en/security/overview/implement.html

page.title=Implementing Security
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    <h2>In this document</h2>
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<p>The Android Security Team regularly receives requests for information about
preventing potential security issues on Android devices. We also occasionally
spot check devices and let device manufacturers and affected partners know of
potential issues.</p>

<p>This page provides security best practices based on our experiences,
extending the
<a href="http://developer.android.com/guide/practices/security.html">Designing
for Security</a> documentation we've provided for developers and includes
details unique to building or installing system-level software on devices.</p>

<p>To facilitate adoption of these best practices, where possible the Android
Security Team incorporates tests into the
<a href="{@docRoot}compatibility/cts-intro.html">Android Compatibility Test
Suite</a> (CTS) and
<a href="http://tools.android.com/tips/lint">Android Lint</a>. We encourage
device implementers to contribute tests that can help other Android users (view
security-related tests at
<code>root/cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts</code>).</p>

<h2 id="dev-process">Development process</h2>
<p>Use the following best practices in your development processes and
environment.</p>

<h3 id="sec-review">Reviewing source code</h3>
<p> Source code review can detect a broad range of security issues, including
those identified in this document. Android strongly encourages both manual and
automated source code review. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Run <a href="http://tools.android.com/tips/lint">Android Lint</a> on all
application code using the Android SDK and correct any identified issues.</li>
<li>Native code should be analyzed using an automated tool that can detect
memory management issues such as buffer overflows and off-by-one errors.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="auto-test">Using automated testing</h3>
<p>Automated testing can detect a broad range of security issues, including
several issues discussed below. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>CTS is regularly updated with security tests; run the most recent version of
CTS to verify compatibility.</li>
<li>Run CTS regularly throughout the development process to detect problems
early and reduce time to correction. Android uses CTS as part of continuous
integration in our automated build process, which builds multiple times per day.
</li>
<li>Device manufacturers should automate security testing of interfaces,
including testing with malformed inputs (fuzz testing).</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="sign-sysimg">Signing system images</h3>
<p>The signature of the system image is critical for determining the integrity
of the device. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Devices must not be signed with a key that is publicly known.</li>
<li>Keys used to sign devices should be managed in a manner consistent with
industry standard practices for handling sensitive keys, including a hardware
security module (HSM) that provides limited, auditable access.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="sign-apk">Signing applications (APKs)</h3>
<p>Application signatures play an important role in device security and are used
for permissions checks as well as software updates. When selecting a key to use
for signing applications, it is important to consider whether an application
will be available only on a single device or common across multiple devices.
Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Applications must not be signed with a key that is publicly known.</li>
<li>Keys used to sign applications should be managed in a manner consistent with
industry standard practices for handling sensitive keys, including an HSM that
provides limited, auditable access.</li>
<li>Applications should not be signed with the platform key.</li>
<li>Applications with the same package name should not be signed with different
keys. This often occurs when creating an application for different devices,
especially when using the platform key. If the application is
device-independent, use the same key across devices. If the application is
device-specific, create unique package names per device and key.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="apps-pub">Publishing applications</h3>
<p>Google Play provides device manufacturers the ability to update applications
without performing a complete system update. This can expedite response to
security issues and delivery of new features, as well as provide a way to ensure
your application has a unique package name. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Upload your applications to Google Play to allow automated updates without
requiring a full over-the-air (OTA) update. Applications that are uploaded but
unpublished are not directly downloadable by users but the applications are
still updated. Users who have previously installed the app can re-install it
and/or install on other devices.</li>
<li>Create an application package name that is clearly associated with your
company, such as by using a company trademark.</li>
<li>Applications published by device manufacturers should be uploaded on the
Google Play store to avoid package name impersonation by third-party users. If
a device manufacturer installs an app on a device without publishing the app on
the Play store, another developer could upload the same app, use the same
package name, and change the metadata for the app. When the app is presented to
the user, this unrelated metadata could create confusion.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="incident-response">Responding to incidents</h3>
<p>External parties must have the ability to contact device manufacturers about
device-specific security issues. We recommend creating a publicly accessible
email address for managing security incidents. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Create a <em>security@your-company.com</em> or similar address and publicize
it.</li>
<li>If you become aware of a security issue affecting Android OS or Android
devices from multiple device manufacturers, you should contact the Android
Security Team by filing a
<a href="https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/entry?template=Security%20bug%20report">Security
bug report</a>.</li>
</ul>

<h2 id="prod-implement">Product implementation</h2>
<p>Use the following best practices when implementing a product.</p>

<h3 id="root-processes">Isolating root processes</h3>
<p>Root processes are the most frequent target of privilege escalation attacks,
so reducing the number of root processes reduces risk of privilege escalation.
CTS includes an informational test that lists root processes. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Devices should run the minimum necessary code as root. Where possible, use a
regular Android process rather than a root process. The ICS Galaxy Nexus has
only six root processes: vold, inetd, zygote, tf_daemon, ueventd, and init. If a
process must run as root on a device, document the process in an AOSP feature
request so it can be publicly reviewed.</li>
<li>Where possible, root code should be isolated from untrusted data and
accessed via IPC. For example, reduce root functionality to a small Service
accessible via Binder and expose the Service with signature permission to an
application with low or no privileges to handle network traffic.</li>
<li>Root processes must not listen on a network socket.</li>
<li>Root processes must not provide a general-purpose runtime for applications
(e.g. a Java VM).</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="sys-apps">Isolating system apps</h3>
<p>In general, pre-installed apps should not run with the shared system UID. If
is it necessary, however, for an app to use the shared UID of system or another
privileged service (i.e., phone), the app should not export any services,
broadcast receivers, or content providers that can be accessed by third-party
apps installed by users. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Devices should run the minimum necessary code as system. Where possible, use
an Android process with its own UID rather than reusing the system UID.</li>
<li>Where possible, system code should be isolated from untrusted data and
expose IPC only to other trusted processes.</li>
<li>System processes must not listen on a network socket.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="process-isolate">Isolating processes</h3>
<p>The Android Application Sandbox provides applications with an expectation of
isolation from other processes on the system, including root processes and
debuggers. Unless debugging is specifically enabled by the application and the
user, no application should violate that expectation. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Root processes must not access data within individual application data
folders, unless using a documented Android debugging method.</li>
<li>Root processes must not access memory of applications, unless using a
documented Android debugging method.</li>
<li>Devices must not include any application that accesses data or memory of
other applications or processes.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="suid-files">Securing SUID files</h3>
<p>New setuid programs should not be accessible by untrusted programs. Setuid
programs have frequently been the location of vulnerabilities that can be used
to gain root access, so strive to minimize the availability of the setuid
program to untrusted applications. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>SUID processes must not provide a shell or backdoor that can be used to
circumvent the Android security model.</li>
<li>SUID programs must not be writable by any user.</li>
<li>SUID programs should not be world readable or executable. Create a group,
limit access to the SUID binary to members of that group, and place any
applications that should be able to execute the SUID program into that group.
</li>
<li>SUID programs are a common source of user rooting of devices. To reduce
this risk, SUID programs should not be executable by the shell user.</li>
</ul>

<p>CTS verifier includes an informational test listing SUID files; some
setuid files are not permitted per CTS tests.</p>

<h3 id="listening-sockets">Securing listening sockets</h3>
<p>CTS tests fail when a device is listening on any port, on any interface. In
the event of a failure, Android verifies the following best practices are in
use:</p>

<ul>
<li>There should be no listening ports on the device.</li>
<li>Listening ports must be able to be disabled without an OTA. This can be
either a server or user-device configuration change.</li>
<li>Root processes must not listen on any port.</li>
<li>Processes owned by the system UID must not listen on any port.</li>
<li>For local IPC using sockets, applications must use a UNIX Domain Socket with
access limited to a group. Create a file descriptor for the IPC and make it +RW
for a specific UNIX group. Any client applications must be within that UNIX
group.</li>
<li>Some devices with multiple processors (e.g. a radio/modem separate from the
application processor) use network sockets to communicate between processors.
In such instances, the network socket used for inter-processor communication
must use an isolated network interface to prevent access by unauthorized
applications on the device (i.e. use iptables to prevent access by other
applications on the device).</li>
<li>Daemons that handle listening ports must be robust against malformed data.
Google may conduct fuzz-testing against the port using an unauthorized client,
and, where possible, authorized client. Any crashes will be filed as bugs with
an appropriate severity.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="logging">Logging data</h3>
<p>Logging data increases the risk of exposure of that data and reduces system
performance. Multiple public security incidents have occurred as the result of
logging sensitive user data by applications installed by default on Android
devices. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Applications or system services should not log data provided from
third-party applications that might include sensitive information.</li>
<li>Applications must not log any Personally Identifiable Information (PII) as
part of normal operation.</li>
</ul>

<p>CTS includes tests that check for the presence of potentially sensitive
information in the system logs.</p>

<h3 id="directories">Limiting directory access</h3>
<p>World-writable directories can introduce security weaknesses and enable an
application to rename trusted files, substitute files, or conduct symlink-based
attacks (attackers may use a symlink to a file to trick a trusted program into
performing actions it shouldn't). Writable directories can also prevent the
uninstall of an application from properly cleaning up all files associated with
an application.</p>

<p>As a best practice, directories created by the system or root users should
not be world writable. CTS tests help enforce this best practice by testing
known directories.</p>

<h3 id="config-files">Securing configuration files</h3>
<p>Many drivers and services rely on configuration and data files stored in
directories such as <code>/system/etc</code> and <code>/data</code>. If these
files are processed by a privileged process and are world writable, it is
possible for an app to exploit a vulnerability in the process by crafting
malicious contents in the world-writable file. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>Configuration files used by privileged processes should not be world
readable.</li>
<li>Configuration files used by privileged processes must not be world
writable.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="native-code">Storing native code libraries</h3>
<p>Any code used by privileged device manufacturer processes must be in
<code>/vendor</code> or <code>/system</code>; these filesystems are mounted
read-only on boot. As a best practice, libraries used by system or other
highly-privileged apps installed on the phone should also be in these
filesystems. This can prevent a security vulnerability that could allow an
attacker to control the code that a privileged process executes.</p>

<h3 id="device-drivers">Limiting device driver access</h3>
<p>Only trusted code should have direct access to drivers. Where possible, the
preferred architecture is to provide a single-purpose daemon that proxies calls
to the driver and restricts driver access to that daemon. As a best practice,
driver device nodes should not be world readable or writable. CTS tests help
enforce this best practice by checking for known instances of exposed drivers.
</p>

<h3 id="adb">Disabling ADB</h3>
<p>Android debug bridge (adb) is a valuable development and debugging tool, but
is designed for use in controlled, secure environments and should not be enabled
for general use. Best practices:</p>

<ul>
<li>ADB must be disabled by default.</li>
<li>ADB must require the user to turn it on before accepting connections.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="unlockable-bootloaders">Unlocking bootloaders</h3>
<p>Many Android devices support unlocking, enabling the device owner to modify
the system partition and/or install a custom operating system. Common use
cases include installing a third-party ROM and performing systems-level
development on the device. For example, a Google Nexus device owner can run
<code>fastboot oem unlock</code> to start the unlocking process, which presents
the following message to the user:</p>

<div style="background-color: #B2EBF2; padding: 10px;margin-right:25px">

<p><strong>Unlock bootloader?</strong></p>

<p>If you unlock the bootloader, you will be able to install custom operating
system software on this phone.</p>

<p>A custom OS is not subject to the same testing as the original OS, and can
cause your phone and installed applications to stop working properly.</p>

<p>To prevent unauthorized access to your personal data, unlocking the
bootloader will also delete all personal data from your phone (a "factory data
reset").</p>

<p>Press the Volume Up/Down buttons to select Yes or No. Then press the Power
button to continue.</p>

<p><strong>Yes</strong>: Unlock bootloader (may void warranty)</p>

<p><strong>No</strong>: Do not unlock bootloader and restart phone.</p>
</div>

<br>
<p>As a best practice, unlockable Android devices must securely erase all user
data prior to being unlocked. Failure to properly delete all data on
unlocking may allow a physically proximate attacker to gain unauthorized access
to confidential Android user data. To prevent the disclosure of user data, a
device that supports unlocking must implement it properly (we've seen numerous
instances where device manufacturers improperly implemented unlocking). A
properly implemented unlocking process has the following properties:</p>

<ul>
<li>When the unlocking command is confirmed by the user, the device must start
an immediate data wipe. The <code>unlocked</code> flag must not be set until
after the secure deletion is complete.</li>
<li>If a secure deletion cannot be completed, the device must stay in a locked
state.</li>
<li>If supported by the underlying block device,
<code>ioctl(BLKSECDISCARD)</code> or equivalent should be used. For eMMC
devices, this means using a Secure Erase or Secure Trim command. For eMMC 4.5
and later, this means using a normal Erase or Trim followed by a Sanitize
operation.</li>
<li>If <code>BLKSECDISCARD</code> is not supported by the underlying block
device, <code>ioctl(BLKDISCARD)</code> must be used instead. On eMMC devices,
this is a normal Trim operation.</li>
<li>If <code>BLKDISCARD</code> is not supported, overwriting the block devices
with all zeros is acceptable.</li>
<li>An end user must have the option to require that user data be wiped prior to
flashing a partition. For example, on Nexus devices, this is done via the
<code>fastboot oem lock</code> command.</li>
<li>A device may record, via efuses or similar mechanism, whether a device was
unlocked and/or relocked.</li>
</ul>

<p>These requirements ensure that all data is destroyed upon the completion of
an unlock operation. Failure to implement these protections is considered a
moderate level security vulnerability.</p>

<p>A device that is unlocked may be subsequently relocked using the
<code>fastboot oem lock</code> command. Locking the bootloader provides the same
protection of user data with the new custom OS as was available with the
original device manufacturer OS (e.g. user data will be wiped if the device is
unlocked again).</p>