socket.socket.setblocking()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.listen()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.makefile()` | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.recv()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.recv_into()` | |
| (but passing a non-zero ``flags`` argument is not allowed) | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.send()`, :meth:`~socket.socket.sendall()` (with | |
| the same limitation) | |
| - :meth:`~socket.socket.shutdown()` | |
| However, since the SSL (and TLS) protocol has its own framing atop | |
| of TCP, the SSL sockets abstraction can, in certain respects, diverge from | |
| the specification of normal, OS-level sockets. See especially the | |
| :ref:`notes on non-blocking sockets <ssl-nonblocking>`. | |
| SSL sockets also have the following additional methods and attributes: | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.do_handshake() | |
| Perform the SSL setup handshake. | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.9 | |
| The handshake method also performs :func:`match_hostname` when the | |
| :attr:`~SSLContext.check_hostname` attribute of the socket's | |
| :attr:`~SSLSocket.context` is true. | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.getpeercert(binary_form=False) | |
| If there is no certificate for the peer on the other end of the connection, | |
| return ``None``. If the SSL handshake hasn't been done yet, raise | |
| :exc:`ValueError`. | |
| If the ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`False`, and a certificate was | |
| received from the peer, this method returns a :class:`dict` instance. If the | |
| certificate was not validated, the dict is empty. If the certificate was | |
| validated, it returns a dict with several keys, amongst them ``subject`` | |
| (the principal for which the certificate was issued) and ``issuer`` | |
| (the principal issuing the certificate). If a certificate contains an | |
| instance of the *Subject Alternative Name* extension (see :rfc:`3280`), | |
| there will also be a ``subjectAltName`` key in the dictionary. | |
| The ``subject`` and ``issuer`` fields are tuples containing the sequence | |
| of relative distinguished names (RDNs) given in the certificate's data | |
| structure for the respective fields, and each RDN is a sequence of | |
| name-value pairs. Here is a real-world example:: | |
| {'issuer': ((('countryName', 'IL'),), | |
| (('organizationName', 'StartCom Ltd.'),), | |
| (('organizationalUnitName', | |
| 'Secure Digital Certificate Signing'),), | |
| (('commonName', | |
| 'StartCom Class 2 Primary Intermediate Server CA'),)), | |
| 'notAfter': 'Nov 22 08:15:19 2013 GMT', | |
| 'notBefore': 'Nov 21 03:09:52 2011 GMT', | |
| 'serialNumber': '95F0', | |
| 'subject': ((('description', '571208-SLe257oHY9fVQ07Z'),), | |
| (('countryName', 'US'),), | |
| (('stateOrProvinceName', 'California'),), | |
| (('localityName', 'San Francisco'),), | |
| (('organizationName', 'Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.'),), | |
| (('commonName', '*.eff.org'),), | |
| (('emailAddress', 'hostmaster@eff.org'),)), | |
| 'subjectAltName': (('DNS', '*.eff.org'), ('DNS', 'eff.org')), | |
| 'version': 3} | |
| .. note:: | |
| To validate a certificate for a particular service, you can use the | |
| :func:`match_hostname` function. | |
| If the ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`True`, and a certificate was | |
| provided, this method returns the DER-encoded form of the entire certificate | |
| as a sequence of bytes, or :const:`None` if the peer did not provide a | |
| certificate. Whether the peer provides a certificate depends on the SSL | |
| socket's role: | |
| * for a client SSL socket, the server will always provide a certificate, | |
| regardless of whether validation was required; | |
| * for a server SSL socket, the client will only provide a certificate | |
| when requested by the server; therefore :meth:`getpeercert` will return | |
| :const:`None` if you used :const:`CERT_NONE` (rather than | |
| :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`). | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.9 | |
| The returned dictionary includes additional items such as ``issuer`` and | |
| ``notBefore``. Additionall :exc:`ValueError` is raised when the handshake | |
| isn't done. The returned dictionary includes additional X509v3 extension | |
| items such as ``crlDistributionPoints``, ``caIssuers`` and ``OCSP`` URIs. | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.cipher() | |
| Returns a three-value tuple containing the name of the cipher being used, the | |
| version of the SSL protocol that defines its use, and the number of secret | |
| bits being used. If no connection has been established, returns ``None``. | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.compression() | |
| Return the compression algorithm being used as a string, or ``None`` | |
| if the connection isn't compressed. | |
| If the higher-level protocol supports its own compression mechanism, | |
| you can use :data:`OP_NO_COMPRESSION` to disable SSL-level compression. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.get_channel_binding(cb_type="tls-unique") | |
| Get channel binding data for current connection, as a bytes object. Returns | |
| ``None`` if not connected or the handshake has not been completed. | |
| The *cb_type* parameter allow selection of the desired channel binding | |
| type. Valid channel binding types are listed in the | |
| :data:`CHANNEL_BINDING_TYPES` list. Currently only the 'tls-unique' channel | |
| binding, defined by :rfc:`5929`, is supported. :exc:`ValueError` will be | |
| raised if an unsupported channel binding type is requested. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.selected_alpn_protocol() | |
| Return the protocol that was selected during the TLS handshake. If | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_alpn_protocols` was not called, if the other party does | |
| not support ALPN, if this socket does not support any of the client's | |
| proposed protocols, or if the handshake has not happened yet, ``None`` is | |
| returned. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.10 | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol() | |
| Return the higher-level protocol that was selected during the TLS/SSL | |
| handshake. If :meth:`SSLContext.set_npn_protocols` was not called, or | |
| if the other party does not support NPN, or if the handshake has not yet | |
| happened, this will return ``None``. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.unwrap() | |
| Performs the SSL shutdown handshake, which removes the TLS layer from the | |
| underlying socket, and returns the underlying socket object. This can be | |
| used to go from encrypted operation over a connection to unencrypted. The | |
| returned socket should always be used for further communication with the | |
| other side of the connection, rather than the original socket. | |
| .. method:: SSLSocket.version() | |
| Return the actual SSL protocol version negotiated by the connection | |
| as a string, or ``None`` is no secure connection is established. | |
| As of this writing, possible return values include ``"SSLv2"``, | |
| ``"SSLv3"``, ``"TLSv1"``, ``"TLSv1.1"`` and ``"TLSv1.2"``. | |
| Recent OpenSSL versions may define more return values. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| .. attribute:: SSLSocket.context | |
| The :class:`SSLContext` object this SSL socket is tied to. If the SSL | |
| socket was created using the top-level :func:`wrap_socket` function | |
| (rather than :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket`), this is a custom context | |
| object created for this SSL socket. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| SSL Contexts | |
| ------------ | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.9 | |
| An SSL context holds various data longer-lived than single SSL connections, | |
| such as SSL configuration options, certificate(s) and private key(s). | |
| It also manages a cache of SSL sessions for server-side sockets, in order | |
| to speed up repeated connections from the same clients. | |
| .. class:: SSLContext(protocol) | |
| Create a new SSL context. You must pass *protocol* which must be one | |
| of the ``PROTOCOL_*`` constants defined in this module. | |
| :data:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` is currently recommended for maximum | |
| interoperability. | |
| .. seealso:: | |
| :func:`create_default_context` lets the :mod:`ssl` module choose | |
| security settings for a given purpose. | |
| :class:`SSLContext` objects have the following methods and attributes: | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.cert_store_stats() | |
| Get statistics about quantities of loaded X.509 certificates, count of | |
| X.509 certificates flagged as CA certificates and certificate revocation | |
| lists as dictionary. | |
| Example for a context with one CA cert and one other cert:: | |
| >>> context.cert_store_stats() | |
| {'crl': 0, 'x509_ca': 1, 'x509': 2} | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile=None, password=None) | |
| Load a private key and the corresponding certificate. The *certfile* | |
| string must be the path to a single file in PEM format containing the | |
| certificate as well as any number of CA certificates needed to establish | |
| the certificate's authenticity. The *keyfile* string, if present, must | |
| point to a file containing the private key in. Otherwise the private | |
| key will be taken from *certfile* as well. See the discussion of | |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information on how the certificate | |
| is stored in the *certfile*. | |
| The *password* argument may be a function to call to get the password for | |
| decrypting the private key. It will only be called if the private key is | |
| encrypted and a password is necessary. It will be called with no arguments, | |
| and it should return a string, bytes, or bytearray. If the return value is | |
| a string it will be encoded as UTF-8 before using it to decrypt the key. | |
| Alternatively a string, bytes, or bytearray value may be supplied directly | |
| as the *password* argument. It will be ignored if the private key is not | |
| encrypted and no password is needed. | |
| If the *password* argument is not specified and a password is required, | |
| OpenSSL's built-in password prompting mechanism will be used to | |
| interactively prompt the user for a password. | |
| An :class:`SSLError` is raised if the private key doesn't | |
| match with the certificate. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_default_certs(purpose=Purpose.SERVER_AUTH) | |
| Load a set of default "certification authority" (CA) certificates from | |
| default locations. On Windows it loads CA certs from the ``CA`` and | |
| ``ROOT`` system stores. On other systems it calls | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_default_verify_paths`. In the future the method may | |
| load CA certificates from other locations, too. | |
| The *purpose* flag specifies what kind of CA certificates are loaded. The | |
| default settings :data:`Purpose.SERVER_AUTH` loads certificates, that are | |
| flagged and trusted for TLS web server authentication (client side | |
| sockets). :data:`Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH` loads CA certificates for client | |
| certificate verification on the server side. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_verify_locations(cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None) | |
| Load a set of "certification authority" (CA) certificates used to validate | |
| other peers' certificates when :data:`verify_mode` is other than | |
| :data:`CERT_NONE`. At least one of *cafile* or *capath* must be specified. | |
| This method can also load certification revocation lists (CRLs) in PEM or | |
| DER format. In order to make use of CRLs, :attr:`SSLContext.verify_flags` | |
| must be configured properly. | |
| The *cafile* string, if present, is the path to a file of concatenated | |
| CA certificates in PEM format. See the discussion of | |
| :ref:`ssl-certificates` for more information about how to arrange the | |
| certificates in this file. | |
| The *capath* string, if present, is | |
| the path to a directory containing several CA certificates in PEM format, | |
| following an `OpenSSL specific layout | |
| <https://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations.html>`_. | |
| The *cadata* object, if present, is either an ASCII string of one or more | |
| PEM-encoded certificates or a bytes-like object of DER-encoded | |
| certificates. Like with *capath* extra lines around PEM-encoded | |
| certificates are ignored but at least one certificate must be present. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.get_ca_certs(binary_form=False) | |
| Get a list of loaded "certification authority" (CA) certificates. If the | |
| ``binary_form`` parameter is :const:`False` each list | |
| entry is a dict like the output of :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`. Otherwise | |
| the method returns a list of DER-encoded certificates. The returned list | |
| does not contain certificates from *capath* unless a certificate was | |
| requested and loaded by a SSL connection. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_default_verify_paths() | |
| Load a set of default "certification authority" (CA) certificates from | |
| a filesystem path defined when building the OpenSSL library. Unfortunately, | |
| there's no easy way to know whether this method succeeds: no error is | |
| returned if no certificates are to be found. When the OpenSSL library is | |
| provided as part of the operating system, though, it is likely to be | |
| configured properly. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_ciphers(ciphers) | |
| Set the available ciphers for sockets created with this context. | |
| It should be a string in the `OpenSSL cipher list format | |
| <https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER-LIST-FORMAT>`_. | |
| If no cipher can be selected (because compile-time options or other | |
| configuration forbids use of all the specified ciphers), an | |
| :class:`SSLError` will be raised. | |
| .. note:: | |
| when connected, the :meth:`SSLSocket.cipher` method of SSL sockets will | |
| give the currently selected cipher. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_alpn_protocols(protocols) | |
| Specify which protocols the socket should advertise during the SSL/TLS | |
| handshake. It should be a list of ASCII strings, like ``['http/1.1', | |
| 'spdy/2']``, ordered by preference. The selection of a protocol will happen | |
| during the handshake, and will play out according to :rfc:`7301`. After a | |
| successful handshake, the :meth:`SSLSocket.selected_alpn_protocol` method will | |
| return the agreed-upon protocol. | |
| This method will raise :exc:`NotImplementedError` if :data:`HAS_ALPN` is | |
| False. | |
| OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will abort the handshake and raise :exc:`SSLError` when | |
| both sides support ALPN but cannot agree on a protocol. | |
| .. versionadded:: 2.7.10 | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_npn_protocols(protocols) | |
| Specify which protocols the socket should advertise during the SSL/TLS | |
| handshake. It should be a list of strings, like ``['http/1.1', 'spdy/2']``, | |
| ordered by preference. The selection of a protocol will happen during the | |
| handshake, and will play out according to the `NPN draft specification | |
| <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg>`_. After a | |
| successful handshake, the :meth:`SSLSocket.selected_npn_protocol` method will | |
| return the agreed-upon protocol. | |
| This method will raise :exc:`NotImplementedError` if :data:`HAS_NPN` is | |
| False. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_servername_callback(server_name_callback) | |
| Register a callback function that will be called after the TLS Client Hello | |
| handshake message has been received by the SSL/TLS server when the TLS client | |
| specifies a server name indication. The server name indication mechanism | |
| is specified in :rfc:`6066` section 3 - Server Name Indication. | |
| Only one callback can be set per ``SSLContext``. If *server_name_callback* | |
| is ``None`` then the callback is disabled. Calling this function a | |
| subsequent time will disable the previously registered callback. | |
| The callback function, *server_name_callback*, will be called with three | |
| arguments; the first being the :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`, the second is a string | |
| that represents the server name that the client is intending to communicate | |
| (or :const:`None` if the TLS Client Hello does not contain a server name) | |
| and the third argument is the original :class:`SSLContext`. The server name | |
| argument is the IDNA decoded server name. | |
| A typical use of this callback is to change the :class:`ssl.SSLSocket`'s | |
| :attr:`SSLSocket.context` attribute to a new object of type | |
| :class:`SSLContext` representing a certificate chain that matches the server | |
| name. | |
| Due to the early negotiation phase of the TLS connection, only limited | |
| methods and attributes are usable like | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.selected_alpn_protocol` and :attr:`SSLSocket.context`. | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`, :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`, | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.cipher` and :meth:`SSLSocket.compress` methods require that | |
| the TLS connection has progressed beyond the TLS Client Hello and therefore | |
| will not contain return meaningful values nor can they be called safely. | |
| The *server_name_callback* function must return ``None`` to allow the | |
| TLS negotiation to continue. If a TLS failure is required, a constant | |
| :const:`ALERT_DESCRIPTION_* <ALERT_DESCRIPTION_INTERNAL_ERROR>` can be | |
| returned. Other return values will result in a TLS fatal error with | |
| :const:`ALERT_DESCRIPTION_INTERNAL_ERROR`. | |
| If there is an IDNA decoding error on the server name, the TLS connection | |
| will terminate with an :const:`ALERT_DESCRIPTION_INTERNAL_ERROR` fatal TLS | |
| alert message to the client. | |
| If an exception is raised from the *server_name_callback* function the TLS | |
| connection will terminate with a fatal TLS alert message | |
| :const:`ALERT_DESCRIPTION_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE`. | |
| This method will raise :exc:`NotImplementedError` if the OpenSSL library | |
| had OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT defined when it was built. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.load_dh_params(dhfile) | |
| Load the key generation parameters for Diffie-Helman (DH) key exchange. | |
| Using DH key exchange improves forward secrecy at the expense of | |
| computational resources (both on the server and on the client). | |
| The *dhfile* parameter should be the path to a file containing DH | |
| parameters in PEM format. | |
| This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the | |
| :data:`OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` option to further improve security. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.set_ecdh_curve(curve_name) | |
| Set the curve name for Elliptic Curve-based Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key | |
| exchange. ECDH is significantly faster than regular DH while arguably | |
| as secure. The *curve_name* parameter should be a string describing | |
| a well-known elliptic curve, for example ``prime256v1`` for a widely | |
| supported curve. | |
| This setting doesn't apply to client sockets. You can also use the | |
| :data:`OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE` option to further improve security. | |
| This method is not available if :data:`HAS_ECDH` is ``False``. | |
| .. seealso:: | |
| `SSL/TLS & Perfect Forward Secrecy <http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-secrecy.html>`_ | |
| Vincent Bernat. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.wrap_socket(sock, server_side=False, \ | |
| do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, \ | |
| server_hostname=None) | |
| Wrap an existing Python socket *sock* and return an :class:`SSLSocket` | |
| object. *sock* must be a :data:`~socket.SOCK_STREAM` socket; other socket | |
| types are unsupported. | |
| The returned SSL socket is tied to the context, its settings and | |
| certificates. The parameters *server_side*, *do_handshake_on_connect* | |
| and *suppress_ragged_eofs* have the same meaning as in the top-level | |
| :func:`wrap_socket` function. | |
| On client connections, the optional parameter *server_hostname* specifies | |
| the hostname of the service which we are connecting to. This allows a | |
| single server to host multiple SSL-based services with distinct certificates, | |
| quite similarly to HTTP virtual hosts. Specifying *server_hostname* will | |
| raise a :exc:`ValueError` if *server_side* is true. | |
| .. versionchanged:: 2.7.9 | |
| Always allow a server_hostname to be passed, even if OpenSSL does not | |
| have SNI. | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.session_stats() | |
| Get statistics about the SSL sessions created or managed by this context. | |
| A dictionary is returned which maps the names of each `piece of information | |
| <https://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_CTX_sess_number.html>`_ to their | |
| numeric values. For example, here is the total number of hits and misses | |
| in the session cache since the context was created:: | |
| >>> stats = context.session_stats() | |
| >>> stats['hits'], stats['misses'] | |
| (0, 0) | |
| .. method:: SSLContext.get_ca_certs(binary_form=False) | |
| Returns a list of dicts with information of loaded CA certs. If the | |
| optional argument is true, returns a DER-encoded copy of the CA | |
| certificate. | |
| .. note:: | |
| Certificates in a capath directory aren't loaded unless they have | |
| been used at least once. | |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.check_hostname | |
| Wether to match the peer cert's hostname with :func:`match_hostname` in | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake`. The context's | |
| :attr:`~SSLContext.verify_mode` must be set to :data:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or | |
| :data:`CERT_REQUIRED`, and you must pass *server_hostname* to | |
| :meth:`~SSLContext.wrap_socket` in order to match the hostname. | |
| Example:: | |
| import socket, ssl | |
| context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1) | |
| context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED | |
| context.check_hostname = True | |
| context.load_default_certs() | |
| s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) | |
| ssl_sock = context.wrap_socket(s, server_hostname='www.verisign.com') | |
| ssl_sock.connect(('www.verisign.com', 443)) | |
| .. note:: | |
| This features requires OpenSSL 0.9.8f or newer. | |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.options | |
| An integer representing the set of SSL options enabled on this context. | |
| The default value is :data:`OP_ALL`, but you can specify other options | |
| such as :data:`OP_NO_SSLv2` by ORing them together. | |
| .. note:: | |
| With versions of OpenSSL older than 0.9.8m, it is only possible | |
| to set options, not to clear them. Attempting to clear an option | |
| (by resetting the corresponding bits) will raise a ``ValueError``. | |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.protocol | |
| The protocol version chosen when constructing the context. This attribute | |
| is read-only. | |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.verify_flags | |
| The flags for certificate verification operations. You can set flags like | |
| :data:`VERIFY_CRL_CHECK_LEAF` by ORing them together. By default OpenSSL | |
| does neither require nor verify certificate revocation lists (CRLs). | |
| Available only with openssl version 0.9.8+. | |
| .. attribute:: SSLContext.verify_mode | |
| Whether to try to verify other peers' certificates and how to behave | |
| if verification fails. This attribute must be one of | |
| :data:`CERT_NONE`, :data:`CERT_OPTIONAL` or :data:`CERT_REQUIRED`. | |
| .. index:: single: certificates | |
| .. index:: single: X509 certificate | |
| .. _ssl-certificates: | |
| Certificates | |
| ------------ | |
| Certificates in general are part of a public-key / private-key system. In this | |
| system, each *principal*, (which may be a machine, or a person, or an | |
| organization) is assigned a unique two-part encryption key. One part of the key | |
| is public, and is called the *public key*; the other part is kept secret, and is | |
| called the *private key*. The two parts are related, in that if you encrypt a | |
| message with one of the parts, you can decrypt it with the other part, and | |
| **only** with the other part. | |
| A certificate contains information about two principals. It contains the name | |
| of a *subject*, and the subject's public key. It also contains a statement by a | |
| second principal, the *issuer*, that the subject is who he claims to be, and | |
| that this is indeed the subject's public key. The issuer's statement is signed | |
| with the issuer's private key, which only the issuer knows. However, anyone can | |
| verify the issuer's statement by finding the issuer's public key, decrypting the | |
| statement with it, and comparing it to the other information in the certificate. | |
| The certificate also contains information about the time period over which it is | |
| valid. This is expressed as two fields, called "notBefore" and "notAfter". | |
| In the Python use of certificates, a client or server can use a certificate to | |
| prove who they are. The other side of a network connection can also be required | |
| to produce a certificate, and that certificate can be validated to the | |
| satisfaction of the client or server that requires such validation. The | |
| connection attempt can be set to raise an exception if the validation fails. | |
| Validation is done automatically, by the underlying OpenSSL framework; the | |
| application need not concern itself with its mechanics. But the application | |
| does usually need to provide sets of certificates to allow this process to take | |
| place. | |
| Python uses files to contain certificates. They should be formatted as "PEM" | |
| (see :rfc:`1422`), which is a base-64 encoded form wrapped with a header line | |
| and a footer line:: | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| ... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ... | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| Certificate chains | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| The Python files which contain certificates can contain a sequence of | |
| certificates, sometimes called a *certificate chain*. This chain should start | |
| with the specific certificate for the principal who "is" the client or server, | |
| and then the certificate for the issuer of that certificate, and then the | |
| certificate for the issuer of *that* certificate, and so on up the chain till | |
| you get to a certificate which is *self-signed*, that is, a certificate which | |
| has the same subject and issuer, sometimes called a *root certificate*. The | |
| certificates should just be concatenated together in the certificate file. For | |
| example, suppose we had a three certificate chain, from our server certificate | |
| to the certificate of the certification authority that signed our server | |
| certificate, to the root certificate of the agency which issued the | |
| certification authority's certificate:: | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| ... (certificate for your server)... | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| ... (the certificate for the CA)... | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| ... (the root certificate for the CA's issuer)... | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| CA certificates | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| If you are going to require validation of the other side of the connection's | |
| certificate, you need to provide a "CA certs" file, filled with the certificate | |
| chains for each issuer you are willing to trust. Again, this file just contains | |
| these chains concatenated together. For validation, Python will use the first | |
| chain it finds in the file which matches. The platform's certificates file can | |
| be used by calling :meth:`SSLContext.load_default_certs`, this is done | |
| automatically with :func:`.create_default_context`. | |
| Combined key and certificate | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| Often the private key is stored in the same file as the certificate; in this | |
| case, only the ``certfile`` parameter to :meth:`SSLContext.load_cert_chain` | |
| and :func:`wrap_socket` needs to be passed. If the private key is stored | |
| with the certificate, it should come before the first certificate in | |
| the certificate chain:: | |
| -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| ... (private key in base64 encoding) ... | |
| -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| ... (certificate in base64 PEM encoding) ... | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| Self-signed certificates | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| If you are going to create a server that provides SSL-encrypted connection | |
| services, you will need to acquire a certificate for that service. There are | |
| many ways of acquiring appropriate certificates, such as buying one from a | |
| certification authority. Another common practice is to generate a self-signed | |
| certificate. The simplest way to do this is with the OpenSSL package, using | |
| something like the following:: | |
| % openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -nodes -out cert.pem -keyout cert.pem | |
| Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key | |
| .......++++++ | |
| .............................++++++ | |
| writing new private key to 'cert.pem' | |
| ----- | |
| You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated | |
| into your certificate request. | |
| What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. | |
| There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank | |
| For some fields there will be a default value, | |
| If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. | |
| ----- | |
| Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:US | |
| State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:MyState | |
| Locality Name (eg, city) []:Some City | |
| Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:My Organization, Inc. | |
| Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:My Group | |
| Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com | |
| Email Address []:ops@myserver.mygroup.myorganization.com | |
| % | |
| The disadvantage of a self-signed certificate is that it is its own root | |
| certificate, and no one else will have it in their cache of known (and trusted) | |
| root certificates. | |
| Examples | |
| -------- | |
| Testing for SSL support | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| To test for the presence of SSL support in a Python installation, user code | |
| should use the following idiom:: | |
| try: | |
| import ssl | |
| except ImportError: | |
| pass | |
| else: | |
| ... # do something that requires SSL support | |
| Client-side operation | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| This example creates a SSL context with the recommended security settings | |
| for client sockets, including automatic certificate verification:: | |
| >>> context = ssl.create_default_context() | |
| If you prefer to tune security settings yourself, you might create | |
| a context from scratch (but beware that you might not get the settings | |
| right):: | |
| >>> context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23) | |
| >>> context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED | |
| >>> context.check_hostname = True | |
| >>> context.load_verify_locations("/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt") | |
| (this snippet assumes your operating system places a bundle of all CA | |
| certificates in ``/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt``; if not, you'll get an | |
| error and have to adjust the location) | |
| When you use the context to connect to a server, :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` | |
| validates the server certificate: it ensures that the server certificate | |
| was signed with one of the CA certificates, and checks the signature for | |
| correctness:: | |
| >>> conn = context.wrap_socket(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET), | |
| ... server_hostname="www.python.org") | |
| >>> conn.connect(("www.python.org", 443)) | |
| You may then fetch the certificate:: | |
| >>> cert = conn.getpeercert() | |
| Visual inspection shows that the certificate does identify the desired service | |
| (that is, the HTTPS host ``www.python.org``):: | |
| >>> pprint.pprint(cert) | |
| {'OCSP': ('http://ocsp.digicert.com',), | |
| 'caIssuers': ('http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertSHA2ExtendedValidationServerCA.crt',), | |
| 'crlDistributionPoints': ('http://crl3.digicert.com/sha2-ev-server-g1.crl', | |
| 'http://crl4.digicert.com/sha2-ev-server-g1.crl'), | |
| 'issuer': ((('countryName', 'US'),), | |
| (('organizationName', 'DigiCert Inc'),), | |
| (('organizationalUnitName', 'www.digicert.com'),), | |
| (('commonName', 'DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA'),)), | |
| 'notAfter': 'Sep 9 12:00:00 2016 GMT', | |
| 'notBefore': 'Sep 5 00:00:00 2014 GMT', | |
| 'serialNumber': '01BB6F00122B177F36CAB49CEA8B6B26', | |
| 'subject': ((('businessCategory', 'Private Organization'),), | |
| (('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3', 'US'),), | |
| (('1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2', 'Delaware'),), | |
| (('serialNumber', '3359300'),), | |
| (('streetAddress', '16 Allen Rd'),), | |
| (('postalCode', '03894-4801'),), | |
| (('countryName', 'US'),), | |
| (('stateOrProvinceName', 'NH'),), | |
| (('localityName', 'Wolfeboro,'),), | |
| (('organizationName', 'Python Software Foundation'),), | |
| (('commonName', 'www.python.org'),)), | |
| 'subjectAltName': (('DNS', 'www.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'pypi.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'docs.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'testpypi.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'bugs.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'wiki.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'hg.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'mail.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'packaging.python.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'pythonhosted.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'www.pythonhosted.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'test.pythonhosted.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'us.pycon.org'), | |
| ('DNS', 'id.python.org')), | |
| 'version': 3} | |
| Now the SSL channel is established and the certificate verified, you can | |
| proceed to talk with the server:: | |
| >>> conn.sendall(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: linuxfr.org\r\n\r\n") | |
| >>> pprint.pprint(conn.recv(1024).split(b"\r\n")) | |
| [b'HTTP/1.1 200 OK', | |
| b'Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 18:27:20 GMT', | |
| b'Server: nginx', | |
| b'Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8', | |
| b'X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN', | |
| b'Content-Length: 45679', | |
| b'Accept-Ranges: bytes', | |
| b'Via: 1.1 varnish', | |
| b'Age: 2188', | |
| b'X-Served-By: cache-lcy1134-LCY', | |
| b'X-Cache: HIT', | |
| b'X-Cache-Hits: 11', | |
| b'Vary: Cookie', | |
| b'Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains', | |
| b'Connection: close', | |
| b'', | |
| b''] | |
| See the discussion of :ref:`ssl-security` below. | |
| Server-side operation | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| For server operation, typically you'll need to have a server certificate, and | |
| private key, each in a file. You'll first create a context holding the key | |
| and the certificate, so that clients can check your authenticity. Then | |
| you'll open a socket, bind it to a port, call :meth:`listen` on it, and start | |
| waiting for clients to connect:: | |
| import socket, ssl | |
| context = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH) | |
| context.load_cert_chain(certfile="mycertfile", keyfile="mykeyfile") | |
| bindsocket = socket.socket() | |
| bindsocket.bind(('myaddr.mydomain.com', 10023)) | |
| bindsocket.listen(5) | |
| When a client connects, you'll call :meth:`accept` on the socket to get the | |
| new socket from the other end, and use the context's :meth:`SSLContext.wrap_socket` | |
| method to create a server-side SSL socket for the connection:: | |
| while True: | |
| newsocket, fromaddr = bindsocket.accept() | |
| connstream = context.wrap_socket(newsocket, server_side=True) | |
| try: | |
| deal_with_client(connstream) | |
| finally: | |
| connstream.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR) | |
| connstream.close() | |
| Then you'll read data from the ``connstream`` and do something with it till you | |
| are finished with the client (or the client is finished with you):: | |
| def deal_with_client(connstream): | |
| data = connstream.read() | |
| # null data means the client is finished with us | |
| while data: | |
| if not do_something(connstream, data): | |
| # we'll assume do_something returns False | |
| # when we're finished with client | |
| break | |
| data = connstream.read() | |
| # finished with client | |
| And go back to listening for new client connections (of course, a real server | |
| would probably handle each client connection in a separate thread, or put | |
| the sockets in non-blocking mode and use an event loop). | |
| .. _ssl-nonblocking: | |
| Notes on non-blocking sockets | |
| ----------------------------- | |
| When working with non-blocking sockets, there are several things you need | |
| to be aware of: | |
| - Calling :func:`~select.select` tells you that the OS-level socket can be | |
| read from (or written to), but it does not imply that there is sufficient | |
| data at the upper SSL layer. For example, only part of an SSL frame might | |
| have arrived. Therefore, you must be ready to handle :meth:`SSLSocket.recv` | |
| and :meth:`SSLSocket.send` failures, and retry after another call to | |
| :func:`~select.select`. | |
| - Conversely, since the SSL layer has its own framing, a SSL socket may | |
| still have data available for reading without :func:`~select.select` | |
| being aware of it. Therefore, you should first call | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.recv` to drain any potentially available data, and then | |
| only block on a :func:`~select.select` call if still necessary. | |
| (of course, similar provisions apply when using other primitives such as | |
| :func:`~select.poll`, or those in the :mod:`selectors` module) | |
| - The SSL handshake itself will be non-blocking: the | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.do_handshake` method has to be retried until it returns | |
| successfully. Here is a synopsis using :func:`~select.select` to wait for | |
| the socket's readiness:: | |
| while True: | |
| try: | |
| sock.do_handshake() | |
| break | |
| except ssl.SSLWantReadError: | |
| select.select([sock], [], []) | |
| except ssl.SSLWantWriteError: | |
| select.select([], [sock], []) | |
| .. _ssl-security: | |
| Security considerations | |
| ----------------------- | |
| Best defaults | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| For **client use**, if you don't have any special requirements for your | |
| security policy, it is highly recommended that you use the | |
| :func:`create_default_context` function to create your SSL context. | |
| It will load the system's trusted CA certificates, enable certificate | |
| validation and hostname checking, and try to choose reasonably secure | |
| protocol and cipher settings. | |
| If a client certificate is needed for the connection, it can be added with | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.load_cert_chain`. | |
| By contrast, if you create the SSL context by calling the :class:`SSLContext` | |
| constructor yourself, it will not have certificate validation nor hostname | |
| checking enabled by default. If you do so, please read the paragraphs below | |
| to achieve a good security level. | |
| Manual settings | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| Verifying certificates | |
| '''''''''''''''''''''' | |
| When calling the :class:`SSLContext` constructor directly, | |
| :const:`CERT_NONE` is the default. Since it does not authenticate the other | |
| peer, it can be insecure, especially in client mode where most of time you | |
| would like to ensure the authenticity of the server you're talking to. | |
| Therefore, when in client mode, it is highly recommended to use | |
| :const:`CERT_REQUIRED`. However, it is in itself not sufficient; you also | |
| have to check that the server certificate, which can be obtained by calling | |
| :meth:`SSLSocket.getpeercert`, matches the desired service. For many | |
| protocols and applications, the service can be identified by the hostname; | |
| in this case, the :func:`match_hostname` function can be used. This common | |
| check is automatically performed when :attr:`SSLContext.check_hostname` is | |
| enabled. | |
| In server mode, if you want to authenticate your clients using the SSL layer | |
| (rather than using a higher-level authentication mechanism), you'll also have | |
| to specify :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` and similarly check the client certificate. | |
| .. note:: | |
| In client mode, :const:`CERT_OPTIONAL` and :const:`CERT_REQUIRED` are | |
| equivalent unless anonymous ciphers are enabled (they are disabled | |
| by default). | |
| Protocol versions | |
| ''''''''''''''''' | |
| SSL versions 2 and 3 are considered insecure and are therefore dangerous to | |
| use. If you want maximum compatibility between clients and servers, it is | |
| recommended to use :const:`PROTOCOL_SSLv23` as the protocol version and then | |
| disable SSLv2 and SSLv3 explicitly using the :data:`SSLContext.options` | |
| attribute:: | |
| context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23) | |
| context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2 | |
| context.options |= ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3 | |
| The SSL context created above will only allow TLSv1 and later (if | |
| supported by your system) connections. | |
| Cipher selection | |
| '''''''''''''''' | |
| If you have advanced security requirements, fine-tuning of the ciphers | |
| enabled when negotiating a SSL session is possible through the | |
| :meth:`SSLContext.set_ciphers` method. Starting from Python 2.7.9, the | |
| ssl module disables certain weak ciphers by default, but you may want | |
| to further restrict the cipher choice. Be sure to read OpenSSL's documentation | |
| about the `cipher list format <https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER-LIST-FORMAT>`_. | |
| If you want to check which ciphers are enabled by a given cipher list, use the | |
| ``openssl ciphers`` command on your system. | |
| Multi-processing | |
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | |
| If using this module as part of a multi-processed application (using, | |
| for example the :mod:`multiprocessing` or :mod:`concurrent.futures` modules), | |
| be aware that OpenSSL's internal random number generator does not properly | |
| handle forked processes. Applications must change the PRNG state of the | |
| parent process if they use any SSL feature with :func:`os.fork`. Any | |
| successful call of :func:`~ssl.RAND_add`, :func:`~ssl.RAND_bytes` or | |
| :func:`~ssl.RAND_pseudo_bytes` is sufficient. | |
| .. seealso:: | |
| Class :class:`socket.socket` | |
| Documentation of underlying :mod:`socket` class | |
| `SSL/TLS Strong Encryption: An Introduction <https://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/en/ssl/ssl_intro.html>`_ | |
| Intro from the Apache webserver documentation | |
| `RFC 1422: Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1422>`_ | |
| Steve Kent | |
| `RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750>`_ | |
| D. Eastlake et. al. | |
| `RFC 3280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280>`_ | |
| Housley et. al. | |
| `RFC 4366: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4366>`_ | |
| Blake-Wilson et. al. | |
| `RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>`_ | |
| T. Dierks et. al. | |
| `RFC 6066: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066>`_ | |
| D. Eastlake | |
| `IANA TLS: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml>`_ | |
| IANA |