net/third_party/nss/patches/cbc.patch

diff -pu a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
--- a/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2013-07-31 14:10:35.113325316 -0700
+++ b/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c	2013-07-31 14:12:00.254575103 -0700
@@ -2157,6 +2157,20 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
     return rv;
 }
 
+/* This is a bodge to allow this code to be compiled against older NSS headers
+ * that don't contain the CBC constant-time changes. */
+#ifndef CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME
+#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19)
+#define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20)
+
+typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS {
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg;   /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen;    /* in */
+    CK_BYTE * pHeader;          /* in */
+    CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen;       /* in */
+} CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS;
+#endif
+
 /* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord()
  * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!)
  *
@@ -2179,7 +2193,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
 {
     CK_MECHANISM_TYPE            macType;
     CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params;
-    SECItem                      param, inputItem, outputItem;
+    PK11Context *                mac_context;
+    SECItem                      param;
     SECStatus                    rv;
     unsigned char                header[13];
     PK11SymKey *                 key;
@@ -2240,34 +2255,27 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime(
     param.len = sizeof(params);
     param.type = 0;
 
-    inputItem.data = (unsigned char *) input;
-    inputItem.len = inputLen;
-    inputItem.type = 0;
-
-    outputItem.data = outbuf;
-    outputItem.len = *outLen;
-    outputItem.type = 0;
-
     key = spec->server.write_mac_key;
     if (!useServerMacKey) {
 	key = spec->client.write_mac_key;
     }
+    mac_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macType, CKA_SIGN, key, &param);
+    if (mac_context == NULL) {
+	/* Older versions of NSS may not support constant-time MAC. */
+	goto fallback;
+    }
 
-    rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(key, macType, &param, &outputItem, &inputItem);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) {
-	    goto fallback;
-	}
+    rv  = PK11_DigestBegin(mac_context);
+    rv |= PK11_DigestOp(mac_context, input, inputLen);
+    rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(mac_context, outbuf, outLen, spec->mac_size);
+    PK11_DestroyContext(mac_context, PR_TRUE);
 
-	*outLen = 0;
+    PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
 	rv = SECFailure;
 	ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE);
-	return rv;
     }
-
-    PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)spec->mac_size);
-    *outLen = outputItem.len;
-
     return rv;
 
 fallback: