private/kernel.te

typeattribute kernel coredomain;

domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init)
domain_auto_trans(kernel, snapuserd_exec, snapuserd)

# Allow the kernel to read otapreopt_chroot's file descriptors and files under
# /postinstall, as it uses apexd logic to mount APEX packages in /postinstall/apex.
allow kernel otapreopt_chroot:fd use;
allow kernel postinstall_file:file read;

# The following sections are for the transition period during a Virtual A/B
# OTA. Once sepolicy is loaded, snapuserd must be re-launched in the correct
# context, and with properly labelled devices. This must be done before
# enabling enforcement, eg, in permissive mode while still in the kernel
# context.
allow kernel tmpfs:blk_file { getattr relabelfrom };
allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file { getattr relabelfrom };
allow kernel tmpfs:lnk_file { getattr relabelfrom };
allow kernel tmpfs:dir { open read relabelfrom };

allow kernel block_device:blk_file relabelto;
allow kernel block_device:lnk_file relabelto;
allow kernel dm_device:chr_file relabelto;
allow kernel dm_device:blk_file relabelto;
allow kernel dm_user_device:dir { read open search relabelto };
allow kernel dm_user_device:chr_file relabelto;
allow kernel kmsg_device:chr_file relabelto;
allow kernel null_device:chr_file relabelto;
allow kernel random_device:chr_file relabelto;
allow kernel snapuserd_exec:file relabelto;

allow kernel kmsg_device:chr_file write;
allow kernel gsid:fd use;

# Some contexts are changed before the device is flipped into enforcing mode
# during the setup of Apex sepolicy. These denials can be suppressed since
# the permissions should not be allowed after the device is flipped into
# enforcing mode.
dontaudit kernel device:dir { open read relabelto };
dontaudit kernel tmpfs:file { getattr open read relabelfrom };
dontaudit kernel {
  file_contexts_file
  hwservice_contexts_file
  mac_perms_file
  property_contexts_file
  seapp_contexts_file
  sepolicy_test_file
  service_contexts_file
}:file relabelto;