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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/stack.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "../asn1/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
const X509_REVOKED *const *b);
static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED, extensions, X509_EXTENSION),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
X509_NAME *issuer);
// The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache
// the original encoding the signature wont be affected by reordering of the
// revoked field.
static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg) {
X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
if (!a || !a->revoked) {
return 1;
}
switch (operation) {
// Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would
// affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
(void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp);
break;
}
return 1;
}
ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
// Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension. Check
// for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl) {
size_t i, k;
int j;
GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
gens = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) {
X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_certificate_issuer, &j, NULL);
if (!gtmp && (j != -1)) {
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
return 1;
}
if (gtmp) {
gens = gtmp;
if (!crl->issuers) {
crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
if (!crl->issuers) {
return 0;
}
}
if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp)) {
return 0;
}
}
rev->issuer = gens;
reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &j, NULL);
if (!reason && (j != -1)) {
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
return 1;
}
if (reason) {
rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
} else {
rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
}
// Check for critical CRL entry extensions
exts = rev->extensions;
for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); k++) {
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, k);
if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)) ==
NID_certificate_issuer) {
continue;
}
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
break;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
// The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
// and hash of the whole CRL.
static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg) {
X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
size_t idx;
int i;
switch (operation) {
case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
crl->idp = NULL;
crl->akid = NULL;
crl->flags = 0;
crl->idp_flags = 0;
crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
crl->issuers = NULL;
crl->crl_number = NULL;
crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
break;
case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: {
// The version must be one of v1(0) or v2(1).
long version = X509_CRL_VERSION_1;
if (crl->crl->version != NULL) {
version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl->version);
// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_CRL_VERSION_1|
// should also be rejected. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1
// version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted.
if (version < X509_CRL_VERSION_1 || version > X509_CRL_VERSION_2) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION);
return 0;
}
}
// Per RFC 5280, section 5.1.2.1, extensions require v2.
if (version != X509_CRL_VERSION_2 && crl->crl->extensions != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION);
return 0;
}
if (!X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha256(), crl->crl_hash, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
crl->idp =
X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_issuing_distribution_point, &i, NULL);
if (crl->idp != NULL) {
if (!setup_idp(crl, crl->idp)) {
return 0;
}
} else if (i != -1) {
return 0;
}
crl->akid =
X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
if (crl->akid == NULL && i != -1) {
return 0;
}
crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_crl_number, &i, NULL);
if (crl->crl_number == NULL && i != -1) {
return 0;
}
crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_delta_crl, &i, NULL);
if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL && i != -1) {
return 0;
}
// Delta CRLs must have CRL number
if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_DELTA_CRL_WITHOUT_CRL_NUMBER);
return 0;
}
// See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate
// this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else
// critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure
// directly: applications shouldn't do this.
exts = crl->crl->extensions;
for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) {
int nid;
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext));
if (nid == NID_freshest_crl) {
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
}
if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
// We handle IDP and deltas
if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point) ||
(nid == NID_authority_key_identifier) || (nid == NID_delta_crl)) {
continue;
}
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
break;
}
}
if (!crl_set_issuers(crl)) {
return 0;
}
break;
}
case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
break;
}
return 1;
}
// Convert IDP into a more convenient form
static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp) {
int idp_only = 0;
// Set various flags according to IDP
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
if (idp->onlyuser > 0) {
idp_only++;
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
}
if (idp->onlyCA > 0) {
idp_only++;
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
}
if (idp->onlyattr > 0) {
idp_only++;
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
}
if (idp_only > 1) {
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
}
if (idp->indirectCRL > 0) {
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
}
if (idp->onlysomereasons) {
crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0) {
crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
}
if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1) {
crl->idp_reasons |= (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
}
crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
}
return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
}
ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
// Although |X509_REVOKED| contains an |X509_NAME|, it can be const. It is not
// affected by https://crbug.com/boringssl/407 because the |X509_NAME| does
// not participate in serialization.
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(X509_REVOKED)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION_const(X509_REVOKED)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
const X509_REVOKED *const *b) {
return ASN1_STRING_cmp((*a)->serialNumber, (*b)->serialNumber);
}
int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev) {
X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
inf = crl->crl;
if (!inf->revoked) {
inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
}
if (!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
return 0;
}
asn1_encoding_clear(&inf->enc);
return 1;
}
int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(crl->sig_alg, crl->crl->sig_alg) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
return ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), crl->sig_alg,
crl->signature, crl->crl, pkey);
}
int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
ASN1_INTEGER *serial) {
return crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
}
int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x) {
return crl_lookup(crl, ret, X509_get_serialNumber(x),
X509_get_issuer_name(x));
}
static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
X509_REVOKED *rev) {
size_t i;
if (!rev->issuer) {
if (!nm) {
return 1;
}
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
if (!nm) {
nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
continue;
}
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static CRYPTO_MUTEX g_crl_sort_lock = CRYPTO_MUTEX_INIT;
static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
X509_NAME *issuer) {
// Use an assert, rather than a runtime error, because returning nothing for a
// CRL is arguably failing open, rather than closed.
assert(serial->type == V_ASN1_INTEGER || serial->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER);
X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
size_t idx;
rtmp.serialNumber = serial;
// Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this
// under a lock to avoid race condition.
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock);
const int is_sorted = sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock);
if (!is_sorted) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock);
if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) {
sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock);
}
if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &idx, &rtmp)) {
return 0;
}
// Need to look for matching name
for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++) {
rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx);
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial)) {
return 0;
}
if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) {
if (ret) {
*ret = rev;
}
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) {
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}