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<p>The availability of a trusted execution environment in a system on a chip (SoC)
offers an opportunity for Android devices to provide hardware-backed, strong
security services to the Android OS, to platform services, and even to
third-party apps. Developers seeking the Android-specific extensions should go
to <a
href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/keystore/KeyGenParameterSpec.html">android.security.keystore</a>.</p>
<p>Before Android 6.0, Android already had a simple, hardware-backed crypto
services API, provided by versions 0.2 and 0.3 of the Keymaster Hardware
Abstraction Layer (HAL). Keystore provided digital signing and verification
operations, plus generation and import of asymmetric signing key pairs. This is
already implemented on many devices, but there are many security goals that
cannot easily be achieved with only a signature API. Keystore in Android 6.0
extends the Keystore API to provide a broader range of capabilities.</p>
<p>In Android 6.0, Keystore added <a href="/security/keystore/features.html">symmetric cryptographic
primitives</a>, AES and HMAC, and an access control system for hardware-backed
keys. Access controls are specified during key generation and enforced for the
lifetime of the key. Keys can be restricted to be usable only after the user has
authenticated, and only for specified purposes or with specified cryptographic
parameters. For more information, see the <a href="/security/keystore/tags">Authorization
Tags</a> and <a href="/security/keystore/implementer-ref">Functions</a> pages.</p>
<p>
In Android 7.0, Keymaster 2 added support for key attestation and version binding.
<a href="/security/keystore/attestation">Key attestation</a>
provides public key certificates that contain a detailed
description of the key and its access controls, to make the key's existence in
secure hardware and its configuration remotely verifiable.
</p>
<p>
<a href="/security/keystore/version-binding">Version binding</a>
binds keys to operating system and patch
level version. This ensures that an attacker who discovers a weakness in an old
version of system or TEE software cannot roll a device back to the vulnerable
version and use keys created with the newer version. In addition, when a key
with a given version and patch level is used on a device that has been upgraded
to a newer version or patch level, the key is upgraded before it can be used,
and the previous version of the key invalidated. As the device is upgraded, the
keys "ratchet" forward along with the device, but any reversion of the device to
a previous release causes the keys to be unusable.
</p>
<h2 id=goals>Goals</h2>
<p>The Android 7.0 Keystore API and the underlying Keymaster HAL
provides a basic but adequate set of cryptographic primitives to allow the
implementation of protocols using access-controlled, hardware-backed keys.</p>
<p>In addition to expanding the range of cryptographic primitives, Keystore in
Android 6.0 adds the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>A usage control scheme to allow key usage to be limited, to mitigate the risk
of security compromise due to misuse of keys
<li>An access control scheme to enable restriction of keys to specified users,
clients, and a defined time range
</ul>
<h2 id=architecture>Architecture</h2>
<p>The Keymaster HAL is an OEM-provided, dynamically-loadable library used by the
Keystore service to provide hardware-backed cryptographic services. To keep
things secure, HAL implementations don't perform any sensitive operations in
user space, or even in kernel space. Sensitive operations are delegated to a
secure processor reached through some kernel interface.
The resulting architecture looks like this:</p>
<div align="center">
<img src="/security/images/access-to-keymaster.png" alt="Access to Keymaster" id="figure1" />
</div>
<p class="img-caption"><strong>Figure 1.</strong> Access to Keymaster</p>
<p>Within an Android device, the "client" of the Keymaster HAL consists of
multiple layers (e.g. app, framework, Keystore daemon), but that can be ignored
for the purposes of this document. This means that the described Keymaster HAL
API is low-level, used by platform-internal components, and not exposed to app
developers. The higher-level API, for API level 23, is described on the <a
href="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/keystore/KeyGenParameterSpec.html">Android
Developer site</a>.</p>
<p>The purpose of the Keymaster HAL is not to implement the security-sensitive
algorithms but only to marshal and unmarshal requests to the secure world. The
wire format is implementation-defined.</p>
<h2 id=compatibility_with_previous_versions>Compatibility with previous versions</h2>
<p>The Keymaster 1 HAL is completely incompatible with the
previously-released HALs, e.g. Keymaster 0.2 and 0.3. To facilitate
interoperability on devices running Android 5.0 and earlier that launched with
the older Keymaster HALs, Keystore provides an adapter that implements the
Keymaster 1 HAL with calls to the existing hardware library. The result cannot
provide the full range of functionality in the Keymaster 1 HAL. In particular,
it only supports RSA and ECDSA algorithms, and all of the key authorization
enforcement is performed by the adapter, in the non-secure world.</p>
<p>
Keymaster 2 further simplified the HAL interface by removing the <code>get_supported_*</code>
methods and allowing the <code>finish()</code> method to accept input. This reduces the
number of round trips to the TEE in cases where the input is available all at
once, and simplifies implementation of AEAD decryption.
</p>
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