tree 603d43b0512b4fe8b744d6e0f7471da9dfbaa09e
parent f62167e88c0c1b9621f2984f1a59ae7d41cf4c88
author Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> 1428395531 +0300
committer Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com> 1428607408 +0000

P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it

This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
peer discovery purposes.

This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
and potentially arbitrary code execution.

Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.

Change-Id: I9f350f20cdd010f2c096514b245b4a901ad74e46
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>