32161610 Security Vulnerability - Information disclosure vulnerability
in AOSP Messaging
* Check to make sure the returned uri from the gallery picker does
not point to bugle's data directory (or any subdir).
* Test:
Manual-
* I created the test app in the bug, the one that injects the bad
uri into Bugle. I verified the bad behavior before the fix and the
good behavior after.
* I tested the gallery to make sure picking photos,
from the photos app and drive, still work.
* I verified the behavior in the debugger to be sure the code is
catching the bad uri from the test app.
Change-Id: I3393f3b886c837a49758b91945cf1e17ec9bee41
Fixes: 32161610
(cherry picked from commit 69ed579fb8092395c4ffeb64ff5147622def3d4a)
diff --git a/src/com/android/messaging/ui/mediapicker/DocumentImagePicker.java b/src/com/android/messaging/ui/mediapicker/DocumentImagePicker.java
index 2c36752..dff59cf 100644
--- a/src/com/android/messaging/ui/mediapicker/DocumentImagePicker.java
+++ b/src/com/android/messaging/ui/mediapicker/DocumentImagePicker.java
@@ -24,8 +24,13 @@
import com.android.messaging.Factory;
import com.android.messaging.datamodel.data.PendingAttachmentData;
import com.android.messaging.ui.UIIntents;
+import com.android.messaging.util.LogUtil;
+import com.android.messaging.util.FileUtil;
import com.android.messaging.util.ImageUtils;
import com.android.messaging.util.SafeAsyncTask;
+import com.android.messaging.util.UriUtil;
+
+import java.io.File;
/**
* Wraps around the functionalities to allow the user to pick images from the document
@@ -111,12 +116,24 @@
new SafeAsyncTask<Void, Void, String>() {
@Override
protected String doInBackgroundTimed(final Void... params) {
+ if (UriUtil.isFileUri(documentUri) &&
+ FileUtil.isInDataDir(new File(documentUri.getPath()))) {
+ // hacker sending private app data. Bail out
+ if (LogUtil.isLoggable(LogUtil.BUGLE_TAG, LogUtil.ERROR)) {
+ LogUtil.e(LogUtil.BUGLE_TAG, "Aborting attach of private app data ("
+ + documentUri + ")");
+ }
+ return null;
+ }
return ImageUtils.getContentType(
Factory.get().getApplicationContext().getContentResolver(), documentUri);
}
@Override
protected void onPostExecute(final String contentType) {
+ if (contentType == null) {
+ return; // bad uri on input
+ }
// Ask the listener to create a temporary placeholder item to show the progress.
final PendingAttachmentData pendingItem =
PendingAttachmentData.createPendingAttachmentData(contentType,
diff --git a/src/com/android/messaging/util/FileUtil.java b/src/com/android/messaging/util/FileUtil.java
index 7c47ae9..b147b25 100644
--- a/src/com/android/messaging/util/FileUtil.java
+++ b/src/com/android/messaging/util/FileUtil.java
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
package com.android.messaging.util;
import android.content.Context;
+import android.os.Environment;
import android.webkit.MimeTypeMap;
import com.android.messaging.Factory;
@@ -116,6 +117,13 @@
}
}
+ // Checks if the file is in /data, and don't allow any app to send personal information.
+ // We're told it's possible to create world readable hardlinks to other apps private data
+ // so we ban all /data file uris. b/28793303
+ public static boolean isInDataDir(File file) {
+ return isSameOrSubDirectory(Environment.getDataDirectory(), file);
+ }
+
/**
* Checks, whether the child directory is the same as, or a sub-directory of the base
* directory.
