blob: 1bf329dd306cad7125914cd0cdc6dc449de8ff56 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "base/basictypes.h"
#include "base/callback.h"
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "components/nacl/common/nacl_switches.h"
#include "components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.h"
#include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_bpf_sandbox_linux.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/services/thread_helpers.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h"
namespace nacl {
namespace {
// This is a poor man's check on whether we are sandboxed.
bool IsSandboxed() {
int proc_fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
if (proc_fd >= 0) {
PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(proc_fd)));
return false;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace
NaClSandbox::NaClSandbox()
: layer_one_enabled_(false),
layer_one_sealed_(false),
layer_two_enabled_(false),
layer_two_is_nonsfi_(false),
proc_fd_(-1) {
proc_fd_.reset(
HANDLE_EINTR(open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
PCHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
}
NaClSandbox::~NaClSandbox() {
}
bool NaClSandbox::IsSingleThreaded() {
CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
base::ScopedFD proc_self_task(HANDLE_EINTR(openat(
proc_fd_.get(), "self/task/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)));
PCHECK(proc_self_task.is_valid());
return sandbox::ThreadHelpers::IsSingleThreaded(proc_self_task.get());
}
bool NaClSandbox::HasOpenDirectory() {
CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
sandbox::Credentials credentials;
return credentials.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd_.get());
}
void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerOneSandbox() {
// Check that IsSandboxed() works. We should not be sandboxed at this point.
CHECK(!IsSandboxed()) << "Unexpectedly sandboxed!";
scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client(
sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient::Create());
// Close the file descriptor that is an artefact of how the setuid sandbox
// works.
PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(
setuid_sandbox_client->GetUniqueToChildFileDescriptor())));
const bool suid_sandbox_child = setuid_sandbox_client->IsSuidSandboxChild();
if (suid_sandbox_child) {
// Make sure that no directory file descriptor is open, as it would bypass
// the setuid sandbox model.
CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
// Get sandboxed.
CHECK(setuid_sandbox_client->ChrootMe());
CHECK(IsSandboxed());
layer_one_enabled_ = true;
}
}
void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerTwoSandbox(bool uses_nonsfi_mode) {
// seccomp-bpf only applies to the current thread, so it's critical to only
// have a single thread running here.
DCHECK(!layer_one_sealed_);
CHECK(IsSingleThreaded());
if (uses_nonsfi_mode) {
layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::nonsfi::InitializeBPFSandbox();
layer_two_is_nonsfi_ = true;
} else {
layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::InitializeBPFSandbox();
}
}
void NaClSandbox::SealLayerOneSandbox() {
if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
// If nothing prevents us, check that there is no superfluous directory
// open.
CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
}
proc_fd_.reset();
layer_one_sealed_ = true;
}
void NaClSandbox::CheckSandboxingStateWithPolicy() {
static const char kItIsDangerousMsg[] = " this is dangerous.";
static const char kItIsNotAllowedMsg[] =
" this is not allowed in this configuration.";
const bool no_sandbox_for_nonsfi_ok =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kNaClDangerousNoSandboxNonSfi);
const bool can_be_no_sandbox =
!layer_two_is_nonsfi_ || no_sandbox_for_nonsfi_ok;
if (!layer_one_enabled_ || !layer_one_sealed_) {
static const char kNoSuidMsg[] =
"The SUID sandbox is not engaged for NaCl:";
if (can_be_no_sandbox)
LOG(ERROR) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
else
LOG(FATAL) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
}
if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
static const char kNoBpfMsg[] =
"The seccomp-bpf sandbox is not engaged for NaCl:";
if (can_be_no_sandbox)
LOG(ERROR) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
else
LOG(FATAL) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
}
}
} // namespace nacl