patches/0004-channelid.patch

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 05699ab..d05fa22 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -266,6 +266,9 @@ void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
 #define BIO_RR_CONNECT			0x02
 /* Returned from the accept BIO when an accept would have blocked */
 #define BIO_RR_ACCEPT			0x03
+/* Returned from the SSL bio when the channel id retrieval code cannot find the
+ * private key. */
+#define BIO_RR_SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP	0x04
 
 /* These are passed by the BIO callback */
 #define BIO_CB_FREE	0x01
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h
index ea4bed9..5f18d4b 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -921,6 +921,7 @@ struct ec_key_st *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 #endif
 
 EVP_PKEY *	EVP_PKEY_new(void);
+EVP_PKEY *	EVP_PKEY_dup(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 void		EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 
 EVP_PKEY *	d2i_PublicKey(int type,EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index a0e14a3..65a4440 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -200,6 +200,12 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_dup(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+	{
+	CRYPTO_add(&pkey->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	return pkey;
+	}
+
 /* Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string.
  * If pkey is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists.
  */
diff --git a/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/ssl/bio_ssl.c
index e9552ca..06a13de 100644
--- a/ssl/bio_ssl.c
+++ b/ssl/bio_ssl.c
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
 		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
 		break;
+	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
+		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+		break;
 	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
 		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
 		retry_reason=BIO_RR_ACCEPT;
@@ -280,6 +284,10 @@ static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *out, int outl)
 		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
 		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
 		break;
+	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP:
+		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
+		retry_reason=BIO_RR_SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+		break;
 	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
 		BIO_set_retry_special(b);
 		retry_reason=BIO_RR_CONNECT;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
index 53b9390..c0dac70 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -554,7 +554,8 @@ long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 #endif
 
 	/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
-	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+	if (*((unsigned char*) s->init_buf->data) != SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)
+		ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
 	if (s->msg_callback)
 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 	*ok=1;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 3d3fd64..7e0c4d5 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -465,13 +465,14 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-#else
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-			else
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+# endif
 #endif
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -505,6 +506,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
 			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+			ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 			break;
 #endif
@@ -532,6 +545,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 				}
 			else
 				{
+				/* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it
+				 * involves ChannelID, then record the
+				 * handshake hashes at this point in the
+				 * session so that any resumption of this
+				 * session with ChannelID can sign those
+				 * hashes. */
+				if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+					{
+					ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
+					if (ret <= 0)
+						goto end;
+					}
 				if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
 				    && ssl3_can_cutthrough(s)
 				    && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
@@ -3338,7 +3363,8 @@ err:
 	return(0);
 	}
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 	{
 	unsigned int len, padding_len;
@@ -3362,7 +3388,135 @@ int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
 
 	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
         }
-#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+# endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+
+int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char *d;
+	int ret = -1, public_key_len;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+	size_t sig_len;
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+	unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
+
+	if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A)
+		return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+	if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+		s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
+		if (key != NULL)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
+			}
+		}
+	if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		{
+		s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+		return (-1);
+		}
+	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+	d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	*(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
+	l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
+	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
+	else
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
+	s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+	public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
+	if (public_key_len <= 0)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	/* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
+	 * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
+	 * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
+	if (public_key_len != 65)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
+	if (!public_key)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	derp = public_key;
+	i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
+
+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
+			       s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
+	if (!der_sig)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	derp = der_sig;
+	sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len);
+	if (sig == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
+	memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
+	d += 64;
+	memset(d, 0, 2 * 32);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+	d += 32;
+	BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+	d += 32;
+
+	s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
+	s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE;
+	s->init_off = 0;
+
+	ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+err:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	if (public_key)
+		OPENSSL_free(public_key);
+	if (der_sig)
+		OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
+	if (sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+	return ret;
+	}
+#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
 	{
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 1865c70..f801923 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2951,6 +2951,11 @@ int ssl3_new(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s);
 #endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+	s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup(s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+#endif
 	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
 	return(1);
 err:
@@ -3079,6 +3084,10 @@ void ssl3_clear(SSL *s)
 		s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
 		}
 #endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+	s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+#endif
 	}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -3353,6 +3362,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 		ret = 1;
 		break;
 #endif
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		if (s->server)
+			break;
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+			break;
+			}
+		if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+		s->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup((EVP_PKEY*) parg);
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		if (!s->server)
+			break;
+		if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+			break;
+		memcpy(parg, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, larg < 64 ? larg : 64);
+		return 64;
 
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 	default:
@@ -3574,6 +3610,12 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 			}
 		return 1;
 		}
+	case SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID:
+		/* must be called on a server */
+		if (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)
+			return 0;
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled=1;
+		return 1;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_CB_ARG:
@@ -3642,6 +3684,18 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 			}
 		break;
 
+	case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID:
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled = 1;
+		if (EVP_PKEY_bits(parg) != 256)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
+			break;
+			}
+		if (ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+		ctx->tlsext_channel_id_private = EVP_PKEY_dup((EVP_PKEY*) parg);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		return(0);
 		}
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 323b260..6824ef6 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -157,8 +157,11 @@
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -615,15 +618,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
 				 * for key exchange.
 				 */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-				else
-					s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
 				s->init_num = 0;
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
 				}
 			else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 				{
@@ -683,16 +679,28 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
+			s->init_num=0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: {
+			char next_proto_neg = 0;
+			char channel_id = 0;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+			next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+# endif
+			channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+#endif
+
+			if (next_proto_neg)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+			else if (channel_id)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
-			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
+		}
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
@@ -700,6 +708,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->init_num = 0;
+			if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
+			else
+				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B:
+			ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s);
+			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			s->init_num = 0;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			break;
 #endif
@@ -717,6 +738,15 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #endif
 			else
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			/* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then
+			 * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case
+			 * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a
+			 * resumption of this session in the future. */
+			if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+				{
+				ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
+				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+				}
 			s->init_num=0;
 			break;
 
@@ -771,18 +801,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			if (s->hit)
-				{
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
-				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
-				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
-					{
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-					}
-				else
-					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
-				}
+				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT;
 			else
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -1466,6 +1487,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 
 	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
 		{
+		/* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order
+		 * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
+		if (s->s3 &&
+		    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+		    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+
+		/* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't
+		 * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original
+		 * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with
+		 * ChannelIDs. */
+		if (s->hit &&
+		    s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new &&
+		    s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+
 		buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 		p=s->s3->server_random;
@@ -3632,4 +3669,145 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
 	return 1;
 	}
 # endif
+
+/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = -1, ok;
+	long n;
+	const unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned short extension_type, extension_len;
+	EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL;
+	EC_KEY* key = NULL;
+	EC_POINT* point = NULL;
+	ECDSA_SIG sig;
+	BIGNUM x, y;
+	unsigned short expected_extension_type;
+
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0)
+		{
+		/* The first time that we're called we take the current
+		 * handshake hash and store it. */
+		EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+		unsigned int len;
+
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+		if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s))
+			return -1;
+		len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id);
+		EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len);
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+		}
+
+	n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A,
+		SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B,
+		SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+		2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE,
+		&ok);
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return((int)n);
+
+	ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+
+	/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+	 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+	 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+	if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+	/* The payload looks like:
+	 *   uint16 extension_type
+	 *   uint16 extension_len;
+	 *   uint8 x[32];
+	 *   uint8 y[32];
+	 *   uint8 r[32];
+	 *   uint8 s[32];
+	 */
+	n2s(p, extension_type);
+	n2s(p, extension_len);
+
+	expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id;
+	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+		expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new;
+
+	if (extension_type != expected_extension_type ||
+	    extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+	if (!p256)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	BN_init(&x);
+	BN_init(&y);
+	sig.r = BN_new();
+	sig.s = BN_new();
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(p +  0, 32, &x) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	point = EC_POINT_new(p256);
+	if (!point ||
+	    !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL))
+		goto err;
+
+	key = EC_KEY_new();
+	if (!key ||
+	    !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) ||
+	    !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
+		goto err;
+
+	/* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time
+	 * that we were called. */
+	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) {
+	case 1:
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID,SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
+		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+		goto err;
+	default:
+		s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64);
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+	BN_free(&x);
+	BN_free(&y);
+	BN_free(sig.r);
+	BN_free(sig.s);
+	if (key)
+		EC_KEY_free(key);
+	if (point)
+		EC_POINT_free(point);
+	if (p256)
+		EC_GROUP_free(p256);
+	return ret;
+	}
 #endif
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 944aea6..e50b8f0 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -547,6 +547,13 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	char *srp_username;
 #endif
+
+	/* original_handshake_hash contains the handshake hash (either
+	 * SHA-1+MD5 or SHA-2, depending on TLS version) for the original, full
+	 * handshake that created a session. This is used by Channel IDs during
+	 * resumption. */
+	unsigned char original_handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int original_handshake_hash_len;
 	};
 
 #endif
@@ -862,6 +869,9 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 	/* get client cert callback */
 	int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
 
+	/* get channel id callback */
+	void (*channel_id_cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+
     /* cookie generate callback */
     int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, 
         unsigned int *cookie_len);
@@ -999,6 +1009,16 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
 # endif
         /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
         STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;  
+
+	/* If true, a client will advertise the Channel ID extension and a
+	 * server will echo it. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	/* tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new is a hack to support both old and new
+	 * ChannelID signatures. It indicates that a client should advertise the
+	 * new ChannelID extension number. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new;
+	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
+	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
 #endif
 	};
 
@@ -1040,6 +1060,10 @@ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL)
 #define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL)
+/* SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
+ * IDs from clients. Returns 1 on success. */
+#define SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(ctx) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
 
 void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess));
 int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
@@ -1056,6 +1080,8 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,
 void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val);
 void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
 int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*channel_id_cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey));
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e);
 #endif
@@ -1117,5 +1143,6 @@ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
 #define SSL_WRITING	2
 #define SSL_READING	3
 #define SSL_X509_LOOKUP	4
+#define SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP	5
 
 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */
@@ -1124,5 +1151,6 @@ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s);
 #define SSL_want_read(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING)
 #define SSL_want_write(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING)
 #define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+#define SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s)	(SSL_want(s) == SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP)
 
 #define SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM 1
@@ -1373,6 +1401,13 @@ struct ssl_st
 	                                 */
 	unsigned int tlsext_hb_pending; /* Indicates if a HeartbeatRequest is in flight */
 	unsigned int tlsext_hb_seq;     /* HeartbeatRequest sequence number */
+
+	/* Copied from the SSL_CTX. For a server, means that we'll accept
+	 * Channel IDs from clients. For a client, means that we'll advertise
+	 * support. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_enabled;
+	/* The client's Channel ID private key. */
+	EVP_PKEY *tlsext_channel_id_private;
 #else
 #define session_ctx ctx
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@@ -1543,5 +1578,6 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN		6
 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT		7
 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT		8
+#define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP	9
 
 #define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA			1
@@ -1631,6 +1667,9 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING		86
 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS	87
 #endif
+#define SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID			88
+#define SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID			89
+#define SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID			90
 #endif
 
 #define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT		73
@@ -1678,6 +1717,26 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 #define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \
 	SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh)
 
+/* SSL_enable_tls_channel_id either configures a TLS server to accept TLS client
+ * IDs from clients, or configure a client to send TLS client IDs to server.
+ * Returns 1 on success. */
+#define SSL_enable_tls_channel_id(s) \
+	SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_CHANNEL_ID,0,NULL)
+/* SSL_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID to
+ * compatible servers. private_key must be a P-256 EVP_PKEY*. Returns 1 on
+ * success. */
+#define SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(s, private_key) \
+	SSL_ctrl(s,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
+#define SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(ctx, private_key) \
+	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_CHANNEL_ID,0,(void*)private_key)
+/* SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server SSL*
+ * and copies up to the first |channel_id_len| bytes into |channel_id|. The
+ * Channel ID consists of the client's P-256 public key as an (x,y) pair where
+ * each is a 32-byte, big-endian field element. Returns 0 if the client didn't
+ * offer a Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise. */
+#define SSL_get_tls_channel_id(ctx, channel_id, channel_id_len) \
+	SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_CHANNEL_ID,channel_id_len,(void*)channel_id)
+
 #define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \
 	SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509)
 #define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx,px509) \
@@ -2176,6 +2235,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 135
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS			 289
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY			 136
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID			 317
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 137
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO			 138
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 139
@@ -2195,6 +2255,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES				 148
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N				 149
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST		 150
+#define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID			 318
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE		 151
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE		 152
 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY			 153
@@ -2361,12 +2422,15 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET				 128
 #define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG			 129
 #define SSL_R_BN_LIB					 130
+#define SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY		 376
 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 131
 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG				 132
 #define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY			 133
 #define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED			 134
 #define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH			 135
 #define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT			 136
+#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256			 375
+#define SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID		 371
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH			 137
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE		 138
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR			 139
@@ -2379,6 +2443,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT		 143
 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET			 144
 #define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH				 308
+#define SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG				 379
 #define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED		 145
 #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
 #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
@@ -2396,9 +2461,12 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 150
 #define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY		 282
 #define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST		 151
+#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED		 377
+#define SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED			 378
 #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE			 152
 #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE			 153
 #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS			 154
+#define SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS		 372
 #define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS		 355
 #define SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION		 356
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
@@ -2408,6 +2476,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH			 158
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM		 341
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE				 374
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE				 278
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME			 357
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE			 328
@@ -2462,6 +2531,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED			 187
 #define SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER		 330
 #define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED			 188
+#define SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT				 380
 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY				 189
 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED			 190
 #define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE			 191
diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index cf81de0..8502628 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -548,6 +548,22 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 	char is_probably_safari;
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+	/* In a client, this means that the server supported Channel ID and that
+	 * a Channel ID was sent. In a server it means that we echoed support
+	 * for Channel IDs and that tlsext_channel_id will be valid after the
+	 * handshake. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_valid;
+	/* tlsext_channel_id_new means that the updated Channel ID extension
+	 * was negotiated. This is a temporary hack in the code to support both
+	 * forms of Channel ID extension while we transition to the new format,
+	 * which fixed a security issue. */
+	char tlsext_channel_id_new;
+	/* For a server:
+	 *     If |tlsext_channel_id_valid| is true, then this contains the
+	 *     verified Channel ID from the client: a P256 point, (x,y), where
+	 *     each are big-endian values. */
+	unsigned char tlsext_channel_id[64];
 	} SSL3_STATE;
 
 #endif
@@ -592,6 +608,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x200|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x201|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #endif
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+#define SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A		(0x1B0|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 #define SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B		(0x1B1|SSL_ST_CONNECT)
 /* read from server */
@@ -646,6 +664,9 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A		(0x210|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B		(0x211|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #endif
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT	(0x1BF|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A		(0x220|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+#define SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B		(0x221|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A		(0x1C0|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 #define SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B		(0x1C1|SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
 /* write to client */
@@ -673,6 +694,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 #define SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO			67
 #endif
+#define SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS		203
 #define DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST    3
 
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
index 8bda011..e579e7c 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c
@@ -118,11 +118,12 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_asn1_st
 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING original_handshake_hash;
 	} SSL_SESSION_ASN1;
 
 int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 	{
 #define LSIZE2 (sizeof(long)*2)
-	int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0,v7=0,v8=0;
+	int v1=0,v2=0,v3=0,v4=0,v5=0,v7=0,v8=0,v14=0;
 	unsigned char buf[4],ibuf1[LSIZE2],ibuf2[LSIZE2];
 	unsigned char ibuf3[LSIZE2],ibuf4[LSIZE2],ibuf5[LSIZE2];
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
@@ -280,4 +281,11 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 		}
+
+	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
+		{
+		a.original_handshake_hash.length = in->original_handshake_hash_len;
+		a.original_handshake_hash.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+		a.original_handshake_hash.data = in->original_handshake_hash;
+		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	if (in->srp_username)
@@ -335,4 +343,6 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
+		M_ASN1_I2D_len_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
 
 	M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total();
 
@@ -385,4 +395,6 @@ int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+	if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0)
+		M_ASN1_I2D_put_EXP_opt(&(a.original_handshake_hash),i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14,v14);
 	M_ASN1_I2D_finish();
 	}
 
@@ -661,5 +673,16 @@ SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 		os.data = NULL;
 		}
 
+	os.length=0;
+	os.data=NULL;
+	M_ASN1_D2I_get_EXP_opt(osp,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,14);
+	if (os.data && os.length < (int)sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash))
+		{
+		memcpy(ret->original_handshake_hash, os.data, os.length);
+		ret->original_handshake_hash_len = os.length;
+		OPENSSL_free(os.data);
+		os.data = NULL;
+		}
+
 	M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,SSL_SESSION_free,SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION);
 	}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 370fb57..b3eee4d 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_GET_CHANNEL_ID"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES),	"SSL3_READ_BYTES"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N),	"SSL3_READ_N"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST),	"SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID),	"SSL3_SEND_CHANNEL_ID"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY),	"SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY"},
@@ -339,12 +341,15 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET)           ,"bio not set"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG),"block cipher pad is wrong"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BN_LIB)                ,"bn lib"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY),"cannot serialize public key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH) ,"ca dn length mismatch"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG)        ,"ca dn too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY)    ,"ccs received early"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED),"certificate verify failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH)  ,"cert length mismatch"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT),"challenge is different"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256)   ,"channel id not p256"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID),"Channel ID signature invalid"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH),"cipher code wrong length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE),"cipher or hash unavailable"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR),"cipher table src error"},
@@ -357,6 +362,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT),"connection id is different"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET),"connection type not set"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH)       ,"cookie mismatch"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG)         ,"d2i ecdsa sig"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED),"data between ccs and finished"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
@@ -374,9 +380,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"encrypted length too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY),"error generating tmp rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST),"error in received cipher list"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED),"evp digestsignfinal failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED),"evp digestsigninit failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE),"excessive message size"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE) ,"extra data in message"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got a fin before a ccs"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got Channel ID before a ccs"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS),"got next proto before a ccs"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION),"got next proto without seeing extension"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
@@ -386,6 +395,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND)       ,"invalid command"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),"invalid compression algorithm"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE)       ,"invalid message"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE)       ,"invalid purpose"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME)  ,"invalid srp username"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE),"invalid status response"},
@@ -440,6 +450,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED),"no compression specified"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED)   ,"no method specified"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT)       ,"no p256 support"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY)         ,"no privatekey"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED),"no private key assigned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE),"no protocols available"},
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 123f925..6938267 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -562,6 +562,8 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 		sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
 	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
 		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
 #endif
 
 	if (s->client_CA != NULL)
@@ -1952,6 +1954,11 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 		ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
+#endif
+
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	}
 
@@ -2504,6 +2511,10 @@ int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
 		{
 		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
 		}
+	if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s))
+		{
+		return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP);
+		}
 
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index fcc6d80..3ce3d60 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@
  * (currently this also goes into algorithm2) */
 #define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x04
 
+#define TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE 128
 
 
 /*
@@ -1008,6 +1009,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
 int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s);
+int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s);
 # endif
 #endif
 
@@ -1030,6 +1032,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s);
 #endif
+int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s);
 
 int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1072,6 +1075,7 @@ void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s);
 int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which);
 int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s);
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int snd);
+int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len);
 int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
 	const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *p);
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
@@ -1127,6 +1131,8 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk);
 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg);
 
+int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, SSL *s);
+int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s);
 #endif
 
 int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 2a378c3..dd3b4a6 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -1151,6 +1151,17 @@ int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, X509 ** x509 , EVP_PK
 	return ctx->client_cert_cb;
 	}
 
+void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+	void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey))
+	{
+	ctx->channel_id_cb=cb;
+	}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL * ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+	{
+	return ctx->channel_id_cb;
+	}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e)
 	{
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 0c4cdde..f396674 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -895,54 +895,79 @@ int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 	return((int)ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
+ * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
+ * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
+ * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
+ * update etc. */
+int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len)
+	{
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	int i, err = 0, len = 0;
+	long mask;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+	for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++)
+		{
+		int hash_size;
+		unsigned int digest_len;
+		EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+
+		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
+		if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len)
+			{
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+			}
+
+		if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
+		    !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
+		    digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */
+			{
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+			}
+		out += digest_len;
+		out_len -= digest_len;
+		len += digest_len;
+		}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+	if (err != 0)
+		return -1;
+	return len;
+	}
+
 int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
 	     const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
 	{
-	unsigned int i;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
-	int idx;
-	long mask;
+	unsigned char buf2[12];
 	int err=0;
-	const EVP_MD *md; 
+	int digests_len;
 
-	q=buf;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
 		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
 			return 0;
 
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
+	digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	if (digests_len < 0)
 		{
-		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
-			{
-			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
-			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
-				{
-				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
-				err = 1;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
-					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
-					err = 1;
-				q+=hashsize;
-				}
-			}
+		err = 1;
+		digests_len = 0;
 		}
-		
+
 	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-			str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
+			str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
 			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
 			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
 		err = 1;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
 	if (err)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index bddffd9..1a56a97 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -641,6 +641,19 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
+		{
+		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
+		 * support for Channel ID. */
+		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
+		else
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
+		s2n(0,ret);
+		}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
@@ -881,6 +894,19 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	/* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
+	 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
+	if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
+		{
+		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
+		else
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
+		s2n(0,ret);
+		}
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -1442,6 +1468,16 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
+			 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
+			{
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
+			}
+
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
@@ -1672,6 +1708,15 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
 			}
 #endif
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
+			{
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+			s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
+			}
+
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
 			{
 			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
@@ -2727,3 +2772,74 @@ tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	return ret;
 	}
 #endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
+ * SSL connection and writes it to |md|.
+ */
+int
+tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
+	{
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned temp_digest_len;
+	int i;
+	static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+			return 0;
+
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+
+	if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+		{
+		static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
+				 sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
+		if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
+			return 0;
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
+				 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+		}
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
+		{
+		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
+		EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
+		}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
+ * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
+int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int digest_len;
+	/* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
+	 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
+	 * full handshake. */
+	if (s->hit)
+		return -1;
+	/* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
+	 * negotiated. */
+	if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
+		return -1;
+
+	digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
+		s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
+		sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
+	if (digest_len < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
diff --git a/ssl/tls1.h b/ssl/tls1.h
index c992091..12f2f21 100644
--- a/ssl/tls1.h
+++ b/ssl/tls1.h
@@ -254,6 +254,10 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg		13172
 #endif
 
+/* This is not an IANA defined extension number */
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id			30031
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new		30032
+
 /* NameType value from RFC 3546 */
 #define TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 0
 /* status request value from RFC 3546 */
-- 
1.9.1.423.g4596e3a