blob: 2be6da6f99316d88b50fe780c71964119fcb29e7 [file] [log] [blame]
# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
type shell_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# Create and use network sockets.
# logcat
# logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
# Root fs.
allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# read files in /data/anr
allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Access /data/local/tmp.
allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Read and delete from /data/local/traces.
allow shell trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
allow shell trace_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name write };
# Access /data/misc/profman.
allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { search getattr write remove_name };
allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
# Read/execute files in /data/nativetest
allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
# adb bugreport
unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
# Set properties.
set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop)
set_prop(shell, exported_dumpstate_prop)
set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop)
set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop)
# Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable
# property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization).
set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop)
# adjust is_loggable properties
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
# logpersist script
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
# "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop)
# Read device's serial number from system properties
get_prop(shell, serialno_prop)
# Allow shell to read the vendor security patch level for CTS
get_prop(shell, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
# Read state of logging-related properties
get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop)
# Read state of boot reason properties
get_prop(shell, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop)
get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop)
# allow shell access to services
allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
# don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
# TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list:
# - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates)
allow shell {
}:service_manager find;
allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
# allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager
# for instance, listing hardware services with lshal
allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
# allow shell to look through /proc/ for lsmod, ps, top, netstat.
r_dir_file(shell, proc_net_type)
allow shell {
}:file r_file_perms;
# allow listing network interfaces under /sys/class/net.
allow shell sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms;
r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
# statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems
# (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs)
allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr;
# stat() of /dev
allow shell device:dir getattr;
# allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
allow shell domain:process getattr;
# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
# enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
# User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
# and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user
allow shell self:process ptrace;
# allow shell to get battery info
allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
# Allow access to ion memory allocation device.
allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done
# via a host side test
allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr;
# /dev/fd is a symlink
allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr;
# filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done
# via hostside test
allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr;
# read selinux policy files
allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow shell to start up vendor shell
allow shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
### Neverallow rules
# Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
# In particular, if shell hard links to app data
# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
# bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
# capability.
neverallow shell file_type:file link;
# Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
# limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to
# only getattr required for host side test.
neverallow shell {
}:chr_file ~getattr;
# Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests.
neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr;