ossl_seed: fix the last resort PRNG seeding
Instead of just abusing the pseudo-randomizer from Curl_FormBoundary(),
this now uses Curl_ossl_random() to get entropy.
diff --git a/lib/ssluse.c b/lib/ssluse.c
index 4a0dba7..79a61e4 100644
--- a/lib/ssluse.c
+++ b/lib/ssluse.c
@@ -236,27 +236,14 @@
/* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
approach! */
- {
+ do {
int len;
- char *area;
+ unsigned char randb[64];
+ Curl_ossl_random(data, randb, sizeof(randb));
- /* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
- * directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
- * being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
- * of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
- */
-
- do {
- area = Curl_FormBoundary();
- if(!area)
- return 3; /* out of memory */
-
- len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
- RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
-
- free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
- } while(!RAND_status());
- }
+ len = sizeof(randb);
+ RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1));
+ } while(!RAND_status());
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
