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Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 4: Supporting Routines
Family "2.0"
Level 00 Revision 01.16
October 30, 2014
Published
Contact: admin@trustedcomputinggroup.org
TCG Published
Copyright © TCG 2006-2014
TCG
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
Licenses and Notices
1. Copyright Licenses:
 Trusted Computing Group (TCG) grants to the user of the source code in this specification (the
“Source Code”) a worldwide, irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty free, copyright license to
reproduce, create derivative works, distribute, display and perform the Source Code and
derivative works thereof, and to grant others the rights granted herein.
 The TCG grants to the user of the other parts of the specification (other than the Source Code)
the rights to reproduce, distribute, display, and perform the specification solely for the purpose
of developing products based on such documents.
2. Source Code Distribution Conditions:
 Redistributions of Source Code must retain the above copyright licenses, this list of conditions
and the following disclaimers.
 Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright licenses, this list of
conditions and the following disclaimers in the documentation and/or other materials provided
with the distribution.
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 THE COPYRIGHT LICENSES SET FORTH ABOVE DO NOT REPRESENT ANY FORM OF LICENSE OR
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HELD BY TCG MEMBERS (OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES) THAT MAY BE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT
THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHERWISE. Contact TCG Administration
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Any marks and brands contained herein are the property of their respective owner.
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Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
CONTENTS
1 Scope ................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Terms and definitions ........................................................................................................... 1
3 Symbols and abbreviated terms ............................................................................................ 1
4 Automation ........................................................................................................................... 1
4.1 Configuration Parser ................................................................................................... 1
4.2 Structure Parser .......................................................................................................... 2
4.2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 2
4.2.2 Unmarshaling Code Prototype .............................................................................. 2
4.2.2.1 Simple Types and Structures .......................................................................... 2
4.2.2.2 Union Types ................................................................................................... 3
4.2.2.3 Null Types ...................................................................................................... 3
4.2.2.4 Arrays ............................................................................................................. 3
4.2.3 Marshaling Code Function Prototypes .................................................................. 4
4.2.3.1 Simple Types and Structures .......................................................................... 4
4.2.3.2 Union Types ................................................................................................... 4
4.2.3.3 Arrays ............................................................................................................. 4
4.3 Command Parser ........................................................................................................ 5
4.4 Portability .................................................................................................................... 5
5 Header Files ......................................................................................................................... 6
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 6
5.2 BaseTypes.h ............................................................................................................... 6
5.3 bits.h ........................................................................................................................... 7
5.4 bool.h .......................................................................................................................... 8
5.5 Capabilities.h .............................................................................................................. 8
5.6 TPMB.h ....................................................................................................................... 8
5.7 TpmError.h .................................................................................................................. 9
5.8 Global.h ...................................................................................................................... 9
5.8.1 Description ........................................................................................................... 9
5.8.2 Includes ............................................................................................................... 9
5.8.3 Defines and Types ............................................................................................. 10
5.8.3.1 Unreferenced Parameter .............................................................................. 10
5.8.3.2 Crypto Self-Test Values ................................................................................ 10
5.8.3.3 Hash and HMAC State Structures ................................................................. 10
5.8.3.4 Other Types .................................................................................................. 11
5.8.4 Loaded Object Structures ................................................................................... 11
5.8.4.1 Description ................................................................................................... 11
5.8.4.2 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ................................................................................ 11
5.8.4.3 OBJECT Structure ........................................................................................ 12
5.8.4.4 HASH_OBJECT Structure ............................................................................. 12
5.8.4.5 ANY_OBJECT .............................................................................................. 13
5.8.5 AUTH_DUP Types .............................................................................................. 13
5.8.6 Active Session Context ....................................................................................... 13
5.8.6.1 Description ................................................................................................... 13
5.8.6.2 SESSION_ATTRIBUTES .............................................................................. 13
5.8.6.3 SESSION Structure ...................................................................................... 14
5.8.7 PCR ................................................................................................................... 15
5.8.7.1 PCR_SAVE Structure ................................................................................... 15
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5.8.7.2 PCR_POLICY ............................................................................................... 16
5.8.7.3 PCR_AUTHVALUE ....................................................................................... 16
5.8.8 Startup ............................................................................................................... 16
5.8.8.1 SHUTDOWN_NONE ..................................................................................... 16
5.8.8.2 STARTUP_TYPE .......................................................................................... 16
5.8.9 NV ...................................................................................................................... 16
5.8.9.1 NV_RESERVE .............................................................................................. 16
5.8.9.2 NV_INDEX .................................................................................................... 18
5.8.10 COMMIT_INDEX_MASK ..................................................................................... 18
5.8.11 RAM Global Values ............................................................................................ 18
5.8.11.1 Description ................................................................................................... 18
5.8.11.2 g_rcIndex ..................................................................................................... 18
5.8.11.3 g_exclusiveAuditSession .............................................................................. 18
5.8.11.4 g_time .......................................................................................................... 18
5.8.11.5 g_phEnable .................................................................................................. 18
5.8.11.6 g_pceReConfig ............................................................................................. 19
5.8.11.7 g_DRTMHandle ............................................................................................ 19
5.8.11.8 g_DrtmPreStartup ......................................................................................... 19
5.8.11.9 g_StartupLocality3 ........................................................................................ 19
5.8.11.10 g_updateNV ................................................................................................. 19
5.8.11.11 g_clearOrderly .............................................................................................. 19
5.8.11.12 g_prevOrderlyState ...................................................................................... 20
5.8.11.13 g_nvOk ......................................................................................................... 20
5.8.11.14 g_platformUnique ......................................................................................... 20
5.8.12 Persistent Global Values .................................................................................... 20
5.8.12.1 Description ................................................................................................... 20
5.8.12.2 PERSISTENT_DATA .................................................................................... 20
5.8.12.3 ORDERLY_DATA ......................................................................................... 22
5.8.12.4 STATE_CLEAR_DATA ................................................................................. 23
5.8.12.5 State Reset Data .......................................................................................... 24
5.8.13 Global Macro Definitions .................................................................................... 25
5.8.14 Private data ........................................................................................................ 25
5.9 Tpm.h ........................................................................................................................ 29
5.10 swap.h ...................................................................................................................... 30
5.11 InternalRoutines.h ..................................................................................................... 31
5.12 TpmBuildSwitches.h .................................................................................................. 32
5.13 VendorString.h .......................................................................................................... 33
6 Main ................................................................................................................................... 35
6.1 CommandDispatcher() ............................................................................................... 35
6.2 ExecCommand.c ....................................................................................................... 35
6.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 35
6.2.2 Includes ............................................................................................................. 35
6.2.3 ExecuteCommand() ............................................................................................ 35
6.3 ParseHandleBuffer() .................................................................................................. 41
6.4 SessionProcess.c ...................................................................................................... 42
6.4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 42
6.4.2 Includes and Data Definitions ............................................................................. 42
6.4.3 Authorization Support Functions ......................................................................... 42
6.4.3.1 IsDAExempted() ........................................................................................... 42
6.4.3.2 IncrementLockout() ....................................................................................... 43
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6.4.3.3 IsSessionBindEntity() ................................................................................... 44
6.4.3.4 IsPolicySessionRequired() ............................................................................ 45
6.4.3.5 IsAuthValueAvailable() ................................................................................. 46
6.4.3.6 IsAuthPolicyAvailable() ................................................................................. 48
6.4.4 Session Parsing Functions ................................................................................. 49
6.4.4.1 ComputeCpHash() ........................................................................................ 49
6.4.4.2 CheckPWAuthSession() ................................................................................ 50
6.4.4.3 ComputeCommandHMAC() ........................................................................... 51
6.4.4.4 CheckSessionHMAC() .................................................................................. 53
6.4.4.5 CheckPolicyAuthSession() ............................................................................ 53
6.4.4.6 RetrieveSessionData() .................................................................................. 56
6.4.4.7 CheckLockedOut() ........................................................................................ 59
6.4.4.8 CheckAuthSession() ..................................................................................... 60
6.4.4.9 CheckCommandAudit() ................................................................................. 62
6.4.4.10 ParseSessionBuffer() .................................................................................... 63
6.4.4.11 CheckAuthNoSession() ................................................................................. 65
6.4.5 Response Session Processing ........................................................................... 66
6.4.5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 66
6.4.5.2 ComputeRpHash() ........................................................................................ 66
6.4.5.3 InitAuditSession() ......................................................................................... 67
6.4.5.4 Audit() .......................................................................................................... 67
6.4.5.5 CommandAudit() ........................................................................................... 68
6.4.5.6 UpdateAuditSessionStatus() ......................................................................... 69
6.4.5.7 ComputeResponseHMAC() ........................................................................... 70
6.4.5.8 BuildSingleResponseAuth() .......................................................................... 71
6.4.5.9 UpdateTPMNonce() ...................................................................................... 72
6.4.5.10 UpdateInternalSession() ............................................................................... 72
6.4.5.11 BuildResponseSession() ............................................................................... 73
7 Command Support Functions .............................................................................................. 76
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 76
7.2 Attestation Command Support (Attest_spt.c) ............................................................. 76
7.2.1 Includes ............................................................................................................. 76
7.2.2 Functions ........................................................................................................... 76
7.2.2.1 FillInAttestInfo() ............................................................................................ 76
7.2.2.2 SignAttestInfo() ............................................................................................ 77
7.3 Context Management Command Support (Context_spt.c) .......................................... 79
7.3.1 Includes ............................................................................................................. 79
7.3.2 Functions ........................................................................................................... 79
7.3.2.1 ComputeContextProtectionKey() ................................................................... 79
7.3.2.2 ComputeContextIntegrity() ............................................................................ 80
7.3.2.3 SequenceDataImportExport() ........................................................................ 81
7.4 Policy Command Support (Policy_spt.c) .................................................................... 81
7.4.1 PolicyParameterChecks() ................................................................................... 81
7.4.2 PolicyContextUpdate() ........................................................................................ 82
7.5 NV Command Support (NV_spt.c) ............................................................................. 83
7.5.1 Includes ............................................................................................................. 83
7.5.2 Fuctions ............................................................................................................. 83
7.5.2.1 NvReadAccessChecks() ............................................................................... 83
7.5.2.2 NvWriteAccessChecks() ............................................................................... 84
7.6 Object Command Support (Object_spt.c) ................................................................... 85
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Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
7.6.1 Includes ............................................................................................................. 85
7.6.2 Local Functions .................................................................................................. 86
7.6.2.1 EqualCryptSet() ............................................................................................ 86
7.6.2.2 GetIV2BSize() .............................................................................................. 86
7.6.2.3 ComputeProtectionKeyParms() ..................................................................... 87
7.6.2.4 ComputeOuterIntegrity() ............................................................................... 88
7.6.2.5 ComputeInnerIntegrity() ................................................................................ 89
7.6.2.6 ProduceInnerIntegrity() ................................................................................. 89
7.6.2.7 CheckInnerIntegrity() .................................................................................... 90
7.6.3 Public Functions ................................................................................................. 90
7.6.3.1 AreAttributesForParent() ............................................................................... 90
7.6.3.2 SchemeChecks() .......................................................................................... 91
7.6.3.3 PublicAttributesValidation()........................................................................... 94
7.6.3.4 FillInCreationData() ...................................................................................... 95
7.6.3.5 GetSeedForKDF() ......................................................................................... 97
7.6.3.6 ProduceOuterWrap() ..................................................................................... 97
7.6.3.7 UnwrapOuter() .............................................................................................. 99
7.6.3.8 SensitiveToPrivate() ................................................................................... 100
7.6.3.9 PrivateToSensitive() ................................................................................... 101
7.6.3.10 SensitiveToDuplicate()................................................................................ 103
7.6.3.11 DuplicateToSensitive()................................................................................ 105
7.6.3.12 SecretToCredential() .................................................................................. 107
7.6.3.13 CredentialToSecret() .................................................................................. 108
8 Subsystem........................................................................................................................ 109
8.1 CommandAudit.c ..................................................................................................... 109
8.1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 109
8.1.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 109
8.1.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 109
8.1.3.1 CommandAuditPreInstall_Init() ................................................................... 109
8.1.3.2 CommandAuditStartup() ............................................................................. 109
8.1.3.3 CommandAuditSet() ................................................................................... 110
8.1.3.4 CommandAuditClear() ................................................................................ 110
8.1.3.5 CommandAuditIsRequired() ........................................................................ 111
8.1.3.6 CommandAuditCapGetCCList() .................................................................. 111
8.1.3.7 CommandAuditGetDigest ............................................................................ 112
8.2 DA.c ........................................................................................................................ 113
8.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 113
8.2.2 Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 113
8.2.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 113
8.2.3.1 DAPreInstall_Init() ...................................................................................... 113
8.2.3.2 DAStartup() ................................................................................................ 114
8.2.3.3 DARegisterFailure() .................................................................................... 114
8.2.3.4 DASelfHeal() .............................................................................................. 115
8.3 Hierarchy.c .............................................................................................................. 116
8.3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 116
8.3.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 116
8.3.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 116
8.3.3.1 HierarchyPreInstall() ................................................................................... 116
8.3.3.2 HierarchyStartup() ...................................................................................... 117
8.3.3.3 HierarchyGetProof() ................................................................................... 118
8.3.3.4 HierarchyGetPrimarySeed() ........................................................................ 118
8.3.3.5 HierarchyIsEnabled() .................................................................................. 119
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8.4 NV.c ........................................................................................................................ 119
8.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 119
8.4.2 Includes, Defines and Data Definitions ............................................................. 119
8.4.3 NV Utility Functions .......................................................................................... 120
8.4.3.1 NvCheckState() .......................................................................................... 120
8.4.3.2 NvIsAvailable() ........................................................................................... 120
8.4.3.3 NvCommit ................................................................................................... 120
8.4.3.4 NvReadMaxCount() .................................................................................... 121
8.4.3.5 NvWriteMaxCount() .................................................................................... 121
8.4.4 NV Index and Persistent Object Access Functions ............................................ 121
8.4.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 121
8.4.4.2 NvNext() ..................................................................................................... 121
8.4.4.3 NvGetEnd() ................................................................................................ 122
8.4.4.4 NvGetFreeByte ........................................................................................... 122
8.4.4.5 NvGetEvictObjectSize................................................................................. 123
8.4.4.6 NvGetCounterSize ...................................................................................... 123
8.4.4.7 NvTestSpace() ............................................................................................ 123
8.4.4.8 NvAdd() ...................................................................................................... 124
8.4.4.9 NvDelete() .................................................................................................. 124
8.4.5 RAM-based NV Index Data Access Functions ................................................... 125
8.4.5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 125
8.4.5.2 NvTestRAMSpace() .................................................................................... 125
8.4.5.3 NvGetRamIndexOffset ................................................................................ 126
8.4.5.4 NvAddRAM() .............................................................................................. 126
8.4.5.5 NvDeleteRAM() .......................................................................................... 127
8.4.6 Utility Functions ................................................................................................ 128
8.4.6.1 NvInitStatic() .............................................................................................. 128
8.4.6.2 NvInit() ....................................................................................................... 129
8.4.6.3 NvReadReserved() ..................................................................................... 129
8.4.6.4 NvWriteReserved() ..................................................................................... 130
8.4.6.5 NvReadPersistent() .................................................................................... 130
8.4.6.6 NvIsPlatformPersistentHandle() .................................................................. 131
8.4.6.7 NvIsOwnerPersistentHandle() ..................................................................... 131
8.4.6.8 NvNextIndex() ............................................................................................ 131
8.4.6.9 NvNextEvict() ............................................................................................. 132
8.4.6.10 NvFindHandle() .......................................................................................... 132
8.4.6.11 NvPowerOn() .............................................................................................. 133
8.4.6.12 NvStateSave() ............................................................................................ 133
8.4.6.13 NvEntityStartup() ........................................................................................ 134
8.4.7 NV Access Functions ....................................................................................... 135
8.4.7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 135
8.4.7.2 NvIsUndefinedIndex() ................................................................................. 135
8.4.7.3 NvIndexIsAccessible() ................................................................................ 136
8.4.7.4 NvIsUndefinedEvictHandle() ....................................................................... 137
8.4.7.5 NvGetEvictObject() ..................................................................................... 138
8.4.7.6 NvGetIndexInfo() ........................................................................................ 138
8.4.7.7 NvInitialCounter() ....................................................................................... 139
8.4.7.8 NvGetIndexData() ....................................................................................... 139
8.4.7.9 NvGetIntIndexData() ................................................................................... 140
8.4.7.10 NvWriteIndexInfo() ...................................................................................... 141
8.4.7.11 NvWriteIndexData() .................................................................................... 142
8.4.7.12 NvGetName() ............................................................................................. 143
8.4.7.13 NvDefineIndex().......................................................................................... 143
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8.4.7.14 NvAddEvictObject() .................................................................................... 144
8.4.7.15 NvDeleteEntity() ......................................................................................... 145
8.4.7.16 NvFlushHierarchy() ..................................................................................... 146
8.4.7.17 NvSetGlobalLock()...................................................................................... 147
8.4.7.18 InsertSort() ................................................................................................. 148
8.4.7.19 NvCapGetPersistent() ................................................................................. 149
8.4.7.20 NvCapGetIndex() ........................................................................................ 150
8.4.7.21 NvCapGetIndexNumber() ............................................................................ 151
8.4.7.22 NvCapGetPersistentNumber() .................................................................... 151
8.4.7.23 NvCapGetPersistentAvail() ......................................................................... 151
8.4.7.24 NvCapGetCounterNumber() ........................................................................ 151
8.4.7.25 NvCapGetCounterAvail() ............................................................................ 152
8.5 Object.c................................................................................................................... 153
8.5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 153
8.5.2 Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 153
8.5.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 153
8.5.3.1 ObjectStartup() ........................................................................................... 153
8.5.3.2 ObjectCleanupEvict() .................................................................................. 153
8.5.3.3 ObjectIsPresent() ....................................................................................... 154
8.5.3.4 ObjectIsSequence() .................................................................................... 154
8.5.3.5 ObjectGet() ................................................................................................. 155
8.5.3.6 ObjectGetName() ........................................................................................ 155
8.5.3.7 ObjectGetNameAlg() ................................................................................... 155
8.5.3.8 ObjectGetQualifiedName() .......................................................................... 156
8.5.3.9 ObjectDataGetHierarchy() .......................................................................... 156
8.5.3.10 ObjectGetHierarchy() .................................................................................. 156
8.5.3.11 ObjectAllocateSlot() .................................................................................... 157
8.5.3.12 ObjectLoad()............................................................................................... 157
8.5.3.13 AllocateSequenceSlot() .............................................................................. 160
8.5.3.14 ObjectCreateHMACSequence() .................................................................. 160
8.5.3.15 ObjectCreateHashSequence() .................................................................... 161
8.5.3.16 ObjectCreateEventSequence() ................................................................... 161
8.5.3.17 ObjectTerminateEvent() .............................................................................. 162
8.5.3.18 ObjectContextLoad() ................................................................................... 163
8.5.3.19 ObjectFlush() .............................................................................................. 163
8.5.3.20 ObjectFlushHierarchy() ............................................................................... 163
8.5.3.21 ObjectLoadEvict() ....................................................................................... 164
8.5.3.22 ObjectComputeName() ............................................................................... 165
8.5.3.23 ObjectComputeQualifiedName() ................................................................. 166
8.5.3.24 ObjectDataIsStorage() ................................................................................ 166
8.5.3.25 ObjectIsStorage() ....................................................................................... 167
8.5.3.26 ObjectCapGetLoaded() ............................................................................... 167
8.5.3.27 ObjectCapGetTransientAvail() .................................................................... 168
8.6 PCR.c ..................................................................................................................... 168
8.6.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 168
8.6.2 Includes, Defines, and Data Definitions ............................................................ 168
8.6.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 169
8.6.3.1 PCRBelongsAuthGroup() ............................................................................ 169
8.6.3.2 PCRBelongsPolicyGroup() .......................................................................... 169
8.6.3.3 PCRBelongsTCBGroup() ............................................................................ 170
8.6.3.4 PCRPolicyIsAvailable() ............................................................................... 170
8.6.3.5 PCRGetAuthValue() .................................................................................... 171
8.6.3.6 PCRGetAuthPolicy() ................................................................................... 171
8.6.3.7 PCRSimStart() ............................................................................................ 172
8.6.3.8 GetSavedPcrPointer() ................................................................................. 172
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8.6.3.9 PcrIsAllocated() .......................................................................................... 173
8.6.3.10 GetPcrPointer() .......................................................................................... 174
8.6.3.11 IsPcrSelected() ........................................................................................... 175
8.6.3.12 FilterPcr() ................................................................................................... 175
8.6.3.13 PcrDrtm() .................................................................................................... 176
8.6.3.14 PCRStartup() .............................................................................................. 176
8.6.3.15 PCRStateSave() ......................................................................................... 177
8.6.3.16 PCRIsStateSaved() .................................................................................... 178
8.6.3.17 PCRIsResetAllowed() ................................................................................. 179
8.6.3.18 PCRChanged() ........................................................................................... 179
8.6.3.19 PCRIsExtendAllowed() ............................................................................... 179
8.6.3.20 PCRExtend() .............................................................................................. 180
8.6.3.21 PCRComputeCurrentDigest() ...................................................................... 181
8.6.3.22 PCRRead() ................................................................................................. 181
8.6.3.23 PcrWrite() ................................................................................................... 183
8.6.3.24 PCRAllocate() ............................................................................................. 183
8.6.3.25 PCRSetValue() ........................................................................................... 185
8.6.3.26 PCRResetDynamics ................................................................................... 185
8.6.3.27 PCRCapGetAllocation() .............................................................................. 186
8.6.3.28 PCRSetSelectBit() ...................................................................................... 186
8.6.3.29 PCRGetProperty() ...................................................................................... 187
8.6.3.30 PCRCapGetProperties() ............................................................................. 188
8.6.3.31 PCRCapGetHandles() ................................................................................. 189
8.7 PP.c ........................................................................................................................ 190
8.7.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 190
8.7.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 190
8.7.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 190
8.7.3.1 PhysicalPresencePreInstall_Init() ............................................................... 190
8.7.3.2 PhysicalPresenceCommandSet() ................................................................ 191
8.7.3.3 PhysicalPresenceCommandClear() ............................................................. 191
8.7.3.4 PhysicalPresenceIsRequired() .................................................................... 192
8.7.3.5 PhysicalPresenceCapGetCCList() .............................................................. 192
8.8 Session.c ................................................................................................................ 193
8.8.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 193
8.8.2 Includes, Defines, and Local Variables ............................................................. 194
8.8.3 File Scope Function -- ContextIdSetOldest() ..................................................... 194
8.8.4 Startup Function -- SessionStartup() ................................................................ 195
8.8.5 Access Functions ............................................................................................. 196
8.8.5.1 SessionIsLoaded() ...................................................................................... 196
8.8.5.2 SessionIsSaved() ....................................................................................... 196
8.8.5.3 SessionPCRValueIsCurrent() ...................................................................... 197
8.8.5.4 SessionGet() .............................................................................................. 197
8.8.6 Utility Functions ................................................................................................ 198
8.8.6.1 ContextIdSessionCreate() ........................................................................... 198
8.8.6.2 SessionCreate().......................................................................................... 199
8.8.6.3 SessionContextSave() ................................................................................ 201
8.8.6.4 SessionContextLoad() ................................................................................ 202
8.8.6.5 SessionFlush() ........................................................................................... 204
8.8.6.6 SessionComputeBoundEntity() ................................................................... 204
8.8.6.7 SessionInitPolicyData()............................................................................... 205
8.8.6.8 SessionResetPolicyData() .......................................................................... 206
8.8.6.9 SessionCapGetLoaded() ............................................................................. 206
8.8.6.10 SessionCapGetSaved() .............................................................................. 207
8.8.6.11 SessionCapGetLoadedNumber() ................................................................ 208
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8.8.6.12 SessionCapGetLoadedAvail() ..................................................................... 208
8.8.6.13 SessionCapGetActiveNumber() .................................................................. 209
8.8.6.14 SessionCapGetActiveAvail() ....................................................................... 209
8.9 Time.c ..................................................................................................................... 209
8.9.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 209
8.9.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 209
8.9.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 210
8.9.3.1 TimePowerOn() .......................................................................................... 210
8.9.3.2 TimeStartup() ............................................................................................. 210
8.9.3.3 TimeUpdateToCurrent() .............................................................................. 211
8.9.3.4 TimeSetAdjustRate() .................................................................................. 212
8.9.3.5 TimeGetRange() ......................................................................................... 212
8.9.3.6 TimeFillInfo ................................................................................................ 213
9 Support ............................................................................................................................ 214
9.1 AlgorithmCap.c ........................................................................................................ 214
9.1.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 214
9.1.2 Includes and Defines ........................................................................................ 214
9.1.3 AlgorithmCapGetImplemented() ........................................................................ 215
9.2 Bits.c ....................................................................................................................... 217
9.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 217
9.2.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 217
9.2.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 217
9.2.3.1 BitIsSet() .................................................................................................... 217
9.2.3.2 BitSet() ....................................................................................................... 217
9.2.3.3 BitClear() .................................................................................................... 218
9.3 CommandAttributeData.c ........................................................................................ 218
9.4 CommandCodeAttributes.c ...................................................................................... 224
9.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 224
9.4.2 Includes and Defines ........................................................................................ 224
9.4.3 Command Attribute Functions .......................................................................... 224
9.4.3.1 CommandAuthRole() .................................................................................. 224
9.4.3.2 CommandIsImplemented() .......................................................................... 224
9.4.3.3 CommandGetAttribute() .............................................................................. 225
9.4.3.4 EncryptSize() .............................................................................................. 225
9.4.3.5 DecryptSize().............................................................................................. 226
9.4.3.6 IsSessionAllowed() ..................................................................................... 226
9.4.3.7 IsHandleInResponse() ................................................................................ 226
9.4.3.8 IsWriteOperation() ...................................................................................... 227
9.4.3.9 IsReadOperation() ...................................................................................... 227
9.4.3.10 CommandCapGetCCList() .......................................................................... 227
9.5 DRTM.c ................................................................................................................... 228
9.5.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 228
9.5.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 228
9.5.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 229
9.5.3.1 Signal_Hash_Start() ................................................................................... 229
9.5.3.2 Signal_Hash_Data() ................................................................................... 229
9.5.3.3 Signal_Hash_End() ..................................................................................... 229
9.6 Entity.c .................................................................................................................... 229
9.6.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 229
9.6.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 229
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9.6.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 230
9.6.3.1 EntityGetLoadStatus() ................................................................................ 230
9.6.3.2 EntityGetAuthValue() .................................................................................. 232
9.6.3.3 EntityGetAuthPolicy() ................................................................................. 233
9.6.3.4 EntityGetName() ......................................................................................... 234
9.6.3.5 EntityGetHierarchy() ................................................................................... 235
9.7 Global.c................................................................................................................... 236
9.7.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 236
9.7.2 Includes and Defines ........................................................................................ 236
9.7.3 Global Data Values .......................................................................................... 236
9.7.4 Private Values .................................................................................................. 237
9.7.4.1 SessionProcess.c ....................................................................................... 237
9.7.4.2 DA.c ........................................................................................................... 237
9.7.4.3 NV.c ........................................................................................................... 237
9.7.4.4 Object.c ...................................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.5 PCR.c ......................................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.6 Session.c .................................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.7 Manufacture.c ............................................................................................. 238
9.7.4.8 Power.c ...................................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.9 MemoryLib.c ............................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.10 SelfTest.c ................................................................................................... 238
9.7.4.11 TpmFail.c ................................................................................................... 238
9.8 Handle.c .................................................................................................................. 239
9.8.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 239
9.8.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 239
9.8.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 239
9.8.3.1 HandleGetType() ........................................................................................ 239
9.8.3.2 NextPermanentHandle() ............................................................................. 239
9.8.3.3 PermanentCapGetHandles() ....................................................................... 240
9.9 Locality.c ................................................................................................................. 241
9.9.1 Includes ........................................................................................................... 241
9.9.2 LocalityGetAttributes() ...................................................................................... 241
9.10 Manufacture.c ......................................................................................................... 241
9.10.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 241
9.10.2 Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 241
9.10.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 242
9.10.3.1 TPM_Manufacture() .................................................................................... 242
9.10.3.2 TPM_TearDown() ....................................................................................... 243
9.11 Marshal.c ................................................................................................................ 244
9.11.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 244
9.11.2 Unmarshal and Marshal a Value ....................................................................... 244
9.11.3 Unmarshal and Marshal a Union ....................................................................... 245
9.11.4 Unmarshal and Marshal a Structure .................................................................. 247
9.11.5 Unmarshal and Marshal an Array ..................................................................... 249
9.11.6 TPM2B Handling .............................................................................................. 251
9.12 MemoryLib.c............................................................................................................ 252
9.12.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 252
9.12.2 Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 252
9.12.3 Functions on BYTE Arrays................................................................................ 252
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9.12.3.1 MemoryMove()............................................................................................ 252
9.12.3.2 MemoryCopy() ............................................................................................ 253
9.12.3.3 MemoryEqual() ........................................................................................... 253
9.12.3.4 MemoryCopy2B() ........................................................................................ 253
9.12.3.5 MemoryConcat2B() ..................................................................................... 254
9.12.3.6 Memory2BEqual() ....................................................................................... 254
9.12.3.7 MemorySet() ............................................................................................... 255
9.12.3.8 MemoryGetActionInputBuffer().................................................................... 255
9.12.3.9 MemoryGetActionOutputBuffer() ................................................................. 255
9.12.3.10 MemoryGetResponseBuffer() ...................................................................... 256
9.12.3.11 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros() ................................................................... 256
9.13 Power.c ................................................................................................................... 256
9.13.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 256
9.13.2 Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 256
9.13.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 257
9.13.3.1 TPMInit() .................................................................................................... 257
9.13.3.2 TPMRegisterStartup() ................................................................................. 257
9.13.3.3 TPMIsStarted() ........................................................................................... 257
9.14 PropertyCap.c ......................................................................................................... 257
9.14.1 Description ....................................................................................................... 257
9.14.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 258
9.14.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 258
9.14.3.1 PCRGetProperty() ...................................................................................... 258
9.14.3.2 TPMCapGetProperties() ............................................................................. 264
9.15 TpmFail.c ................................................................................................................ 265
9.15.1 Includes, Defines, and Types ........................................................................... 265
9.15.2 Typedefs .......................................................................................................... 265
9.15.3 Local Functions ................................................................................................ 266
9.15.3.1 MarshalUint16() .......................................................................................... 266
9.15.3.2 MarshalUint32() .......................................................................................... 266
9.15.3.3 UnmarshalHeader() .................................................................................... 267
9.15.4 Public Functions ............................................................................................... 267
9.15.4.1 SetForceFailureMode() ............................................................................... 267
9.15.4.2 TpmFail() .................................................................................................... 267
9.15.5 TpmFailureMode .............................................................................................. 268
10 Cryptographic Functions ................................................................................................... 272
10.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 272
10.2 CryptUtil.c ............................................................................................................... 272
10.2.1 Includes ........................................................................................................... 272
10.2.2 TranslateCryptErrors() ...................................................................................... 272
10.2.3 Random Number Generation Functions ............................................................ 273
10.2.3.1 CryptDrbgGetPutState() .............................................................................. 273
10.2.3.2 CryptStirRandom() ...................................................................................... 273
10.2.3.3 CryptGenerateRandom() ............................................................................. 273
10.2.4 Hash/HMAC Functions ..................................................................................... 274
10.2.4.1 CryptGetContextAlg() ................................................................................. 274
10.2.4.2 CryptStartHash()......................................................................................... 274
10.2.4.3 CryptStartHashSequence() ......................................................................... 275
10.2.4.4 CryptStartHMAC() ....................................................................................... 275
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10.2.4.5 CryptStartHMACSequence() ....................................................................... 276
10.2.4.6 CryptStartHMAC2B() .................................................................................. 276
10.2.4.7 CryptStartHMACSequence2B() ................................................................... 277
10.2.4.8 CryptUpdateDigest() ................................................................................... 277
10.2.4.9 CryptUpdateDigest2B() ............................................................................... 278
10.2.4.10 CryptUpdateDigestInt() ............................................................................... 278
10.2.4.11 CryptCompleteHash() ................................................................................. 279
10.2.4.12 CryptCompleteHash2B() ............................................................................. 279
10.2.4.13 CryptHashBlock() ....................................................................................... 280
10.2.4.14 CryptCompleteHMAC() ............................................................................... 280
10.2.4.15 CryptCompleteHMAC2B() ........................................................................... 281
10.2.4.16 CryptHashStateImportExport() .................................................................... 281
10.2.4.17 CryptGetHashDigestSize() .......................................................................... 281
10.2.4.18 CryptGetHashBlockSize() ........................................................................... 282
10.2.4.19 CryptGetHashAlgByIndex() ......................................................................... 282
10.2.4.20 CryptSignHMAC() ....................................................................................... 282
10.2.4.21 CryptHMACVerifySignature() ...................................................................... 283
10.2.4.22 CryptGenerateKeyedHash() ........................................................................ 283
10.2.4.23 CryptKDFa() ............................................................................................... 285
10.2.4.24 CryptKDFaOnce() ....................................................................................... 285
10.2.4.25 KDFa() ....................................................................................................... 285
10.2.4.26 CryptKDFe() ............................................................................................... 286
10.2.5 RSA Functions ................................................................................................. 286
10.2.5.1 BuildRSA() ................................................................................................. 286
10.2.5.2 CryptTestKeyRSA() .................................................................................... 286
10.2.5.3 CryptGenerateKeyRSA() ............................................................................. 287
10.2.5.4 CryptLoadPrivateRSA() .............................................................................. 288
10.2.5.5 CryptSelectRSAScheme() ........................................................................... 288
10.2.5.6 CryptDecryptRSA() ..................................................................................... 289
10.2.5.7 CryptEncryptRSA() ..................................................................................... 291
10.2.5.8 CryptSignRSA() .......................................................................................... 292
10.2.5.9 CryptRSAVerifySignature() ......................................................................... 293
10.2.6 ECC Functions ................................................................................................. 294
10.2.6.1 CryptEccGetCurveDataPointer() ................................................................. 294
10.2.6.2 CryptEccGetKeySizeInBits() ....................................................................... 294
10.2.6.3 CryptEccGetKeySizeBytes() ....................................................................... 294
10.2.6.4 CryptEccGetParameter()............................................................................. 294
10.2.6.5 CryptGetCurveSignScheme() ...................................................................... 295
10.2.6.6 CryptEccIsPointOnCurve() .......................................................................... 295
10.2.6.7 CryptNewEccKey() ..................................................................................... 296
10.2.6.8 CryptEccPointMultiply() .............................................................................. 296
10.2.6.9 CryptGenerateKeyECC() ............................................................................ 297
10.2.6.10 CryptSignECC() .......................................................................................... 297
10.2.6.11 CryptECCVerifySignature() ......................................................................... 298
10.2.6.12 CryptGenerateR() ....................................................................................... 299
10.2.6.13 CryptCommit() ............................................................................................ 301
10.2.6.14 CryptEndCommit() ...................................................................................... 301
10.2.6.15 CryptCommitCompute() .............................................................................. 301
10.2.6.16 CryptEccGetParameters() ........................................................................... 302
10.2.6.17 CryptIsSchemeAnonymous() ....................................................................... 303
10.2.7 Symmetric Functions ........................................................................................ 303
10.2.7.1 ParmDecryptSym() ..................................................................................... 303
10.2.7.2 ParmEncryptSym() ..................................................................................... 304
10.2.7.3 CryptGenerateNewSymmetric() .................................................................. 305
10.2.7.4 CryptGenerateKeySymmetric() ................................................................... 306
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10.2.7.5 CryptXORObfuscation() .............................................................................. 307
10.2.8 Initialization and shut down .............................................................................. 307
10.2.8.1 CryptInitUnits() ........................................................................................... 307
10.2.8.2 CryptStopUnits() ......................................................................................... 308
10.2.8.3 CryptUtilStartup()........................................................................................ 308
10.2.9 Algorithm-Independent Functions ..................................................................... 309
10.2.9.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 309
10.2.9.2 CryptIsAsymAlgorithm() .............................................................................. 309
10.2.9.3 CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize() ................................................................... 309
10.2.9.4 CryptSymmetricEncrypt() ............................................................................ 310
10.2.9.5 CryptSymmetricDecrypt() ............................................................................ 311
10.2.9.6 CryptSecretEncrypt() .................................................................................. 313
10.2.9.7 CryptSecretDecrypt() .................................................................................. 315
10.2.9.8 CryptParameterEncryption() ....................................................................... 318
10.2.9.9 CryptParameterDecryption() ....................................................................... 319
10.2.9.10 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique() ............................................................... 320
10.2.9.11 CryptComputeSymValue() .......................................................................... 321
10.2.9.12 CryptCreateObject() ................................................................................... 321
10.2.9.13 CryptObjectIsPublicConsistent() ................................................................. 324
10.2.9.14 CryptObjectPublicPrivateMatch() ................................................................ 325
10.2.9.15 CryptGetSignHashAlg() .............................................................................. 326
10.2.9.16 CryptIsSplitSign() ....................................................................................... 327
10.2.9.17 CryptIsSignScheme() .................................................................................. 327
10.2.9.18 CryptIsDecryptScheme() ............................................................................. 328
10.2.9.19 CryptSelectSignScheme() ........................................................................... 328
10.2.9.20 CryptSign() ................................................................................................. 330
10.2.9.21 CryptVerifySignature() ................................................................................ 331
10.2.10 Math functions .................................................................................................. 332
10.2.10.1 CryptDivide() .............................................................................................. 332
10.2.10.2 CryptCompare() .......................................................................................... 333
10.2.10.3 CryptCompareSigned() ............................................................................... 333
10.2.10.4 CryptGetTestResult .................................................................................... 333
10.2.11 Capability Support ............................................................................................ 334
10.2.11.1 CryptCapGetECCCurve() ............................................................................ 334
10.2.11.2 CryptCapGetEccCurveNumber() ................................................................. 335
10.2.11.3 CryptAreKeySizesConsistent() .................................................................... 335
10.2.11.4 CryptAlgSetImplemented() .......................................................................... 336
10.3 Ticket.c ................................................................................................................... 336
10.3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 336
10.3.2 Includes ........................................................................................................... 336
10.3.3 Functions ......................................................................................................... 336
10.3.3.1 TicketIsSafe() ............................................................................................. 336
10.3.3.2 TicketComputeVerified() ............................................................................. 337
10.3.3.3 TicketComputeAuth() .................................................................................. 337
10.3.3.4 TicketComputeHashCheck() ....................................................................... 338
10.3.3.5 TicketComputeCreation() ............................................................................ 339
10.4 CryptSelfTest.c ....................................................................................................... 339
10.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 339
10.4.2 Functions ......................................................................................................... 340
10.4.2.1 RunSelfTest() ............................................................................................. 340
10.4.2.2 CryptSelfTest() ........................................................................................... 340
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10.4.2.3 CryptIncrementalSelfTest() ......................................................................... 341
10.4.2.4 CryptInitializeToTest() ................................................................................ 342
10.4.2.5 CryptTestAlgorithm() .................................................................................. 342
Annex A (informative) Implementation Dependent .................................................................. 344
A.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 344
A.2 Implementation.h ..................................................................................................... 344
Annex B (informative) Cryptographic Library Interface ............................................................ 359
B.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 359
B.2 Integer Format ........................................................................................................ 359
B.3 CryptoEngine.h ....................................................................................................... 359
B.3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 359
B.3.2. General Purpose Macros .................................................................................. 360
B.3.3. Self-test ........................................................................................................... 360
B.3.4. Hash-related Structures .................................................................................... 360
B.3.5. Asymmetric Structures and Values ................................................................... 362
B.3.5.1. ECC-related Structures ............................................................................... 362
B.3.5.2. RSA-related Structures ............................................................................... 362
B.3.6. Miscelaneous ................................................................................................... 362
B.4 OsslCryptoEngine.h ................................................................................................ 364
B.4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 364
B.4.2. Defines ............................................................................................................. 364
B.5 MathFunctions.c ...................................................................................................... 365
B.5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 365
B.5.2. Externally Accessible Functions ....................................................................... 365
B.5.2.1. _math__Normalize2B() ............................................................................... 365
B.5.2.2. _math__Denormalize2B() ........................................................................... 366
B.5.2.3. _math__sub() ............................................................................................. 366
B.5.2.4. _math__Inc() .............................................................................................. 367
B.5.2.5. _math__Dec() ............................................................................................. 368
B.5.2.6. _math__Mul() ............................................................................................. 368
B.5.2.7. _math__Div() .............................................................................................. 369
B.5.2.8. _math__uComp() ........................................................................................ 370
B.5.2.9. _math__Comp() .......................................................................................... 371
B.5.2.10. _math__ModExp ......................................................................................... 372
B.5.2.11. _math__IsPrime() ....................................................................................... 373
B.6 CpriCryptPri.c .......................................................................................................... 375
B.6.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 375
B.6.2. Includes and Locals .......................................................................................... 375
B.6.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 375
B.6.3.1. TpmFail() .................................................................................................... 375
B.6.3.2. FAILURE_TRAP() ....................................................................................... 375
B.6.3.3. _cpri__InitCryptoUnits() .............................................................................. 375
B.6.3.4. _cpri__StopCryptoUnits()............................................................................ 376
B.6.3.5. _cpri__Startup() .......................................................................................... 376
B.7 CpriRNG.c ............................................................................................................... 377
B.7.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 377
B.7.2. Includes ........................................................................................................... 377
B.7.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 377
B.7.3.1. _cpri__RngStartup() ................................................................................... 377
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B.7.3.2. _cpri__DrbgGetPutState() .......................................................................... 377
B.7.3.3. _cpri__StirRandom() ................................................................................... 378
B.7.3.4. _cpri__GenerateRandom().......................................................................... 378
B.7.3.4.1. _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom() .............................................................. 379
B.8 CpriHash.c .............................................................................................................. 380
B.8.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 380
B.8.2. Includes, Defines, and Types ........................................................................... 380
B.8.3. Static Functions................................................................................................ 380
B.8.3.1. GetHashServer() ........................................................................................ 380
B.8.3.2. MarshalHashState() .................................................................................... 381
B.8.3.3. GetHashState()........................................................................................... 381
B.8.3.4. GetHashInfoPointer() .................................................................................. 382
B.8.4. Hash Functions ................................................................................................ 382
B.8.4.1. _cpri__HashStartup() .................................................................................. 382
B.8.4.2. _cpri__GetHashAlgByIndex() ...................................................................... 382
B.8.4.3. _cpri__GetHashBlockSize() ........................................................................ 383
B.8.4.4. _cpri__GetHashDER .................................................................................. 383
B.8.4.5. _cpri__GetDigestSize() ............................................................................... 383
B.8.4.6. _cpri__GetContextAlg() .............................................................................. 384
B.8.4.7. _cpri__CopyHashState ............................................................................... 384
B.8.4.8. _cpri__StartHash() ..................................................................................... 384
B.8.4.9. _cpri__UpdateHash() .................................................................................. 385
B.8.4.10. _cpri__CompleteHash() .............................................................................. 386
B.8.4.11. _cpri__ImportExportHashState() ................................................................. 387
B.8.4.12. _cpri__HashBlock() .................................................................................... 388
B.8.5. HMAC Functions .............................................................................................. 389
B.8.5.1. _cpri__StartHMAC ...................................................................................... 389
B.8.5.2. _cpri_CompleteHMAC() .............................................................................. 390
B.8.6. Mask and Key Generation Functions ................................................................ 390
B.8.6.1. _crypi_MGF1() ............................................................................................ 390
B.8.6.2. _cpri_KDFa() .............................................................................................. 392
B.8.6.3. _cpri__KDFe() ............................................................................................ 394
B.9 CpriHashData.c ....................................................................................................... 396
B.10 CpriMisc.c ............................................................................................................... 397
B.10.1. Includes ........................................................................................................... 397
B.10.2. Functions ......................................................................................................... 397
B.10.2.1. BnTo2B() .................................................................................................... 397
B.10.2.2. Copy2B() .................................................................................................... 397
B.10.2.3. BnFrom2B() ................................................................................................ 398
B.11 CpriSym.c ............................................................................................................... 399
B.11.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 399
B.11.2. Includes, Defines, and Typedefs ....................................................................... 399
B.11.3. Utility Functions ................................................................................................ 399
B.11.3.1. _cpri_SymStartup() ..................................................................................... 399
B.11.3.2. _cpri__GetSymmetricBlockSize() ................................................................ 399
B.11.4. AES Encryption ................................................................................................ 400
B.11.4.1. _cpri__AESEncryptCBC() ........................................................................... 400
B.11.4.2. _cpri__AESDecryptCBC() ........................................................................... 401
B.11.4.3. _cpri__AESEncryptCFB() ........................................................................... 402
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B.11.4.4. _cpri__AESDecryptCFB() ........................................................................... 403
B.11.4.5. _cpri__AESEncryptCTR() ........................................................................... 404
B.11.4.6. _cpri__AESDecryptCTR() ........................................................................... 405
B.11.4.7. _cpri__AESEncryptECB() ........................................................................... 405
B.11.4.8. _cpri__AESDecryptECB() ........................................................................... 406
B.11.4.9. _cpri__AESEncryptOFB() ........................................................................... 406
B.11.4.10. _cpri__AESDecryptOFB() ........................................................................... 407
B.11.5. SM4 Encryption ................................................................................................ 408
B.11.5.1. _cpri__SM4EncryptCBC() ........................................................................... 408
B.11.5.2. _cpri__SM4DecryptCBC() ........................................................................... 409
B.11.5.3. _cpri__SM4EncryptCFB() ........................................................................... 410
B.11.5.4. _cpri__SM4DecryptCFB() ........................................................................... 410
B.11.5.5. _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR() ........................................................................... 411
B.11.5.6. _cpri__SM4DecryptCTR() ........................................................................... 412
B.11.5.7. _cpri__SM4EncryptECB() ........................................................................... 413
B.11.5.8. _cpri__SM4DecryptECB() ........................................................................... 413
B.11.5.9. _cpri__SM4EncryptOFB() ........................................................................... 414
B.11.5.10. _cpri__SM4DecryptOFB() ........................................................................... 415
B.12 RSA Files ................................................................................................................ 416
B.12.1. CpriRSA.c ........................................................................................................ 416
B.12.1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 416
B.12.1.2. Includes ...................................................................................................... 416
B.12.1.3. Local Functions .......................................................................................... 416
B.12.1.3.1. RsaPrivateExponent() ............................................................................ 416
B.12.1.3.2. _cpri__TestKeyRSA() ............................................................................. 418
B.12.1.3.3. RSAEP() ................................................................................................ 420
B.12.1.3.4. RSADP() ................................................................................................ 420
B.12.1.3.5. OaepEncode() ........................................................................................ 421
B.12.1.3.6. OaepDecode() ........................................................................................ 423
B.12.1.3.7. PKSC1v1_5Encode() .............................................................................. 425
B.12.1.3.8. RSAES_Decode() ................................................................................... 425
B.12.1.3.9. PssEncode() ........................................................................................... 426
B.12.1.3.10. PssDecode() ........................................................................................ 427
B.12.1.3.11. PKSC1v1_5SignEncode() ..................................................................... 429
B.12.1.3.12. RSASSA_Decode()............................................................................... 430
B.12.1.4. Externally Accessible Functions .................................................................. 431
B.12.1.4.1. _cpri__RsaStartup() ............................................................................... 431
B.12.1.4.2. _cpri__EncryptRSA() .............................................................................. 431
B.12.1.4.3. _cpri__DecryptRSA() .............................................................................. 433
B.12.1.4.4. _cpri__SignRSA() ................................................................................... 434
B.12.1.4.5. _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA() .............................................................. 435
B.12.1.4.6. _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA() ..................................................................... 435
B.12.2. Alternative RSA Key Generation ....................................................................... 440
B.12.2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 440
B.12.2.2. RSAKeySieve.h .......................................................................................... 440
B.12.2.3. RSAKeySieve.c .......................................................................................... 443
B.12.2.3.1. Includes and defines .............................................................................. 443
B.12.2.3.2. Bit Manipulation Functions ..................................................................... 443
B.12.2.3.3. Miscellaneous Functions ........................................................................ 445
B.12.2.3.4. Public Function ...................................................................................... 455
B.12.2.4. RSAData.c .................................................................................................. 459
B.13 Elliptic Curve Files .................................................................................................. 471
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B.13.1. CpriDataEcc.h .................................................................................................. 471
B.13.2. CpriDataEcc.c .................................................................................................. 472
B.13.3. CpriECC.c ........................................................................................................ 479
B.13.3.1. Includes and Defines .................................................................................. 479
B.13.3.2. Functions .................................................................................................... 479
B.13.3.2.1. _cpri__EccStartup() ................................................................................ 479
B.13.3.2.2. _cpri__GetCurveIdByIndex() .................................................................. 479
B.13.3.2.3. _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId() ................................................... 479
B.13.3.2.4. Point2B() ................................................................................................ 480
B.13.3.2.5. EccCurveInit() ........................................................................................ 481
B.13.3.2.6. PointFrom2B() ........................................................................................ 482
B.13.3.2.7. EccInitPoint2B() ..................................................................................... 482
B.13.3.2.8. PointMul() .............................................................................................. 483
B.13.3.2.9. GetRandomPrivate() ............................................................................... 483
B.13.3.2.10. Mod2B() ............................................................................................... 484
B.13.3.2.11. _cpri__EccPointMultiply ....................................................................... 484
B.13.3.2.12. ClearPoint2B() ...................................................................................... 486
B.13.3.2.13. _cpri__EccCommitCompute() ............................................................... 486
B.13.3.2.14. _cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve() ................................................................ 489
B.13.3.2.15. _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc() ..................................................................... 490
B.13.3.2.16. _cpri__GetEphemeralEcc() ................................................................... 492
B.13.3.2.17. SignEcdsa().......................................................................................... 492
B.13.3.2.18. EcDaa() ................................................................................................ 495
B.13.3.2.19. SchnorrEcc() ........................................................................................ 496
B.13.3.2.20. SignSM2() ............................................................................................ 499
B.13.3.2.21. _cpri__SignEcc() .................................................................................. 502
B.13.3.2.22. ValidateSignatureEcdsa() ..................................................................... 502
B.13.3.2.23. ValidateSignatureEcSchnorr() .............................................................. 505
B.13.3.2.24. ValidateSignatueSM2Dsa() ................................................................... 506
B.13.3.2.25. _cpri__ValidateSignatureEcc() ............................................................. 508
B.13.3.2.26. avf1() ................................................................................................... 509
B.13.3.2.27. C_2_2_MQV() ...................................................................................... 509
B.13.3.2.28. avfSm2() .............................................................................................. 512
B.13.3.2.29. C_2_2_ECDH() .................................................................................... 514
B.13.3.2.30. _cpri__C_2_2_KeyExchange() ............................................................. 515
Annex C (informative) Simulation Environment ....................................................................... 517
C.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 517
C.2 Cancel.c .................................................................................................................. 517
C.2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 517
C.2.2. Includes, Typedefs, Structures, and Defines ..................................................... 517
C.2.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 517
C.2.3.1. _plat__IsCanceled() ................................................................................... 517
C.2.3.2. _plat__SetCancel() ..................................................................................... 517
C.2.3.3. _plat__ClearCancel() .................................................................................. 518
C.3 Clock.c .................................................................................................................... 519
C.3.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 519
C.3.2. Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 519
C.3.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 519
C.3.3.1. _plat__ClockReset() ................................................................................... 519
C.3.3.2. _plat__ClockTimeFromStart() ..................................................................... 519
C.3.3.3. _plat__ClockTimeElapsed() ........................................................................ 519
C.3.3.4. _plat__ClockAdjustRate() ........................................................................... 520
C.4 Entropy.c ................................................................................................................. 521
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C.4.1. Includes ........................................................................................................... 521
C.4.2. Local values ..................................................................................................... 521
C.4.3. _plat__GetEntropy() ......................................................................................... 521
C.5 LocalityPlat.c ........................................................................................................... 523
C.5.1. Includes ........................................................................................................... 523
C.5.2. Functions ......................................................................................................... 523
C.5.2.1. _plat__LocalityGet() ................................................................................... 523
C.5.2.2. _plat__LocalitySet() .................................................................................... 523
C.5.2.3. _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled() ............................................................... 523
C.6 NVMem.c ................................................................................................................ 524
C.6.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 524
C.6.2. Includes ........................................................................................................... 524
C.6.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 524
C.6.3.1. _plat__NvErrors() ....................................................................................... 524
C.6.3.2. _plat__NVEnable() ..................................................................................... 524
C.6.3.3. _plat__NVDisable() .................................................................................... 525
C.6.3.4. _plat__IsNvAvailable() ................................................................................ 526
C.6.3.5. _plat__NvMemoryRead() ............................................................................ 526
C.6.3.6. _plat__NvIsDifferent() ................................................................................. 526
C.6.3.7. _plat__NvMemoryWrite() ............................................................................ 527
C.6.3.8. _plat__NvMemoryMove() ............................................................................ 527
C.6.3.9. _plat__NvCommit() ..................................................................................... 527
C.6.3.10. _plat__SetNvAvail() .................................................................................... 528
C.6.3.11. _plat__ClearNvAvail() ................................................................................. 528
C.7 PowerPlat.c ............................................................................................................. 529
C.7.1. Includes and Function Prototypes ..................................................................... 529
C.7.2. Functions ......................................................................................................... 529
C.7.2.1. _plat__Signal_PowerOn() ........................................................................... 529
C.7.2.2. _plat__WasPowerLost() .............................................................................. 529
C.7.2.3. _plat_Signal_Reset() .................................................................................. 529
C.7.2.4. _plat__Signal_PowerOff() ........................................................................... 530
C.8 Platform.h ............................................................................................................... 531
C.8.1. Includes and Defines ........................................................................................ 531
C.8.2. Power Functions ............................................................................................... 531
C.8.2.1. _plat__Signal_PowerOn ............................................................................. 531
C.8.2.2. _plat__Signal_Reset ................................................................................... 531
C.8.2.3. _plat__WasPowerLost() .............................................................................. 531
C.8.2.4. _plat__Signal_PowerOff() ........................................................................... 531
C.8.3. Physical Presence Functions ............................................................................ 531
C.8.3.1. _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted() ............................................................ 531
C.8.3.2. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn............................................................ 532
C.8.3.3. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff() ......................................................... 532
C.8.4. Command Canceling Functions ........................................................................ 532
C.8.4.1. _plat__IsCanceled() ................................................................................... 532
C.8.4.2. _plat__SetCancel() ..................................................................................... 532
C.8.4.3. _plat__ClearCancel() .................................................................................. 532
C.8.5. NV memory functions ....................................................................................... 533
C.8.5.1. _plat__NvErrors() ....................................................................................... 533
C.8.5.2. _plat__NVEnable() ..................................................................................... 533
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C.8.5.3. _plat__NVDisable() .................................................................................... 533
C.8.5.4. _plat__IsNvAvailable() ................................................................................ 533
C.8.5.5. _plat__NvCommit() ..................................................................................... 533
C.8.5.6. _plat__NvMemoryRead() ............................................................................ 534
C.8.5.7. _plat__NvIsDifferent() ................................................................................. 534
C.8.5.8. _plat__NvMemoryWrite() ............................................................................ 534
C.8.5.9. _plat__NvMemoryMove() ............................................................................ 534
C.8.5.10. _plat__SetNvAvail() .................................................................................... 535
C.8.5.11. _plat__ClearNvAvail() ................................................................................. 535
C.8.6. Locality Functions ............................................................................................ 535
C.8.6.1. _plat__LocalityGet() ................................................................................... 535
C.8.6.2. _plat__LocalitySet() .................................................................................... 535
C.8.6.3. _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled() ............................................................... 535
C.8.7. Clock Constants and Functions ........................................................................ 535
C.8.7.1. _plat__ClockReset() ................................................................................... 536
C.8.7.2. _plat__ClockTimeFromStart() ..................................................................... 536
C.8.7.3. _plat__ClockTimeElapsed() ........................................................................ 536
C.8.7.4. _plat__ClockAdjustRate() ........................................................................... 536
C.8.8. Single Function Files ........................................................................................ 537
C.8.8.1. _plat__GetEntropy() ................................................................................... 537
C.9 PlatformData.h ........................................................................................................ 538
C.10 PlatformData.c ........................................................................................................ 539
C.10.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 539
C.10.2. Includes ........................................................................................................... 539
C.11 PPPlat.c .................................................................................................................. 540
C.11.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 540
C.11.2. Includes ........................................................................................................... 540
C.11.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 540
C.11.3.1. _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted() ............................................................ 540
C.11.3.2. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn() ......................................................... 540
C.11.3.3. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff() ......................................................... 540
C.12 Unique.c .................................................................................................................. 541
C.12.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 541
C.12.2. Includes ........................................................................................................... 541
C.12.3. _plat__GetUnique() .......................................................................................... 541
Annex D (informative) Remote Procedure Interface ................................................................ 542
D.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 542
D.2 TpmTcpProtocol.h ................................................................................................... 543
D.2.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 543
D.2.2. Typedefs and Defines ....................................................................................... 543
D.3 TcpServer.c ............................................................................................................. 545
D.3.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 545
D.3.2. Includes, Locals, Defines and Function Prototypes ........................................... 545
D.3.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 545
D.3.3.1. CreateSocket() ........................................................................................... 545
D.3.3.2. PlatformServer() ......................................................................................... 546
D.3.3.3. PlatformSvcRoutine() .................................................................................. 547
D.3.3.4. PlatformSignalService() .............................................................................. 548
D.3.3.5. RegularCommandService() ......................................................................... 549
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D.3.3.6. StartTcpServer() ......................................................................................... 549
D.3.3.7. ReadBytes() ............................................................................................... 550
D.3.3.8. WriteBytes() ............................................................................................... 550
D.3.3.9. WriteUINT32() ............................................................................................ 551
D.3.3.10. ReadVarBytes() .......................................................................................... 551
D.3.3.11. WriteVarBytes() .......................................................................................... 552
D.3.3.12. TpmServer() ............................................................................................... 552
D.4 TPMCmdp.c ............................................................................................................ 555
D.4.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 555
D.4.2. Includes and Data Definitions ........................................................................... 555
D.4.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 555
D.4.3.1. Signal_PowerOn() ...................................................................................... 555
D.4.3.2. Signal_PowerOff() ...................................................................................... 556
D.4.3.3. _rpc__ForceFailureMode() .......................................................................... 556
D.4.3.4. _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn() .......................................................... 556
D.4.3.5. _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff() .......................................................... 556
D.4.3.6. _rpc__Signal_Hash_Start() ......................................................................... 557
D.4.3.7. _rpc__Signal_Hash_Data() ......................................................................... 557
D.4.3.8. _rpc__Signal_HashEnd() ............................................................................ 557
D.4.3.9. _rpc__Signal_CancelOn() ........................................................................... 558
D.4.3.10. _rpc__Signal_CancelOff() ........................................................................... 558
D.4.3.11. _rpc__Signal_NvOn() ................................................................................. 559
D.4.3.12. _rpc__Signal_NvOff() ................................................................................. 559
D.4.3.13. _rpc__Shutdown() ...................................................................................... 559
D.5 TPMCmds.c............................................................................................................. 560
D.5.1. Description ....................................................................................................... 560
D.5.2. Includes, Defines, Data Definitions, and Function Prototypes ........................... 560
D.5.3. Functions ......................................................................................................... 560
D.5.3.1. Usage() ...................................................................................................... 560
D.5.3.2. main() ......................................................................................................... 560
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Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 4: Supporting Routines
1 Scope
This part contains C code that describes the algorithms and methods used by the command code in TPM
2.0 Part 3. The code in this document augments TPM 2.0 Part 2 and TPM 2.0 Part 3 to provide a
complete description of a TPM, including the supporting framework for the code that performs the
command actions.
Any TPM 2.0 Part 4 code may be replaced by code that provides similar results when interfacing to the
action code in TPM 2.0 Part 3. The behavior of code in this document that is not included in an annex is
normative, as observed at the interfaces with TPM 2.0 Part 3 code. Code in an annex is provided for
completeness, that is, to allow a full implementation of the specification from the provided code.
The code in parts 3 and 4 is written to define the behavior of a compliant TPM. In some cases (e.g.,
firmware update), it is not possible to provide a compliant implementation. In those cases, any
implementation provided by the vendor that meets the general description of the function provided in TPM
2.0 Part 3 would be compliant.
The code in parts 3 and 4 is not written to meet any particular level of conformance nor does this
specification require that a TPM meet any particular level of conformance.
2 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in TPM 2.0 Part 1 apply.
3 Symbols and abbreviated terms
For the purposes of this document, the symbols and abbreviated terms given in TPM 2.0 Part 1 apply.
4 Automation
TPM 2.0 Part 2 and 3 are constructed so that they can be processed by an automated parser. For
example, TPM 2.0 Part 2 can be processed to generate header file contents such as structures, typedefs,
and enums. TPM 2.0 Part 3 can be processed to generate command and response marshaling and
unmarshaling code.
The automated processor is not provided to the TCG. It was used to generate the Microsoft Visual Studio
TPM simulator files. These files are not specification reference code, but rather design examples.
4.1 Configuration Parser
The tables in the TPM 2.0 Part 2 Annexes are constructed so that they can be processed by a program.
The program that processes these tables in the TPM 2.0 Part 2 Annexes is called "The TPM 2.0 Part 2
Configuration Parser."
The tables in the TPM 2.0 Part 2 Annexes determine the configuration of a TPM implementation. These
tables may be modified by an implementer to describe the algorithms and commands to be executed in
by a specific implementation as well as to set implementation limits such as the number of PCR, sizes of
buffers, etc.
The TPM 2.0 Part 2 Configuration Parser produces a set of structures and definitions that are used by the
TPM 2.0 Part 2 Structure Parser.
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4.2 Structure Parser
4.2.1 Introduction
The program that processes the tables in TPM 2.0 Part 2 (other than the table in the annexes) is called
"The TPM 2.0 Part 2 Structure Parser."
NOTE A Perl script was used to parse the tables in TPM 2.0 Part 2 to produce the header files and unmarshaling code
in for the reference implementation.
The TPM 2.0 Part 2 Structure Parser takes as input the files produced by the TPM 2.0 Part 2
Configuration Parser and the same TPM 2.0 Part 2 specification that was used as input to the TPM 2.0
Part 2 Configuration Parser. The TPM 2.0 Part 2 Structure Parser will generate all of the C structure
constant definitions that are required by the TPM interface. Additionally, the parser will generate
unmarshaling code for all structures passed to the TPM, and marshaling code for structures passed from
the TPM.
The unmarshaling code produced by the parser uses the prototypes defined below. The unmarshaling
code will perform validations of the data to ensure that it is compliant with the limitations on the data
imposed by the structure definition and use the response code provided in the table if not.
EXAMPLE: The definition for a TPMI_RH_PROVISION indicates that the primitive data type is a TPM_HANDLE and the
only allowed values are TPM_RH_OWNER and TPM_RH_PLATFORM. The definition also indicates that the
TPM shall indicate TPM_RC_HANDLE if the input value is not none of these values. The unmarshaling code
will validate that the input value has one of those allowed values and return TPM_RC_HANDLE if not.
The sections below describe the function prototypes for the marshaling and unmarshaling code that is
automatically generated by the TPM 2.0 Part 2 Structure Parser. These prototypes are described here as
the unmarshaling and marshaling of various types occurs in places other than when the command is
being parsed or the response is being built. The prototypes and the description of the interface are
intended to aid in the comprehension of the code that uses these auto-generated routines.
4.2.2 Unmarshaling Code Prototype
4.2.2.1 Simple Types and Structures
The general form for the unmarshaling code for a simple type or a structure is:
TPM_RC TYPE_Unmarshal(TYPE *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size);
Where:
TYPE name of the data type or structure
*target location in the TPM memory into which the data from **buffer is placed
**buffer location in input buffer containing the most significant octet (MSO) of
*target
*size number of octets remaining in **buffer
When the data is successfully unmarshaled, the called routine will return TPM_RC_SUCCESS.
Otherwise, it will return a Format-One response code (see TPM 2.0 Part 2).
If the data is successfully unmarshaled, *buffer is advanced point to the first octet of the next parameter
in the input buffer and size is reduced by the number of octets removed from the buffer.
When the data type is a simple type, the parser will generate code that will unmarshal the underlying type
and then perform checks on the type as indicated by the type definition.
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When the data type is a structure, the parser will generate code that unmarshals each of the structure
elements in turn and performs any additional parameter checks as indicated by the data type.
4.2.2.2 Union Types
When a union is defined, an extra parameter is defined for the unmarshaling code. This parameter is the
selector for the type. The unmarshaling code for the union will unmarshal the type indicated by the
selector.
The function prototype for a union has the form:
TPM_RC TYPE_Unmarshal(TYPE *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, UINT32 selector);
where:
TYPE name of the union type or structure
*target location in the TPM memory into which the data from **buffer is placed
**buffer location in input buffer containing the most significant octet (MSO) of
*target
*size number of octets remaining in **buffer
selector union selector that determines what will be unmarshaled into *target
4.2.2.3 Null Types
In some cases, the structure definition allows an optional “null” value. The “null” value allows the use of
the same C type for the entity even though it does not always have the same members.
For example, the TPMI_ALG_HASH data type is used in many places. In some cases, TPM_ALG_NULL
is permitted and in some cases it is not. If two different data types had to be defined, the interfaces and
code would become more complex because of the number of cast operations that would be necessary.
Rather than encumber the code, the “null” value is defined and the unmarshaling code is given a flag to
indicate if this instance of the type accepts the “null” parameter or not. When the data type has a “null”
value, the function prototype is
TPM_RC TYPE_Unmarshal(TYPE *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, bool flag);
The parser detects when the type allows a “null” value and will always include flag in any call to
unmarshal that type.
4.2.2.4 Arrays
Any data type may be included in an array. The function prototype use to unmarshal an array for a TYPE is
TPM_RC TYPE_Array_Unmarshal(TYPE *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,INT32 count);
The generated code for an array uses a count-limited loop within which it calls the unmarshaling code for
TYPE.
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4.2.3 Marshaling Code Function Prototypes
4.2.3.1 Simple Types and Structures
The general form for the unmarshaling code for a simple type or a structure is:
UINT16 TYPE_Marshal(TYPE *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size);
Where:
TYPE name of the data type or structure
*source location in the TPM memory containing the value that is to be marshaled
in to the designated buffer
**buffer location in the output buffer where the first octet of the TYPE is to be
placed
*size number of octets remaining in **buffer. If size is a NULL pointer, then
no data is marshaled and the routine will compute the size of the
memory required to marshal the indicated type
When the data is successfully marshaled, the called routine will return the number of octets marshaled
into **buffer.
If the data is successfully marshaled, *buffer is advanced point to the first octet of the next location in
the output buffer and *size is reduced by the number of octets placed in the buffer.
When the data type is a simple type, the parser will generate code that will marshal the underlying type.
The presumption is that the TPM internal structures are consistent and correct so the marshaling code
does not validate that the data placed in the buffer has a permissible value.
When the data type is a structure, the parser will generate code that marshals each of the structure
elements in turn.
4.2.3.2 Union Types
An extra parameter is defined for the marshaling function of a union. This parameter is the selector for the
type. The marshaling code for the union will marshal the type indicated by the selector.
The function prototype for a union has the form:
UINT16 TYPE_Marshal(TYPE *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, UINT32 selector);
The parameters have a similar meaning as those in 5.2.2.2 but the data movement is from source to
buffer.
4.2.3.3 Arrays
Any type may be included in an array. The function prototype use to unmarshal an array is:
UINT16 TYPE_Array_Marshal(TYPE *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, INT32 count);
The generated code for an array uses a count-limited loop within which it calls the marshaling code for
TYPE.
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4.3 Command Parser
The program that processes the tables in TPM 2.0 Part 3 is called "The TPM 2.0 Part 3 Command
Parser."
The TPM 2.0 Part 3 Command Parser takes as input a TPM 2.0 Part 3 of the TPM specification and some
configuration files produced by the TPM 2.0 Part 2 Configuration Parser. This parser uses the contents of
the command and response tables in TPM 2.0 Part 3 to produce unmarshaling code for the command
and the marshaling code for the response. Additionally, this parser produces support routines that are
used to check that the proper number of authorization values of the proper type have been provided.
These support routines are called by the functions in this TPM 2.0 Part 4.
4.4 Portability
Where reasonable, the code is written to be portable. There are a few known cases where the code is not
portable. Specifically, the handling of bit fields will not always be portable. The bit fields are marshaled
and unmarshaled as a simple element of the underlying type. For example, a TPMA_SESSION is defined
as a bit field in an octet (BYTE). When sent on the interface a TPMA_SESSION will occupy one octet.
When unmarshaled, it is unmarshaled as a UINT8. The ramifications of this are that a TPMA_SESSION
th
will occupy the 0 octet of the structure in which it is placed regardless of the size of the structure.
Many compilers will pad a bit field to some "natural" size for the processor, often 4 octets, meaning that
sizeof(TPMA_SESSION) would return 4 rather than 1 (the canonical size of a TPMA_SESSION).
th
For a little endian machine, padding of bit fields should have little consequence since the 0 octet always
th
contains the 0 bit of the structure no matter how large the structure. However, for a big endian machine,
th
the 0 bit will be in the highest numbered octet. When unmarshaling a TPMA_SESSION, the current
th th
unmarshaling code will place the input octet at the 0 octet of the TPMA_SESSION. Since the 0 octet is
most significant octet, this has the effect of shifting all the session attribute bits left by 24 places.
As a consequence, someone implementing on a big endian machine should do one of two things:
a) allocate all structures as packed to a byte boundary (this may not be possible if the processor does
not handle unaligned accesses); or
b) modify the code that manipulates bit fields that are not defined as being the alignment size of the
system.
For many RISC processors, option #2 would be the only choice. This is may not be a terribly daunting
task since only two attribute structures are not 32-bits (TPMA_SESSION and TPMA_LOCALITY).
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5 Header Files
5.1 Introduction
The files in this section are used to define values that are used in multiple parts of the specification and
are not confined to a single module.
5.2 BaseTypes.h
1 #ifndef _BASETYPES_H
2 #define _BASETYPES_H
3 #include "stdint.h"
NULL definition
4 #ifndef NULL
5 #define NULL (0)
6 #endif
7 typedef uint8_t UINT8;
8 typedef uint8_t BYTE;
9 typedef int8_t INT8;
10 typedef int BOOL;
11 typedef uint16_t UINT16;
12 typedef int16_t INT16;
13 typedef uint32_t UINT32;
14 typedef int32_t INT32;
15 typedef uint64_t UINT64;
16 typedef int64_t INT64;
17 typedef struct {
18 UINT16 size;
19 BYTE buffer[1];
20 } TPM2B;
21 #endif
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5.3 bits.h
1 #ifndef _BITS_H
2 #define _BITS_H
3 #define CLEAR_BIT(bit, vector) BitClear((bit), (BYTE *)&(vector), sizeof(vector))
4 #define SET_BIT(bit, vector) BitSet((bit), (BYTE *)&(vector), sizeof(vector))
5 #define TEST_BIT(bit, vector) BitIsSet((bit), (BYTE *)&(vector), sizeof(vector))
6 #endif
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5.4 bool.h
1 #ifndef _BOOL_H
2 #define _BOOL_H
3 #if defined(TRUE)
4 #undef TRUE
5 #endif
6 #if defined FALSE
7 #undef FALSE
8 #endif
9 typedef int BOOL;
10 #define FALSE ((BOOL)0)
11 #define TRUE ((BOOL)1)
12 #endif
5.5 Capabilities.h
This file contains defines for the number of capability values that will fit into the largest data buffer.
These defines are used in various function in the "support" and the "subsystem" code groups. A module
that supports a type that is returned by a capability will have a function that returns the capabilities of the
type.
EXAMPLE PCR.c contains PCRCapGetHandles() and PCRCapGetProperties().
1 #ifndef _CAPABILITIES_H
2 #define _CAPABILITIES_H
3 #define MAX_CAP_DATA (MAX_CAP_BUFFER-sizeof(TPM_CAP)-sizeof(UINT32))
4 #define MAX_CAP_ALGS (ALG_LAST_VALUE - ALG_FIRST_VALUE + 1)
5 #define MAX_CAP_HANDLES (MAX_CAP_DATA/sizeof(TPM_HANDLE))
6 #define MAX_CAP_CC ((TPM_CC_LAST - TPM_CC_FIRST) + 1)
7 #define MAX_TPM_PROPERTIES (MAX_CAP_DATA/sizeof(TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY))
8 #define MAX_PCR_PROPERTIES (MAX_CAP_DATA/sizeof(TPMS_TAGGED_PCR_SELECT))
9 #define MAX_ECC_CURVES (MAX_CAP_DATA/sizeof(TPM_ECC_CURVE))
10 #endif
5.6 TPMB.h
This file contains extra TPM2B structures
1 #ifndef _TPMB_H
2 #define _TPMB_H
This macro helps avoid having to type in the structure in order to create a new TPM2B type that is used in
a function.
3 #define TPM2B_TYPE(name, bytes) \
4 typedef union { \
5 struct { \
6 UINT16 size; \
7 BYTE buffer[(bytes)]; \
8 } t; \
9 TPM2B b; \
10 } TPM2B_##name
Macro to instance and initialize a TPM2B value
11 #define TPM2B_INIT(TYPE, name) \
12 TPM2B_##TYPE name = {sizeof(name.t.buffer), {0}}
13 #define TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(bytes) TPM2B_TYPE(bytes##_BYTE_VALUE, bytes)
14 #endif
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5.7 TpmError.h
1 #ifndef _TPM_ERROR_H
2 #define _TPM_ERROR_H
3 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
4 #define FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION (1)
5 #define FATAL_ERROR_DIVIDE_ZERO (2)
6 #define FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL (3)
7 #define FATAL_ERROR_PARAMETER (4)
8 #define FATAL_ERROR_ENTROPY (5)
9 #define FATAL_ERROR_SELF_TEST (6)
10 #define FATAL_ERROR_CRYPTO (7)
11 #define FATAL_ERROR_NV_UNRECOVERABLE (8)
12 #define FATAL_ERROR_REMANUFACTURED (9) // indicates that the TPM has
13 // been re-manufactured after an
14 // unrecoverable NV error
15 #define FATAL_ERROR_DRBG (10)
16 #define FATAL_ERROR_FORCED (666)
These are the crypto assertion routines. When a function returns an unexpected and unrecoverable
result, the assertion fails and the TpmFail() is called
17 void
18 TpmFail(const char *function, int line, int code);
19 typedef void (*FAIL_FUNCTION)(const char *, int, int);
20 #define FAIL(a) (TpmFail(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, a))
21 #if defined(EMPTY_ASSERT)
22 # define pAssert(a) ((void)0)
23 #else
24 # define pAssert(a) (!!(a) ? 1 : (FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_PARAMETER), 0))
25 #endif
26 #endif // _TPM_ERROR_H
5.8 Global.h
5.8.1 Description
This file contains internal global type definitions and data declarations that are need between
subsystems. The instantiation of global data is in Global.c. The initialization of global data is in the
subsystem that is the primary owner of the data.
The first part of this file has the typedefs for structures and other defines used in many portions of the
code. After the typedef section, is a section that defines global values that are only present in RAM. The
next three sections define the structures for the NV data areas: persistent, orderly, and state save.
Additional sections define the data that is used in specific modules. That data is private to the module but
is collected here to simplify the management of the instance data. All the data is instanced in Global.c.
5.8.2 Includes
1 #ifndef GLOBAL_H
2 #define GLOBAL_H
3 //#define SELF_TEST
4 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
5 #include "Tpm.h"
6 #include "TPMB.h"
7 #include "CryptoEngine.h"
8 #include <setjmp.h>
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5.8.3 Defines and Types
5.8.3.1 Unreferenced Parameter
This define is used to eliminate the compiler warning about an unreferenced parameter. Basically, it tells
the compiler that it is not an accident that the parameter is unreferenced.
9 #ifndef UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER
10 # define UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(a) (a)
11 #endif
12 #include "bits.h"
5.8.3.2 Crypto Self-Test Values
Define these values here if the AlgorithmTests() project is not used
13 #ifndef SELF_TEST
14 extern ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_implementedAlgorithms;
15 extern ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_toTest;
16 #else
17 LIB_IMPORT extern ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_implementedAlgorithms;
18 LIB_IMPORT extern ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_toTest;
19 #endif
These macros are used in CryptUtil() to invoke the incremental self test.
20 #define TEST(alg) if(TEST_BIT(alg, g_toTest)) CryptTestAlgorithm(alg, NULL)
Use of TPM_ALG_NULL is reserved for RSAEP/RSADP testing. If someone is wanting to test a hash with
that value, don't do it.
21 #define TEST_HASH(alg) \
22 if( TEST_BIT(alg, g_toTest) \
23 && (alg != ALG_NULL_VALUE)) \
24 CryptTestAlgorithm(alg, NULL)
5.8.3.3 Hash and HMAC State Structures
These definitions are for the types that can be in a hash state structure. These types are used in the
crypto utilities
25 typedef BYTE HASH_STATE_TYPE;
26 #define HASH_STATE_EMPTY ((HASH_STATE_TYPE) 0)
27 #define HASH_STATE_HASH ((HASH_STATE_TYPE) 1)
28 #define HASH_STATE_HMAC ((HASH_STATE_TYPE) 2)
A HASH_STATE structure contains an opaque hash stack state. A caller would use this structure when
performing incremental hash operations. The state is updated on each call. If type is an HMAC_STATE,
or HMAC_STATE_SEQUENCE then state is followed by the HMAC key in oPad format.
29 typedef struct
30 {
31 CPRI_HASH_STATE state; // hash state
32 HASH_STATE_TYPE type; // type of the context
33 } HASH_STATE;
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An HMAC_STATE structure contains an opaque HMAC stack state. A caller would use this structure
when performing incremental HMAC operations. This structure contains a hash state and an HMAC key
and allows slightly better stack optimization than adding an HMAC key to each hash state.
34 typedef struct
35 {
36 HASH_STATE hashState; // the hash state
37 TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK hmacKey; // the HMAC key
38 } HMAC_STATE;
5.8.3.4 Other Types
An AUTH_VALUE is a BYTE array containing a digest (TPMU_HA)
39 typedef BYTE AUTH_VALUE[sizeof(TPMU_HA)];
A TIME_INFO is a BYTE array that can contain a TPMS_TIME_INFO
40 typedef BYTE TIME_INFO[sizeof(TPMS_TIME_INFO)];
A NAME is a BYTE array that can contain a TPMU_NAME
41 typedef BYTE NAME[sizeof(TPMU_NAME)];
5.8.4 Loaded Object Structures
5.8.4.1 Description
The structures in this section define the object layout as it exists in TPM memory.
Two types of objects are defined: an ordinary object such as a key, and a sequence object that may be a
hash, HMAC, or event.
5.8.4.2 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
An OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES structure contains the variable attributes of an object. These properties are
not part of the public properties but are used by the TPM in managing the object. An
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES is used in the definition of the OBJECT data type.
42 typedef struct
43 {
44 unsigned publicOnly : 1; //0) SET if only the public portion of
45 // an object is loaded
46 unsigned epsHierarchy : 1; //1) SET if the object belongs to EPS
47 // Hierarchy
48 unsigned ppsHierarchy : 1; //2) SET if the object belongs to PPS
49 // Hierarchy
50 unsigned spsHierarchy : 1; //3) SET f the object belongs to SPS
51 // Hierarchy
52 unsigned evict : 1; //4) SET if the object is a platform or
53 // owner evict object. Platform-
54 // evict object belongs to PPS
55 // hierarchy, owner-evict object
56 // belongs to SPS or EPS hierarchy.
57 // This bit is also used to mark a
58 // completed sequence object so it
59 // will be flush when the
60 // SequenceComplete command succeeds.
61 unsigned primary : 1; //5) SET for a primary object
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62 unsigned temporary : 1;
//6) SET for a temporary object
63 unsigned stClear : 1;
//7) SET for an stClear object
64 unsigned hmacSeq : 1;
//8) SET for an HMAC sequence object
65 unsigned hashSeq : 1;
//9) SET for a hash sequence object
66 unsigned eventSeq : 1;
//10) SET for an event sequence object
67 unsigned ticketSafe : 1;
//11) SET if a ticket is safe to create
68 // for hash sequence object
69 unsigned firstBlock : 1; //12) SET if the first block of hash
70 // data has been received. It
71 // works with ticketSafe bit
72 unsigned isParent : 1; //13) SET if the key has the proper
73 // attributes to be a parent key
74 unsigned privateExp : 1; //14) SET when the private exponent
75 // of an RSA key has been validated.
76 unsigned reserved : 1; //15) reserved bits. unused.
77 } OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
5.8.4.3 OBJECT Structure
An OBJECT structure holds the object public, sensitive, and meta-data associated. This structure is
implementation dependent. For this implementation, the structure is not optimized for space but rather for
clarity of the reference implementation. Other implementations may choose to overlap portions of the
structure that are not used simultaneously. These changes would necessitate changes to the source code
but those changes would be compatible with the reference implementation.
78 typedef struct
79 {
80 // The attributes field is required to be first followed by the publicArea.
81 // This allows the overlay of the object structure and a sequence structure
82 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes; // object attributes
83 TPMT_PUBLIC publicArea; // public area of an object
84 TPMT_SENSITIVE sensitive; // sensitive area of an object
85
86 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
87 TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA privateExponent; // Additional field for the private
88 // exponent of an RSA key.
89 #endif
90 TPM2B_NAME qualifiedName; // object qualified name
91 TPMI_DH_OBJECT evictHandle; // if the object is an evict object,
92 // the original handle is kept here.
93 // The 'working' handle will be the
94 // handle of an object slot.
95
96 TPM2B_NAME name; // Name of the object name. Kept here
97 // to avoid repeatedly computing it.
98 } OBJECT;
5.8.4.4 HASH_OBJECT Structure
This structure holds a hash sequence object or an event sequence object.
The first four components of this structure are manually set to be the same as the first four components of
the object structure. This prevents the object from being inadvertently misused as sequence objects
occupy the same memory as a regular object. A debug check is present to make sure that the offsets are
what they are supposed to be.
99 typedef struct
100 {
101 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES attributes; // The attributes of the HASH object
102 TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC type; // algorithm
103 TPMI_ALG_HASH nameAlg; // name algorithm
104 TPMA_OBJECT objectAttributes; // object attributes
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105
106 // The data below is unique to a sequence object
107 TPM2B_AUTH auth; // auth for use of sequence
108 union
109 {
110 HASH_STATE hashState[HASH_COUNT];
111 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
112 } state;
113 } HASH_OBJECT;
5.8.4.5 ANY_OBJECT
This is the union for holding either a sequence object or a regular object.
114 typedef union
115 {
116 OBJECT entity;
117 HASH_OBJECT hash;
118 } ANY_OBJECT;
5.8.5 AUTH_DUP Types
These values are used in the authorization processing.
119 typedef UINT32 AUTH_ROLE;
120 #define AUTH_NONE ((AUTH_ROLE)(0))
121 #define AUTH_USER ((AUTH_ROLE)(1))
122 #define AUTH_ADMIN ((AUTH_ROLE)(2))
123 #define AUTH_DUP ((AUTH_ROLE)(3))
5.8.6 Active Session Context
5.8.6.1 Description
The structures in this section define the internal structure of a session context.
5.8.6.2 SESSION_ATTRIBUTES
The attributes in the SESSION_ATTRIBUTES structure track the various properties of the session. It
maintains most of the tracking state information for the policy session. It is used within the SESSION
structure.
124 typedef struct
125 {
126 unsigned isPolicy : 1; //1) SET if the session may only
127 // be used for policy
128 unsigned isAudit : 1; //2) SET if the session is used
129 // for audit
130 unsigned isBound : 1; //3) SET if the session is bound to
131 // with an entity.
132 // This attribute will be CLEAR if
133 // either isPolicy or isAudit is SET.
134 unsigned iscpHashDefined : 1;//4) SET if the cpHash has been defined
135 // This attribute is not SET unless
136 // 'isPolicy' is SET.
137 unsigned isAuthValueNeeded : 1;
138 //5) SET if the authValue is required
139 // for computing the session HMAC.
140 // This attribute is not SET unless
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141 // isPolicy is SET.
142 unsigned isPasswordNeeded : 1;
143 //6) SET if a password authValue is
144 // required for authorization
145 // This attribute is not SET unless
146 // isPolicy is SET.
147 unsigned isPPRequired : 1; //7) SET if physical presence is
148 // required to be asserted when the
149 // authorization is checked.
150 // This attribute is not SET unless
151 // isPolicy is SET.
152 unsigned isTrialPolicy : 1; //8) SET if the policy session is
153 // created for trial of the policy's
154 // policyHash generation.
155 // This attribute is not SET unless
156 // isPolicy is SET.
157 unsigned isDaBound : 1; //9) SET if the bind entity had noDA
158 // CLEAR. If this is SET, then an
159 // auth failure using this session
160 // will count against lockout even
161 // if the object being authorized is
162 // exempt from DA.
163 unsigned isLockoutBound : 1; //10)SET if the session is bound to
164 // lockoutAuth.
165 unsigned requestWasBound : 1;//11) SET if the session is being used
166 // with the bind entity. If SET
167 // the authValue will not be use
168 // in the response HMAC computation.
169 unsigned checkNvWritten : 1; //12) SET if the TPMA_NV_WRITTEN
170 // attribute needs to be checked
171 // when the policy is used for
172 // authorization for NV access.
173 // If this is SET for any other
174 // type, the policy will fail.
175 unsigned nvWrittenState : 1; //13) SET if TPMA_NV_WRITTEN is
176 // required to be SET.
177 } SESSION_ATTRIBUTES;
5.8.6.3 SESSION Structure
The SESSION structure contains all the context of a session except for the associated contextID.
NOTE: The contextID of a session is only relevant when the session context is stored off the TPM.
178 typedef struct
179 {
180 TPM_ALG_ID authHashAlg; // session hash algorithm
181 TPM2B_NONCE nonceTPM; // last TPM-generated nonce for
182 // this session
183
184 TPMT_SYM_DEF symmetric; // session symmetric algorithm (if any)
185 TPM2B_AUTH sessionKey; // session secret value used for
186 // generating HMAC and encryption keys
187
188 SESSION_ATTRIBUTES attributes; // session attributes
189 TPM_CC commandCode; // command code (policy session)
190 TPMA_LOCALITY commandLocality; // command locality (policy session)
191 UINT32 pcrCounter; // PCR counter value when PCR is
192 // included (policy session)
193 // If no PCR is included, this
194 // value is 0.
195
196 UINT64 startTime; // value of TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.clock when
197 // the session was started (policy
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198 // session)
199
200 UINT64 timeOut; // timeout relative to
201 // TPMS_CLOCK_INFO.clock
202 // There is no timeout if this value
203 // is 0.
204 union
205 {
206 TPM2B_NAME boundEntity; // value used to track the entity to
207 // which the session is bound
208
209 TPM2B_DIGEST cpHash; // the required cpHash value for the
210 // command being authorized
211
212 } u1; // 'boundEntity' and 'cpHash' may
213 // share the same space to save memory
214
215 union
216 {
217 TPM2B_DIGEST auditDigest; // audit session digest
218 TPM2B_DIGEST policyDigest; // policyHash
219
220 } u2; // audit log and policyHash may
221 // share space to save memory
222 } SESSION;
5.8.7 PCR
5.8.7.1 PCR_SAVE Structure
The PCR_SAVE structure type contains the PCR data that are saved across power cycles. Only the static
PCR are required to be saved across power cycles. The DRTM and resettable PCR are not saved. The
number of static and resettable PCR is determined by the platform-specific specification to which the TPM
is built.
223 typedef struct
224 {
225 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
226 BYTE sha1[NUM_STATIC_PCR][SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
227 #endif
228 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
229 BYTE sha256[NUM_STATIC_PCR][SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
230 #endif
231 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
232 BYTE sha384[NUM_STATIC_PCR][SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE];
233 #endif
234 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
235 BYTE sha512[NUM_STATIC_PCR][SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
236 #endif
237 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
238 BYTE sm3_256[NUM_STATIC_PCR][SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
239 #endif
240
241 // This counter increments whenever the PCR are updated.
242 // NOTE: A platform-specific specification may designate
243 // certain PCR changes as not causing this counter
244 // to increment.
245 UINT32 pcrCounter;
246
247 } PCR_SAVE;
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5.8.7.2 PCR_POLICY
This structure holds the PCR policies, one for each group of PCR controlled by policy.
248 typedef struct
249 {
250 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg[NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP];
251 TPM2B_DIGEST a;
252 TPM2B_DIGEST policy[NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP];
253 } PCR_POLICY;
5.8.7.3 PCR_AUTHVALUE
This structure holds the PCR policies, one for each group of PCR controlled by policy.
254 typedef struct
255 {
256 TPM2B_DIGEST auth[NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP];
257 } PCR_AUTHVALUE;
5.8.8 Startup
5.8.8.1 SHUTDOWN_NONE
Part 2 defines the two shutdown/startup types that may be used in TPM2_Shutdown() and
TPM2_Starup(). This additional define is used by the TPM to indicate that no shutdown was received.
NOTE: This is a reserved value.
258 #define SHUTDOWN_NONE (TPM_SU)(0xFFFF)
5.8.8.2 STARTUP_TYPE
This enumeration is the possible startup types. The type is determined by the combination of
TPM2_ShutDown() and TPM2_Startup().
259 typedef enum
260 {
261 SU_RESET,
262 SU_RESTART,
263 SU_RESUME
264 } STARTUP_TYPE;
5.8.9 NV
5.8.9.1 NV_RESERVE
This enumeration defines the master list of the elements of a reserved portion of NV. This list includes all
the pre-defined data that takes space in NV, either as persistent data or as state save data. The
enumerations are used as indexes into an array of offset values. The offset values then are used to index
into NV. This is method provides an imperfect analog to an actual NV implementation.
265 typedef enum
266 {
267 // Entries below mirror the PERSISTENT_DATA structure. These values are written
268 // to NV as individual items.
269 // hierarchy
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270 NV_DISABLE_CLEAR,
271 NV_OWNER_ALG,
272 NV_ENDORSEMENT_ALG,
273 NV_LOCKOUT_ALG,
274 NV_OWNER_POLICY,
275 NV_ENDORSEMENT_POLICY,
276 NV_LOCKOUT_POLICY,
277 NV_OWNER_AUTH,
278 NV_ENDORSEMENT_AUTH,
279 NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH,
280
281 NV_EP_SEED,
282 NV_SP_SEED,
283 NV_PP_SEED,
284
285 NV_PH_PROOF,
286 NV_SH_PROOF,
287 NV_EH_PROOF,
288
289 // Time
290 NV_TOTAL_RESET_COUNT,
291 NV_RESET_COUNT,
292
293 // PCR
294 NV_PCR_POLICIES,
295 NV_PCR_ALLOCATED,
296
297 // Physical Presence
298 NV_PP_LIST,
299
300 // Dictionary Attack
301 NV_FAILED_TRIES,
302 NV_MAX_TRIES,
303 NV_RECOVERY_TIME,
304 NV_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY,
305 NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED,
306
307 // Orderly State flag
308 NV_ORDERLY,
309
310 // Command Audit
311 NV_AUDIT_COMMANDS,
312 NV_AUDIT_HASH_ALG,
313 NV_AUDIT_COUNTER,
314
315 // Algorithm Set
316 NV_ALGORITHM_SET,
317
318 NV_FIRMWARE_V1,
319 NV_FIRMWARE_V2,
320
321 // The entries above are in PERSISTENT_DATA. The entries below represent
322 // structures that are read and written as a unit.
323
324 // ORDERLY_DATA data structure written on each orderly shutdown
325 NV_ORDERLY_DATA,
326
327 // STATE_CLEAR_DATA structure written on each Shutdown(STATE)
328 NV_STATE_CLEAR,
329
330 // STATE_RESET_DATA structure written on each Shutdown(STATE)
331 NV_STATE_RESET,
332
333 NV_RESERVE_LAST // end of NV reserved data list
334 } NV_RESERVE;
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5.8.9.2 NV_INDEX
The NV_INDEX structure defines the internal format for an NV index. The indexData size varies
according to the type of the index. In this implementation, all of the index is manipulated as a unit.
335 typedef struct
336 {
337 TPMS_NV_PUBLIC publicArea;
338 TPM2B_AUTH authValue;
339 } NV_INDEX;
5.8.10 COMMIT_INDEX_MASK
This is the define for the mask value that is used when manipulating the bits in the commit bit array. The
commit counter is a 64-bit value and the low order bits are used to index the commitArray. This mask
value is applied to the commit counter to extract the bit number in the array.
340 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
341 #define COMMIT_INDEX_MASK ((UINT16)((sizeof(gr.commitArray)*8)-1))
342 #endif
5.8.11 RAM Global Values
5.8.11.1 Description
The values in this section are only extant in RAM. They are defined here and instanced in Global.c.
5.8.11.2 g_rcIndex
This array is used to contain the array of values that are added to a return code when it is a parameter-,
handle-, or session-related error. This is an implementation choice and the same result can be achieved
by using a macro.
343 extern const UINT16 g_rcIndex[15];
5.8.11.3 g_exclusiveAuditSession
This location holds the session handle for the current exclusive audit session. If there is no exclusive
audit session, the location is set to TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED.
344 extern TPM_HANDLE g_exclusiveAuditSession;
5.8.11.4 g_time
This value is the count of milliseconds since the TPM was powered up. This value is initialized at
_TPM_Init().
345 extern UINT64 g_time;
5.8.11.5 g_phEnable
This is the platform hierarchy control and determines if the platform hierarchy is available. This value is
SET on each TPM2_Startup(). The default value is SET.
346 extern BOOL g_phEnable;
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5.8.11.6 g_pceReConfig
This value is SET if a TPM2_PCR_Allocate() command successfully executed since the last
TPM2_Startup(). If so, then the next shutdown is required to be Shutdown(CLEAR).
347 extern BOOL g_pcrReConfig;
5.8.11.7 g_DRTMHandle
This location indicates the sequence object handle that holds the DRTM sequence data. When not used,
it is set to TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED. A sequence DRTM sequence is started on either _TPM_Init() or
_TPM_Hash_Start().
348 extern TPMI_DH_OBJECT g_DRTMHandle;
5.8.11.8 g_DrtmPreStartup
This value indicates that an H-CRTM occurred after _TPM_Init() but before TPM2_Startup(). The define
for PRE_STARTUP_FLAG is used to add the g_DrtmPreStartup value to gp_orderlyState at shutdown.
This hack is to avoid adding another NV variable.
349 extern BOOL g_DrtmPreStartup;
350 #define PRE_STARTUP_FLAG 0x8000
5.8.11.9 g_StartupLocality3
This value indicates that a TPM2_Startup() occured at locality 3. Otherwise, it at locality 0. The define for
STARTUP_LOCALITY_3 is to indicate that the startup was not at locality 0. This hack is to avoid adding
another NV variable.
351 extern BOOL g_StartupLocality3;
352 #define STARTUP_LOCALITY_3 0x4000
5.8.11.10 g_updateNV
This flag indicates if NV should be updated at the end of a command. This flag is set to FALSE at the
beginning of each command in ExecuteCommand(). This flag is checked in ExecuteCommand() after the
detailed actions of a command complete. If the command execution was successful and this flag is SET,
any pending NV writes will be committed to NV.
353 extern BOOL g_updateNV;
5.8.11.11 g_clearOrderly
This flag indicates if the execution of a command should cause the orderly state to be cleared. This flag
is set to FALSE at the beginning of each command in ExecuteCommand() and is checked in
ExecuteCommand() after the detailed actions of a command complete but before the check of
g_updateNV. If this flag is TRUE, and the orderly state is not SHUTDOWN_NONE, then the orderly state
in NV memory will be changed to SHUTDOWN_NONE.
354 extern BOOL g_clearOrderly;
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5.8.11.12 g_prevOrderlyState
This location indicates how the TPM was shut down before the most recent TPM2_Startup(). This value,
along with the startup type, determines if the TPM should do a TPM Reset, TPM Restart, or TPM
Resume.
355 extern TPM_SU g_prevOrderlyState;
5.8.11.13 g_nvOk
This value indicates if the NV integrity check was successful or not. If not and the failure was severe, then
the TPM would have been put into failure mode after it had been re-manufactured. If the NV failure was in
the area where the state-save data is kept, then this variable will have a value of FALSE indicating that a
TPM2_Startup(CLEAR) is required.
356 extern BOOL g_nvOk;
5.8.11.14 g_platformUnique
This location contains the unique value(s) used to identify the TPM. It is loaded on every
_TPM2_Startup() The first value is used to seed the RNG. The second value is used as a vendor
authValue. The value used by the RNG would be the value derived from the chip unique value (such as
fused) with a dependency on the authorities of the code in the TPM boot path. The second would be
derived from the chip unique value with a dependency on the details of the code in the boot path. That is,
the first value depends on the various signers of the code and the second depends on what was signed.
The TPM vendor should not be able to know the first value but they are expected to know the second.
357 extern TPM2B_AUTH g_platformUniqueAuthorities; // Reserved for RNG
358 extern TPM2B_AUTH g_platformUniqueDetails; // referenced by VENDOR_PERMANENT
5.8.12 Persistent Global Values
5.8.12.1 Description
The values in this section are global values that are persistent across power events. The lifetime of the
values determines the structure in which the value is placed.
5.8.12.2 PERSISTENT_DATA
This structure holds the persistent values that only change as a consequence of a specific Protected
Capability and are not affected by TPM power events (TPM2_Startup() or TPM2_Shutdown().
359 typedef struct
360 {
361 //*********************************************************************************
362 // Hierarchy
363 //*********************************************************************************
364 // The values in this section are related to the hierarchies.
365
366 BOOL disableClear; // TRUE if TPM2_Clear() using
367 // lockoutAuth is disabled
368
369 // Hierarchy authPolicies
370 TPMI_ALG_HASH ownerAlg;
371 TPMI_ALG_HASH endorsementAlg;
372 TPMI_ALG_HASH lockoutAlg;
373 TPM2B_DIGEST ownerPolicy;
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374 TPM2B_DIGEST endorsementPolicy;
375 TPM2B_DIGEST lockoutPolicy;
376
377 // Hierarchy authValues
378 TPM2B_AUTH ownerAuth;
379 TPM2B_AUTH endorsementAuth;
380 TPM2B_AUTH lockoutAuth;
381
382 // Primary Seeds
383 TPM2B_SEED EPSeed;
384 TPM2B_SEED SPSeed;
385 TPM2B_SEED PPSeed;
386 // Note there is a nullSeed in the state_reset memory.
387
388 // Hierarchy proofs
389 TPM2B_AUTH phProof;
390 TPM2B_AUTH shProof;
391 TPM2B_AUTH ehProof;
392 // Note there is a nullProof in the state_reset memory.
393
394 //*********************************************************************************
395 // Reset Events
396 //*********************************************************************************
397 // A count that increments at each TPM reset and never get reset during the life
398 // time of TPM. The value of this counter is initialized to 1 during TPM
399 // manufacture process.
400 UINT64 totalResetCount;
401
402 // This counter increments on each TPM Reset. The counter is reset by
403 // TPM2_Clear().
404 UINT32 resetCount;
405
406 //*********************************************************************************
407 // PCR
408 //*********************************************************************************
409 // This structure hold the policies for those PCR that have an update policy.
410 // This implementation only supports a single group of PCR controlled by
411 // policy. If more are required, then this structure would be changed to
412 // an array.
413 PCR_POLICY pcrPolicies;
414
415 // This structure indicates the allocation of PCR. The structure contains a
416 // list of PCR allocations for each implemented algorithm. If no PCR are
417 // allocated for an algorithm, a list entry still exists but the bit map
418 // will contain no SET bits.
419 TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcrAllocated;
420
421 //*********************************************************************************
422 // Physical Presence
423 //*********************************************************************************
424 // The PP_LIST type contains a bit map of the commands that require physical
425 // to be asserted when the authorization is evaluated. Physical presence will be
426 // checked if the corresponding bit in the array is SET and if the authorization
427 // handle is TPM_RH_PLATFORM.
428 //
429 // These bits may be changed with TPM2_PP_Commands().
430 BYTE ppList[((TPM_CC_PP_LAST - TPM_CC_PP_FIRST + 1) + 7)/8];
431
432 //*********************************************************************************
433 // Dictionary attack values
434 //*********************************************************************************
435 // These values are used for dictionary attack tracking and control.
436 UINT32 failedTries; // the current count of unexpired
437 // authorization failures
438
439 UINT32 maxTries; // number of unexpired authorization
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440 // failures before the TPM is in
441 // lockout
442
443 UINT32 recoveryTime; // time between authorization failures
444 // before failedTries is decremented
445
446 UINT32 lockoutRecovery; // time that must expire between
447 // authorization failures associated
448 // with lockoutAuth
449
450 BOOL lockOutAuthEnabled; // TRUE if use of lockoutAuth is
451 // allowed
452
453 //*****************************************************************************
454 // Orderly State
455 //*****************************************************************************
456 // The orderly state for current cycle
457 TPM_SU orderlyState;
458
459 //*****************************************************************************
460 // Command audit values.
461 //*****************************************************************************
462 BYTE auditComands[((TPM_CC_LAST - TPM_CC_FIRST + 1) + 7) / 8];
463 TPMI_ALG_HASH auditHashAlg;
464 UINT64 auditCounter;
465
466 //*****************************************************************************
467 // Algorithm selection
468 //*****************************************************************************
469 //
470 // The 'algorithmSet' value indicates the collection of algorithms that are
471 // currently in used on the TPM. The interpretation of value is vendor dependent.
472 UINT32 algorithmSet;
473
474 //*****************************************************************************
475 // Firmware version
476 //*****************************************************************************
477 // The firmwareV1 and firmwareV2 values are instanced in TimeStamp.c. This is
478 // a scheme used in development to allow determination of the linker build time
479 // of the TPM. An actual implementation would implement these values in a way that
480 // is consistent with vendor needs. The values are maintained in RAM for simplified
481 // access with a master version in NV. These values are modified in a
482 // vendor-specific way.
483
484 // g_firmwareV1 contains the more significant 32-bits of the vendor version number.
485 // In the reference implementation, if this value is printed as a hex
486 // value, it will have the format of yyyymmdd
487 UINT32 firmwareV1;
488
489 // g_firmwareV1 contains the less significant 32-bits of the vendor version number.
490 // In the reference implementation, if this value is printed as a hex
491 // value, it will have the format of 00 hh mm ss
492 UINT32 firmwareV2;
493
494 } PERSISTENT_DATA;
495 extern PERSISTENT_DATA gp;
5.8.12.3 ORDERLY_DATA
The data in this structure is saved to NV on each TPM2_Shutdown().
496 typedef struct orderly_data
497 {
498
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499 //*****************************************************************************
500 // TIME
501 //*****************************************************************************
502
503 // Clock has two parts. One is the state save part and one is the NV part. The
504 // state save version is updated on each command. When the clock rolls over, the
505 // NV version is updated. When the TPM starts up, if the TPM was shutdown in and
506 // orderly way, then the sClock value is used to initialize the clock. If the
507 // TPM shutdown was not orderly, then the persistent value is used and the safe
508 // attribute is clear.
509
510 UINT64 clock; // The orderly version of clock
511 TPMI_YES_NO clockSafe; // Indicates if the clock value is
512 // safe.
513 //*********************************************************************************
514 // DRBG
515 //*********************************************************************************
516 #ifdef _DRBG_STATE_SAVE
517 // This is DRBG state data. This is saved each time the value of clock is
518 // updated.
519 DRBG_STATE drbgState;
520 #endif
521
522 } ORDERLY_DATA;
523 extern ORDERLY_DATA go;
5.8.12.4 STATE_CLEAR_DATA
This structure contains the data that is saved on Shutdown(STATE). and restored on Startup(STATE).
The values are set to their default settings on any Startup(Clear). In other words the data is only
persistent across TPM Resume.
If the comments associated with a parameter indicate a default reset value, the value is applied on each
Startup(CLEAR).
524 typedef struct state_clear_data
525 {
526 //*****************************************************************************
527 // Hierarchy Control
528 //*****************************************************************************
529 BOOL shEnable; // default reset is SET
530 BOOL ehEnable; // default reset is SET
531 BOOL phEnableNV; // default reset is SET
532 TPMI_ALG_HASH platformAlg; // default reset is TPM_ALG_NULL
533 TPM2B_DIGEST platformPolicy; // default reset is an Empty Buffer
534 TPM2B_AUTH platformAuth; // default reset is an Empty Buffer
535
536 //*****************************************************************************
537 // PCR
538 //*****************************************************************************
539 // The set of PCR to be saved on Shutdown(STATE)
540 PCR_SAVE pcrSave; // default reset is 0...0
541
542 // This structure hold the authorization values for those PCR that have an
543 // update authorization.
544 // This implementation only supports a single group of PCR controlled by
545 // authorization. If more are required, then this structure would be changed to
546 // an array.
547 PCR_AUTHVALUE pcrAuthValues;
548
549 } STATE_CLEAR_DATA;
550 extern STATE_CLEAR_DATA gc;
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5.8.12.5 State Reset Data
This structure contains data is that is saved on Shutdown(STATE) and restored on the subsequent
Startup(ANY). That is, the data is preserved across TPM Resume and TPM Restart.
If a default value is specified in the comments this value is applied on TPM Reset.
551 typedef struct state_reset_data
552 {
553 //*****************************************************************************
554 // Hierarchy Control
555 //*****************************************************************************
556 TPM2B_AUTH nullProof; // The proof value associated with
557 // the TPM_RH_NULL hierarchy. The
558 // default reset value is from the RNG.
559
560 TPM2B_SEED nullSeed; // The seed value for the TPM_RN_NULL
561 // hierarchy. The default reset value
562 // is from the RNG.
563
564 //*****************************************************************************
565 // Context
566 //*****************************************************************************
567 // The 'clearCount' counter is incremented each time the TPM successfully executes
568 // a TPM Resume. The counter is included in each saved context that has 'stClear'
569 // SET (including descendants of keys that have 'stClear' SET). This prevents these
570 // objects from being loaded after a TPM Resume.
571 // If 'clearCount' at its maximum value when the TPM receives a Shutdown(STATE),
572 // the TPM will return TPM_RC_RANGE and the TPM will only accept Shutdown(CLEAR).
573 UINT32 clearCount; // The default reset value is 0.
574
575 UINT64 objectContextID; // This is the context ID for a saved
576 // object context. The default reset
577 // value is 0.
578
579 CONTEXT_SLOT contextArray[MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS];
580 // This is the value from which the
581 // 'contextID' is derived. The
582 // default reset value is {0}.
583
584 CONTEXT_COUNTER contextCounter; // This array contains contains the
585 // values used to track the version
586 // numbers of saved contexts (see
587 // Session.c in for details). The
588 // default reset value is 0.
589
590 //*****************************************************************************
591 // Command Audit
592 //*****************************************************************************
593 // When an audited command completes, ExecuteCommand() checks the return
594 // value. If it is TPM_RC_SUCCESS, and the command is an audited command, the
595 // TPM will extend the cpHash and rpHash for the command to this value. If this
596 // digest was the Zero Digest before the cpHash was extended, the audit counter
597 // is incremented.
598
599 TPM2B_DIGEST commandAuditDigest; // This value is set to an Empty Digest
600 // by TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest() or a
601 // TPM Reset.
602
603 //*****************************************************************************
604 // Boot counter
605 //*****************************************************************************
606
607 UINT32 restartCount; // This counter counts TPM Restarts.
608 // The default reset value is 0.
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609
610 //*********************************************************************************
611 // PCR
612 //*********************************************************************************
613 // This counter increments whenever the PCR are updated. This counter is preserved
614 // across TPM Resume even though the PCR are not preserved. This is because
615 // sessions remain active across TPM Restart and the count value in the session
616 // is compared to this counter so this counter must have values that are unique
617 // as long as the sessions are active.
618 // NOTE: A platform-specific specification may designate that certain PCR changes
619 // do not increment this counter to increment.
620 UINT32 pcrCounter; // The default reset value is 0.
621
622 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
623
624 //*****************************************************************************
625 // ECDAA
626 //*****************************************************************************
627 UINT64 commitCounter; // This counter increments each time
628 // TPM2_Commit() returns
629 // TPM_RC_SUCCESS. The default reset
630 // value is 0.
631
632 TPM2B_NONCE commitNonce; // This random value is used to compute
633 // the commit values. The default reset
634 // value is from the RNG.
635
636 // This implementation relies on the number of bits in g_commitArray being a
637 // power of 2 (8, 16, 32, 64, etc.) and no greater than 64K.
638 BYTE commitArray[16]; // The default reset value is {0}.
639
640 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
641
642 } STATE_RESET_DATA;
643 extern STATE_RESET_DATA gr;
5.8.13 Global Macro Definitions
This macro is used to ensure that a handle, session, or parameter number is only added if the response
code is FMT1.
644 #define RcSafeAddToResult(r, v) \
645 ((r) + (((r) & RC_FMT1) ? (v) : 0))
This macro is used when a parameter is not otherwise referenced in a function. This macro is normally
not used by itself but is paired with a pAssert() within a #ifdef pAssert. If pAssert is not defined, then a
parameter might not otherwise be referenced. This macro uses the parameter from the perspective of the
compiler so it doesn't complain.
646 #define UNREFERENCED(a) ((void)(a))
5.8.14 Private data
647 #if defined SESSION_PROCESS_C || defined GLOBAL_C || defined MANUFACTURE_C
From SessionProcess.c
The following arrays are used to save command sessions information so that the command
handle/session buffer does not have to be preserved for the duration of the command. These arrays are
indexed by the session index in accordance with the order of sessions in the session area of the
command.
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Array of the authorization session handles
648 extern TPM_HANDLE s_sessionHandles[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
Array of authorization session attributes
649 extern TPMA_SESSION s_attributes[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
Array of handles authorized by the corresponding authorization sessions; and if none, then
TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED value is used
650 extern TPM_HANDLE s_associatedHandles[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
Array of nonces provided by the caller for the corresponding sessions
651 extern TPM2B_NONCE s_nonceCaller[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
Array of authorization values (HMAC's or passwords) for the corresponding sessions
652 extern TPM2B_AUTH s_inputAuthValues[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
Special value to indicate an undefined session index
653 #define UNDEFINED_INDEX (0xFFFF)
Index of the session used for encryption of a response parameter
654 extern UINT32 s_encryptSessionIndex;
Index of the session used for decryption of a command parameter
655 extern UINT32 s_decryptSessionIndex;
Index of a session used for audit
656 extern UINT32 s_auditSessionIndex;
The cpHash for an audit session
657 extern TPM2B_DIGEST s_cpHashForAudit;
The cpHash for command audit
658 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
659 extern TPM2B_DIGEST s_cpHashForCommandAudit;
660 #endif
Number of authorization sessions present in the command
661 extern UINT32 s_sessionNum;
Flag indicating if NV update is pending for the lockOutAuthEnabled or failedTries DA parameter
662 extern BOOL s_DAPendingOnNV;
663 #endif // SESSION_PROCESS_C
664 #if defined DA_C || defined GLOBAL_C || defined MANUFACTURE_C
From DA.c
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This variable holds the accumulated time since the last time that failedTries was decremented. This value
is in millisecond.
665 extern UINT64 s_selfHealTimer;
This variable holds the accumulated time that the lockoutAuth has been blocked.
666 extern UINT64 s_lockoutTimer;
667 #endif // DA_C
668 #if defined NV_C || defined GLOBAL_C
From NV.c
List of pre-defined address of reserved data
669 extern UINT32 s_reservedAddr[NV_RESERVE_LAST];
List of pre-defined reserved data size in byte
670 extern UINT32 s_reservedSize[NV_RESERVE_LAST];
Size of data in RAM index buffer
671 extern UINT32 s_ramIndexSize;
Reserved RAM space for frequently updated NV Index. The data layout in ram buffer is {NV_handle(),
size of data, data} for each NV index data stored in RAM
672 extern BYTE s_ramIndex[RAM_INDEX_SPACE];
Address of size of RAM index space in NV
673 extern UINT32 s_ramIndexSizeAddr;
Address of NV copy of RAM index space
674 extern UINT32 s_ramIndexAddr;
Address of maximum counter value; an auxiliary variable to implement NV counters
675 extern UINT32 s_maxCountAddr;
Beginning of NV dynamic area; starts right after the s_maxCountAddr and s_evictHandleMapAddr
variables
676 extern UINT32 s_evictNvStart;
Beginning of NV dynamic area; also the beginning of the predefined reserved data area.
677 extern UINT32 s_evictNvEnd;
NV availability is sampled as the start of each command and stored here so that its value remains
consistent during the command execution
678 extern TPM_RC s_NvStatus;
679 #endif
680 #if defined OBJECT_C || defined GLOBAL_C
From Object.c
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This type is the container for an object.
681 typedef struct
682 {
683 BOOL occupied;
684 ANY_OBJECT object;
685 } OBJECT_SLOT;
This is the memory that holds the loaded objects.
686 extern OBJECT_SLOT s_objects[MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS];
687 #endif // OBJECT_C
688 #if defined PCR_C || defined GLOBAL_C
From PCR.c
689 typedef struct
690 {
691 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
692 // SHA1 PCR
693 BYTE sha1Pcr[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
694 #endif
695 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
696 // SHA256 PCR
697 BYTE sha256Pcr[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
698 #endif
699 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
700 // SHA384 PCR
701 BYTE sha384Pcr[SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE];
702 #endif
703 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
704 // SHA512 PCR
705 BYTE sha512Pcr[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
706 #endif
707 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
708 // SHA256 PCR
709 BYTE sm3_256Pcr[SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE];
710 #endif
711 } PCR;
712 typedef struct
713 {
714 unsigned int stateSave : 1; // if the PCR value should be
715 // saved in state save
716 unsigned int resetLocality : 5; // The locality that the PCR
717 // can be reset
718 unsigned int extendLocality : 5; // The locality that the PCR
719 // can be extend
720 } PCR_Attributes;
721 extern PCR s_pcrs[IMPLEMENTATION_PCR];
722 #endif // PCR_C
723 #if defined SESSION_C || defined GLOBAL_C
From Session.c
Container for HMAC or policy session tracking information
724 typedef struct
725 {
726 BOOL occupied;
727 SESSION session; // session structure
728 } SESSION_SLOT;
729 extern SESSION_SLOT s_sessions[MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS];
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The index in conextArray that has the value of the oldest saved session context. When no context is
saved, this will have a value that is greater than or equal to MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS.
730 extern UINT32 s_oldestSavedSession;
The number of available session slot openings. When this is 1, a session can't be created or loaded if the
GAP is maxed out. The exception is that the oldest saved session context can always be loaded
(assuming that there is a space in memory to put it)
731 extern int s_freeSessionSlots;
732 #endif // SESSION_C
From Manufacture.c
733 extern BOOL g_manufactured;
734 #if defined POWER_C || defined GLOBAL_C
From Power.c
This value indicates if a TPM2_Startup() commands has been receive since the power on event. This
flag is maintained in power simulation module because this is the only place that may reliably set this flag
to FALSE.
735 extern BOOL s_initialized;
736 #endif // POWER_C
737 #if defined MEMORY_LIB_C || defined GLOBAL_C
The s_actionOutputBuffer should not be modifiable by the host system until the TPM has returned a
response code. The s_actionOutputBuffer should not be accessible until response parameter encryption,
if any, is complete.
738 extern UINT32 s_actionInputBuffer[1024]; // action input buffer
739 extern UINT32 s_actionOutputBuffer[1024]; // action output buffer
740 extern BYTE s_responseBuffer[MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE];// response buffer
741 #endif // MEMORY_LIB_C
From TPMFail.c
This value holds the address of the string containing the name of the function in which the failure
occurred. This address value isn't useful for anything other than helping the vendor to know in which file
the failure occurred.
742 extern jmp_buf g_jumpBuffer; // the jump buffer
743 extern BOOL g_inFailureMode; // Indicates that the TPM is in failure mode
744 extern BOOL g_forceFailureMode; // flag to force failure mode during test
745 #if defined TPM_FAIL_C || defined GLOBAL_C || 1
746 extern UINT32 s_failFunction;
747 extern UINT32 s_failLine; // the line in the file at which
748 // the error was signaled
749 extern UINT32 s_failCode; // the error code used
750 #endif // TPM_FAIL_C
751 #endif // GLOBAL_H
5.9 Tpm.h
Root header file for building any TPM.lib code
1 #ifndef _TPM_H_
2 #define _TPM_H_
3 #include "bool.h"
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4 #include "Implementation.h"
5 #include "TPM_Types.h"
6 #include "swap.h"
7 #endif // _TPM_H_
5.10 swap.h
1 #ifndef _SWAP_H
2 #define _SWAP_H
3 #include "Implementation.h"
4 #if NO_AUTO_ALIGN == YES || LITTLE_ENDIAN_TPM == YES
The aggregation macros for machines that do not allow unaligned access or for little-endian machines.
Aggregate bytes into an UINT
5 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT8(b) (UINT8)((b)[0])
6 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(b) (UINT16)( ((b)[0] << 8) \
7 + (b)[1])
8 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(b) (UINT32)( ((b)[0] << 24) \
9 + ((b)[1] << 16) \
10 + ((b)[2] << 8 ) \
11 + (b)[3])
12 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT64(b) (UINT64)( ((UINT64)(b)[0] << 56) \
13 + ((UINT64)(b)[1] << 48) \
14 + ((UINT64)(b)[2] << 40) \
15 + ((UINT64)(b)[3] << 32) \
16 + ((UINT64)(b)[4] << 24) \
17 + ((UINT64)(b)[5] << 16) \
18 + ((UINT64)(b)[6] << 8) \
19 + (UINT64)(b)[7])
Disaggregate a UINT into a byte array
20 #define UINT8_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) ((b)[0] = (BYTE)(i), i)
21 #define UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) ((b)[0] = (BYTE)((i) >> 8), \
22 (b)[1] = (BYTE) (i), \
23 (i))
24 #define UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) ((b)[0] = (BYTE)((i) >> 24), \
25 (b)[1] = (BYTE)((i) >> 16), \
26 (b)[2] = (BYTE)((i) >> 8), \
27 (b)[3] = (BYTE) (i), \
28 (i))
29 #define UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) ((b)[0] = (BYTE)((i) >> 56), \
30 (b)[1] = (BYTE)((i) >> 48), \
31 (b)[2] = (BYTE)((i) >> 40), \
32 (b)[3] = (BYTE)((i) >> 32), \
33 (b)[4] = (BYTE)((i) >> 24), \
34 (b)[5] = (BYTE)((i) >> 16), \
35 (b)[6] = (BYTE)((i) >> 8), \
36 (b)[7] = (BYTE) (i), \
37 (i))
38 #else
the big-endian macros for machines that allow unaligned memory access Aggregate a byte array into a
UINT
39 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT8(b) *((UINT8 *)(b))
40 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(b) *((UINT16 *)(b))
41 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(b) *((UINT32 *)(b))
42 #define BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT64(b) *((UINT64 *)(b))
Disaggregate a UINT into a byte array
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43 #define UINT8_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) (*((UINT8 *)(b)) = (i))
44 #define UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) (*((UINT16 *)(b)) = (i))
45 #define UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) (*((UINT32 *)(b)) = (i))
46 #define UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(i, b) (*((UINT64 *)(b)) = (i))
47 #endif // NO_AUTO_ALIGN == YES
48 #endif // _SWAP_H
5.11 InternalRoutines.h
1 #ifndef INTERNAL_ROUTINES_H
2 #define INTERNAL_ROUTINES_H
NULL definition
3 #ifndef NULL
4 #define NULL (0)
5 #endif
UNUSED_PARAMETER
6 #ifndef UNUSED_PARAMETER
7 #define UNUSED_PARAMETER(param) (void)(param);
8 #endif
Internal data definition
9 #include "Global.h"
10 #include "VendorString.h"
Error Reporting
11 #include "TpmError.h"
DRTM functions
12 #include "_TPM_Hash_Start_fp.h"
13 #include "_TPM_Hash_Data_fp.h"
14 #include "_TPM_Hash_End_fp.h"
Internal subsystem functions
15 #include "Object_fp.h"
16 #include "Entity_fp.h"
17 #include "Session_fp.h"
18 #include "Hierarchy_fp.h"
19 #include "NV_fp.h"
20 #include "PCR_fp.h"
21 #include "DA_fp.h"
22 #include "TpmFail_fp.h"
Internal support functions
23 #include "CommandCodeAttributes_fp.h"
24 #include "MemoryLib_fp.h"
25 #include "marshal_fp.h"
26 #include "Time_fp.h"
27 #include "Locality_fp.h"
28 #include "PP_fp.h"
29 #include "CommandAudit_fp.h"
30 #include "Manufacture_fp.h"
31 #include "Power_fp.h"
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32 #include "Handle_fp.h"
33 #include "Commands_fp.h"
34 #include "AlgorithmCap_fp.h"
35 #include "PropertyCap_fp.h"
36 #include "Bits_fp.h"
Internal crypto functions
37 #include "Ticket_fp.h"
38 #include "CryptUtil_fp.h"
39 #include "CryptSelfTest_fp.h"
40 #endif
5.12 TpmBuildSwitches.h
This file contains the build switches. This contains switches for multiple versions of the crypto-library so
some may not apply to your environment.
1 #ifndef _TPM_BUILD_SWITCHES_H
2 #define _TPM_BUILD_SWITCHES_H
3 #define SIMULATION
4 #define FIPS_COMPLIANT
Define the alignment macro appropriate for the build environment For MS C compiler
5 #define ALIGN_TO(boundary) __declspec(align(boundary))
For ISO 9899:2011
6 // #define ALIGN_TO(boundary) _Alignas(boundary)
This switch enables the RNG state save and restore
7 #undef _DRBG_STATE_SAVE
8 #define _DRBG_STATE_SAVE // Comment this out if no state save is wanted
Set the alignment size for the crypto. It would be nice to set this according to macros automatically
defined by the build environment, but that doesn't seem possible because there isn't any simple set for
that. So, this is just a plugged value. Your compiler should complain if this alignment isn't possible.
NOTE: this value can be set at the command line or just plugged in here.
9 #ifdef CRYPTO_ALIGN_16
10 # define CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT 16
11 #elif defined CRYPTO_ALIGN_8
12 # define CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT 8
13 #eliF defined CRYPTO_ALIGN_2
14 # define CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT 2
15 #elif defined CRTYPO_ALIGN_1
16 # define CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT 1
17 #else
18 # define CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT 4 // For 32-bit builds
19 #endif
20 #define CRYPTO_ALIGNED ALIGN_TO(CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT)
This macro is used to handle LIB_EXPORT of function and variable names in lieu of a .def file
21 #define LIB_EXPORT __declspec(dllexport)
22 // #define LIB_EXPORT
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For import of a variable
23 #define LIB_IMPORT __declspec(dllimport)
24 //#define LIB_IMPORT
This is defined to indicate a function that does not return. This is used in static code anlaysis.
25 #define _No_Return_ __declspec(noreturn)
26 //#define _No_Return_
27 #ifdef SELF_TEST
28 #pragma comment(lib, "algorithmtests.lib")
29 #endif
The switches in this group can only be enabled when running a simulation
30 #ifdef SIMULATION
31 # define RSA_KEY_CACHE
32 # define TPM_RNG_FOR_DEBUG
33 #else
34 # undef RSA_KEY_CACHE
35 # undef TPM_RNG_FOR_DEBUG
36 #endif // SIMULATION
37 #define INLINE __inline
38 #endif // _TPM_BUILD_SWITCHES_H
5.13 VendorString.h
1 #ifndef _VENDOR_STRING_H
2 #define _VENDOR_STRING_H
Define up to 4-byte values for MANUFACTURER. This value defines the response for
TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER in TPM2_GetCapability(). The following line should be un-commented and a
vendor specific string should be provided here.
3 #define MANUFACTURER "MSFT"
The following #if macro may be deleted after a proper MANUFACTURER is provided.
4 #ifndef MANUFACTURER
5 #error MANUFACTURER is not provided. \
6 Please modify include\VendorString.h to provide a specific \
7 manufacturer name.
8 #endif
Define up to 4, 4-byte values. The values must each be 4 bytes long and the last value used may contain
trailing zeros. These values define the response for TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_(1-4) in
TPM2_GetCapability(). The following line should be un-commented and a vendor specific string should
be provided here. The vendor strings 2-4 may also be defined as appropriately.
9 #define VENDOR_STRING_1 "xCG "
10 #define VENDOR_STRING_2 "fTPM"
11 // #define VENDOR_STRING_3
12 // #define VENDOR_STRING_4
The following #if macro may be deleted after a proper VENDOR_STRING_1 is provided.
13 #ifndef VENDOR_STRING_1
14 #error VENDOR_STRING_1 is not provided. \
15 Please modify include\VendorString.h to provide a vednor specific \
16 string.
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17 #endif
the more significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value indicating the version of the firmware The following
line should be un-commented and a vendor specific firmware V1 should be provided here. The
FIRMWARE_V2 may also be defined as appropriate.
18 #define FIRMWARE_V1 (0x20140504)
the less significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value indicating the version of the firmware
19 #define FIRMWARE_V2 (0x00200136)
The following #if macro may be deleted after a proper FIRMWARE_V1 is provided.
20 #ifndef FIRMWARE_V1
21 #error FIRMWARE_V1 is not provided. \
22 Please modify include\VendorString.h to provide a vendor specific firmware \
23 version
24 #endif
25 #endif
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6 Main
6.1 CommandDispatcher.h
In the reference implementation, a program that uses TPM 2.0 Part 3 as input automatically generates
the command dispatch code. The function prototype header file (CommandDispatcher_fp.h) is shown
here.
CommandDispatcher() performs the following operations:
 unmarshals command parameters from the input buffer;
 invokes the function that performs the command actions;
 marshals the returned handles, if any; and
 marshals the returned parameters, if any, into the output buffer putting in the parameterSize field if
authorization sessions are present.
1 #ifndef _COMMANDDISPATCHER_FP_H_
2 #define _COMMANDDISPATCHER_FP_H_
3 TPM_RC
4 CommandDispatcher(
5 TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG tag, // IN: Input command tag
6 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: Command code
7 INT32 *parmBufferSize, // IN: size of parameter buffer
8 BYTE *parmBufferStart, // IN: pointer to start of parameter buffer
9 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // IN: handle array
10 UINT32 *responseHandleSize,// OUT: size of handle buffer in response
11 UINT32 *respParmSize // OUT: size of parameter buffer in response
12 );
13 #endif // _COMMANDDISPATCHER_FP_H_
6.2 ExecCommand.c
6.2.1 Introduction
This file contains the entry function ExecuteCommand() which provides the main control flow for TPM
command execution.
6.2.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "HandleProcess_fp.h"
3 #include "SessionProcess_fp.h"
4 #include "CommandDispatcher_fp.h"
Uncomment this next #include if doing static command/response buffer sizing
5 // #include "CommandResponseSizes_fp.h"
6.2.3 ExecuteCommand()
The function performs the following steps.
a) Parses the command header from input buffer.
b) Calls ParseHandleBuffer() to parse the handle area of the command.
c) Validates that each of the handles references a loaded entity.
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d) Calls ParseSessionBuffer() () to:
1) unmarshal and parse the session area;
2) check the authorizations; and
3) when necessary, decrypt a parameter.
e) Calls CommandDispatcher() to:
1) unmarshal the command parameters from the command buffer;
2) call the routine that performs the command actions; and
3) marshal the responses into the response buffer.
f) If any error occurs in any of the steps above create the error response and return.
g) Calls BuildResponseSession() to:
1) when necessary, encrypt a parameter
2) build the response authorization sessions
3) update the audit sessions and nonces
h) Assembles handle, parameter and session buffers for response and return.
6 LIB_EXPORT void
7 ExecuteCommand(
8 unsigned int requestSize, // IN: command buffer size
9 unsigned char *request, // IN: command buffer
10 unsigned int *responseSize, // OUT: response buffer size
11 unsigned char **response // OUT: response buffer
12 )
13 {
14 // Command local variables
15 TPM_ST tag; // these first three variables are the
16 UINT32 commandSize;
17 TPM_CC commandCode = 0;
18
19 BYTE *parmBufferStart; // pointer to the first byte of an
20 // optional parameter buffer
21
22 UINT32 parmBufferSize = 0;// number of bytes in parameter area
23
24 UINT32 handleNum = 0; // number of handles unmarshaled into
25 // the handles array
26
27 TPM_HANDLE handles[MAX_HANDLE_NUM];// array to hold handles in the
28 // command. Only handles in the handle
29 // area are stored here, not handles
30 // passed as parameters.
31
32 // Response local variables
33 TPM_RC result; // return code for the command
34
35 TPM_ST resTag; // tag for the response
36
37 UINT32 resHandleSize = 0; // size of the handle area in the
38 // response. This is needed so that the
39 // handle area can be skipped when
40 // generating the rpHash.
41
42 UINT32 resParmSize = 0; // the size of the response parameters
43 // These values go in the rpHash.
44
45 UINT32 resAuthSize = 0; // size of authorization area in the
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46 // response
47
48 INT32 size; // remaining data to be unmarshaled
49 // or remaining space in the marshaling
50 // buffer
51
52 BYTE *buffer; // pointer into the buffer being used
53 // for marshaling or unmarshaling
54
55 UINT32 i; // local temp
56
57 // This next function call is used in development to size the command and response
58 // buffers. The values printed are the sizes of the internal structures and
59 // not the sizes of the canonical forms of the command response structures. Also,
60 // the sizes do not include the tag, commandCode, requestSize, or the authorization
61 // fields.
62 //CommandResponseSizes();
63
64 // Set flags for NV access state. This should happen before any other
65 // operation that may require a NV write. Note, that this needs to be done
66 // even when in failure mode. Otherwise, g_updateNV would stay SET while in
67 // Failure mode and the NB would be written on each call.
68 g_updateNV = FALSE;
69 g_clearOrderly = FALSE;
70
71 // As of Sept 25, 2013, the failure mode handling has been incorporated in the
72 // reference code. This implementation requires that the system support
73 // setjmp/longjmp. This code is put here because of the complexity being
74 // added to the platform and simulator code to deal with all the variations
75 // of errors.
76 if(g_inFailureMode)
77 {
78 // Do failure mode processing
79 TpmFailureMode (requestSize, request, responseSize, response);
80 return;
81 }
82 if(setjmp(g_jumpBuffer) != 0)
83 {
84 // Get here if we got a longjump putting us into failure mode
85 g_inFailureMode = TRUE;
86 result = TPM_RC_FAILURE;
87 goto Fail;
88 }
89
90 // Assume that everything is going to work.
91 result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
92
93 // Query platform to get the NV state. The result state is saved internally
94 // and will be reported by NvIsAvailable(). The reference code requires that
95 // accessibility of NV does not change during the execution of a command.
96 // Specifically, if NV is available when the command execution starts and then
97 // is not available later when it is necessary to write to NV, then the TPM
98 // will go into failure mode.
99 NvCheckState();
100
101 // Due to the limitations of the simulation, TPM clock must be explicitly
102 // synchronized with the system clock whenever a command is received.
103 // This function call is not necessary in a hardware TPM. However, taking
104 // a snapshot of the hardware timer at the beginning of the command allows
105 // the time value to be consistent for the duration of the command execution.
106 TimeUpdateToCurrent();
107
108 // Any command through this function will unceremoniously end the
109 // _TPM_Hash_Data/_TPM_Hash_End sequence.
110 if(g_DRTMHandle != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
111 ObjectTerminateEvent();
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112
113 // Get command buffer size and command buffer.
114 size = requestSize;
115 buffer = request;
116
117 // Parse command header: tag, commandSize and commandCode.
118 // First parse the tag. The unmarshaling routine will validate
119 // that it is either TPM_ST_SESSIONS or TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
120 result = TPMI_ST_COMMAND_TAG_Unmarshal(&tag, &buffer, &size);
121 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
122 goto Cleanup;
123
124 // Unmarshal the commandSize indicator.
125 result = UINT32_Unmarshal(&commandSize, &buffer, &size);
126 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
127 goto Cleanup;
128
129 // On a TPM that receives bytes on a port, the number of bytes that were
130 // received on that port is requestSize it must be identical to commandSize.
131 // In addition, commandSize must not be larger than MAX_COMMAND_SIZE allowed
132 // by the implementation. The check against MAX_COMMAND_SIZE may be redundant
133 // as the input processing (the function that receives the command bytes and
134 // places them in the input buffer) would likely have the input truncated when
135 // it reaches MAX_COMMAND_SIZE, and requestSize would not equal commandSize.
136 if(commandSize != requestSize || commandSize > MAX_COMMAND_SIZE)
137 {
138 result = TPM_RC_COMMAND_SIZE;
139 goto Cleanup;
140 }
141
142 // Unmarshal the command code.
143 result = TPM_CC_Unmarshal(&commandCode, &buffer, &size);
144 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
145 goto Cleanup;
146
147 // Check to see if the command is implemented.
148 if(!CommandIsImplemented(commandCode))
149 {
150 result = TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE;
151 goto Cleanup;
152 }
153
154 #if FIELD_UPGRADE_IMPLEMENTED == YES
155 // If the TPM is in FUM, then the only allowed command is
156 // TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData.
157 if(IsFieldUgradeMode() && (commandCode != TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData))
158 {
159 result = TPM_RC_UPGRADE;
160 goto Cleanup;
161 }
162 else
163 #endif
164 // Excepting FUM, the TPM only accepts TPM2_Startup() after
165 // _TPM_Init. After getting a TPM2_Startup(), TPM2_Startup()
166 // is no longer allowed.
167 if(( !TPMIsStarted() && commandCode != TPM_CC_Startup)
168 || (TPMIsStarted() && commandCode == TPM_CC_Startup))
169 {
170 result = TPM_RC_INITIALIZE;
171 goto Cleanup;
172 }
173
174 // Start regular command process.
175 // Parse Handle buffer.
176 result = ParseHandleBuffer(commandCode, &buffer, &size, handles, &handleNum);
177 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
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178 goto Cleanup;
179
180 // Number of handles retrieved from handle area should be less than
181 // MAX_HANDLE_NUM.
182 pAssert(handleNum <= MAX_HANDLE_NUM);
183
184 // All handles in the handle area are required to reference TPM-resident
185 // entities.
186 for(i = 0; i < handleNum; i++)
187 {
188 result = EntityGetLoadStatus(&handles[i], commandCode);
189 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
190 {
191 if(result == TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0)
192 result = result + i;
193 else
194 result = RcSafeAddToResult(result, TPM_RC_H + g_rcIndex[i]);
195 goto Cleanup;
196 }
197 }
198
199 // Authorization session handling for the command.
200 if(tag == TPM_ST_SESSIONS)
201 {
202 BYTE *sessionBufferStart;// address of the session area first byte
203 // in the input buffer
204
205 UINT32 authorizationSize; // number of bytes in the session area
206
207 // Find out session buffer size.
208 result = UINT32_Unmarshal(&authorizationSize, &buffer, &size);
209 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
210 goto Cleanup;
211
212 // Perform sanity check on the unmarshaled value. If it is smaller than
213 // the smallest possible session or larger than the remaining size of
214 // the command, then it is an error. NOTE: This check could pass but the
215 // session size could still be wrong. That will be determined after the
216 // sessions are unmarshaled.
217 if( authorizationSize < 9
218 || authorizationSize > (UINT32) size)
219 {
220 result = TPM_RC_SIZE;
221 goto Cleanup;
222 }
223
224 // The sessions, if any, follows authorizationSize.
225 sessionBufferStart = buffer;
226
227 // The parameters follow the session area.
228 parmBufferStart = sessionBufferStart + authorizationSize;
229
230 // Any data left over after removing the authorization sessions is
231 // parameter data. If the command does not have parameters, then an
232 // error will be returned if the remaining size is not zero. This is
233 // checked later.
234 parmBufferSize = size - authorizationSize;
235
236 // The actions of ParseSessionBuffer() are described in the introduction.
237 result = ParseSessionBuffer(commandCode,
238 handleNum,
239 handles,
240 sessionBufferStart,
241 authorizationSize,
242 parmBufferStart,
243 parmBufferSize);
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244 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
245 goto Cleanup;
246 }
247 else
248 {
249 // Whatever remains in the input buffer is used for the parameters of the
250 // command.
251 parmBufferStart = buffer;
252 parmBufferSize = size;
253
254 // The command has no authorization sessions.
255 // If the command requires authorizations, then CheckAuthNoSession() will
256 // return an error.
257 result = CheckAuthNoSession(commandCode, handleNum, handles,
258 parmBufferStart, parmBufferSize);
259 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
260 goto Cleanup;
261 }
262
263 // CommandDispatcher returns a response handle buffer and a response parameter
264 // buffer if it succeeds. It will also set the parameterSize field in the
265 // buffer if the tag is TPM_RC_SESSIONS.
266 result = CommandDispatcher(tag,
267 commandCode,
268 (INT32 *) &parmBufferSize,
269 parmBufferStart,
270 handles,
271 &resHandleSize,
272 &resParmSize);
273 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
274 goto Cleanup;
275
276 // Build the session area at the end of the parameter area.
277 BuildResponseSession(tag,
278 commandCode,
279 resHandleSize,
280 resParmSize,
281 &resAuthSize);
282
283 Cleanup:
284 // This implementation loads an "evict" object to a transient object slot in
285 // RAM whenever an "evict" object handle is used in a command so that the
286 // access to any object is the same. These temporary objects need to be
287 // cleared from RAM whether the command succeeds or fails.
288 ObjectCleanupEvict();
289
290 Fail:
291 // The response will contain at least a response header.
292 *responseSize = sizeof(TPM_ST) + sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_RC);
293
294 // If the command completed successfully, then build the rest of the response.
295 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
296 {
297 // Outgoing tag will be the same as the incoming tag.
298 resTag = tag;
299 // The overall response will include the handles, parameters,
300 // and authorizations.
301 *responseSize += resHandleSize + resParmSize + resAuthSize;
302
303 // Adding parameter size field.
304 if(tag == TPM_ST_SESSIONS)
305 *responseSize += sizeof(UINT32);
306
307 if( g_clearOrderly == TRUE
308 && gp.orderlyState != SHUTDOWN_NONE)
309 {
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310 gp.orderlyState = SHUTDOWN_NONE;
311 NvWriteReserved(NV_ORDERLY, &gp.orderlyState);
312 g_updateNV = TRUE;
313 }
314 }
315 else
316 {
317 // The command failed.
318 // If this was a failure due to a bad command tag, then need to return
319 // a TPM 1.2 compatible response
320 if(result == TPM_RC_BAD_TAG)
321 resTag = TPM_ST_RSP_COMMAND;
322 else
323 // return 2.0 compatible response
324 resTag = TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS;
325 }
326 // Try to commit all the writes to NV if any NV write happened during this
327 // command execution. This check should be made for both succeeded and failed
328 // commands, because a failed one may trigger a NV write in DA logic as well.
329 // This is the only place in the command execution path that may call the NV
330 // commit. If the NV commit fails, the TPM should be put in failure mode.
331 if(g_updateNV && !g_inFailureMode)
332 {
333 g_updateNV = FALSE;
334 if(!NvCommit())
335 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
336 }
337
338 // Marshal the response header.
339 buffer = MemoryGetResponseBuffer(commandCode);
340 TPM_ST_Marshal(&resTag, &buffer, NULL);
341 UINT32_Marshal((UINT32 *)responseSize, &buffer, NULL);
342 pAssert(*responseSize <= MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE);
343 TPM_RC_Marshal(&result, &buffer, NULL);
344
345 *response = MemoryGetResponseBuffer(commandCode);
346
347 // Clear unused bit in response buffer.
348 MemorySet(*response + *responseSize, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - *responseSize);
349
350 return;
351 }
6.3 ParseHandleBuffer.h
In the reference implementation, the routine for unmarshaling the command handles is automatically
generated from TPM 2.0 Part 3 command tables. The prototype header file (HandleProcess_fp.h) is
shown here.
1 #ifndef _HANDLEPROCESS_FP_H_
2 #define _HANDLEPROCESS_FP_H_
3 TPM_RC
4 ParseHandleBuffer(
5 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: Command being processed
6 BYTE **handleBufferStart, // IN/OUT: command buffer where handles
7 // are located. Updated as handles
8 // are unmarshaled
9 INT32 *bufferRemainingSize, // IN/OUT: indicates the amount of data
10 // left in the command buffer.
11 // Updated as handles are unmarshaled
12 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // OUT: Array that receives the handles
13 UINT32 *handleCount // OUT: Receives the count of handles
14 );
15 #endif // _HANDLEPROCESS_FP_H_
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6.4 SessionProcess.c
6.4.1 Introduction
This file contains the subsystem that process the authorization sessions including implementation of the
Dictionary Attack logic. ExecCommand() uses ParseSessionBuffer() to process the authorization session
area of a command and BuildResponseSession() to create the authorization session area of a response.
6.4.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define SESSION_PROCESS_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include "SessionProcess_fp.h"
4 #include "Platform.h"
6.4.3 Authorization Support Functions
6.4.3.1 IsDAExempted()
This function indicates if a handle is exempted from DA logic. A handle is exempted if it is
a) a primary seed handle,
b) an object with noDA bit SET,
c) an NV Index with TPMA_NV_NO_DA bit SET, or
d) a PCR handle.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE handle is exempted from DA logic
FALSE handle is not exempted from DA logic
5 BOOL
6 IsDAExempted(
7 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: entity handle
8 )
9 {
10 BOOL result = FALSE;
11
12 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
13 {
14 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
15 // All permanent handles, other than TPM_RH_LOCKOUT, are exempt from
16 // DA protection.
17 result = (handle != TPM_RH_LOCKOUT);
18 break;
19
20 // When this function is called, a persistent object will have been loaded
21 // into an object slot and assigned a transient handle.
22 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
23 {
24 OBJECT *object;
25 object = ObjectGet(handle);
26 result = (object->publicArea.objectAttributes.noDA == SET);
27 break;
28 }
29 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
30 {
31 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
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32 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
33 result = (nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_NO_DA == SET);
34 break;
35 }
36 case TPM_HT_PCR:
37 // PCRs are always exempted from DA.
38 result = TRUE;
39 break;
40 default:
41 break;
42 }
43 return result;
44 }
6.4.3.2 IncrementLockout()
This function is called after an authorization failure that involves use of an authValue. If the entity
referenced by the handle is not exempt from DA protection, then the failedTries counter will be
incremented.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL authorization failure that caused DA lockout to increment
TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH authorization failure did not cause DA lockout to increment
45 static TPM_RC
46 IncrementLockout(
47 UINT32 sessionIndex
48 )
49 {
50 TPM_HANDLE handle = s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex];
51 TPM_HANDLE sessionHandle = s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex];
52 TPM_RC result;
53 SESSION *session = NULL;
54
55 // Don't increment lockout unless the handle associated with the session
56 // is DA protected or the session is bound to a DA protected entity.
57 if(sessionHandle == TPM_RS_PW)
58 {
59 if(IsDAExempted(handle))
60 return TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH;
61
62 }
63 else
64 {
65 session = SessionGet(sessionHandle);
66 // If the session is bound to lockout, then use that as the relevant
67 // handle. This means that an auth failure with a bound session
68 // bound to lockoutAuth will take precedence over any other
69 // lockout check
70 if(session->attributes.isLockoutBound == SET)
71 handle = TPM_RH_LOCKOUT;
72
73 if( session->attributes.isDaBound == CLEAR
74 && IsDAExempted(handle)
75 )
76 // If the handle was changed to TPM_RH_LOCKOUT, this will not return
77 // TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH
78 return TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH;
79
80 }
81
82 if(handle == TPM_RH_LOCKOUT)
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83 {
84 pAssert(gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
85 gp.lockOutAuthEnabled = FALSE;
86 // For TPM_RH_LOCKOUT, if lockoutRecovery is 0, no need to update NV since
87 // the lockout auth will be reset at startup.
88 if(gp.lockoutRecovery != 0)
89 {
90 result = NvIsAvailable();
91 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
92 {
93 // No NV access for now. Put the TPM in pending mode.
94 s_DAPendingOnNV = TRUE;
95 }
96 else
97 {
98 // Update NV.
99 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED, &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
100 g_updateNV = TRUE;
101 }
102 }
103 }
104 else
105 {
106 if(gp.recoveryTime != 0)
107 {
108 gp.failedTries++;
109 result = NvIsAvailable();
110 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
111 {
112 // No NV access for now. Put the TPM in pending mode.
113 s_DAPendingOnNV = TRUE;
114 }
115 else
116 {
117 // Record changes to NV.
118 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
119 g_updateNV = TRUE;
120 }
121 }
122 }
123
124 // Register a DA failure and reset the timers.
125 DARegisterFailure(handle);
126
127 return TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL;
128 }
6.4.3.3 IsSessionBindEntity()
This function indicates if the entity associated with the handle is the entity, to which this session is bound.
The binding would occur by making the bind parameter in TPM2_StartAuthSession() not equal to
TPM_RH_NULL. The binding only occurs if the session is an HMAC session. The bind value is a
combination of the Name and the authValue of the entity.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE handle points to the session start entity
FALSE handle does not point to the session start entity
129 static BOOL
130 IsSessionBindEntity(
131 TPM_HANDLE associatedHandle, // IN: handle to be authorized
132 SESSION *session // IN: associated session
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133 )
134 {
135 TPM2B_NAME entity; // The bind value for the entity
136
137 // If the session is not bound, return FALSE.
138 if(!session->attributes.isBound)
139 return FALSE;
140
141 // Compute the bind value for the entity.
142 SessionComputeBoundEntity(associatedHandle, &entity);
143
144 // Compare to the bind value in the session.
145 session->attributes.requestWasBound =
146 Memory2BEqual(&entity.b, &session->u1.boundEntity.b);
147 return session->attributes.requestWasBound;
148 }
6.4.3.4 IsPolicySessionRequired()
Checks if a policy session is required for a command. If a command requires DUP or ADMIN role
authorization, then the handle that requires that role is the first handle in the command. This simplifies
this checking. If a new command is created that requires multiple ADMIN role authorizations, then it will
have to be special-cased in this function. A policy session is required if:
a) the command requires the DUP role,
b) the command requires the ADMIN role and the authorized entity is an object and its adminWithPolicy
bit is SET, or
c) the command requires the ADMIN role and the authorized entity is a permanent handle or an NV
Index.
d) The authorized entity is a PCR belonging to a policy group, and has its policy initialized
Return Value Meaning
TRUE policy session is required
FALSE policy session is not required
149 static BOOL
150 IsPolicySessionRequired(
151 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
152 UINT32 sessionIndex // IN: session index
153 )
154 {
155 AUTH_ROLE role = CommandAuthRole(commandCode, sessionIndex);
156 TPM_HT type = HandleGetType(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex]);
157
158 if(role == AUTH_DUP)
159 return TRUE;
160
161 if(role == AUTH_ADMIN)
162 {
163 if(type == TPM_HT_TRANSIENT)
164 {
165 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex]);
166
167 if(object->publicArea.objectAttributes.adminWithPolicy == CLEAR)
168 return FALSE;
169 }
170 return TRUE;
171 }
172
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173 if(type == TPM_HT_PCR)
174 {
175 if(PCRPolicyIsAvailable(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex]))
176 {
177 TPM2B_DIGEST policy;
178 TPMI_ALG_HASH policyAlg;
179 policyAlg = PCRGetAuthPolicy(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex],
180 &policy);
181 if(policyAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL)
182 return TRUE;
183 }
184 }
185 return FALSE;
186 }
6.4.3.5 IsAuthValueAvailable()
This function indicates if authValue is available and allowed for USER role authorization of an entity.
This function is similar to IsAuthPolicyAvailable() except that it does not check the size of the authValue
as IsAuthPolicyAvailable() does (a null authValue is a valid auth, but a null policy is not a valid policy).
This function does not check that the handle reference is valid or if the entity is in an enabled hierarchy.
Those checks are assumed to have been performed during the handle unmarshaling.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE authValue is available
FALSE authValue is not available
187 static BOOL
188 IsAuthValueAvailable(
189 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: handle of entity
190 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
191 UINT32 sessionIndex // IN: session index
192 )
193 {
194 BOOL result = FALSE;
195 // If a policy session is required, the entity can not be authorized by
196 // authValue. However, at this point, the policy session requirement should
197 // already have been checked.
198 pAssert(!IsPolicySessionRequired(commandCode, sessionIndex));
199
200 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
201 {
202 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
203 switch(handle)
204 {
205 // At this point hierarchy availability has already been
206 // checked so primary seed handles are always available here
207 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
208 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
209 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
210 #ifdef VENDOR_PERMANENT
211 // This vendor defined handle associated with the
212 // manufacturer's shared secret
213 case VENDOR_PERMANENT:
214 #endif
215 // NullAuth is always available.
216 case TPM_RH_NULL:
217 // At the point when authValue availability is checked, control
218 // path has already passed the DA check so LockOut auth is
219 // always available here
220 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
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221
222 result = TRUE;
223 break;
224 default:
225 // Otherwise authValue is not available.
226 break;
227 }
228 break;
229 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
230 // A persistent object has already been loaded and the internal
231 // handle changed.
232 {
233 OBJECT *object;
234 object = ObjectGet(handle);
235
236 // authValue is always available for a sequence object.
237 if(ObjectIsSequence(object))
238 {
239 result = TRUE;
240 break;
241 }
242 // authValue is available for an object if it has its sensitive
243 // portion loaded and
244 // 1. userWithAuth bit is SET, or
245 // 2. ADMIN role is required
246 if( object->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR
247 && (object->publicArea.objectAttributes.userWithAuth == SET
248 || (CommandAuthRole(commandCode, sessionIndex) == AUTH_ADMIN
249 && object->publicArea.objectAttributes.adminWithPolicy
250 == CLEAR)))
251 result = TRUE;
252 }
253 break;
254 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
255 // NV Index.
256 {
257 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
258 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
259 if(IsWriteOperation(commandCode))
260 {
261 if (nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_AUTHWRITE == SET)
262 result = TRUE;
263
264 }
265 else
266 {
267 if (nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD == SET)
268 result = TRUE;
269 }
270 }
271 break;
272 case TPM_HT_PCR:
273 // PCR handle.
274 // authValue is always allowed for PCR
275 result = TRUE;
276 break;
277 default:
278 // Otherwise, authValue is not available
279 break;
280 }
281 return result;
282 }
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6.4.3.6 IsAuthPolicyAvailable()
This function indicates if an authPolicy is available and allowed.
This function does not check that the handle reference is valid or if the entity is in an enabled hierarchy.
Those checks are assumed to have been performed during the handle unmarshaling.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE authPolicy is available
FALSE authPolicy is not available
283 static BOOL
284 IsAuthPolicyAvailable(
285 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: handle of entity
286 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
287 UINT32 sessionIndex // IN: session index
288 )
289 {
290 BOOL result = FALSE;
291 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
292 {
293 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
294 switch(handle)
295 {
296 // At this point hierarchy availability has already been checked.
297 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
298 if (gp.ownerPolicy.t.size != 0)
299 result = TRUE;
300 break;
301
302 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
303 if (gp.endorsementPolicy.t.size != 0)
304 result = TRUE;
305 break;
306
307 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
308 if (gc.platformPolicy.t.size != 0)
309 result = TRUE;
310 break;
311 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
312 if(gp.lockoutPolicy.t.size != 0)
313 result = TRUE;
314 break;
315 default:
316 break;
317 }
318 break;
319 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
320 {
321 // Object handle.
322 // An evict object would already have been loaded and given a
323 // transient object handle by this point.
324 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
325 // Policy authorization is not available for an object with only
326 // public portion loaded.
327 if(object->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR)
328 {
329 // Policy authorization is always available for an object but
330 // is never available for a sequence.
331 if(!ObjectIsSequence(object))
332 result = TRUE;
333 }
334 break;
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335 }
336 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
337 // An NV Index.
338 {
339 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
340 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
341 // If the policy size is not zero, check if policy can be used.
342 if(nvIndex.publicArea.authPolicy.t.size != 0)
343 {
344 // If policy session is required for this handle, always
345 // uses policy regardless of the attributes bit setting
346 if(IsPolicySessionRequired(commandCode, sessionIndex))
347 result = TRUE;
348 // Otherwise, the presence of the policy depends on the NV
349 // attributes.
350 else if(IsWriteOperation(commandCode))
351 {
352 if ( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_POLICYWRITE
353 == SET)
354 result = TRUE;
355 }
356 else
357 {
358 if ( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_POLICYREAD
359 == SET)
360 result = TRUE;
361 }
362 }
363 }
364 break;
365 case TPM_HT_PCR:
366 // PCR handle.
367 if(PCRPolicyIsAvailable(handle))
368 result = TRUE;
369 break;
370 default:
371 break;
372 }
373 return result;
374 }
6.4.4 Session Parsing Functions
6.4.4.1 ComputeCpHash()
This function computes the cpHash as defined in Part 2 and described in Part 1.
375 static void
376 ComputeCpHash(
377 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
378 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
379 UINT32 handleNum, // IN: number of handle
380 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // IN: array of handle
381 UINT32 parmBufferSize, // IN: size of input parameter area
382 BYTE *parmBuffer, // IN: input parameter area
383 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash, // OUT: cpHash
384 TPM2B_DIGEST *nameHash // OUT: name hash of command
385 )
386 {
387 UINT32 i;
388 HASH_STATE hashState;
389 TPM2B_NAME name;
390
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391 // cpHash = hash(commandCode [ || authName1
392 // [ || authName2
393 // [ || authName 3 ]]]
394 // [ || parameters])
395 // A cpHash can contain just a commandCode only if the lone session is
396 // an audit session.
397
398 // Start cpHash.
399 cpHash->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
400
401 // Add commandCode.
402 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), &commandCode);
403
404 // Add authNames for each of the handles.
405 for(i = 0; i < handleNum; i++)
406 {
407 name.t.size = EntityGetName(handles[i], &name.t.name);
408 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name.b);
409 }
410
411 // Add the parameters.
412 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, parmBufferSize, parmBuffer);
413
414 // Complete the hash.
415 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &cpHash->b);
416
417 // If the nameHash is needed, compute it here.
418 if(nameHash != NULL)
419 {
420 // Start name hash. hashState may be reused.
421 nameHash->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
422
423 // Adding names.
424 for(i = 0; i < handleNum; i++)
425 {
426 name.t.size = EntityGetName(handles[i], &name.t.name);
427 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name.b);
428 }
429 // Complete hash.
430 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &nameHash->b);
431 }
432 return;
433 }
6.4.4.2 CheckPWAuthSession()
This function validates the authorization provided in a PWAP session. It compares the input value to
authValue of the authorized entity. Argument sessionIndex is used to get handles handle of the
referenced entities from s_inputAuthValues[] and s_associatedHandles[].
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL auth fails and increments DA failure count
TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH auth fails but DA does not apply
434 static TPM_RC
435 CheckPWAuthSession(
436 UINT32 sessionIndex // IN: index of session to be processed
437 )
438 {
439 TPM2B_AUTH authValue;
440 TPM_HANDLE associatedHandle = s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex];
441
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442 // Strip trailing zeros from the password.
443 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex]);
444
445 // Get the auth value and size.
446 authValue.t.size = EntityGetAuthValue(associatedHandle, &authValue.t.buffer);
447
448 // Success if the digests are identical.
449 if(Memory2BEqual(&s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex].b, &authValue.b))
450 {
451 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
452 }
453 else // if the digests are not identical
454 {
455 // Invoke DA protection if applicable.
456 return IncrementLockout(sessionIndex);
457 }
458 }
6.4.4.3 ComputeCommandHMAC()
This function computes the HMAC for an authorization session in a command.
459 static void
460 ComputeCommandHMAC(
461 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: index of session to be processed
462 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash, // IN: cpHash
463 TPM2B_DIGEST *hmac // OUT: authorization HMAC
464 )
465 {
466 TPM2B_TYPE(KEY, (sizeof(AUTH_VALUE) * 2));
467 TPM2B_KEY key;
468 BYTE marshalBuffer[sizeof(TPMA_SESSION)];
469 BYTE *buffer;
470 UINT32 marshalSize;
471 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
472 TPM2B_NONCE *nonceDecrypt;
473 TPM2B_NONCE *nonceEncrypt;
474 SESSION *session;
475 TPM_HT sessionHandleType =
476 HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
477
478 nonceDecrypt = NULL;
479 nonceEncrypt = NULL;
480
481 // Determine if extra nonceTPM values are going to be required.
482 // If this is the first session (sessionIndex = 0) and it is an authorization
483 // session that uses an HMAC, then check if additional session nonces are to be
484 // included.
485 if( sessionIndex == 0
486 && s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
487 {
488 // If there is a decrypt session and if this is not the decrypt session,
489 // then an extra nonce may be needed.
490 if( s_decryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX
491 && s_decryptSessionIndex != sessionIndex)
492 {
493 // Will add the nonce for the decrypt session.
494 SESSION *decryptSession
495 = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[s_decryptSessionIndex]);
496 nonceDecrypt = &decryptSession->nonceTPM;
497 }
498 // Now repeat for the encrypt session.
499 if( s_encryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX
500 && s_encryptSessionIndex != sessionIndex
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501 && s_encryptSessionIndex != s_decryptSessionIndex)
502 {
503 // Have to have the nonce for the encrypt session.
504 SESSION *encryptSession
505 = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[s_encryptSessionIndex]);
506 nonceEncrypt = &encryptSession->nonceTPM;
507 }
508 }
509
510 // Continue with the HMAC processing.
511 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
512
513 // Generate HMAC key.
514 MemoryCopy2B(&key.b, &session->sessionKey.b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
515
516 // Check if the session has an associated handle and if the associated entity
517 // is the one to which the session is bound. If not, add the authValue of
518 // this entity to the HMAC key.
519 // If the session is bound to the object or the session is a policy session
520 // with no authValue required, do not include the authValue in the HMAC key.
521 // Note: For a policy session, its isBound attribute is CLEARED.
522
523 // If the session isn't used for authorization, then there is no auth value
524 // to add
525 if(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
526 {
527 // used for auth so see if this is a policy session with authValue needed
528 // or an hmac session that is not bound
529 if( sessionHandleType == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
530 && session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded == SET
531 || sessionHandleType == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION
532 && !IsSessionBindEntity(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex], session)
533 )
534 {
535 // add the authValue to the HMAC key
536 pAssert((sizeof(AUTH_VALUE) + key.t.size) <= sizeof(key.t.buffer));
537 key.t.size = key.t.size
538 + EntityGetAuthValue(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex],
539 (AUTH_VALUE *)&(key.t.buffer[key.t.size]));
540 }
541 }
542
543 // if the HMAC key size is 0, a NULL string HMAC is allowed
544 if( key.t.size == 0
545 && s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex].t.size == 0)
546 {
547 hmac->t.size = 0;
548 return;
549 }
550
551 // Start HMAC
552 hmac->t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(session->authHashAlg, &key.b, &hmacState);
553
554 // Add cpHash
555 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &cpHash->b);
556
557 // Add nonceCaller
558 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &s_nonceCaller[sessionIndex].b);
559
560 // Add nonceTPM
561 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &session->nonceTPM.b);
562
563 // If needed, add nonceTPM for decrypt session
564 if(nonceDecrypt != NULL)
565 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &nonceDecrypt->b);
566
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567 // If needed, add nonceTPM for encrypt session
568 if(nonceEncrypt != NULL)
569 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &nonceEncrypt->b);
570
571 // Add sessionAttributes
572 buffer = marshalBuffer;
573 marshalSize = TPMA_SESSION_Marshal(&(s_attributes[sessionIndex]),
574 &buffer, NULL);
575 CryptUpdateDigest(&hmacState, marshalSize, marshalBuffer);
576
577 // Complete the HMAC computation
578 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &hmac->b);
579
580 return;
581 }
6.4.4.4 CheckSessionHMAC()
This function checks the HMAC of in a session. It uses ComputeCommandHMAC() to compute the
expected HMAC value and then compares the result with the HMAC in the authorization session. The
authorization is successful if they are the same.
If the authorizations are not the same, IncrementLockout() is called. It will return TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL if
the failure caused the failureCount to increment. Otherwise, it will return TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL auth failure caused failureCount increment
TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH auth failure did not cause failureCount increment
582 static TPM_RC
583 CheckSessionHMAC(
584 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: index of session to be processed
585 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash // IN: cpHash of the command
586 )
587 {
588 TPM2B_DIGEST hmac; // authHMAC for comparing
589
590 // Compute authHMAC
591 ComputeCommandHMAC(sessionIndex, cpHash, &hmac);
592
593 // Compare the input HMAC with the authHMAC computed above.
594 if(!Memory2BEqual(&s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex].b, &hmac.b))
595 {
596 // If an HMAC session has a failure, invoke the anti-hammering
597 // if it applies to the authorized entity or the session.
598 // Otherwise, just indicate that the authorization is bad.
599 return IncrementLockout(sessionIndex);
600 }
601 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
602 }
6.4.4.5 CheckPolicyAuthSession()
This function is used to validate the authorization in a policy session. This function performs the following
comparisons to see if a policy authorization is properly provided. The check are:
a) compare policyDigest in session with authPolicy associated with the entity to be authorized;
b) compare timeout if applicable;
c) compare commandCode if applicable;
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d) compare cpHash if applicable; and
e) see if PCR values have changed since computed.
If all the above checks succeed, the handle is authorized. The order of these comparisons is not
important because any failure will result in the same error code.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED PCR value is not current
TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL policy session fails
TPM_RC_LOCALITY command locality is not allowed
TPM_RC_POLICY_CC CC doesn't match
TPM_RC_EXPIRED policy session has expired
TPM_RC_PP PP is required but not asserted
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is not available for write
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is rate limiting
603 static TPM_RC
604 CheckPolicyAuthSession(
605 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: index of session to be processed
606 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
607 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash, // IN: cpHash using the algorithm of this
608 // session
609 TPM2B_DIGEST *nameHash // IN: nameHash using the session algorithm
610 )
611 {
612 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
613 SESSION *session;
614 TPM2B_DIGEST authPolicy;
615 TPMI_ALG_HASH policyAlg;
616 UINT8 locality;
617
618 // Initialize pointer to the auth session.
619 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
620
621 // If the command is TPM_RC_PolicySecret(), make sure that
622 // either password or authValue is required
623 if( commandCode == TPM_CC_PolicySecret
624 && session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded == CLEAR
625 && session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded == CLEAR)
626 return TPM_RC_MODE;
627
628 // See if the PCR counter for the session is still valid.
629 if( !SessionPCRValueIsCurrent(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]) )
630 return TPM_RC_PCR_CHANGED;
631
632 // Get authPolicy.
633 policyAlg = EntityGetAuthPolicy(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex],
634 &authPolicy);
635 // Compare authPolicy.
636 if(!Memory2BEqual(&session->u2.policyDigest.b, &authPolicy.b))
637 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
638
639 // Policy is OK so check if the other factors are correct
640
641 // Compare policy hash algorithm.
642 if(policyAlg != session->authHashAlg)
643 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
644
645 // Compare timeout.
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646 if(session->timeOut != 0)
647 {
648 // Cannot compare time if clock stop advancing. An TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE
649 // or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned here.
650 result = NvIsAvailable();
651 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
652 return result;
653
654 if(session->timeOut < go.clock)
655 return TPM_RC_EXPIRED;
656 }
657
658 // If command code is provided it must match
659 if(session->commandCode != 0)
660 {
661 if(session->commandCode != commandCode)
662 return TPM_RC_POLICY_CC;
663 }
664 else
665 {
666 // If command requires a DUP or ADMIN authorization, the session must have
667 // command code set.
668 AUTH_ROLE role = CommandAuthRole(commandCode, sessionIndex);
669 if(role == AUTH_ADMIN || role == AUTH_DUP)
670 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
671 }
672 // Check command locality.
673 {
674 BYTE sessionLocality[sizeof(TPMA_LOCALITY)];
675 BYTE *buffer = sessionLocality;
676
677 // Get existing locality setting in canonical form
678 TPMA_LOCALITY_Marshal(&session->commandLocality, &buffer, NULL);
679
680 // See if the locality has been set
681 if(sessionLocality[0] != 0)
682 {
683 // If so, get the current locality
684 locality = _plat__LocalityGet();
685 if (locality < 5)
686 {
687 if( ((sessionLocality[0] & (1 << locality)) == 0)
688 || sessionLocality[0] > 31)
689 return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
690 }
691 else if (locality > 31)
692 {
693 if(sessionLocality[0] != locality)
694 return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
695 }
696 else
697 {
698 // Could throw an assert here but a locality error is just
699 // as good. It just means that, whatever the locality is, it isn't
700 // the locality requested so...
701 return TPM_RC_LOCALITY;
702 }
703 }
704 } // end of locality check
705
706 // Check physical presence.
707 if( session->attributes.isPPRequired == SET
708 && !_plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted())
709 return TPM_RC_PP;
710
711 // Compare cpHash/nameHash if defined, or if the command requires an ADMIN or
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712 // DUP role for this handle.
713 if(session->u1.cpHash.b.size != 0)
714 {
715 if(session->attributes.iscpHashDefined)
716 {
717 // Compare cpHash.
718 if(!Memory2BEqual(&session->u1.cpHash.b, &cpHash->b))
719 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
720 }
721 else
722 {
723 // Compare nameHash.
724 // When cpHash is not defined, nameHash is placed in its space.
725 if(!Memory2BEqual(&session->u1.cpHash.b, &nameHash->b))
726 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
727 }
728 }
729 if(session->attributes.checkNvWritten)
730 {
731 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
732
733 // If this is not an NV index, the policy makes no sense so fail it.
734 if(HandleGetType(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex])!= TPM_HT_NV_INDEX)
735 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
736
737 // Get the index data
738 NvGetIndexInfo(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex], &nvIndex);
739
740 // Make sure that the TPMA_WRITTEN_ATTRIBUTE has the desired state
741 if( (nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET)
742 != (session->attributes.nvWrittenState == SET))
743 return TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL;
744 }
745
746 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
747 }
6.4.4.6 RetrieveSessionData()
This function will unmarshal the sessions in the session area of a command. The values are placed in the
arrays that are defined at the beginning of this file. The normal unmarshaling errors are possible.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SUCCSS unmarshaled without error
TPM_RC_SIZE the number of bytes unmarshaled is not the same as the value for
authorizationSize in the command
748 static TPM_RC
749 RetrieveSessionData (
750 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
751 UINT32 *sessionCount, // OUT: number of sessions found
752 BYTE *sessionBuffer, // IN: pointer to the session buffer
753 INT32 bufferSize // IN: size of the session buffer
754 )
755 {
756 int sessionIndex;
757 int i;
758 TPM_RC result;
759 SESSION *session;
760 TPM_HT sessionType;
761
762 s_decryptSessionIndex = UNDEFINED_INDEX;
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763 s_encryptSessionIndex = UNDEFINED_INDEX;
764 s_auditSessionIndex = UNDEFINED_INDEX;
765
766 for(sessionIndex = 0; bufferSize > 0; sessionIndex++)
767 {
768 // If maximum allowed number of sessions has been parsed, return a size
769 // error with a session number that is larger than the number of allowed
770 // sessions
771 if(sessionIndex == MAX_SESSION_NUM)
772 return TPM_RC_SIZE + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex+1];
773
774 // make sure that the associated handle for each session starts out
775 // unassigned
776 s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
777
778 // First parameter: Session handle.
779 result = TPMI_SH_AUTH_SESSION_Unmarshal(&s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex],
780 &sessionBuffer, &bufferSize, TRUE);
781 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
782 return result + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
783
784 // Second parameter: Nonce.
785 result = TPM2B_NONCE_Unmarshal(&s_nonceCaller[sessionIndex],
786 &sessionBuffer, &bufferSize);
787 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
788 return result + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
789
790 // Third parameter: sessionAttributes.
791 result = TPMA_SESSION_Unmarshal(&s_attributes[sessionIndex],
792 &sessionBuffer, &bufferSize);
793 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
794 return result + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
795
796 // Fourth parameter: authValue (PW or HMAC).
797 result = TPM2B_AUTH_Unmarshal(&s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex],
798 &sessionBuffer, &bufferSize);
799 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
800 return result + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
801
802 if(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex] == TPM_RS_PW)
803 {
804 // A PWAP session needs additional processing.
805 // Can't have any attributes set other than continueSession bit
806 if( s_attributes[sessionIndex].encrypt
807 || s_attributes[sessionIndex].decrypt
808 || s_attributes[sessionIndex].audit
809 || s_attributes[sessionIndex].auditExclusive
810 || s_attributes[sessionIndex].auditReset
811 )
812 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
813
814 // The nonce size must be zero.
815 if(s_nonceCaller[sessionIndex].t.size != 0)
816 return TPM_RC_NONCE + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
817
818 continue;
819 }
820 // For not password sessions...
821
822 // Find out if the session is loaded.
823 if(!SessionIsLoaded(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]))
824 return TPM_RC_REFERENCE_S0 + sessionIndex;
825
826 sessionType = HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
827 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
828 // Check if the session is an HMAC/policy session.
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829 if( ( session->attributes.isPolicy == SET
830 && sessionType == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION
831 )
832 || ( session->attributes.isPolicy == CLEAR
833 && sessionType == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
834 )
835 )
836 return TPM_RC_HANDLE + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
837
838 // Check that this handle has not previously been used.
839 for(i = 0; i < sessionIndex; i++)
840 {
841 if(s_sessionHandles[i] == s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex])
842 return TPM_RC_HANDLE + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
843 }
844
845 // If the session is used for parameter encryption or audit as well, set
846 // the corresponding indices.
847
848 // First process decrypt.
849 if(s_attributes[sessionIndex].decrypt)
850 {
851 // Check if the commandCode allows command parameter encryption.
852 if(DecryptSize(commandCode) == 0)
853 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
854
855 // Encrypt attribute can only appear in one session
856 if(s_decryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX)
857 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
858
859 // Can't decrypt if the session's symmetric algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL
860 if(session->symmetric.algorithm == TPM_ALG_NULL)
861 return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
862
863 // All checks passed, so set the index for the session used to decrypt
864 // a command parameter.
865 s_decryptSessionIndex = sessionIndex;
866 }
867
868 // Now process encrypt.
869 if(s_attributes[sessionIndex].encrypt)
870 {
871 // Check if the commandCode allows response parameter encryption.
872 if(EncryptSize(commandCode) == 0)
873 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
874
875 // Encrypt attribute can only appear in one session.
876 if(s_encryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX)
877 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
878
879 // Can't encrypt if the session's symmetric algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL
880 if(session->symmetric.algorithm == TPM_ALG_NULL)
881 return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
882
883 // All checks passed, so set the index for the session used to encrypt
884 // a response parameter.
885 s_encryptSessionIndex = sessionIndex;
886 }
887
888 // At last process audit.
889 if(s_attributes[sessionIndex].audit)
890 {
891 // Audit attribute can only appear in one session.
892 if(s_auditSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX)
893 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
894
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895 // An audit session can not be policy session.
896 if( HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex])
897 == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION)
898 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
899
900 // If this is a reset of the audit session, or the first use
901 // of the session as an audit session, it doesn't matter what
902 // the exclusive state is. The session will become exclusive.
903 if( s_attributes[sessionIndex].auditReset == CLEAR
904 && session->attributes.isAudit == SET)
905 {
906 // Not first use or reset. If auditExlusive is SET, then this
907 // session must be the current exclusive session.
908 if( s_attributes[sessionIndex].auditExclusive == SET
909 && g_exclusiveAuditSession != s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex])
910 return TPM_RC_EXCLUSIVE;
911 }
912
913 s_auditSessionIndex = sessionIndex;
914 }
915
916 // Initialize associated handle as undefined. This will be changed when
917 // the handles are processed.
918 s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
919
920 }
921
922 // Set the number of sessions found.
923 *sessionCount = sessionIndex;
924 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
925 }
6.4.4.7 CheckLockedOut()
This function checks to see if the TPM is in lockout. This function should only be called if the entity being
checked is subject to DA protection. The TPM is in lockout if the NV is not available and a DA write is
pending. Otherwise the TPM is locked out if checking for lockoutAuth (lockoutAuthCheck == TRUE) and
use of lockoutAuth is disabled, or failedTries >= maxTries
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is rate limiting
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is not available at this time
TPM_RC_LOCKOUT TPM is in lockout
926 static TPM_RC
927 CheckLockedOut(
928 BOOL lockoutAuthCheck // IN: TRUE if checking is for lockoutAuth
929 )
930 {
931 TPM_RC result;
932
933 // If NV is unavailable, and current cycle state recorded in NV is not
934 // SHUTDOWN_NONE, refuse to check any authorization because we would
935 // not be able to handle a DA failure.
936 result = NvIsAvailable();
937 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS && gp.orderlyState != SHUTDOWN_NONE)
938 return result;
939
940 // Check if DA info needs to be updated in NV.
941 if(s_DAPendingOnNV)
942 {
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943 // If NV is accessible, ...
944 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
945 {
946 // ... write the pending DA data and proceed.
947 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED,
948 &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
949 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
950 g_updateNV = TRUE;
951 s_DAPendingOnNV = FALSE;
952 }
953 else
954 {
955 // Otherwise no authorization can be checked.
956 return result;
957 }
958 }
959
960 // Lockout is in effect if checking for lockoutAuth and use of lockoutAuth
961 // is disabled...
962 if(lockoutAuthCheck)
963 {
964 if(gp.lockOutAuthEnabled == FALSE)
965 return TPM_RC_LOCKOUT;
966 }
967 else
968 {
969 // ... or if the number of failed tries has been maxed out.
970 if(gp.failedTries >= gp.maxTries)
971 return TPM_RC_LOCKOUT;
972 }
973 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
974 }
6.4.4.8 CheckAuthSession()
This function checks that the authorization session properly authorizes the use of the associated handle.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_LOCKOUT entity is protected by DA and TPM is in lockout, or TPM is locked out
on NV update pending on DA parameters
TPM_RC_PP Physical Presence is required but not provided
TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL HMAC or PW authorization failed with DA side-effects (can be a
policy session)
TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH HMAC or PW authorization failed without DA side-effects (can be a
policy session)
TPM_RC_POLICY_FAIL if policy session fails
TPM_RC_POLICY_CC command code of policy was wrong
TPM_RC_EXPIRED the policy session has expired
TPM_RC_PCR ???
TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE authValue or authPolicy unavailable
975 static TPM_RC
976 CheckAuthSession(
977 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
978 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: index of session to be processed
979 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash, // IN: cpHash
980 TPM2B_DIGEST *nameHash // IN: nameHash
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981 )
982 {
983 TPM_RC result;
984 SESSION *session = NULL;
985 TPM_HANDLE sessionHandle = s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex];
986 TPM_HANDLE associatedHandle = s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex];
987 TPM_HT sessionHandleType = HandleGetType(sessionHandle);
988
989 pAssert(sessionHandle != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED);
990
991 if(sessionHandle != TPM_RS_PW)
992 session = SessionGet(sessionHandle);
993
994 pAssert(sessionHandleType != TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION || session != NULL);
995
996 // If the authorization session is not a policy session, or if the policy
997 // session requires authorization, then check lockout.
998 if( sessionHandleType != TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
999 || session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded
1000 || session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded)
1001 {
1002 // See if entity is subject to lockout.
1003 if(!IsDAExempted(associatedHandle))
1004 {
1005 // If NV is unavailable, and current cycle state recorded in NV is not
1006 // SHUTDOWN_NONE, refuse to check any authorization because we would
1007 // not be able to handle a DA failure.
1008 result = CheckLockedOut(associatedHandle == TPM_RH_LOCKOUT);
1009 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1010 return result;
1011 }
1012 }
1013
1014 if(associatedHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
1015 {
1016 // If the physical presence is required for this command, check for PP
1017 // assertion. If it isn't asserted, no point going any further.
1018 if( PhysicalPresenceIsRequired(commandCode)
1019 && !_plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted()
1020 )
1021 return TPM_RC_PP;
1022 }
1023 // If a policy session is required, make sure that it is being used.
1024 if( IsPolicySessionRequired(commandCode, sessionIndex)
1025 && sessionHandleType != TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION)
1026 return TPM_RC_AUTH_TYPE;
1027
1028 // If this is a PW authorization, check it and return.
1029 if(sessionHandle == TPM_RS_PW)
1030 {
1031 if(IsAuthValueAvailable(associatedHandle, commandCode, sessionIndex))
1032 return CheckPWAuthSession(sessionIndex);
1033 else
1034 return TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE;
1035 }
1036 // If this is a policy session, ...
1037 if(sessionHandleType == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION)
1038 {
1039 // ... see if the entity has a policy, ...
1040 if( !IsAuthPolicyAvailable(associatedHandle, commandCode, sessionIndex))
1041 return TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE;
1042 // ... and check the policy session.
1043 result = CheckPolicyAuthSession(sessionIndex, commandCode,
1044 cpHash, nameHash);
1045 if (result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1046 return result;
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1047 }
1048 else
1049 {
1050 // For non policy, the entity being accessed must allow authorization
1051 // with an auth value. This is required even if the auth value is not
1052 // going to be used in an HMAC because it is bound.
1053 if(!IsAuthValueAvailable(associatedHandle, commandCode, sessionIndex))
1054 return TPM_RC_AUTH_UNAVAILABLE;
1055 }
1056 // At this point, the session must be either a policy or an HMAC session.
1057 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
1058
1059 if( sessionHandleType == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
1060 && session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded == SET)
1061 {
1062 // For policy session that requires a password, check it as PWAP session.
1063 return CheckPWAuthSession(sessionIndex);
1064 }
1065 else
1066 {
1067 // For other policy or HMAC sessions, have its HMAC checked.
1068 return CheckSessionHMAC(sessionIndex, cpHash);
1069 }
1070 }
1071 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
6.4.4.9 CheckCommandAudit()
This function checks if the current command may trigger command audit, and if it is safe to perform the
action.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is not available for write
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is rate limiting
1072 static TPM_RC
1073 CheckCommandAudit(
1074 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: Command code
1075 UINT32 handleNum, // IN: number of element in handle array
1076 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // IN: array of handle
1077 BYTE *parmBufferStart, // IN: start of parameter buffer
1078 UINT32 parmBufferSize // IN: size of parameter buffer
1079 )
1080 {
1081 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1082
1083 // If audit is implemented, need to check to see if auditing is being done
1084 // for this command.
1085 if(CommandAuditIsRequired(commandCode))
1086 {
1087 // If the audit digest is clear and command audit is required, NV must be
1088 // available so that TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest() is able to increment
1089 // audit counter. If NV is not available, the function bails out to prevent
1090 // the TPM from attempting an operation that would fail anyway.
1091 if( gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size == 0
1092 || commandCode == TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest)
1093 {
1094 result = NvIsAvailable();
1095 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1096 return result;
1097 }
1098 ComputeCpHash(gp.auditHashAlg, commandCode, handleNum,
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1099 handles, parmBufferSize, parmBufferStart,
1100 &s_cpHashForCommandAudit, NULL);
1101 }
1102
1103 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1104 }
1105 #endif
6.4.4.10 ParseSessionBuffer()
This function is the entry function for command session processing. It iterates sessions in session area
and reports if the required authorization has been properly provided. It also processes audit session and
passes the information of encryption sessions to parameter encryption module.
Error Returns Meaning
various parsing failure or authorization failure
1106 TPM_RC
1107 ParseSessionBuffer(
1108 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: Command code
1109 UINT32 handleNum, // IN: number of element in handle array
1110 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // IN: array of handle
1111 BYTE *sessionBufferStart, // IN: start of session buffer
1112 UINT32 sessionBufferSize, // IN: size of session buffer
1113 BYTE *parmBufferStart, // IN: start of parameter buffer
1114 UINT32 parmBufferSize // IN: size of parameter buffer
1115 )
1116 {
1117 TPM_RC result;
1118 UINT32 i;
1119 INT32 size = 0;
1120 TPM2B_AUTH extraKey;
1121 UINT32 sessionIndex;
1122 SESSION *session;
1123 TPM2B_DIGEST cpHash;
1124 TPM2B_DIGEST nameHash;
1125 TPM_ALG_ID cpHashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL; // algID for the last computed
1126 // cpHash
1127
1128 // Check if a command allows any session in its session area.
1129 if(!IsSessionAllowed(commandCode))
1130 return TPM_RC_AUTH_CONTEXT;
1131
1132 // Default-initialization.
1133 s_sessionNum = 0;
1134 cpHash.t.size = 0;
1135
1136 result = RetrieveSessionData(commandCode, &s_sessionNum,
1137 sessionBufferStart, sessionBufferSize);
1138 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1139 return result;
1140
1141 // There is no command in the TPM spec that has more handles than
1142 // MAX_SESSION_NUM.
1143 pAssert(handleNum <= MAX_SESSION_NUM);
1144
1145 // Associate the session with an authorization handle.
1146 for(i = 0; i < handleNum; i++)
1147 {
1148 if(CommandAuthRole(commandCode, i) != AUTH_NONE)
1149 {
1150 // If the received session number is less than the number of handle
1151 // that requires authorization, an error should be returned.
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1152 // Note: for all the TPM 2.0 commands, handles requiring
1153 // authorization come first in a command input.
1154 if(i > (s_sessionNum - 1))
1155 return TPM_RC_AUTH_MISSING;
1156
1157 // Record the handle associated with the authorization session
1158 s_associatedHandles[i] = handles[i];
1159 }
1160 }
1161
1162 // Consistency checks are done first to avoid auth failure when the command
1163 // will not be executed anyway.
1164 for(sessionIndex = 0; sessionIndex < s_sessionNum; sessionIndex++)
1165 {
1166 // PW session must be an authorization session
1167 if(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex] == TPM_RS_PW )
1168 {
1169 if(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] == TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
1170 return TPM_RC_HANDLE + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
1171 }
1172 else
1173 {
1174 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
1175
1176 // A trial session can not appear in session area, because it cannot
1177 // be used for authorization, audit or encrypt/decrypt.
1178 if(session->attributes.isTrialPolicy == SET)
1179 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
1180
1181 // See if the session is bound to a DA protected entity
1182 // NOTE: Since a policy session is never bound, a policy is still
1183 // usable even if the object is DA protected and the TPM is in
1184 // lockout.
1185 if(session->attributes.isDaBound == SET)
1186 {
1187 result = CheckLockedOut(session->attributes.isLockoutBound == SET);
1188 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1189 return result;
1190 }
1191 // If the current cpHash is the right one, don't re-compute.
1192 if(cpHashAlg != session->authHashAlg) // different so compute
1193 {
1194 cpHashAlg = session->authHashAlg; // save this new algID
1195 ComputeCpHash(session->authHashAlg, commandCode, handleNum,
1196 handles, parmBufferSize, parmBufferStart,
1197 &cpHash, &nameHash);
1198 }
1199 // If this session is for auditing, save the cpHash.
1200 if(s_attributes[sessionIndex].audit)
1201 s_cpHashForAudit = cpHash;
1202 }
1203
1204 // if the session has an associated handle, check the auth
1205 if(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED)
1206 {
1207 result = CheckAuthSession(commandCode, sessionIndex,
1208 &cpHash, &nameHash);
1209 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1210 return RcSafeAddToResult(result,
1211 TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex]);
1212 }
1213 else
1214 {
1215 // a session that is not for authorization must either be encrypt,
1216 // decrypt, or audit
1217 if( s_attributes[sessionIndex].audit == CLEAR
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1218 && s_attributes[sessionIndex].encrypt == CLEAR
1219 && s_attributes[sessionIndex].decrypt == CLEAR)
1220 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES + TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex];
1221
1222 // check HMAC for encrypt/decrypt/audit only sessions
1223 result = CheckSessionHMAC(sessionIndex, &cpHash);
1224 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1225 return RcSafeAddToResult(result,
1226 TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[sessionIndex]);
1227 }
1228 }
1229
1230 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
1231 // Check if the command should be audited.
1232 result = CheckCommandAudit(commandCode, handleNum, handles,
1233 parmBufferStart, parmBufferSize);
1234 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1235 return result; // No session number to reference
1236 #endif
1237
1238 // Decrypt the first parameter if applicable. This should be the last operation
1239 // in session processing.
1240 // If the encrypt session is associated with a handle and the handle's
1241 // authValue is available, then authValue is concatenated with sessionAuth to
1242 // generate encryption key, no matter if the handle is the session bound entity
1243 // or not.
1244 if(s_decryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX)
1245 {
1246 // Get size of the leading size field in decrypt parameter
1247 if( s_associatedHandles[s_decryptSessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED
1248 && IsAuthValueAvailable(s_associatedHandles[s_decryptSessionIndex],
1249 commandCode,
1250 s_decryptSessionIndex)
1251 )
1252 {
1253 extraKey.b.size=
1254 EntityGetAuthValue(s_associatedHandles[s_decryptSessionIndex],
1255 &extraKey.t.buffer);
1256 }
1257 else
1258 {
1259 extraKey.b.size = 0;
1260 }
1261 size = DecryptSize(commandCode);
1262 result = CryptParameterDecryption(
1263 s_sessionHandles[s_decryptSessionIndex],
1264 &s_nonceCaller[s_decryptSessionIndex].b,
1265 parmBufferSize, (UINT16)size,
1266 &extraKey,
1267 parmBufferStart);
1268 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1269 return RcSafeAddToResult(result,
1270 TPM_RC_S + g_rcIndex[s_decryptSessionIndex]);
1271 }
1272
1273 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1274 }
6.4.4.11 CheckAuthNoSession()
Function to process a command with no session associated. The function makes sure all the handles in
the command require no authorization.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_AUTH_MISSING failure - one or more handles require auth
1275 TPM_RC
1276 CheckAuthNoSession(
1277 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: Command Code
1278 UINT32 handleNum, // IN: number of handles in command
1279 TPM_HANDLE handles[], // IN: array of handle
1280 BYTE *parmBufferStart, // IN: start of parameter buffer
1281 UINT32 parmBufferSize // IN: size of parameter buffer
1282 )
1283 {
1284 UINT32 i;
1285 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1286
1287 // Check if the commandCode requires authorization
1288 for(i = 0; i < handleNum; i++)
1289 {
1290 if(CommandAuthRole(commandCode, i) != AUTH_NONE)
1291 return TPM_RC_AUTH_MISSING;
1292 }
1293
1294 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
1295 // Check if the command should be audited.
1296 result = CheckCommandAudit(commandCode, handleNum, handles,
1297 parmBufferStart, parmBufferSize);
1298 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS) return result;
1299 #endif
1300
1301 // Initialize number of sessions to be 0
1302 s_sessionNum = 0;
1303
1304 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1305 }
6.4.5 Response Session Processing
6.4.5.1 Introduction
The following functions build the session area in a response, and handle the audit sessions (if present).
6.4.5.2 ComputeRpHash()
Function to compute rpHash (Response Parameter Hash). The rpHash is only computed if there is an
HMAC authorization session and the return code is TPM_RC_SUCCESS.
1306 static void
1307 ComputeRpHash(
1308 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to compute rpHash
1309 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1310 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1311 BYTE *resParmBuffer, // IN: response parameter buffer
1312 TPM2B_DIGEST *rpHash // OUT: rpHash
1313 )
1314 {
1315 // The command result in rpHash is always TPM_RC_SUCCESS.
1316 TPM_RC responseCode = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1317 HASH_STATE hashState;
1318
1319 // rpHash := hash(responseCode || commandCode || parameters)
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1320
1321 // Initiate hash creation.
1322 rpHash->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
1323
1324 // Add hash constituents.
1325 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_RC), &responseCode);
1326 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hashState, sizeof(TPM_CC), &commandCode);
1327 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, resParmBufferSize, resParmBuffer);
1328
1329 // Complete hash computation.
1330 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &rpHash->b);
1331
1332 return;
1333 }
6.4.5.3 InitAuditSession()
This function initializes the audit data in an audit session.
1334 static void
1335 InitAuditSession(
1336 SESSION *session // session to be initialized
1337 )
1338 {
1339 // Mark session as an audit session.
1340 session->attributes.isAudit = SET;
1341
1342 // Audit session can not be bound.
1343 session->attributes.isBound = CLEAR;
1344
1345 // Size of the audit log is the size of session hash algorithm digest.
1346 session->u2.auditDigest.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(session->authHashAlg);
1347
1348 // Set the original digest value to be 0.
1349 MemorySet(&session->u2.auditDigest.t.buffer,
1350 0,
1351 session->u2.auditDigest.t.size);
1352
1353 return;
1354 }
6.4.5.4 Audit()
This function updates the audit digest in an audit session.
1355 static void
1356 Audit(
1357 SESSION *auditSession, // IN: loaded audit session
1358 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1359 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1360 BYTE *resParmBuffer // IN: response parameter buffer
1361 )
1362 {
1363 TPM2B_DIGEST rpHash; // rpHash for response
1364 HASH_STATE hashState;
1365
1366 // Compute rpHash
1367 ComputeRpHash(auditSession->authHashAlg,
1368 commandCode,
1369 resParmBufferSize,
1370 resParmBuffer,
1371 &rpHash);
1372
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1373 // auditDigestnew := hash (auditDigestold || cpHash || rpHash)
1374
1375 // Start hash computation.
1376 CryptStartHash(auditSession->authHashAlg, &hashState);
1377
1378 // Add old digest.
1379 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &auditSession->u2.auditDigest.b);
1380
1381 // Add cpHash and rpHash.
1382 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &s_cpHashForAudit.b);
1383 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &rpHash.b);
1384
1385 // Finalize the hash.
1386 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &auditSession->u2.auditDigest.b);
1387
1388 return;
1389 }
1390 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
6.4.5.5 CommandAudit()
This function updates the command audit digest.
1391 static void
1392 CommandAudit(
1393 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1394 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1395 BYTE *resParmBuffer // IN: response parameter buffer
1396 )
1397 {
1398 if(CommandAuditIsRequired(commandCode))
1399 {
1400 TPM2B_DIGEST rpHash; // rpHash for response
1401 HASH_STATE hashState;
1402
1403 // Compute rpHash.
1404 ComputeRpHash(gp.auditHashAlg, commandCode, resParmBufferSize,
1405 resParmBuffer, &rpHash);
1406
1407 // If the digest.size is one, it indicates the special case of changing
1408 // the audit hash algorithm. For this case, no audit is done on exit.
1409 // NOTE: When the hash algorithm is changed, g_updateNV is set in order to
1410 // force an update to the NV on exit so that the change in digest will
1411 // be recorded. So, it is safe to exit here without setting any flags
1412 // because the digest change will be written to NV when this code exits.
1413 if(gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size == 1)
1414 {
1415 gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size = 0;
1416 return;
1417 }
1418
1419 // If the digest size is zero, need to start a new digest and increment
1420 // the audit counter.
1421 if(gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size == 0)
1422 {
1423 gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(gp.auditHashAlg);
1424 MemorySet(gr.commandAuditDigest.t.buffer,
1425 0,
1426 gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size);
1427
1428 // Bump the counter and save its value to NV.
1429 gp.auditCounter++;
1430 NvWriteReserved(NV_AUDIT_COUNTER, &gp.auditCounter);
1431 g_updateNV = TRUE;
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1432 }
1433
1434 // auditDigestnew := hash (auditDigestold || cpHash || rpHash)
1435
1436 // Start hash computation.
1437 CryptStartHash(gp.auditHashAlg, &hashState);
1438
1439 // Add old digest.
1440 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &gr.commandAuditDigest.b);
1441
1442 // Add cpHash
1443 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &s_cpHashForCommandAudit.b);
1444
1445 // Add rpHash
1446 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &rpHash.b);
1447
1448 // Finalize the hash.
1449 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &gr.commandAuditDigest.b);
1450 }
1451 return;
1452 }
1453 #endif
6.4.5.6 UpdateAuditSessionStatus()
Function to update the internal audit related states of a session. It
a) initializes the session as audit session and sets it to be exclusive if this is the first time it is used for
audit or audit reset was requested;
b) reports exclusive audit session;
c) extends audit log; and
d) clears exclusive audit session if no audit session found in the command.
1454 static void
1455 UpdateAuditSessionStatus(
1456 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1457 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1458 BYTE *resParmBuffer // IN: response parameter buffer
1459 )
1460 {
1461 UINT32 i;
1462 TPM_HANDLE auditSession = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
1463
1464 // Iterate through sessions
1465 for (i = 0; i < s_sessionNum; i++)
1466 {
1467 SESSION *session;
1468
1469 // PW session do not have a loaded session and can not be an audit
1470 // session either. Skip it.
1471 if(s_sessionHandles[i] == TPM_RS_PW) continue;
1472
1473 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[i]);
1474
1475 // If a session is used for audit
1476 if(s_attributes[i].audit == SET)
1477 {
1478 // An audit session has been found
1479 auditSession = s_sessionHandles[i];
1480
1481 // If the session has not been an audit session yet, or
1482 // the auditSetting bits indicate a reset, initialize it and set
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1483 // it to be the exclusive session
1484 if( session->attributes.isAudit == CLEAR
1485 || s_attributes[i].auditReset == SET
1486 )
1487 {
1488 InitAuditSession(session);
1489 g_exclusiveAuditSession = auditSession;
1490 }
1491 else
1492 {
1493 // Check if the audit session is the current exclusive audit
1494 // session and, if not, clear previous exclusive audit session.
1495 if(g_exclusiveAuditSession != auditSession)
1496 g_exclusiveAuditSession = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
1497 }
1498
1499 // Report audit session exclusivity.
1500 if(g_exclusiveAuditSession == auditSession)
1501 {
1502 s_attributes[i].auditExclusive = SET;
1503 }
1504 else
1505 {
1506 s_attributes[i].auditExclusive = CLEAR;
1507 }
1508
1509 // Extend audit log.
1510 Audit(session, commandCode, resParmBufferSize, resParmBuffer);
1511 }
1512 }
1513
1514 // If no audit session is found in the command, and the command allows
1515 // a session then, clear the current exclusive
1516 // audit session.
1517 if(auditSession == TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED && IsSessionAllowed(commandCode))
1518 {
1519 g_exclusiveAuditSession = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
1520 }
1521
1522 return;
1523 }
6.4.5.7 ComputeResponseHMAC()
Function to compute HMAC for authorization session in a response.
1524 static void
1525 ComputeResponseHMAC(
1526 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: session index to be processed
1527 SESSION *session, // IN: loaded session
1528 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1529 TPM2B_NONCE *nonceTPM, // IN: nonceTPM
1530 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1531 BYTE *resParmBuffer, // IN: response parameter buffer
1532 TPM2B_DIGEST *hmac // OUT: authHMAC
1533 )
1534 {
1535 TPM2B_TYPE(KEY, (sizeof(AUTH_VALUE) * 2));
1536 TPM2B_KEY key; // HMAC key
1537 BYTE marshalBuffer[sizeof(TPMA_SESSION)];
1538 BYTE *buffer;
1539 UINT32 marshalSize;
1540 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
1541 TPM2B_DIGEST rp_hash;
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1542
1543 // Compute rpHash.
1544 ComputeRpHash(session->authHashAlg, commandCode, resParmBufferSize,
1545 resParmBuffer, &rp_hash);
1546
1547 // Generate HMAC key
1548 MemoryCopy2B(&key.b, &session->sessionKey.b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
1549
1550 // Check if the session has an associated handle and the associated entity is
1551 // the one that the session is bound to.
1552 // If not bound, add the authValue of this entity to the HMAC key.
1553 if( s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED
1554 && !( HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex])
1555 == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
1556 && session->attributes.isAuthValueNeeded == CLEAR)
1557 && !session->attributes.requestWasBound)
1558 {
1559 pAssert((sizeof(AUTH_VALUE) + key.t.size) <= sizeof(key.t.buffer));
1560 key.t.size = key.t.size +
1561 EntityGetAuthValue(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex],
1562 (AUTH_VALUE *)&key.t.buffer[key.t.size]);
1563 }
1564
1565 // if the HMAC key size for a policy session is 0, the response HMAC is
1566 // computed according to the input HMAC
1567 if(HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
1568 && key.t.size == 0
1569 && s_inputAuthValues[sessionIndex].t.size == 0)
1570 {
1571 hmac->t.size = 0;
1572 return;
1573 }
1574
1575 // Start HMAC computation.
1576 hmac->t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(session->authHashAlg, &key.b, &hmacState);
1577
1578 // Add hash components.
1579 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &rp_hash.b);
1580 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &nonceTPM->b);
1581 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &s_nonceCaller[sessionIndex].b);
1582
1583 // Add session attributes.
1584 buffer = marshalBuffer;
1585 marshalSize = TPMA_SESSION_Marshal(&s_attributes[sessionIndex], &buffer, NULL);
1586 CryptUpdateDigest(&hmacState, marshalSize, marshalBuffer);
1587
1588 // Finalize HMAC.
1589 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &hmac->b);
1590
1591 return;
1592 }
6.4.5.8 BuildSingleResponseAuth()
Function to compute response for an authorization session.
1593 static void
1594 BuildSingleResponseAuth(
1595 UINT32 sessionIndex, // IN: session index to be processed
1596 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1597 UINT32 resParmBufferSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1598 BYTE *resParmBuffer, // IN: response parameter buffer
1599 TPM2B_AUTH *auth // OUT: authHMAC
1600 )
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1601 {
1602 // For password authorization, field is empty.
1603 if(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex] == TPM_RS_PW)
1604 {
1605 auth->t.size = 0;
1606 }
1607 else
1608 {
1609 // Fill in policy/HMAC based session response.
1610 SESSION *session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]);
1611
1612 // If the session is a policy session with isPasswordNeeded SET, the auth
1613 // field is empty.
1614 if(HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex]) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
1615 && session->attributes.isPasswordNeeded == SET)
1616 auth->t.size = 0;
1617 else
1618 // Compute response HMAC.
1619 ComputeResponseHMAC(sessionIndex,
1620 session,
1621 commandCode,
1622 &session->nonceTPM,
1623 resParmBufferSize,
1624 resParmBuffer,
1625 auth);
1626 }
1627
1628 return;
1629 }
6.4.5.9 UpdateTPMNonce()
Updates TPM nonce in both internal session or response if applicable.
1630 static void
1631 UpdateTPMNonce(
1632 UINT16 noncesSize, // IN: number of elements in 'nonces' array
1633 TPM2B_NONCE nonces[] // OUT: nonceTPM
1634 )
1635 {
1636 UINT32 i;
1637 pAssert(noncesSize >= s_sessionNum);
1638 for(i = 0; i < s_sessionNum; i++)
1639 {
1640 SESSION *session;
1641 // For PW session, nonce is 0.
1642 if(s_sessionHandles[i] == TPM_RS_PW)
1643 {
1644 nonces[i].t.size = 0;
1645 continue;
1646 }
1647 session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[i]);
1648 // Update nonceTPM in both internal session and response.
1649 CryptGenerateRandom(session->nonceTPM.t.size, session->nonceTPM.t.buffer);
1650 nonces[i] = session->nonceTPM;
1651 }
1652 return;
1653 }
6.4.5.10 UpdateInternalSession()
Updates internal sessions:
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a) Restarts session time, and
b) Clears a policy session since nonce is rolling.
1654 static void
1655 UpdateInternalSession(
1656 void
1657 )
1658 {
1659 UINT32 i;
1660 for(i = 0; i < s_sessionNum; i++)
1661 {
1662 // For PW session, no update.
1663 if(s_sessionHandles[i] == TPM_RS_PW) continue;
1664
1665 if(s_attributes[i].continueSession == CLEAR)
1666 {
1667 // Close internal session.
1668 SessionFlush(s_sessionHandles[i]);
1669 }
1670 else
1671 {
1672 // If nonce is rolling in a policy session, the policy related data
1673 // will be re-initialized.
1674 if(HandleGetType(s_sessionHandles[i]) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION)
1675 {
1676 SESSION *session = SessionGet(s_sessionHandles[i]);
1677
1678 // When the nonce rolls it starts a new timing interval for the
1679 // policy session.
1680 SessionResetPolicyData(session);
1681 session->startTime = go.clock;
1682 }
1683 }
1684 }
1685 return;
1686 }
6.4.5.11 BuildResponseSession()
Function to build Session buffer in a response.
1687 void
1688 BuildResponseSession(
1689 TPM_ST tag, // IN: tag
1690 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: commandCode
1691 UINT32 resHandleSize, // IN: size of response handle buffer
1692 UINT32 resParmSize, // IN: size of response parameter buffer
1693 UINT32 *resSessionSize // OUT: response session area
1694 )
1695 {
1696 BYTE *resParmBuffer;
1697 TPM2B_NONCE responseNonces[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
1698
1699 // Compute response parameter buffer start.
1700 resParmBuffer = MemoryGetResponseBuffer(commandCode) + sizeof(TPM_ST) +
1701 sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_RC) + resHandleSize;
1702
1703 // For TPM_ST_SESSIONS, there is parameterSize field.
1704 if(tag == TPM_ST_SESSIONS)
1705 resParmBuffer += sizeof(UINT32);
1706
1707 // Session nonce should be updated before parameter encryption
1708 if(tag == TPM_ST_SESSIONS)
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1709 {
1710 UpdateTPMNonce(MAX_SESSION_NUM, responseNonces);
1711
1712 // Encrypt first parameter if applicable. Parameter encryption should
1713 // happen after nonce update and before any rpHash is computed.
1714 // If the encrypt session is associated with a handle, the authValue of
1715 // this handle will be concatenated with sessionAuth to generate
1716 // encryption key, no matter if the handle is the session bound entity
1717 // or not. The authValue is added to sessionAuth only when the authValue
1718 // is available.
1719 if(s_encryptSessionIndex != UNDEFINED_INDEX)
1720 {
1721 UINT32 size;
1722 TPM2B_AUTH extraKey;
1723
1724 // Get size of the leading size field
1725 if( s_associatedHandles[s_encryptSessionIndex] != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED
1726 && IsAuthValueAvailable(s_associatedHandles[s_encryptSessionIndex],
1727 commandCode, s_encryptSessionIndex)
1728 )
1729 {
1730 extraKey.b.size =
1731 EntityGetAuthValue(s_associatedHandles[s_encryptSessionIndex],
1732 &extraKey.t.buffer);
1733 }
1734 else
1735 {
1736 extraKey.b.size = 0;
1737 }
1738 size = EncryptSize(commandCode);
1739 CryptParameterEncryption(s_sessionHandles[s_encryptSessionIndex],
1740 &s_nonceCaller[s_encryptSessionIndex].b,
1741 (UINT16)size,
1742 &extraKey,
1743 resParmBuffer);
1744
1745 }
1746
1747 }
1748 // Audit session should be updated first regardless of the tag.
1749 // A command with no session may trigger a change of the exclusivity state.
1750 UpdateAuditSessionStatus(commandCode, resParmSize, resParmBuffer);
1751
1752 // Audit command.
1753 CommandAudit(commandCode, resParmSize, resParmBuffer);
1754
1755 // Process command with sessions.
1756 if(tag == TPM_ST_SESSIONS)
1757 {
1758 UINT32 i;
1759 BYTE *buffer;
1760 TPM2B_DIGEST responseAuths[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
1761
1762 pAssert(s_sessionNum > 0);
1763
1764 // Iterate over each session in the command session area, and create
1765 // corresponding sessions for response.
1766 for(i = 0; i < s_sessionNum; i++)
1767 {
1768 BuildSingleResponseAuth(
1769 i,
1770 commandCode,
1771 resParmSize,
1772 resParmBuffer,
1773 &responseAuths[i]);
1774 // Make sure that continueSession is SET on any Password session.
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1775 // This makes it marginally easier for the management software
1776 // to keep track of the closed sessions.
1777 if( s_attributes[i].continueSession == CLEAR
1778 && s_sessionHandles[i] == TPM_RS_PW)
1779 {
1780 s_attributes[i].continueSession = SET;
1781 }
1782 }
1783
1784 // Assemble Response Sessions.
1785 *resSessionSize = 0;
1786 buffer = resParmBuffer + resParmSize;
1787 for(i = 0; i < s_sessionNum; i++)
1788 {
1789 *resSessionSize += TPM2B_NONCE_Marshal(&responseNonces[i],
1790 &buffer, NULL);
1791 *resSessionSize += TPMA_SESSION_Marshal(&s_attributes[i],
1792 &buffer, NULL);
1793 *resSessionSize += TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&responseAuths[i],
1794 &buffer, NULL);
1795 }
1796
1797 // Update internal sessions after completing response buffer computation.
1798 UpdateInternalSession();
1799 }
1800 else
1801 {
1802 // Process command with no session.
1803 *resSessionSize = 0;
1804 }
1805
1806 return;
1807 }
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Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
7 Command Support Functions
7.1 Introduction
This clause contains support routines that are called by the command action code in TPM 2.0 Part 3. The
functions are grouped by the command group that is supported by the functions.
7.2 Attestation Command Support (Attest_spt.c)
7.2.1 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "Attest_spt_fp.h"
7.2.2 Functions
7.2.2.1 FillInAttestInfo()
Fill in common fields of TPMS_ATTEST structure.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_KEY key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key
TPM_RC_SCHEME both scheme and key's default scheme are empty; or scheme is
empty while key's default scheme requires explicit input scheme (split
signing); or non-empty default key scheme differs from scheme
3 TPM_RC
4 FillInAttestInfo(
5 TPMI_DH_OBJECT signHandle, // IN: handle of signing object
6 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme, // IN/OUT: scheme to be used for signing
7 TPM2B_DATA *data, // IN: qualifying data
8 TPMS_ATTEST *attest // OUT: attest structure
9 )
10 {
11 TPM_RC result;
12 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY signHierarhcy;
13
14 result = CryptSelectSignScheme(signHandle, scheme);
15 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
16 return result;
17
18 // Magic number
19 attest->magic = TPM_GENERATED_VALUE;
20
21 if(signHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
22 {
23 BYTE *buffer;
24 // For null sign handle, the QN is TPM_RH_NULL
25 buffer = attest->qualifiedSigner.t.name;
26 attest->qualifiedSigner.t.size =
27 TPM_HANDLE_Marshal(&signHandle, &buffer, NULL);
28 }
29 else
30 {
31 // Certifying object qualified name
32 // if the scheme is anonymous, this is an empty buffer
33 if(CryptIsSchemeAnonymous(scheme->scheme))
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34 attest->qualifiedSigner.t.size = 0;
35 else
36 ObjectGetQualifiedName(signHandle, &attest->qualifiedSigner);
37 }
38
39 // current clock in plain text
40 TimeFillInfo(&attest->clockInfo);
41
42 // Firmware version in plain text
43 attest->firmwareVersion = ((UINT64) gp.firmwareV1 << (sizeof(UINT32) * 8));
44 attest->firmwareVersion += gp.firmwareV2;
45
46 // Get the hierarchy of sign object. For NULL sign handle, the hierarchy
47 // will be TPM_RH_NULL
48 signHierarhcy = EntityGetHierarchy(signHandle);
49 if(signHierarhcy != TPM_RH_PLATFORM && signHierarhcy != TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT)
50 {
51 // For sign object is not in platform or endorsement hierarchy,
52 // obfuscate the clock and firmwereVersion information
53 UINT64 obfuscation[2];
54 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg;
55
56 // Get hash algorithm
57 if(signHandle == TPM_RH_NULL || signHandle == TPM_RH_OWNER)
58 {
59 hashAlg = CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG;
60 }
61 else
62 {
63 OBJECT *signObject = NULL;
64 signObject = ObjectGet(signHandle);
65 hashAlg = signObject->publicArea.nameAlg;
66 }
67 KDFa(hashAlg, &gp.shProof.b, "OBFUSCATE",
68 &attest->qualifiedSigner.b, NULL, 128, (BYTE *)&obfuscation[0], NULL);
69
70 // Obfuscate data
71 attest->firmwareVersion += obfuscation[0];
72 attest->clockInfo.resetCount += (UINT32)(obfuscation[1] >> 32);
73 attest->clockInfo.restartCount += (UINT32)obfuscation[1];
74 }
75
76 // External data
77 if(CryptIsSchemeAnonymous(scheme->scheme))
78 attest->extraData.t.size = 0;
79 else
80 {
81 // If we move the data to the attestation structure, then we will not use
82 // it in the signing operation except as part of the signed data
83 attest->extraData = *data;
84 data->t.size = 0;
85 }
86
87 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
88 }
7.2.2.2 SignAttestInfo()
Sign a TPMS_ATTEST structure. If signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, a null signature is returned.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES signHandle references not a signing key
TPM_RC_SCHEME scheme is not compatible with signHandle type
TPM_RC_VALUE digest generated for the given scheme is greater than the modulus of
signHandle (for an RSA key); invalid commit status or failed to
generate r value (for an ECC key)
89 TPM_RC
90 SignAttestInfo(
91 TPMI_DH_OBJECT signHandle, // IN: handle of sign object
92 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme, // IN: sign scheme
93 TPMS_ATTEST *certifyInfo, // IN: the data to be signed
94 TPM2B_DATA *qualifyingData, // IN: extra data for the signing proce
95 TPM2B_ATTEST *attest, // OUT: marshaled attest blob to be
96 // signed
97 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // OUT: signature
98 )
99 {
100 TPM_RC result;
101 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg;
102 BYTE *buffer;
103 HASH_STATE hashState;
104 TPM2B_DIGEST digest;
105
106 // Marshal TPMS_ATTEST structure for hash
107 buffer = attest->t.attestationData;
108 attest->t.size = TPMS_ATTEST_Marshal(certifyInfo, &buffer, NULL);
109
110 if(signHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
111 {
112 signature->sigAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
113 }
114 else
115 {
116 // Attestation command may cause the orderlyState to be cleared due to
117 // the reporting of clock info. If this is the case, check if NV is
118 // available first
119 if(gp.orderlyState != SHUTDOWN_NONE)
120 {
121 // The command needs NV update. Check if NV is available.
122 // A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned at
123 // this point
124 result = NvIsAvailable();
125 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
126 return result;
127 }
128
129 // Compute hash
130 hashAlg = scheme->details.any.hashAlg;
131 digest.t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
132 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, attest->t.size, attest->t.attestationData);
133 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &digest.b);
134
135 // If there is qualifying data, need to rehash the the data
136 // hash(qualifyingData || hash(attestationData))
137 if(qualifyingData->t.size != 0)
138 {
139 CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
140 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState,
141 qualifyingData->t.size,
142 qualifyingData->t.buffer);
143 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, digest.t.size, digest.t.buffer);
144 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &digest.b);
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145 }
146
147 // Sign the hash. A TPM_RC_VALUE, TPM_RC_SCHEME, or
148 // TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES error may be returned at this point
149 return CryptSign(signHandle,
150 scheme,
151 &digest,
152 signature);
153 }
154
155 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
156 }
7.3 Context Management Command Support (Context_spt.c)
7.3.1 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "Context_spt_fp.h"
7.3.2 Functions
7.3.2.1 ComputeContextProtectionKey()
This function retrieves the symmetric protection key for context encryption It is used by
TPM2_ConextSave() and TPM2_ContextLoad() to create the symmetric encryption key and iv
3 void
4 ComputeContextProtectionKey(
5 TPMS_CONTEXT *contextBlob, // IN: context blob
6 TPM2B_SYM_KEY *symKey, // OUT: the symmetric key
7 TPM2B_IV *iv // OUT: the IV.
8 )
9 {
10 UINT16 symKeyBits; // number of bits in the parent's
11 // symmetric key
12 TPM2B_AUTH *proof = NULL; // the proof value to use. Is null for
13 // everything but a primary object in
14 // the Endorsement Hierarchy
15
16 BYTE kdfResult[sizeof(TPMU_HA) * 2];// Value produced by the KDF
17
18 TPM2B_DATA sequence2B, handle2B;
19
20 // Get proof value
21 proof = HierarchyGetProof(contextBlob->hierarchy);
22
23 // Get sequence value in 2B format
24 sequence2B.t.size = sizeof(contextBlob->sequence);
25 MemoryCopy(sequence2B.t.buffer, &contextBlob->sequence,
26 sizeof(contextBlob->sequence),
27 sizeof(sequence2B.t.buffer));
28
29 // Get handle value in 2B format
30 handle2B.t.size = sizeof(contextBlob->savedHandle);
31 MemoryCopy(handle2B.t.buffer, &contextBlob->savedHandle,
32 sizeof(contextBlob->savedHandle),
33 sizeof(handle2B.t.buffer));
34
35 // Get the symmetric encryption key size
36 symKey->t.size = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BYTES;
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37 symKeyBits = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS;
38 // Get the size of the IV for the algorithm
39 iv->t.size = CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG, symKeyBits);
40
41 // KDFa to generate symmetric key and IV value
42 KDFa(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG, &proof->b, "CONTEXT", &sequence2B.b,
43 &handle2B.b, (symKey->t.size + iv->t.size) * 8, kdfResult, NULL);
44
45 // Copy part of the returned value as the key
46 MemoryCopy(symKey->t.buffer, kdfResult, symKey->t.size,
47 sizeof(symKey->t.buffer));
48
49 // Copy the rest as the IV
50 MemoryCopy(iv->t.buffer, &kdfResult[symKey->t.size], iv->t.size,
51 sizeof(iv->t.buffer));
52
53 return;
54 }
7.3.2.2 ComputeContextIntegrity()
Generate the integrity hash for a context It is used by TPM2_ContextSave() to create an integrity hash
and by TPM2_ContextLoad() to compare an integrity hash
55 void
56 ComputeContextIntegrity(
57 TPMS_CONTEXT *contextBlob, // IN: context blob
58 TPM2B_DIGEST *integrity // OUT: integrity
59 )
60 {
61 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
62 TPM2B_AUTH *proof;
63 UINT16 integritySize;
64
65 // Get proof value
66 proof = HierarchyGetProof(contextBlob->hierarchy);
67
68 // Start HMAC
69 integrity->t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG,
70 &proof->b, &hmacState);
71
72 // Compute integrity size at the beginning of context blob
73 integritySize = sizeof(integrity->t.size) + integrity->t.size;
74
75 // Adding total reset counter so that the context cannot be
76 // used after a TPM Reset
77 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(gp.totalResetCount),
78 &gp.totalResetCount);
79
80 // If this is a ST_CLEAR object, add the clear count
81 // so that this contest cannot be loaded after a TPM Restart
82 if(contextBlob->savedHandle == 0x80000002)
83 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(gr.clearCount), &gr.clearCount);
84
85 // Adding sequence number to the HMAC to make sure that it doesn't
86 // get changed
87 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(contextBlob->sequence),
88 &contextBlob->sequence);
89
90 // Protect the handle
91 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(contextBlob->savedHandle),
92 &contextBlob->savedHandle);
93
94 // Adding sensitive contextData, skip the leading integrity area
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95 CryptUpdateDigest(&hmacState, contextBlob->contextBlob.t.size - integritySize,
96 contextBlob->contextBlob.t.buffer + integritySize);
97
98 // Complete HMAC
99 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &integrity->b);
100
101 return;
102 }
7.3.2.3 SequenceDataImportExport()
This function is used scan through the sequence object and either modify the hash state data for
LIB_EXPORT or to import it into the internal format
103 void
104 SequenceDataImportExport(
105 OBJECT *object, // IN: the object containing the sequence data
106 OBJECT *exportObject, // IN/OUT: the object structure that will get
107 // the exported hash state
108 IMPORT_EXPORT direction
109 )
110 {
111 int count = 1;
112 HASH_OBJECT *internalFmt = (HASH_OBJECT *)object;
113 HASH_OBJECT *externalFmt = (HASH_OBJECT *)exportObject;
114
115 if(object->attributes.eventSeq)
116 count = HASH_COUNT;
117 for(; count; count--)
118 CryptHashStateImportExport(&internalFmt->state.hashState[count - 1],
119 externalFmt->state.hashState, direction);
120 }
7.4 Policy Command Support (Policy_spt.c)
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "Policy_spt_fp.h"
3 #include "PolicySigned_fp.h"
4 #include "PolicySecret_fp.h"
5 #include "PolicyTicket_fp.h"
7.4.1 PolicyParameterChecks()
This function validates the common parameters of TPM2_PolicySiged() and TPM2_PolicySecret(). The
common parameters are nonceTPM, expiration, and cpHashA.
6 TPM_RC
7 PolicyParameterChecks(
8 SESSION *session,
9 UINT64 authTimeout,
10 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHashA,
11 TPM2B_NONCE *nonce,
12 TPM_RC nonceParameterNumber,
13 TPM_RC cpHashParameterNumber,
14 TPM_RC expirationParameterNumber
15 )
16 {
17 TPM_RC result;
18
19 // Validate that input nonceTPM is correct if present
20 if(nonce != NULL && nonce->t.size != 0)
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21 {
22 if(!Memory2BEqual(&nonce->b, &session->nonceTPM.b))
23 return TPM_RC_NONCE + RC_PolicySigned_nonceTPM;
24 }
25 // If authTimeout is set (expiration != 0...
26 if(authTimeout != 0)
27 {
28 // ...then nonce must be present
29 // nonce present isn't checked in PolicyTicket
30 if(nonce != NULL && nonce->t.size == 0)
31 // This error says that the time has expired but it is pointing
32 // at the nonceTPM value.
33 return TPM_RC_EXPIRED + nonceParameterNumber;
34
35 // Validate input expiration.
36 // Cannot compare time if clock stop advancing. A TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE
37 // or TPM_RC_NV_RATE error may be returned here.
38 result = NvIsAvailable();
39 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
40 return result;
41
42 if(authTimeout < go.clock)
43 return TPM_RC_EXPIRED + expirationParameterNumber;
44 }
45 // If the cpHash is present, then check it
46 if(cpHashA != NULL && cpHashA->t.size != 0)
47 {
48 // The cpHash input has to have the correct size
49 if(cpHashA->t.size != session->u2.policyDigest.t.size)
50 return TPM_RC_SIZE + cpHashParameterNumber;
51
52 // If the cpHash has already been set, then this input value
53 // must match the current value.
54 if( session->u1.cpHash.b.size != 0
55 && !Memory2BEqual(&cpHashA->b, &session->u1.cpHash.b))
56 return TPM_RC_CPHASH;
57 }
58 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
59 }
7.4.2 PolicyContextUpdate()
Update policy hash Update the policyDigest in policy session by extending policyRef and objectName to
it. This will also update the cpHash if it is present.
60 void
61 PolicyContextUpdate(
62 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
63 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: name of entity
64 TPM2B_NONCE *ref, // IN: the reference data
65 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHash, // IN: the cpHash (optional)
66 UINT64 policyTimeout,
67 SESSION *session // IN/OUT: policy session to be updated
68 )
69 {
70 HASH_STATE hashState;
71 UINT16 policyDigestSize;
72
73 // Start hash
74 policyDigestSize = CryptStartHash(session->authHashAlg, &hashState);
75
76 // policyDigest size should always be the digest size of session hash algorithm.
77 pAssert(session->u2.policyDigest.t.size == policyDigestSize);
78
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79 // add old digest
80 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
81
82 // add commandCode
83 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hashState, sizeof(commandCode), &commandCode);
84
85 // add name if applicable
86 if(name != NULL)
87 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name->b);
88
89 // Complete the digest and get the results
90 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
91
92 // Start second hash computation
93 CryptStartHash(session->authHashAlg, &hashState);
94
95 // add policyDigest
96 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
97
98 // add policyRef
99 if(ref != NULL)
100 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &ref->b);
101
102 // Complete second digest
103 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &session->u2.policyDigest.b);
104
105 // Deal with the cpHash. If the cpHash value is present
106 // then it would have already been checked to make sure that
107 // it is compatible with the current value so all we need
108 // to do here is copy it and set the iscoHashDefined attribute
109 if(cpHash != NULL && cpHash->t.size != 0)
110 {
111 session->u1.cpHash = *cpHash;
112 session->attributes.iscpHashDefined = SET;
113 }
114
115 // update the timeout if it is specified
116 if(policyTimeout!= 0)
117 {
118 // If the timeout has not been set, then set it to the new value
119 if(session->timeOut == 0)
120 session->timeOut = policyTimeout;
121 else if(session->timeOut > policyTimeout)
122 session->timeOut = policyTimeout;
123 }
124 return;
125 }
7.5 NV Command Support (NV_spt.c)
7.5.1 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "NV_spt_fp.h"
7.5.2 Fuctions
7.5.2.1 NvReadAccessChecks()
Common routine for validating a read Used by TPM2_NV_Read(), TPM2_NV_ReadLock() and
TPM2_PolicyNV()
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION autHandle is not allowed to authorize read of the index
TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED Read locked
TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED Try to read an uninitialized index
3 TPM_RC
4 NvReadAccessChecks(
5 TPM_HANDLE authHandle, // IN: the handle that provided the
6 // authorization
7 TPM_HANDLE nvHandle // IN: the handle of the NV index to be written
8 )
9 {
10 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
11
12 // Get NV index info
13 NvGetIndexInfo(nvHandle, &nvIndex);
14
15 // This check may be done before doing authorization checks as is done in this
16 // version of the reference code. If not done there, then uncomment the next
17 // three lines.
18 // // If data is read locked, returns an error
19 // if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_READLOCKED == SET)
20 // return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED;
21
22 // If the authorization was provided by the owner or platform, then check
23 // that the attributes allow the read. If the authorization handle
24 // is the same as the index, then the checks were made when the authorization
25 // was checked..
26 if(authHandle == TPM_RH_OWNER)
27 {
28 // If Owner provided auth then ONWERWRITE must be SET
29 if(! nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_OWNERREAD)
30 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
31 }
32 else if(authHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
33 {
34 // If Platform provided auth then PPWRITE must be SET
35 if(!nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_PPREAD)
36 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
37 }
38 // If neither Owner nor Platform provided auth, make sure that it was
39 // provided by this index.
40 else if(authHandle != nvHandle)
41 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
42
43 // If the index has not been written, then the value cannot be read
44 // NOTE: This has to come after other access checks to make sure that
45 // the proper authorization is given to TPM2_NV_ReadLock()
46 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == CLEAR)
47 return TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED;
48
49 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
50 }
7.5.2.2 NvWriteAccessChecks()
Common routine for validating a write Used by TPM2_NV_Write(), TPM2_NV_Increment(),
TPM2_SetBits(), and TPM2_NV_WriteLock()
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION Authorization fails
TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED Write locked
51 TPM_RC
52 NvWriteAccessChecks(
53 TPM_HANDLE authHandle, // IN: the handle that provided the
54 // authorization
55 TPM_HANDLE nvHandle // IN: the handle of the NV index to be written
56 )
57 {
58 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
59
60 // Get NV index info
61 NvGetIndexInfo(nvHandle, &nvIndex);
62
63 // This check may be done before doing authorization checks as is done in this
64 // version of the reference code. If not done there, then uncomment the next
65 // three lines.
66 // // If data is write locked, returns an error
67 // if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED == SET)
68 // return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED;
69
70 // If the authorization was provided by the owner or platform, then check
71 // that the attributes allow the write. If the authorization handle
72 // is the same as the index, then the checks were made when the authorization
73 // was checked..
74 if(authHandle == TPM_RH_OWNER)
75 {
76 // If Owner provided auth then ONWERWRITE must be SET
77 if(! nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_OWNERWRITE)
78 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
79 }
80 else if(authHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
81 {
82 // If Platform provided auth then PPWRITE must be SET
83 if(!nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE)
84 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
85 }
86 // If neither Owner nor Platform provided auth, make sure that it was
87 // provided by this index.
88 else if(authHandle != nvHandle)
89 return TPM_RC_NV_AUTHORIZATION;
90
91 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
92 }
7.6 Object Command Support (Object_spt.c)
7.6.1 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "Object_spt_fp.h"
3 #include <Platform.h>
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7.6.2 Local Functions
7.6.2.1 EqualCryptSet()
Check if the crypto sets in two public areas are equal
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC mismatched parameters
TPM_RC_HASH mismatched name algorithm
TPM_RC_TYPE mismatched type
4 static TPM_RC
5 EqualCryptSet(
6 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea1, // IN: public area 1
7 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea2 // IN: public area 2
8 )
9 {
10 UINT16 size1;
11 UINT16 size2;
12 BYTE params1[sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS)];
13 BYTE params2[sizeof(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS)];
14 BYTE *buffer;
15
16 // Compare name hash
17 if(publicArea1->nameAlg != publicArea2->nameAlg)
18 return TPM_RC_HASH;
19
20 // Compare algorithm
21 if(publicArea1->type != publicArea2->type)
22 return TPM_RC_TYPE;
23
24 // TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS field should be identical
25 buffer = params1;
26 size1 = TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(&publicArea1->parameters, &buffer,
27 NULL, publicArea1->type);
28 buffer = params2;
29 size2 = TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(&publicArea2->parameters, &buffer,
30 NULL, publicArea2->type);
31
32 if(size1 != size2 || !MemoryEqual(params1, params2, size1))
33 return TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC;
34
35 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
36 }
7.6.2.2 GetIV2BSize()
Get the size of TPM2B_IV in canonical form that will be append to the start of the sensitive data. It
includes both size of size field and size of iv data
Return Value Meaning
37 static UINT16
38 GetIV2BSize(
39 TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle // IN: the protector handle
40 )
41 {
42 OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector object
43 TPM_ALG_ID symAlg;
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44 UINT16 keyBits;
45
46 // Determine the symmetric algorithm and size of key
47 if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
48 {
49 // Use the context encryption algorithm and key size
50 symAlg = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG;
51 keyBits = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS;
52 }
53 else
54 {
55 protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle);
56 symAlg = protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm;
57 keyBits= protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.keyBits.sym;
58 }
59
60 // The IV size is a UINT16 size field plus the block size of the symmetric
61 // algorithm
62 return sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keyBits);
63 }
7.6.2.3 ComputeProtectionKeyParms()
This function retrieves the symmetric protection key parameters for the sensitive data The parameters
retrieved from this function include encryption algorithm, key size in bit, and a TPM2B_SYM_KEY
containing the key material as well as the key size in bytes This function is used for any action that
requires encrypting or decrypting of the sensitive area of an object or a credential blob
64 static void
65 ComputeProtectionKeyParms(
66 TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: the protector handle
67 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for KDFa
68 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: name of the object
69 TPM2B_SEED *seedIn, // IN: optional seed for duplication blob.
70 // For non duplication blob, this
71 // parameter should be NULL
72 TPM_ALG_ID *symAlg, // OUT: the symmetric algorithm
73 UINT16 *keyBits, // OUT: the symmetric key size in bits
74 TPM2B_SYM_KEY *symKey // OUT: the symmetric key
75 )
76 {
77 TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL;
78 OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector
79
80 // Determine the algorithms for the KDF and the encryption/decryption
81 // For TPM_RH_NULL, using context settings
82 if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
83 {
84 // Use the context encryption algorithm and key size
85 *symAlg = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG;
86 symKey->t.size = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BYTES;
87 *keyBits = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS;
88 }
89 else
90 {
91 TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef;
92 protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle);
93 symDef = &protector->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.symmetric;
94 *symAlg = symDef->algorithm;
95 *keyBits= symDef->keyBits.sym;
96 symKey->t.size = (*keyBits + 7) / 8;
97 }
98
99 // Get seed for KDF
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100 seed = GetSeedForKDF(protectorHandle, seedIn);
101
102 // KDFa to generate symmetric key and IV value
103 KDFa(hashAlg, (TPM2B *)seed, "STORAGE", (TPM2B *)name, NULL,
104 symKey->t.size * 8, symKey->t.buffer, NULL);
105
106 return;
107 }
7.6.2.4 ComputeOuterIntegrity()
The sensitive area parameter is a buffer that holds a space for the integrity value and the marshaled
sensitive area. The caller should skip over the area set aside for the integrity value and compute the hash
of the remainder of the object. The size field of sensitive is in unmarshaled form and the sensitive area
contents is an array of bytes.
108 static void
109 ComputeOuterIntegrity(
110 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
111 TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: The handle of the object that
112 // provides protection. For object, it
113 // is parent handle. For credential, it
114 // is the handle of encrypt object. For
115 // a Temporary Object, it is TPM_RH_NULL
116 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for integrity
117 TPM2B_SEED *seedIn, // IN: an external seed may be provided for
118 // duplication blob. For non duplication
119 // blob, this parameter should be NULL
120 UINT32 sensitiveSize, // IN: size of the marshaled sensitive data
121 BYTE *sensitiveData, // IN: sensitive area
122 TPM2B_DIGEST *integrity // OUT: integrity
123 )
124 {
125 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
126
127 TPM2B_DIGEST hmacKey;
128 TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL;
129
130 // Get seed for KDF
131 seed = GetSeedForKDF(protectorHandle, seedIn);
132
133 // Determine the HMAC key bits
134 hmacKey.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
135
136 // KDFa to generate HMAC key
137 KDFa(hashAlg, (TPM2B *)seed, "INTEGRITY", NULL, NULL,
138 hmacKey.t.size * 8, hmacKey.t.buffer, NULL);
139
140 // Start HMAC and get the size of the digest which will become the integrity
141 integrity->t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(hashAlg, &hmacKey.b, &hmacState);
142
143 // Adding the marshaled sensitive area to the integrity value
144 CryptUpdateDigest(&hmacState, sensitiveSize, sensitiveData);
145
146 // Adding name
147 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, (TPM2B *)name);
148
149 // Compute HMAC
150 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &integrity->b);
151
152 return;
153 }
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7.6.2.5 ComputeInnerIntegrity()
This function computes the integrity of an inner wrap
154 static void
155 ComputeInnerIntegrity(
156 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap
157 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
158 UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data
159 BYTE *sensitiveData, // IN: sensitive data
160 TPM2B_DIGEST *integrity // OUT: inner integrity
161 )
162 {
163 HASH_STATE hashState;
164
165 // Start hash and get the size of the digest which will become the integrity
166 integrity->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
167
168 // Adding the marshaled sensitive area to the integrity value
169 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, dataSize, sensitiveData);
170
171 // Adding name
172 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name->b);
173
174 // Compute hash
175 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &integrity->b);
176
177 return;
178
179 }
7.6.2.6 ProduceInnerIntegrity()
This function produces an inner integrity for regular private, credential or duplication blob It requires the
sensitive data being marshaled to the innerBuffer, with the leading bytes reserved for integrity hash. It
assume the sensitive data starts at address (innerBuffer + integrity size). This function integrity at the
beginning of the inner buffer It returns the total size of buffer with the inner wrap
180 static UINT16
181 ProduceInnerIntegrity(
182 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
183 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap
184 UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, excluding the
185 // leading integrity buffer size
186 BYTE *innerBuffer // IN/OUT: inner buffer with sensitive data in
187 // it. At input, the leading bytes of this
188 // buffer is reserved for integrity
189 )
190 {
191 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
192
193 TPM2B_DIGEST integrity;
194 UINT16 integritySize;
195 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
196
197 // sensitiveData points to the beginning of sensitive data in innerBuffer
198 integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
199 sensitiveData = innerBuffer + integritySize;
200
201 ComputeInnerIntegrity(hashAlg, name, dataSize, sensitiveData, &integrity);
202
203 // Add integrity at the beginning of inner buffer
204 buffer = innerBuffer;
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205 TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&integrity, &buffer, NULL);
206
207 return dataSize + integritySize;
208 }
7.6.2.7 CheckInnerIntegrity()
This function check integrity of inner blob
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_INTEGRITY if the outer blob integrity is bad
unmarshal errors unmarshal errors while unmarshaling integrity
209 static TPM_RC
210 CheckInnerIntegrity(
211 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
212 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for inner wrap
213 UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, including the
214 // leading integrity buffer size
215 BYTE *innerBuffer // IN/OUT: inner buffer with sensitive data in
216 // it
217 )
218 {
219 TPM_RC result;
220
221 TPM2B_DIGEST integrity;
222 TPM2B_DIGEST integrityToCompare;
223 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
224 INT32 size;
225
226 // Unmarshal integrity
227 buffer = innerBuffer;
228 size = (INT32) dataSize;
229 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&integrity, &buffer, &size);
230 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
231 {
232 // Compute integrity to compare
233 ComputeInnerIntegrity(hashAlg, name, (UINT16) size, buffer,
234 &integrityToCompare);
235
236 // Compare outer blob integrity
237 if(!Memory2BEqual(&integrity.b, &integrityToCompare.b))
238 result = TPM_RC_INTEGRITY;
239 }
240 return result;
241 }
7.6.3 Public Functions
7.6.3.1 AreAttributesForParent()
This function is called by create, load, and import functions.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE properties are those of a parent
FALSE properties are not those of a parent
242 BOOL
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243 AreAttributesForParent(
244 OBJECT *parentObject // IN: parent handle
245 )
246 {
247 // This function is only called when a parent is needed. Any
248 // time a "parent" is used, it must be authorized. When
249 // the authorization is checked, both the public and sensitive
250 // areas must be loaded. Just make sure...
251 pAssert(parentObject->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR);
252
253 if(ObjectDataIsStorage(&parentObject->publicArea))
254 return TRUE;
255 else
256 return FALSE;
257 }
7.6.3.2 SchemeChecks()
This function validates the schemes in the public area of an object. This function is called by
TPM2_LoadExternal() and PublicAttributesValidation().
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different public
parameters
TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES attempt to inject sensitive data for an asymmetric key; or attempt to
create a symmetric cipher key that is not a decryption key
TPM_RC_HASH non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different name
algorithm
TPM_RC_KDF incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object
TPM_RC_KEY invalid key size values in an asymmetric key public area
TPM_RC_SCHEME inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID;
or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash
object
TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage
key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL
TPM_RC_TYPE unexpected object type; or non-duplicable storage key and its parent
have different types
258 TPM_RC
259 SchemeChecks(
260 BOOL load, // IN: TRUE if load checks, FALSE if
261 // TPM2_Create()
262 TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: input parent handle
263 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area of the object
264 )
265 {
266
267 // Checks for an asymmetric key
268 if(CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(publicArea->type))
269 {
270 TPMT_ASYM_SCHEME *keyScheme;
271 keyScheme = &publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.scheme;
272
273 // An asymmetric key can't be injected
274 // This is only checked when creating an object
275 if(!load && (publicArea->objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin == CLEAR))
276 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
277
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278 if(load && !CryptAreKeySizesConsistent(publicArea))
279 return TPM_RC_KEY;
280
281 // Keys that are both signing and decrypting must have TPM_ALG_NULL
282 // for scheme
283 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET
284 && publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET
285 && keyScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
286 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
287
288 // A restrict sign key must have a non-NULL scheme
289 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET
290 && publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET
291 && keyScheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
292 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
293
294 // Keys must have a valid sign or decrypt scheme, or a TPM_ALG_NULL
295 // scheme
296 // NOTE: The unmarshaling for a public area will unmarshal based on the
297 // object type. If the type is an RSA key, then only RSA schemes will be
298 // allowed because a TPMI_ALG_RSA_SCHEME will be unmarshaled and it
299 // consists only of those algorithms that are allowed with an RSA key.
300 // This means that there is no need to again make sure that the algorithm
301 // is compatible with the object type.
302 if( keyScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL
303 && ( ( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET
304 && !CryptIsSignScheme(keyScheme->scheme)
305 )
306 || ( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET
307 && !CryptIsDecryptScheme(keyScheme->scheme)
308 )
309 )
310 )
311 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
312
313 // Special checks for an ECC key
314 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
315 if(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_ECC)
316 {
317 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID = publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID;
318 const TPMT_ECC_SCHEME *curveScheme = CryptGetCurveSignScheme(curveID);
319 // The curveId must be valid or the unmarshaling is busted.
320 pAssert(curveScheme != NULL);
321
322 // If the curveID requires a specific scheme, then the key must select
323 // the same scheme
324 if(curveScheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
325 {
326 if(keyScheme->scheme != curveScheme->scheme)
327 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
328 // The scheme can allow any hash, or not...
329 if( curveScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL
330 && ( keyScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg
331 != curveScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg
332 )
333 )
334 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
335 }
336 // For now, the KDF must be TPM_ALG_NULL
337 if(publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.kdf.scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
338 return TPM_RC_KDF;
339 }
340 #endif
341
342 // Checks for a storage key (restricted + decryption)
343 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET
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344 && publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET)
345 {
346 // A storage key must have a valid protection key
347 if( publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm
348 == TPM_ALG_NULL)
349 return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC;
350
351 // A storage key must have a null scheme
352 if(publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.scheme.scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
353 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
354
355 // A storage key must match its parent algorithms unless
356 // it is duplicable or a primary (including Temporary Primary Objects)
357 if( HandleGetType(parentHandle) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT
358 && publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedParent == SET
359 )
360 {
361 // If the object to be created is a storage key, and is fixedParent,
362 // its crypto set has to match its parent's crypto set. TPM_RC_TYPE,
363 // TPM_RC_HASH or TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC may be returned at this point
364 return EqualCryptSet(publicArea,
365 &(ObjectGet(parentHandle)->publicArea));
366 }
367 }
368 else
369 {
370 // Non-storage keys must have TPM_ALG_NULL for the symmetric algorithm
371 if( publicArea->parameters.asymDetail.symmetric.algorithm
372 != TPM_ALG_NULL)
373 return TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC;
374
375 }// End of asymmetric decryption key checks
376 } // End of asymmetric checks
377
378 // Check for bit attributes
379 else if(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH)
380 {
381 TPMT_KEYEDHASH_SCHEME *scheme
382 = &publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme;
383 // If both sign and decrypt are set the scheme must be TPM_ALG_NULL
384 // and the scheme selected when the key is used.
385 // If neither sign nor decrypt is set, the scheme must be TPM_ALG_NULL
386 // because this is a data object.
387 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.sign
388 == publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt)
389 {
390 if(scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_NULL)
391 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
392 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
393 }
394 // If this is a decryption key, make sure that is is XOR and that there
395 // is a KDF
396 else if(publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt)
397 {
398 if( scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_XOR
399 || scheme->details.xor.hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
400 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
401 if(scheme->details.xor.kdf == TPM_ALG_NULL)
402 return TPM_RC_KDF;
403 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
404
405 }
406 // only supported signing scheme for keyedHash object is HMAC
407 if( scheme->scheme != TPM_ALG_HMAC
408 || scheme->details.hmac.hashAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
409 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
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410
411 // end of the checks for keyedHash
412 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
413 }
414 else if (publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER)
415 {
416 // Must be a decrypting key and may not be a signing key
417 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == CLEAR
418 || publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET
419 )
420 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
421 }
422 else
423 return TPM_RC_TYPE;
424
425 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
426 }
7.6.3.3 PublicAttributesValidation()
This function validates the values in the public area of an object. This function is called by
TPM2_Create(), TPM2_Load(), and TPM2_CreatePrimary()
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ASYMMETRIC non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different public
parameters
TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES fixedTPM, fixedParent, or encryptedDuplication attributes are
inconsistent between themselves or with those of the parent object;
inconsistent restricted, decrypt and sign attributes; attempt to inject
sensitive data for an asymmetric key; attempt to create a symmetric
cipher key that is not a decryption key
TPM_RC_HASH non-duplicable storage key and its parent have different name
algorithm
TPM_RC_KDF incorrect KDF specified for decrypting keyed hash object
TPM_RC_KEY invalid key size values in an asymmetric key public area
TPM_RC_SCHEME inconsistent attributes decrypt, sign, restricted and key's scheme ID;
or hash algorithm is inconsistent with the scheme ID for keyed hash
object
TPM_RC_SIZE authPolicy size does not match digest size of the name algorithm in
publicArea
TPM_RC_SYMMETRIC a storage key with no symmetric algorithm specified; or non-storage
key with symmetric algorithm different from TPM_ALG_NULL
TPM_RC_TYPE unexpected object type; or non-duplicable storage key and its parent
have different types
427 TPM_RC
428 PublicAttributesValidation(
429 BOOL load, // IN: TRUE if load checks, FALSE if
430 // TPM2_Create()
431 TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: input parent handle
432 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area of the object
433 )
434 {
435 OBJECT *parentObject = NULL;
436
437 if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) != TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
438 parentObject = ObjectGet(parentHandle);
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439
440 // Check authPolicy digest consistency
441 if( publicArea->authPolicy.t.size != 0
442 && ( publicArea->authPolicy.t.size
443 != CryptGetHashDigestSize(publicArea->nameAlg)
444 )
445 )
446 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
447
448 // If the parent is fixedTPM (including a Primary Object) the object must have
449 // the same value for fixedTPM and fixedParent
450 if( parentObject == NULL
451 || parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET)
452 {
453 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedParent
454 != publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM
455 )
456 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
457 }
458 else
459 // The parent is not fixedTPM so the object can't be fixedTPM
460 if(publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET)
461 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
462
463 // A restricted object cannot be both sign and decrypt and it can't be neither
464 // sign nor decrypt
465 if ( publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET
466 && ( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt
467 == publicArea->objectAttributes.sign)
468 )
469 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
470
471 // A fixedTPM object can not have encryptedDuplication bit SET
472 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET
473 && publicArea->objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication == SET)
474 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
475
476 // If a parent object has fixedTPM CLEAR, the child must have the
477 // same encryptedDuplication value as its parent.
478 // Primary objects are considered to have a fixedTPM parent (the seeds).
479 if( ( parentObject != NULL
480 && parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == CLEAR)
481 // Get here if parent is not fixed TPM
482 && ( publicArea->objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication
483 != parentObject->publicArea.objectAttributes.encryptedDuplication
484 )
485 )
486 return TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES;
487
488 return SchemeChecks(load, parentHandle, publicArea);
489 }
7.6.3.4 FillInCreationData()
Fill in creation data for an object.
490 void
491 FillInCreationData(
492 TPMI_DH_OBJECT parentHandle, // IN: handle of parent
493 TPMI_ALG_HASH nameHashAlg, // IN: name hash algorithm
494 TPML_PCR_SELECTION *creationPCR, // IN: PCR selection
495 TPM2B_DATA *outsideData, // IN: outside data
496 TPM2B_CREATION_DATA *outCreation, // OUT: creation data for output
497 TPM2B_DIGEST *creationDigest // OUT: creation digest
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498 )
499 {
500 BYTE creationBuffer[sizeof(TPMS_CREATION_DATA)];
501 BYTE *buffer;
502 HASH_STATE hashState;
503
504 // Fill in TPMS_CREATION_DATA in outCreation
505
506 // Compute PCR digest
507 PCRComputeCurrentDigest(nameHashAlg, creationPCR,
508 &outCreation->t.creationData.pcrDigest);
509
510 // Put back PCR selection list
511 outCreation->t.creationData.pcrSelect = *creationPCR;
512
513 // Get locality
514 outCreation->t.creationData.locality
515 = LocalityGetAttributes(_plat__LocalityGet());
516
517 outCreation->t.creationData.parentNameAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
518
519 // If the parent is is either a primary seed or TPM_ALG_NULL, then the Name
520 // and QN of the parent are the parent's handle.
521 if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
522 {
523 BYTE *buffer = &outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.t.name[0];
524 outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.t.size =
525 TPM_HANDLE_Marshal(&parentHandle, &buffer, NULL);
526
527 // Parent qualified name of a Temporary Object is the same as parent's
528 // name
529 MemoryCopy2B(&outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName.b,
530 &outCreation->t.creationData.parentName.b,
531 sizeof(outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName.t.name));
532
533 }
534 else // Regular object
535 {
536 OBJECT *parentObject = ObjectGet(parentHandle);
537
538 // Set name algorithm
539 outCreation->t.creationData.parentNameAlg =
540 parentObject->publicArea.nameAlg;
541 // Copy parent name
542 outCreation->t.creationData.parentName = parentObject->name;
543
544 // Copy parent qualified name
545 outCreation->t.creationData.parentQualifiedName =
546 parentObject->qualifiedName;
547 }
548
549 // Copy outside information
550 outCreation->t.creationData.outsideInfo = *outsideData;
551
552 // Marshal creation data to canonical form
553 buffer = creationBuffer;
554 outCreation->t.size = TPMS_CREATION_DATA_Marshal(&outCreation->t.creationData,
555 &buffer, NULL);
556
557 // Compute hash for creation field in public template
558 creationDigest->t.size = CryptStartHash(nameHashAlg, &hashState);
559 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, outCreation->t.size, creationBuffer);
560 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &creationDigest->b);
561
562 return;
563 }
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7.6.3.5 GetSeedForKDF()
Get a seed for KDF. The KDF for encryption and HMAC key use the same seed. It returns a pointer to
the seed
564 TPM2B_SEED*
565 GetSeedForKDF(
566 TPM_HANDLE protectorHandle, // IN: the protector handle
567 TPM2B_SEED *seedIn // IN: the optional input seed
568 )
569 {
570 OBJECT *protector = NULL; // Pointer to the protector
571
572 // Get seed for encryption key. Use input seed if provided.
573 // Otherwise, using protector object's seedValue. TPM_RH_NULL is the only
574 // exception that we may not have a loaded object as protector. In such a
575 // case, use nullProof as seed.
576 if(seedIn != NULL)
577 {
578 return seedIn;
579 }
580 else
581 {
582 if(protectorHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
583 {
584 return (TPM2B_SEED *) &gr.nullProof;
585 }
586 else
587 {
588 protector = ObjectGet(protectorHandle);
589 return (TPM2B_SEED *) &protector->sensitive.seedValue;
590 }
591 }
592 }
7.6.3.6 ProduceOuterWrap()
This function produce outer wrap for a buffer containing the sensitive data. It requires the sensitive data
being marshaled to the outerBuffer, with the leading bytes reserved for integrity hash. If iv is used, iv
space should be reserved at the beginning of the buffer. It assumes the sensitive data starts at address
(outerBuffer + integrity size {+ iv size}). This function performs:
a) Add IV before sensitive area if required
b) encrypt sensitive data, if iv is required, encrypt by iv. otherwise, encrypted by a NULL iv
c) add HMAC integrity at the beginning of the buffer It returns the total size of blob with outer wrap
593 UINT16
594 ProduceOuterWrap(
595 TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The handle of the object that provides
596 // protection. For object, it is parent
597 // handle. For credential, it is the handle
598 // of encrypt object.
599 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
600 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for outer wrap
601 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided for
602 // duplication blob. For non duplication
603 // blob, this parameter should be NULL
604 BOOL useIV, // IN: indicate if an IV is used
605 UINT16 dataSize, // IN: the size of sensitive data, excluding the
606 // leading integrity buffer size or the
607 // optional iv size
608 BYTE *outerBuffer // IN/OUT: outer buffer with sensitive data in
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609 // it
610 )
611 {
612 TPM_ALG_ID symAlg;
613 UINT16 keyBits;
614 TPM2B_SYM_KEY symKey;
615 TPM2B_IV ivRNG; // IV from RNG
616 TPM2B_IV *iv = NULL;
617 UINT16 ivSize = 0; // size of iv area, including the size field
618
619 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
620
621 TPM2B_DIGEST integrity;
622 UINT16 integritySize;
623 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
624
625 // Compute the beginning of sensitive data. The outer integrity should
626 // always exist if this function function is called to make an outer wrap
627 integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
628 sensitiveData = outerBuffer + integritySize;
629
630 // If iv is used, adjust the pointer of sensitive data and add iv before it
631 if(useIV)
632 {
633 ivSize = GetIV2BSize(protector);
634
635 // Generate IV from RNG. The iv data size should be the total IV area
636 // size minus the size of size field
637 ivRNG.t.size = ivSize - sizeof(UINT16);
638 CryptGenerateRandom(ivRNG.t.size, ivRNG.t.buffer);
639
640 // Marshal IV to buffer
641 buffer = sensitiveData;
642 TPM2B_IV_Marshal(&ivRNG, &buffer, NULL);
643
644 // adjust sensitive data starting after IV area
645 sensitiveData += ivSize;
646
647 // Use iv for encryption
648 iv = &ivRNG;
649 }
650
651 // Compute symmetric key parameters for outer buffer encryption
652 ComputeProtectionKeyParms(protector, hashAlg, name, seed,
653 &symAlg, &keyBits, &symKey);
654 // Encrypt inner buffer in place
655 CryptSymmetricEncrypt(sensitiveData, symAlg, keyBits,
656 TPM_ALG_CFB, symKey.t.buffer, iv, dataSize,
657 sensitiveData);
658
659 // Compute outer integrity. Integrity computation includes the optional IV
660 // area
661 ComputeOuterIntegrity(name, protector, hashAlg, seed, dataSize + ivSize,
662 outerBuffer + integritySize, &integrity);
663
664 // Add integrity at the beginning of outer buffer
665 buffer = outerBuffer;
666 TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(&integrity, &buffer, NULL);
667
668 // return the total size in outer wrap
669 return dataSize + integritySize + ivSize;
670
671 }
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7.6.3.7 UnwrapOuter()
This function remove the outer wrap of a blob containing sensitive data This function performs:
a) check integrity of outer blob
b) decrypt outer blob
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT error during sensitive data unmarshaling
TPM_RC_INTEGRITY sensitive data integrity is broken
TPM_RC_SIZE error during sensitive data unmarshaling
TPM_RC_VALUE IV size for CFB does not match the encryption algorithm block size
672 TPM_RC
673 UnwrapOuter(
674 TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The handle of the object that provides
675 // protection. For object, it is parent
676 // handle. For credential, it is the handle
677 // of encrypt object.
678 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
679 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for outer wrap
680 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided for
681 // duplication blob. For non duplication
682 // blob, this parameter should be NULL.
683 BOOL useIV, // IN: indicates if an IV is used
684 UINT16 dataSize, // IN: size of sensitive data in outerBuffer,
685 // including the leading integrity buffer
686 // size, and an optional iv area
687 BYTE *outerBuffer // IN/OUT: sensitive data
688 )
689 {
690 TPM_RC result;
691 TPM_ALG_ID symAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
692 TPM2B_SYM_KEY symKey;
693 UINT16 keyBits = 0;
694 TPM2B_IV ivIn; // input IV retrieved from input buffer
695 TPM2B_IV *iv = NULL;
696
697 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
698
699 TPM2B_DIGEST integrityToCompare;
700 TPM2B_DIGEST integrity;
701 INT32 size;
702
703 // Unmarshal integrity
704 sensitiveData = outerBuffer;
705 size = (INT32) dataSize;
706 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&integrity, &sensitiveData, &size);
707 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
708 {
709 // Compute integrity to compare
710 ComputeOuterIntegrity(name, protector, hashAlg, seed,
711 (UINT16) size, sensitiveData,
712 &integrityToCompare);
713
714 // Compare outer blob integrity
715 if(!Memory2BEqual(&integrity.b, &integrityToCompare.b))
716 return TPM_RC_INTEGRITY;
717
718 // Get the symmetric algorithm parameters used for encryption
719 ComputeProtectionKeyParms(protector, hashAlg, name, seed,
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720 &symAlg, &keyBits, &symKey);
721
722 // Retrieve IV if it is used
723 if(useIV)
724 {
725 result = TPM2B_IV_Unmarshal(&ivIn, &sensitiveData, &size);
726 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
727 {
728 // The input iv size for CFB must match the encryption algorithm
729 // block size
730 if(ivIn.t.size != CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keyBits))
731 result = TPM_RC_VALUE;
732 else
733 iv = &ivIn;
734 }
735 }
736 }
737 // If no errors, decrypt private in place
738 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
739 CryptSymmetricDecrypt(sensitiveData, symAlg, keyBits,
740 TPM_ALG_CFB, symKey.t.buffer, iv,
741 (UINT16) size, sensitiveData);
742
743 return result;
744
745 }
7.6.3.8 SensitiveToPrivate()
This function prepare the private blob for off the chip storage The operations in this function:
a) marshal TPM2B_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPM2B_PRIVATE
b) apply encryption to the sensitive area.
c) apply outer integrity computation.
746 void
747 SensitiveToPrivate(
748 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive structure
749 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
750 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle
751 TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. This
752 // parameter is used when parentHandle is
753 // NULL, in which case the object is
754 // temporary.
755 TPM2B_PRIVATE *outPrivate // OUT: output private structure
756 )
757 {
758 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
759 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
760 UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size
761 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg; // hash algorithm for integrity
762 UINT16 integritySize;
763 UINT16 ivSize;
764
765 pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0);
766
767 // Find the hash algorithm for integrity computation
768 if(parentHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
769 {
770 // For Temporary Object, using self name algorithm
771 hashAlg = nameAlg;
772 }
773 else
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774 {
775 // Otherwise, using parent's name algorithm
776 hashAlg = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle);
777 }
778
779 // Starting of sensitive data without wrappers
780 sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer;
781
782 // Compute the integrity size
783 integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
784
785 // Reserve space for integrity
786 sensitiveData += integritySize;
787
788 // Get iv size
789 ivSize = GetIV2BSize(parentHandle);
790
791 // Reserve space for iv
792 sensitiveData += ivSize;
793
794 // Marshal sensitive area, leaving the leading 2 bytes for size
795 buffer = sensitiveData + sizeof(UINT16);
796 dataSize = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal(sensitive, &buffer, NULL);
797
798 // Adding size before the data area
799 buffer = sensitiveData;
800 UINT16_Marshal(&dataSize, &buffer, NULL);
801
802 // Adjust the dataSize to include the size field
803 dataSize += sizeof(UINT16);
804
805 // Adjust the pointer to inner buffer including the iv
806 sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer + ivSize;
807
808 //Produce outer wrap, including encryption and HMAC
809 outPrivate->t.size = ProduceOuterWrap(parentHandle, name, hashAlg, NULL,
810 TRUE, dataSize, outPrivate->t.buffer);
811
812 return;
813 }
7.6.3.9 PrivateToSensitive()
Unwrap a input private area. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a sensitive structure. The
operations in this function:
a) check the integrity HMAC of the input private area
b) decrypt the private buffer
c) unmarshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPMT_SENSITIVE
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_INTEGRITY if the private area integrity is bad
TPM_RC_SENSITIVE unmarshal errors while unmarshaling TPMS_ENCRYPT from input
private
TPM_RC_VALUE outer wrapper does not have an iV of the correct size
814 TPM_RC
815 PrivateToSensitive(
816 TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, // IN: input private structure
817 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
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818 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle
819 TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. It is
820 // passed separately because we only pass
821 // name, rather than the whole public area
822 // of the object. This parameter is used in
823 // the following two cases: 1. primary
824 // objects. 2. duplication blob with inner
825 // wrap. In other cases, this parameter
826 // will be ignored
827 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive // OUT: sensitive structure
828 )
829 {
830 TPM_RC result;
831
832 BYTE *buffer;
833 INT32 size;
834 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
835 UINT16 dataSize;
836 UINT16 dataSizeInput;
837 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg; // hash algorithm for integrity
838 OBJECT *parent = NULL;
839
840 UINT16 integritySize;
841 UINT16 ivSize;
842
843 // Make sure that name is provided
844 pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0);
845
846 // Find the hash algorithm for integrity computation
847 if(parentHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
848 {
849 // For Temporary Object, using self name algorithm
850 hashAlg = nameAlg;
851 }
852 else
853 {
854 // Otherwise, using parent's name algorithm
855 hashAlg = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle);
856 }
857
858 // unwrap outer
859 result = UnwrapOuter(parentHandle, name, hashAlg, NULL, TRUE,
860 inPrivate->t.size, inPrivate->t.buffer);
861 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
862 return result;
863
864 // Compute the inner integrity size.
865 integritySize = sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
866
867 // Get iv size
868 ivSize = GetIV2BSize(parentHandle);
869
870 // The starting of sensitive data and data size without outer wrapper
871 sensitiveData = inPrivate->t.buffer + integritySize + ivSize;
872 dataSize = inPrivate->t.size - integritySize - ivSize;
873
874 // Unmarshal input data size
875 buffer = sensitiveData;
876 size = (INT32) dataSize;
877 result = UINT16_Unmarshal(&dataSizeInput, &buffer, &size);
878 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
879 {
880 if((dataSizeInput + sizeof(UINT16)) != dataSize)
881 result = TPM_RC_SENSITIVE;
882 else
883 {
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884 // Unmarshal sensitive buffer to sensitive structure
885 result = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Unmarshal(sensitive, &buffer, &size);
886 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS || size != 0)
887 {
888 pAssert( (parent == NULL)
889 || parent->publicArea.objectAttributes.fixedTPM == CLEAR);
890 result = TPM_RC_SENSITIVE;
891 }
892 else
893 {
894 // Always remove trailing zeros at load so that it is not necessary
895 // to check
896 // each time auth is checked.
897 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&(sensitive->authValue));
898 }
899 }
900 }
901 return result;
902 }
7.6.3.10 SensitiveToDuplicate()
This function prepare the duplication blob from the sensitive area. The operations in this function:
a) marshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPM2B_PRIVATE
b) apply inner wrap to the sensitive area if required
c) apply outer wrap if required
903 void
904 SensitiveToDuplicate(
905 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive structure
906 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
907 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The new parent's handle
908 TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area. It
909 // is passed separately because we
910 // only pass name, rather than the
911 // whole public area of the object.
912 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: the external seed. If external
913 // seed is provided with size of 0,
914 // no outer wrap should be applied
915 // to duplication blob.
916 TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef, // IN: Symmetric key definition. If the
917 // symmetric key algorithm is NULL,
918 // no inner wrap should be applied.
919 TPM2B_DATA *innerSymKey, // IN/OUT: a symmetric key may be
920 // provided to encrypt the inner
921 // wrap of a duplication blob. May
922 // be generated here if needed.
923 TPM2B_PRIVATE *outPrivate // OUT: output private structure
924 )
925 {
926 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
927 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
928 TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;// The hash algorithm for outer wrap
929 TPMI_ALG_HASH innerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;// The hash algorithm for inner wrap
930 UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size
931 BOOL doInnerWrap = FALSE;
932 BOOL doOuterWrap = FALSE;
933
934 // Make sure that name is provided
935 pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0);
936
937 // Make sure symDef and innerSymKey are not NULL
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938 pAssert(symDef != NULL && innerSymKey != NULL);
939
940 // Starting of sensitive data without wrappers
941 sensitiveData = outPrivate->t.buffer;
942
943 // Find out if inner wrap is required
944 if(symDef->algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL)
945 {
946 doInnerWrap = TRUE;
947 // Use self nameAlg as inner hash algorithm
948 innerHash = nameAlg;
949 // Adjust sensitive data pointer
950 sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash);
951 }
952
953 // Find out if outer wrap is required
954 if(seed->t.size != 0)
955 {
956 doOuterWrap = TRUE;
957 // Use parent nameAlg as outer hash algorithm
958 outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle);
959 // Adjust sensitive data pointer
960 sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
961 }
962
963 // Marshal sensitive area, leaving the leading 2 bytes for size
964 buffer = sensitiveData + sizeof(UINT16);
965 dataSize = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Marshal(sensitive, &buffer, NULL);
966
967 // Adding size before the data area
968 buffer = sensitiveData;
969 UINT16_Marshal(&dataSize, &buffer, NULL);
970
971 // Adjust the dataSize to include the size field
972 dataSize += sizeof(UINT16);
973
974 // Apply inner wrap for duplication blob. It includes both integrity and
975 // encryption
976 if(doInnerWrap)
977 {
978 BYTE *innerBuffer = NULL;
979 BOOL symKeyInput = TRUE;
980 innerBuffer = outPrivate->t.buffer;
981 // Skip outer integrity space
982 if(doOuterWrap)
983 innerBuffer += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
984 dataSize = ProduceInnerIntegrity(name, innerHash, dataSize,
985 innerBuffer);
986
987 // Generate inner encryption key if needed
988 if(innerSymKey->t.size == 0)
989 {
990 innerSymKey->t.size = (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8;
991 CryptGenerateRandom(innerSymKey->t.size, innerSymKey->t.buffer);
992
993 // TPM generates symmetric encryption. Set the flag to FALSE
994 symKeyInput = FALSE;
995 }
996 else
997 {
998 // assume the input key size should matches the symmetric definition
999 pAssert(innerSymKey->t.size == (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8);
1000
1001 }
1002
1003 // Encrypt inner buffer in place
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1004 CryptSymmetricEncrypt(innerBuffer, symDef->algorithm,
1005 symDef->keyBits.sym, TPM_ALG_CFB,
1006 innerSymKey->t.buffer, NULL, dataSize,
1007 innerBuffer);
1008
1009 // If the symmetric encryption key is imported, clear the buffer for
1010 // output
1011 if(symKeyInput)
1012 innerSymKey->t.size = 0;
1013 }
1014
1015 // Apply outer wrap for duplication blob. It includes both integrity and
1016 // encryption
1017 if(doOuterWrap)
1018 {
1019 dataSize = ProduceOuterWrap(parentHandle, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE,
1020 dataSize, outPrivate->t.buffer);
1021 }
1022
1023 // Data size for output
1024 outPrivate->t.size = dataSize;
1025
1026 return;
1027 }
7.6.3.11 DuplicateToSensitive()
Unwrap a duplication blob. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a sensitive structure. The
operations in this function:
a) check the integrity HMAC of the input private area
b) decrypt the private buffer
c) unmarshal TPMT_SENSITIVE structure into the buffer of TPMT_SENSITIVE
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT unmarshaling sensitive data from inPrivate failed
TPM_RC_INTEGRITY inPrivate data integrity is broken
TPM_RC_SIZE unmarshaling sensitive data from inPrivate failed
1028 TPM_RC
1029 DuplicateToSensitive(
1030 TPM2B_PRIVATE *inPrivate, // IN: input private structure
1031 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
1032 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: The parent's handle
1033 TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: hash algorithm in public area.
1034 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed may be provided.
1035 // If external seed is provided with
1036 // size of 0, no outer wrap is
1037 // applied
1038 TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef, // IN: Symmetric key definition. If the
1039 // symmetric key algorithm is NULL,
1040 // no inner wrap is applied
1041 TPM2B_DATA *innerSymKey, // IN: a symmetric key may be provided
1042 // to decrypt the inner wrap of a
1043 // duplication blob.
1044 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive // OUT: sensitive structure
1045 )
1046 {
1047 TPM_RC result;
1048
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1049 BYTE *buffer;
1050 INT32 size;
1051 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
1052 UINT16 dataSize;
1053 UINT16 dataSizeInput;
1054
1055 // Make sure that name is provided
1056 pAssert(name != NULL && name->t.size != 0);
1057
1058 // Make sure symDef and innerSymKey are not NULL
1059 pAssert(symDef != NULL && innerSymKey != NULL);
1060
1061 // Starting of sensitive data
1062 sensitiveData = inPrivate->t.buffer;
1063 dataSize = inPrivate->t.size;
1064
1065 // Find out if outer wrap is applied
1066 if(seed->t.size != 0)
1067 {
1068 TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;
1069
1070 // Use parent nameAlg as outer hash algorithm
1071 outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(parentHandle);
1072 result = UnwrapOuter(parentHandle, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE,
1073 dataSize, sensitiveData);
1074 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1075 return result;
1076
1077 // Adjust sensitive data pointer and size
1078 sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
1079 dataSize -= sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
1080 }
1081 // Find out if inner wrap is applied
1082 if(symDef->algorithm != TPM_ALG_NULL)
1083 {
1084 TPMI_ALG_HASH innerHash = TPM_ALG_NULL;
1085
1086 // assume the input key size should matches the symmetric definition
1087 pAssert(innerSymKey->t.size == (symDef->keyBits.sym + 7) / 8);
1088
1089 // Decrypt inner buffer in place
1090 CryptSymmetricDecrypt(sensitiveData, symDef->algorithm,
1091 symDef->keyBits.sym, TPM_ALG_CFB,
1092 innerSymKey->t.buffer, NULL, dataSize,
1093 sensitiveData);
1094
1095 // Use self nameAlg as inner hash algorithm
1096 innerHash = nameAlg;
1097
1098 // Check inner integrity
1099 result = CheckInnerIntegrity(name, innerHash, dataSize, sensitiveData);
1100 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1101 return result;
1102
1103 // Adjust sensitive data pointer and size
1104 sensitiveData += sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash);
1105 dataSize -= sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(innerHash);
1106 }
1107
1108 // Unmarshal input data size
1109 buffer = sensitiveData;
1110 size = (INT32) dataSize;
1111 result = UINT16_Unmarshal(&dataSizeInput, &buffer, &size);
1112 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1113 {
1114 if((dataSizeInput + sizeof(UINT16)) != dataSize)
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1115 result = TPM_RC_SIZE;
1116 else
1117 {
1118 // Unmarshal sensitive buffer to sensitive structure
1119 result = TPMT_SENSITIVE_Unmarshal(sensitive, &buffer, &size);
1120 // if the results is OK make sure that all the data was unmarshaled
1121 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && size != 0)
1122 result = TPM_RC_SIZE;
1123 }
1124 }
1125 // Always remove trailing zeros at load so that it is not necessary to check
1126 // each time auth is checked.
1127 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1128 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(&(sensitive->authValue));
1129 return result;
1130 }
7.6.3.12 SecretToCredential()
This function prepare the credential blob from a secret (a TPM2B_DIGEST) The operations in this
function:
a) marshal TPM2B_DIGEST structure into the buffer of TPM2B_ID_OBJECT
b) encrypt the private buffer, excluding the leading integrity HMAC area
c) compute integrity HMAC and append to the beginning of the buffer.
d) Set the total size of TPM2B_ID_OBJECT buffer
1131 void
1132 SecretToCredential(
1133 TPM2B_DIGEST *secret, // IN: secret information
1134 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
1135 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed.
1136 TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The protector's handle
1137 TPM2B_ID_OBJECT *outIDObject // OUT: output credential
1138 )
1139 {
1140 BYTE *buffer; // Auxiliary buffer pointer
1141 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
1142 TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash; // The hash algorithm for outer wrap
1143 UINT16 dataSize; // data blob size
1144
1145 pAssert(secret != NULL && outIDObject != NULL);
1146
1147 // use protector's name algorithm as outer hash
1148 outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(protector);
1149
1150 // Marshal secret area to credential buffer, leave space for integrity
1151 sensitiveData = outIDObject->t.credential
1152 + sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
1153
1154 // Marshal secret area
1155 buffer = sensitiveData;
1156 dataSize = TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(secret, &buffer, NULL);
1157
1158 // Apply outer wrap
1159 outIDObject->t.size = ProduceOuterWrap(protector,
1160 name,
1161 outerHash,
1162 seed,
1163 FALSE,
1164 dataSize,
1165 outIDObject->t.credential);
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1166 return;
1167 }
7.6.3.13 CredentialToSecret()
Unwrap a credential. Check the integrity, decrypt and retrieve data to a TPM2B_DIGEST structure. The
operations in this function:
a) check the integrity HMAC of the input credential area
b) decrypt the credential buffer
c) unmarshal TPM2B_DIGEST structure into the buffer of TPM2B_DIGEST
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT error during credential unmarshaling
TPM_RC_INTEGRITY credential integrity is broken
TPM_RC_SIZE error during credential unmarshaling
TPM_RC_VALUE IV size does not match the encryption algorithm block size
1168 TPM_RC
1169 CredentialToSecret(
1170 TPM2B_ID_OBJECT *inIDObject, // IN: input credential blob
1171 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
1172 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: an external seed.
1173 TPM_HANDLE protector, // IN: The protector's handle
1174 TPM2B_DIGEST *secret // OUT: secret information
1175 )
1176 {
1177 TPM_RC result;
1178 BYTE *buffer;
1179 INT32 size;
1180 TPMI_ALG_HASH outerHash; // The hash algorithm for outer wrap
1181 BYTE *sensitiveData; // pointer to the sensitive data
1182 UINT16 dataSize;
1183
1184 // use protector's name algorithm as outer hash
1185 outerHash = ObjectGetNameAlg(protector);
1186
1187 // Unwrap outer, a TPM_RC_INTEGRITY error may be returned at this point
1188 result = UnwrapOuter(protector, name, outerHash, seed, FALSE,
1189 inIDObject->t.size, inIDObject->t.credential);
1190 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1191 {
1192 // Compute the beginning of sensitive data
1193 sensitiveData = inIDObject->t.credential
1194 + sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash);
1195 dataSize = inIDObject->t.size
1196 - (sizeof(UINT16) + CryptGetHashDigestSize(outerHash));
1197
1198 // Unmarshal secret buffer to TPM2B_DIGEST structure
1199 buffer = sensitiveData;
1200 size = (INT32) dataSize;
1201 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(secret, &buffer, &size);
1202 // If there were no other unmarshaling errors, make sure that the
1203 // expected amount of data was recovered
1204 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && size != 0)
1205 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
1206 }
1207 return result;
1208 }
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8 Subsystem
8.1 CommandAudit.c
8.1.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions that support command audit.
8.1.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
8.1.3 Functions
8.1.3.1 CommandAuditPreInstall_Init()
This function initializes the command audit list. This function is simulates the behavior of manufacturing. A
function is used instead of a structure definition because this is easier than figuring out the initialization
value for a bit array.
This function would not be implemented outside of a manufacturing or simulation environment.
2 void
3 CommandAuditPreInstall_Init(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 // Clear all the audit commands
8 MemorySet(gp.auditComands, 0x00,
9 ((TPM_CC_LAST - TPM_CC_FIRST + 1) + 7) / 8);
10
11 // TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus always being audited
12 if(CommandIsImplemented(TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus))
13 CommandAuditSet(TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus);
14
15 // Set initial command audit hash algorithm to be context integrity hash
16 // algorithm
17 gp.auditHashAlg = CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG;
18
19 // Set up audit counter to be 0
20 gp.auditCounter = 0;
21
22 // Write command audit persistent data to NV
23 NvWriteReserved(NV_AUDIT_COMMANDS, &gp.auditComands);
24 NvWriteReserved(NV_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, &gp.auditHashAlg);
25 NvWriteReserved(NV_AUDIT_COUNTER, &gp.auditCounter);
26
27 return;
28 }
8.1.3.2 CommandAuditStartup()
This function clears the command audit digest on a TPM Reset.
29 void
30 CommandAuditStartup(
31 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: start up type
32 )
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33 {
34 if(type == SU_RESET)
35 {
36 // Reset the digest size to initialize the digest
37 gr.commandAuditDigest.t.size = 0;
38 }
39
40 }
8.1.3.3 CommandAuditSet()
This function will SET the audit flag for a command. This function will not SET the audit flag for a
command that is not implemented. This ensures that the audit status is not SET when
TPM2_GetCapability() is used to read the list of audited commands.
This function is only used by TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus().
The actions in TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus() are expected to cause the changes to be saved to
NV after it is setting and clearing bits.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE the command code audit status was changed
FALSE the command code audit status was not changed
41 BOOL
42 CommandAuditSet(
43 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
44 )
45 {
46 UINT32 bitPos;
47
48 // Only SET a bit if the corresponding command is implemented
49 if(CommandIsImplemented(commandCode))
50 {
51 // Can't audit shutdown
52 if(commandCode != TPM_CC_Shutdown)
53 {
54 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST;
55 if(!BitIsSet(bitPos, &gp.auditComands[0], sizeof(gp.auditComands)))
56 {
57 // Set bit
58 BitSet(bitPos, &gp.auditComands[0], sizeof(gp.auditComands));
59 return TRUE;
60 }
61 }
62 }
63 // No change
64 return FALSE;
65 }
8.1.3.4 CommandAuditClear()
This function will CLEAR the audit flag for a command. It will not CLEAR the audit flag for
TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus().
This function is only used by TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus().
The actions in TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus() are expected to cause the changes to be saved to
NV after it is setting and clearing bits.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE the command code audit status was changed
FALSE the command code audit status was not changed
66 BOOL
67 CommandAuditClear(
68 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
69 )
70 {
71 UINT32 bitPos;
72
73 // Do nothing if the command is not implemented
74 if(CommandIsImplemented(commandCode))
75 {
76 // The bit associated with TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus() cannot be
77 // cleared
78 if(commandCode != TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus)
79 {
80 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST;
81 if(BitIsSet(bitPos, &gp.auditComands[0], sizeof(gp.auditComands)))
82 {
83 // Clear bit
84 BitClear(bitPos, &gp.auditComands[0], sizeof(gp.auditComands));
85 return TRUE;
86 }
87 }
88 }
89 // No change
90 return FALSE;
91 }
8.1.3.5 CommandAuditIsRequired()
This function indicates if the audit flag is SET for a command.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if command is audited
FALSE if command is not audited
92 BOOL
93 CommandAuditIsRequired(
94 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
95 )
96 {
97 UINT32 bitPos;
98
99 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST;
100
101 // Check the bit map. If the bit is SET, command audit is required
102 if((gp.auditComands[bitPos/8] & (1 << (bitPos % 8))) != 0)
103 return TRUE;
104 else
105 return FALSE;
106
107 }
8.1.3.6 CommandAuditCapGetCCList()
This function returns a list of commands that have their audit bit SET.
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The list starts at the input commandCode.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more command code available
NO all the available command code has been returned
108 TPMI_YES_NO
109 CommandAuditCapGetCCList(
110 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: start command code
111 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned TPM_CC
112 TPML_CC *commandList // OUT: list of TPM_CC
113 )
114 {
115 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
116 UINT32 i;
117
118 // Initialize output handle list
119 commandList->count = 0;
120
121 // The maximum count of command we may return is MAX_CAP_CC
122 if(count > MAX_CAP_CC) count = MAX_CAP_CC;
123
124 // If the command code is smaller than TPM_CC_FIRST, start from TPM_CC_FIRST
125 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_FIRST) commandCode = TPM_CC_FIRST;
126
127 // Collect audit commands
128 for(i = commandCode; i <= TPM_CC_LAST; i++)
129 {
130 if(CommandAuditIsRequired(i))
131 {
132 if(commandList->count < count)
133 {
134 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this command
135 // code to it
136 commandList->commandCodes[commandList->count] = i;
137 commandList->count++;
138 }
139 else
140 {
141 // If the return list is full but we still have command
142 // available, report this and stop iterating
143 more = YES;
144 break;
145 }
146 }
147 }
148
149 return more;
150
151 }
8.1.3.7 CommandAuditGetDigest
This command is used to create a digest of the commands being audited. The commands are processed
in ascending numeric order with a list of TPM_CC being added to a hash. This operates as if all the
audited command codes were concatenated and then hashed.
152 void
153 CommandAuditGetDigest(
154 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest // OUT: command digest
155 )
156 {
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157 TPM_CC i;
158 HASH_STATE hashState;
159
160 // Start hash
161 digest->t.size = CryptStartHash(gp.auditHashAlg, &hashState);
162
163 // Add command code
164 for(i = TPM_CC_FIRST; i <= TPM_CC_LAST; i++)
165 {
166 if(CommandAuditIsRequired(i))
167 {
168 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hashState, sizeof(i), &i);
169 }
170 }
171
172 // Complete hash
173 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &digest->b);
174
175 return;
176 }
8.2 DA.c
8.2.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions and data definitions relating to the dictionary attack logic.
8.2.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define DA_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
8.2.3 Functions
8.2.3.1 DAPreInstall_Init()
This function initializes the DA parameters to their manufacturer-default values. The default values are
determined by a platform-specific specification.
This function should not be called outside of a manufacturing or simulation environment.
The DA parameters will be restored to these initial values by TPM2_Clear().
3 void
4 DAPreInstall_Init(
5 void
6 )
7 {
8 gp.failedTries = 0;
9 gp.maxTries = 3;
10 gp.recoveryTime = 1000; // in seconds (~16.67 minutes)
11 gp.lockoutRecovery = 1000; // in seconds
12 gp.lockOutAuthEnabled = TRUE; // Use of lockoutAuth is enabled
13
14 // Record persistent DA parameter changes to NV
15 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
16 NvWriteReserved(NV_MAX_TRIES, &gp.maxTries);
17 NvWriteReserved(NV_RECOVERY_TIME, &gp.recoveryTime);
18 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY, &gp.lockoutRecovery);
19 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED, &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
20
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21 return;
22 }
8.2.3.2 DAStartup()
This function is called by TPM2_Startup() to initialize the DA parameters. In the case of Startup(CLEAR),
use of lockoutAuth will be enabled if the lockout recovery time is 0. Otherwise, lockoutAuth will not be
enabled until the TPM has been continuously powered for the lockoutRecovery time.
This function requires that NV be available and not rate limiting.
23 void
24 DAStartup(
25 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: startup type
26 )
27 {
28 // For TPM Reset, if lockoutRecovery is 0, enable use of lockoutAuth.
29 if(type == SU_RESET)
30 {
31 if(gp.lockoutRecovery == 0)
32 {
33 gp.lockOutAuthEnabled = TRUE;
34 // Record the changes to NV
35 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED, &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
36 }
37 }
38
39 // If DA has not been disabled and the previous shutdown is not orderly
40 // failedTries is not already at its maximum then increment 'failedTries'
41 if( gp.recoveryTime != 0
42 && g_prevOrderlyState == SHUTDOWN_NONE
43 && gp.failedTries < gp.maxTries)
44 {
45 gp.failedTries++;
46 // Record the change to NV
47 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
48 }
49
50 // Reset self healing timers
51 s_selfHealTimer = g_time;
52 s_lockoutTimer = g_time;
53
54 return;
55 }
8.2.3.3 DARegisterFailure()
This function is called when a authorization failure occurs on an entity that is subject to dictionary-attack
protection. When a DA failure is triggered, register the failure by resetting the relevant self-healing timer
to the current time.
56 void
57 DARegisterFailure(
58 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: handle for failure
59 )
60 {
61 // Reset the timer associated with lockout if the handle is the lockout auth.
62 if(handle == TPM_RH_LOCKOUT)
63 s_lockoutTimer = g_time;
64 else
65 s_selfHealTimer = g_time;
66
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67 return;
68 }
8.2.3.4 DASelfHeal()
This function is called to check if sufficient time has passed to allow decrement of failedTries or to re-
enable use of lockoutAuth.
This function should be called when the time interval is updated.
69 void
70 DASelfHeal(
71 void
72 )
73 {
74 // Regular auth self healing logic
75 // If no failed authorization tries, do nothing. Otherwise, try to
76 // decrease failedTries
77 if(gp.failedTries != 0)
78 {
79 // if recovery time is 0, DA logic has been disabled. Clear failed tries
80 // immediately
81 if(gp.recoveryTime == 0)
82 {
83 gp.failedTries = 0;
84 // Update NV record
85 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
86 }
87 else
88 {
89 UINT64 decreaseCount;
90
91 // In the unlikely event that failedTries should become larger than
92 // maxTries
93 if(gp.failedTries > gp.maxTries)
94 gp.failedTries = gp.maxTries;
95
96 // How much can failedTried be decreased
97 decreaseCount = ((g_time - s_selfHealTimer) / 1000) / gp.recoveryTime;
98
99 if(gp.failedTries <= (UINT32) decreaseCount)
100 // should not set failedTries below zero
101 gp.failedTries = 0;
102 else
103 gp.failedTries -= (UINT32) decreaseCount;
104
105 // the cast prevents overflow of the product
106 s_selfHealTimer += (decreaseCount * (UINT64)gp.recoveryTime) * 1000;
107 if(decreaseCount != 0)
108 // If there was a change to the failedTries, record the changes
109 // to NV
110 NvWriteReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
111 }
112 }
113
114 // LockoutAuth self healing logic
115 // If lockoutAuth is enabled, do nothing. Otherwise, try to see if we
116 // may enable it
117 if(!gp.lockOutAuthEnabled)
118 {
119 // if lockout authorization recovery time is 0, a reboot is required to
120 // re-enable use of lockout authorization. Self-healing would not
121 // apply in this case.
122 if(gp.lockoutRecovery != 0)
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123 {
124 if(((g_time - s_lockoutTimer)/1000) >= gp.lockoutRecovery)
125 {
126 gp.lockOutAuthEnabled = TRUE;
127 // Record the changes to NV
128 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED, &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
129 }
130 }
131 }
132
133 return;
134 }
8.3 Hierarchy.c
8.3.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions used for managing and accessing the hierarchy-related values.
8.3.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
8.3.3 Functions
8.3.3.1 HierarchyPreInstall()
This function performs the initialization functions for the hierarchy when the TPM is simulated. This
function should not be called if the TPM is not in a manufacturing mode at the manufacturer, or in a
simulated environment.
2 void
3 HierarchyPreInstall_Init(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 // Allow lockout clear command
8 gp.disableClear = FALSE;
9
10 // Initialize Primary Seeds
11 gp.EPSeed.t.size = PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE;
12 CryptGenerateRandom(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.EPSeed.t.buffer);
13 gp.SPSeed.t.size = PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE;
14 CryptGenerateRandom(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.SPSeed.t.buffer);
15 gp.PPSeed.t.size = PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE;
16 CryptGenerateRandom(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.PPSeed.t.buffer);
17
18 // Initialize owner, endorsement and lockout auth
19 gp.ownerAuth.t.size = 0;
20 gp.endorsementAuth.t.size = 0;
21 gp.lockoutAuth.t.size = 0;
22
23 // Initialize owner, endorsement, and lockout policy
24 gp.ownerAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
25 gp.ownerPolicy.t.size = 0;
26 gp.endorsementAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
27 gp.endorsementPolicy.t.size = 0;
28 gp.lockoutAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
29 gp.lockoutPolicy.t.size = 0;
30
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31 // Initialize ehProof, shProof and phProof
32 gp.phProof.t.size = PROOF_SIZE;
33 gp.shProof.t.size = PROOF_SIZE;
34 gp.ehProof.t.size = PROOF_SIZE;
35 CryptGenerateRandom(gp.phProof.t.size, gp.phProof.t.buffer);
36 CryptGenerateRandom(gp.shProof.t.size, gp.shProof.t.buffer);
37 CryptGenerateRandom(gp.ehProof.t.size, gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
38
39 // Write hierarchy data to NV
40 NvWriteReserved(NV_DISABLE_CLEAR, &gp.disableClear);
41 NvWriteReserved(NV_EP_SEED, &gp.EPSeed);
42 NvWriteReserved(NV_SP_SEED, &gp.SPSeed);
43 NvWriteReserved(NV_PP_SEED, &gp.PPSeed);
44 NvWriteReserved(NV_OWNER_AUTH, &gp.ownerAuth);
45 NvWriteReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_AUTH, &gp.endorsementAuth);
46 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH, &gp.lockoutAuth);
47 NvWriteReserved(NV_OWNER_ALG, &gp.ownerAlg);
48 NvWriteReserved(NV_OWNER_POLICY, &gp.ownerPolicy);
49 NvWriteReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_ALG, &gp.endorsementAlg);
50 NvWriteReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_POLICY, &gp.endorsementPolicy);
51 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_ALG, &gp.lockoutAlg);
52 NvWriteReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_POLICY, &gp.lockoutPolicy);
53 NvWriteReserved(NV_PH_PROOF, &gp.phProof);
54 NvWriteReserved(NV_SH_PROOF, &gp.shProof);
55 NvWriteReserved(NV_EH_PROOF, &gp.ehProof);
56
57 return;
58 }
8.3.3.2 HierarchyStartup()
This function is called at TPM2_Startup() to initialize the hierarchy related values.
59 void
60 HierarchyStartup(
61 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: start up type
62 )
63 {
64 // phEnable is SET on any startup
65 g_phEnable = TRUE;
66
67 // Reset platformAuth, platformPolicy; enable SH and EH at TPM_RESET and
68 // TPM_RESTART
69 if(type != SU_RESUME)
70 {
71 gc.platformAuth.t.size = 0;
72 gc.platformPolicy.t.size = 0;
73
74 // enable the storage and endorsement hierarchies and the platformNV
75 gc.shEnable = gc.ehEnable = gc.phEnableNV = TRUE;
76 }
77
78 // nullProof and nullSeed are updated at every TPM_RESET
79 if(type == SU_RESET)
80 {
81 gr.nullProof.t.size = PROOF_SIZE;
82 CryptGenerateRandom(gr.nullProof.t.size,
83 gr.nullProof.t.buffer);
84 gr.nullSeed.t.size = PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE;
85 CryptGenerateRandom(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gr.nullSeed.t.buffer);
86 }
87
88 return;
89 }
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8.3.3.3 HierarchyGetProof()
This function finds the proof value associated with a hierarchy.It returns a pointer to the proof value.
90 TPM2B_AUTH *
91 HierarchyGetProof(
92 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy // IN: hierarchy constant
93 )
94 {
95 TPM2B_AUTH *auth = NULL;
96
97 switch(hierarchy)
98 {
99 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
100 // phProof for TPM_RH_PLATFORM
101 auth = &gp.phProof;
102 break;
103 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
104 // ehProof for TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
105 auth = &gp.ehProof;
106 break;
107 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
108 // shProof for TPM_RH_OWNER
109 auth = &gp.shProof;
110 break;
111 case TPM_RH_NULL:
112 // nullProof for TPM_RH_NULL
113 auth = &gr.nullProof;
114 break;
115 default:
116 pAssert(FALSE);
117 break;
118 }
119 return auth;
120
121 }
8.3.3.4 HierarchyGetPrimarySeed()
This function returns the primary seed of a hierarchy.
122 TPM2B_SEED *
123 HierarchyGetPrimarySeed(
124 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy // IN: hierarchy
125 )
126 {
127 TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL;
128 switch(hierarchy)
129 {
130 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
131 seed = &gp.PPSeed;
132 break;
133 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
134 seed = &gp.SPSeed;
135 break;
136 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
137 seed = &gp.EPSeed;
138 break;
139 case TPM_RH_NULL:
140 return &gr.nullSeed;
141 default:
142 pAssert(FALSE);
143 break;
144 }
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145 return seed;
146 }
8.3.3.5 HierarchyIsEnabled()
This function checks to see if a hierarchy is enabled.
NOTE: The TPM_RH_NULL hierarchy is always enabled.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE hierarchy is enabled
FALSE hierarchy is disabled
147 BOOL
148 HierarchyIsEnabled(
149 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy // IN: hierarchy
150 )
151 {
152 BOOL enabled = FALSE;
153
154 switch(hierarchy)
155 {
156 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
157 enabled = g_phEnable;
158 break;
159 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
160 enabled = gc.shEnable;
161 break;
162 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
163 enabled = gc.ehEnable;
164 break;
165 case TPM_RH_NULL:
166 enabled = TRUE;
167 break;
168 default:
169 pAssert(FALSE);
170 break;
171 }
172 return enabled;
173 }
8.4 NV.c
8.4.1 Introduction
The NV memory is divided into two area: dynamic space for user defined NV Indices and evict objects,
and reserved space for TPM persistent and state save data.
8.4.2 Includes, Defines and Data Definitions
1 #define NV_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include <Platform.h>
NV Index/evict object iterator value
4 typedef UINT32 NV_ITER; // type of a NV iterator
5 #define NV_ITER_INIT 0xFFFFFFFF // initial value to start an
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6 // iterator
8.4.3 NV Utility Functions
8.4.3.1 NvCheckState()
Function to check the NV state by accessing the platform-specific function to get the NV state. The result
state is registered in s_NvIsAvailable that will be reported by NvIsAvailable().
This function is called at the beginning of ExecuteCommand() before any potential call to NvIsAvailable().
7 void
8 NvCheckState(void)
9 {
10 int func_return;
11
12 func_return = _plat__IsNvAvailable();
13 if(func_return == 0)
14 {
15 s_NvStatus = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
16 }
17 else if(func_return == 1)
18 {
19 s_NvStatus = TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE;
20 }
21 else
22 {
23 s_NvStatus = TPM_RC_NV_RATE;
24 }
25
26 return;
27 }
8.4.3.2 NvIsAvailable()
This function returns the NV availability parameter.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SUCCESS NV is available
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is unavailable because of rate limit
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is inaccessible
28 TPM_RC
29 NvIsAvailable(
30 void
31 )
32 {
33 return s_NvStatus;
34 }
8.4.3.3 NvCommit
This is a wrapper for the platform function to commit pending NV writes.
35 BOOL
36 NvCommit(
37 void
38 )
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39 {
40 BOOL success = (_plat__NvCommit() == 0);
41 return success;
42 }
8.4.3.4 NvReadMaxCount()
This function returns the max NV counter value.
43 static UINT64
44 NvReadMaxCount(
45 void
46 )
47 {
48 UINT64 countValue;
49 _plat__NvMemoryRead(s_maxCountAddr, sizeof(UINT64), &countValue);
50 return countValue;
51 }
8.4.3.5 NvWriteMaxCount()
This function updates the max counter value to NV memory.
52 static void
53 NvWriteMaxCount(
54 UINT64 maxCount
55 )
56 {
57 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_maxCountAddr, sizeof(UINT64), &maxCount);
58 return;
59 }
8.4.4 NV Index and Persistent Object Access Functions
8.4.4.1 Introduction
These functions are used to access an NV Index and persistent object memory. In this implementation,
the memory is simulated with RAM. The data in dynamic area is organized as a linked list, starting from
address s_evictNvStart. The first 4 bytes of a node in this link list is the offset of next node, followed by
the data entry. A 0-valued offset value indicates the end of the list. If the data entry area of the last node
happens to reach the end of the dynamic area without space left for an additional 4 byte end marker, the
end address, s_evictNvEnd, should serve as the mark of list end
8.4.4.2 NvNext()
This function provides a method to traverse every data entry in NV dynamic area.
To begin with, parameter iter should be initialized to NV_ITER_INIT indicating the first element. Every
time this function is called, the value in iter would be adjusted pointing to the next element in traversal. If
there is no next element, iter value would be 0. This function returns the address of the 'data entry'
pointed by the iter. If there is no more element in the set, a 0 value is returned indicating the end of
traversal.
60 static UINT32
61 NvNext(
62 NV_ITER *iter
63 )
64 {
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65 NV_ITER currentIter;
66
67 // If iterator is at the beginning of list
68 if(*iter == NV_ITER_INIT)
69 {
70 // Initialize iterator
71 *iter = s_evictNvStart;
72 }
73
74 // If iterator reaches the end of NV space, or iterator indicates list end
75 if(*iter + sizeof(UINT32) > s_evictNvEnd || *iter == 0)
76 return 0;
77
78 // Save the current iter offset
79 currentIter = *iter;
80
81 // Adjust iter pointer pointing to next entity
82 // Read pointer value
83 _plat__NvMemoryRead(*iter, sizeof(UINT32), iter);
84
85 if(*iter == 0) return 0;
86
87 return currentIter + sizeof(UINT32); // entity stores after the pointer
88 }
8.4.4.3 NvGetEnd()
Function to find the end of the NV dynamic data list
89 static UINT32
90 NvGetEnd(
91 void
92 )
93 {
94 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
95 UINT32 endAddr = s_evictNvStart;
96 UINT32 currentAddr;
97
98 while((currentAddr = NvNext(&iter)) != 0)
99 endAddr = currentAddr;
100
101 if(endAddr != s_evictNvStart)
102 {
103 // Read offset
104 endAddr -= sizeof(UINT32);
105 _plat__NvMemoryRead(endAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &endAddr);
106 }
107
108 return endAddr;
109 }
8.4.4.4 NvGetFreeByte
This function returns the number of free octets in NV space.
110 static UINT32
111 NvGetFreeByte(
112 void
113 )
114 {
115 return s_evictNvEnd - NvGetEnd();
116 }
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8.4.4.5 NvGetEvictObjectSize
This function returns the size of an evict object in NV space
117 static UINT32
118 NvGetEvictObjectSize(
119 void
120 )
121 {
122 return sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(OBJECT) + sizeof(UINT32);
123 }
8.4.4.6 NvGetCounterSize
This function returns the size of a counter index in NV space.
124 static UINT32
125 NvGetCounterSize(
126 void
127 )
128 {
129 // It takes an offset field, a handle and the sizeof(NV_INDEX) and
130 // sizeof(UINT64) for counter data
131 return sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX) + sizeof(UINT64) + sizeof(UINT32);
132 }
8.4.4.7 NvTestSpace()
This function will test if there is enough space to add a new entity.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE space available
FALSE no enough space
133 static BOOL
134 NvTestSpace(
135 UINT32 size, // IN: size of the entity to be added
136 BOOL isIndex // IN: TRUE if the entity is an index
137 )
138 {
139 UINT32 remainByte = NvGetFreeByte();
140
141 // For NV Index, need to make sure that we do not allocate and Index if this
142 // would mean that the TPM cannot allocate the minimum number of evict
143 // objects.
144 if(isIndex)
145 {
146 // Get the number of persistent objects allocated
147 UINT32 persistentNum = NvCapGetPersistentNumber();
148
149 // If we have not allocated the requisite number of evict objects, then we
150 // need to reserve space for them.
151 // NOTE: some of this is not written as simply as it might seem because
152 // the values are all unsigned and subtracting needs to be done carefully
153 // so that an underflow doesn't cause problems.
154 if(persistentNum < MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS)
155 {
156 UINT32 needed = (MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS - persistentNum)
157 * NvGetEvictObjectSize();
158 if(needed > remainByte)
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159 remainByte = 0;
160 else
161 remainByte -= needed;
162 }
163 // if the requisite number of evict objects have been allocated then
164 // no need to reserve additional space
165 }
166 // This checks for the size of the value being added plus the index value.
167 // NOTE: This does not check to see if the end marker can be placed in
168 // memory because the end marker will not be written if it will not fit.
169 return (size + sizeof(UINT32) <= remainByte);
170 }
8.4.4.8 NvAdd()
This function adds a new entity to NV.
This function requires that there is enough space to add a new entity (i.e., that NvTestSpace() has been
called and the available space is at least as large as the required space).
171 static void
172 NvAdd(
173 UINT32 totalSize, // IN: total size needed for this entity For
174 // evict object, totalSize is the same as
175 // bufferSize. For NV Index, totalSize is
176 // bufferSize plus index data size
177 UINT32 bufferSize, // IN: size of initial buffer
178 BYTE *entity // IN: initial buffer
179 )
180 {
181 UINT32 endAddr;
182 UINT32 nextAddr;
183 UINT32 listEnd = 0;
184
185 // Get the end of data list
186 endAddr = NvGetEnd();
187
188 // Calculate the value of next pointer, which is the size of a pointer +
189 // the entity data size
190 nextAddr = endAddr + sizeof(UINT32) + totalSize;
191
192 // Write next pointer
193 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(endAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &nextAddr);
194
195 // Write entity data
196 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(endAddr + sizeof(UINT32), bufferSize, entity);
197
198 // Write the end of list if it is not going to exceed the NV space
199 if(nextAddr + sizeof(UINT32) <= s_evictNvEnd)
200 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(nextAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &listEnd);
201
202 // Set the flag so that NV changes are committed before the command completes.
203 g_updateNV = TRUE;
204 }
8.4.4.9 NvDelete()
This function is used to delete an NV Index or persistent object from NV memory.
205 static void
206 NvDelete(
207 UINT32 entityAddr // IN: address of entity to be deleted
208 )
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209 {
210 UINT32 next;
211 UINT32 entrySize;
212 UINT32 entryAddr = entityAddr - sizeof(UINT32);
213 UINT32 listEnd = 0;
214
215 // Get the offset of the next entry.
216 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entryAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &next);
217
218 // The size of this entry is the difference between the current entry and the
219 // next entry.
220 entrySize = next - entryAddr;
221
222 // Move each entry after the current one to fill the freed space.
223 // Stop when we have reached the end of all the indexes. There are two
224 // ways to detect the end of the list. The first is to notice that there
225 // is no room for anything else because we are at the end of NV. The other
226 // indication is that we find an end marker.
227
228 // The loop condition checks for the end of NV.
229 while(next + sizeof(UINT32) <= s_evictNvEnd)
230 {
231 UINT32 size, oldAddr, newAddr;
232
233 // Now check for the end marker
234 _plat__NvMemoryRead(next, sizeof(UINT32), &oldAddr);
235 if(oldAddr == 0)
236 break;
237
238 size = oldAddr - next;
239
240 // Move entry
241 _plat__NvMemoryMove(next, next - entrySize, size);
242
243 // Update forward link
244 newAddr = oldAddr - entrySize;
245 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(next - entrySize, sizeof(UINT32), &newAddr);
246 next = oldAddr;
247 }
248 // Mark the end of list
249 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(next - entrySize, sizeof(UINT32), &listEnd);
250
251 // Set the flag so that NV changes are committed before the command completes.
252 g_updateNV = TRUE;
253 }
8.4.5 RAM-based NV Index Data Access Functions
8.4.5.1 Introduction
The data layout in ram buffer is {size of(NV_handle() + data), NV_handle(), data} for each NV Index data
stored in RAM.
NV storage is updated when a NV Index is added or deleted. We do NOT updated NV storage when the
data is updated/
8.4.5.2 NvTestRAMSpace()
This function indicates if there is enough RAM space to add a data for a new NV Index.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE space available
FALSE no enough space
254 static BOOL
255 NvTestRAMSpace(
256 UINT32 size // IN: size of the data to be added to RAM
257 )
258 {
259 BOOL success = ( s_ramIndexSize
260 + size
261 + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(UINT32)
262 <= RAM_INDEX_SPACE);
263 return success;
264 }
8.4.5.3 NvGetRamIndexOffset
This function returns the offset of NV data in the RAM buffer
This function requires that NV Index is in RAM. That is, the index must be known to exist.
265 static UINT32
266 NvGetRAMIndexOffset(
267 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle // IN: NV handle
268 )
269 {
270 UINT32 currAddr = 0;
271
272 while(currAddr < s_ramIndexSize)
273 {
274 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX currHandle;
275 UINT32 currSize;
276 currHandle = * (TPM_HANDLE *) &s_ramIndex[currAddr + sizeof(UINT32)];
277
278 // Found a match
279 if(currHandle == handle)
280
281 // data buffer follows the handle and size field
282 break;
283
284 currSize = * (UINT32 *) &s_ramIndex[currAddr];
285 currAddr += sizeof(UINT32) + currSize;
286 }
287
288 // We assume the index data is existing in RAM space
289 pAssert(currAddr < s_ramIndexSize);
290 return currAddr + sizeof(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX) + sizeof(UINT32);
291 }
8.4.5.4 NvAddRAM()
This function adds a new data area to RAM.
This function requires that enough free RAM space is available to add the new data.
292 static void
293 NvAddRAM(
294 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: NV handle
295 UINT32 size // IN: size of data
296 )
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297 {
298 // Add data space at the end of reserved RAM buffer
299 * (UINT32 *) &s_ramIndex[s_ramIndexSize] = size + sizeof(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX);
300 * (TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX *) &s_ramIndex[s_ramIndexSize + sizeof(UINT32)] = handle;
301 s_ramIndexSize += sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX) + size;
302
303 pAssert(s_ramIndexSize <= RAM_INDEX_SPACE);
304
305 // Update NV version of s_ramIndexSize
306 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexSizeAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &s_ramIndexSize);
307
308 // Write reserved RAM space to NV to reflect the newly added NV Index
309 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexAddr, RAM_INDEX_SPACE, s_ramIndex);
310
311 return;
312 }
8.4.5.5 NvDeleteRAM()
This function is used to delete a RAM-backed NV Index data area.
This function assumes the data of NV Index exists in RAM
313 static void
314 NvDeleteRAM(
315 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle // IN: NV handle
316 )
317 {
318 UINT32 nodeOffset;
319 UINT32 nextNode;
320 UINT32 size;
321
322 nodeOffset = NvGetRAMIndexOffset(handle);
323
324 // Move the pointer back to get the size field of this node
325 nodeOffset -= sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX);
326
327 // Get node size
328 size = * (UINT32 *) &s_ramIndex[nodeOffset];
329
330 // Get the offset of next node
331 nextNode = nodeOffset + sizeof(UINT32) + size;
332
333 // Move data
334 MemoryMove(s_ramIndex + nodeOffset, s_ramIndex + nextNode,
335 s_ramIndexSize - nextNode, s_ramIndexSize - nextNode);
336
337 // Update RAM size
338 s_ramIndexSize -= size + sizeof(UINT32);
339
340 // Update NV version of s_ramIndexSize
341 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexSizeAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &s_ramIndexSize);
342
343 // Write reserved RAM space to NV to reflect the newly delete NV Index
344 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexAddr, RAM_INDEX_SPACE, s_ramIndex);
345
346 return;
347 }
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8.4.6 Utility Functions
8.4.6.1 NvInitStatic()
This function initializes the static variables used in the NV subsystem.
348 static void
349 NvInitStatic(
350 void
351 )
352 {
353 UINT16 i;
354 UINT32 reservedAddr;
355
356 s_reservedSize[NV_DISABLE_CLEAR] = sizeof(gp.disableClear);
357 s_reservedSize[NV_OWNER_ALG] = sizeof(gp.ownerAlg);
358 s_reservedSize[NV_ENDORSEMENT_ALG] = sizeof(gp.endorsementAlg);
359 s_reservedSize[NV_LOCKOUT_ALG] = sizeof(gp.lockoutAlg);
360 s_reservedSize[NV_OWNER_POLICY] = sizeof(gp.ownerPolicy);
361 s_reservedSize[NV_ENDORSEMENT_POLICY] = sizeof(gp.endorsementPolicy);
362 s_reservedSize[NV_LOCKOUT_POLICY] = sizeof(gp.lockoutPolicy);
363 s_reservedSize[NV_OWNER_AUTH] = sizeof(gp.ownerAuth);
364 s_reservedSize[NV_ENDORSEMENT_AUTH] = sizeof(gp.endorsementAuth);
365 s_reservedSize[NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH] = sizeof(gp.lockoutAuth);
366 s_reservedSize[NV_EP_SEED] = sizeof(gp.EPSeed);
367 s_reservedSize[NV_SP_SEED] = sizeof(gp.SPSeed);
368 s_reservedSize[NV_PP_SEED] = sizeof(gp.PPSeed);
369 s_reservedSize[NV_PH_PROOF] = sizeof(gp.phProof);
370 s_reservedSize[NV_SH_PROOF] = sizeof(gp.shProof);
371 s_reservedSize[NV_EH_PROOF] = sizeof(gp.ehProof);
372 s_reservedSize[NV_TOTAL_RESET_COUNT] = sizeof(gp.totalResetCount);
373 s_reservedSize[NV_RESET_COUNT] = sizeof(gp.resetCount);
374 s_reservedSize[NV_PCR_POLICIES] = sizeof(gp.pcrPolicies);
375 s_reservedSize[NV_PCR_ALLOCATED] = sizeof(gp.pcrAllocated);
376 s_reservedSize[NV_PP_LIST] = sizeof(gp.ppList);
377 s_reservedSize[NV_FAILED_TRIES] = sizeof(gp.failedTries);
378 s_reservedSize[NV_MAX_TRIES] = sizeof(gp.maxTries);
379 s_reservedSize[NV_RECOVERY_TIME] = sizeof(gp.recoveryTime);
380 s_reservedSize[NV_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY] = sizeof(gp.lockoutRecovery);
381 s_reservedSize[NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED] = sizeof(gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
382 s_reservedSize[NV_ORDERLY] = sizeof(gp.orderlyState);
383 s_reservedSize[NV_AUDIT_COMMANDS] = sizeof(gp.auditComands);
384 s_reservedSize[NV_AUDIT_HASH_ALG] = sizeof(gp.auditHashAlg);
385 s_reservedSize[NV_AUDIT_COUNTER] = sizeof(gp.auditCounter);
386 s_reservedSize[NV_ALGORITHM_SET] = sizeof(gp.algorithmSet);
387 s_reservedSize[NV_FIRMWARE_V1] = sizeof(gp.firmwareV1);
388 s_reservedSize[NV_FIRMWARE_V2] = sizeof(gp.firmwareV2);
389 s_reservedSize[NV_ORDERLY_DATA] = sizeof(go);
390 s_reservedSize[NV_STATE_CLEAR] = sizeof(gc);
391 s_reservedSize[NV_STATE_RESET] = sizeof(gr);
392
393 // Initialize reserved data address. In this implementation, reserved data
394 // is stored at the start of NV memory
395 reservedAddr = 0;
396 for(i = 0; i < NV_RESERVE_LAST; i++)
397 {
398 s_reservedAddr[i] = reservedAddr;
399 reservedAddr += s_reservedSize[i];
400 }
401
402 // Initialize auxiliary variable space for index/evict implementation.
403 // Auxiliary variables are stored after reserved data area
404 // RAM index copy starts at the beginning
405 s_ramIndexSizeAddr = reservedAddr;
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406 s_ramIndexAddr = s_ramIndexSizeAddr + sizeof(UINT32);
407
408 // Maximum counter value
409 s_maxCountAddr = s_ramIndexAddr + RAM_INDEX_SPACE;
410
411 // dynamic memory start
412 s_evictNvStart = s_maxCountAddr + sizeof(UINT64);
413
414 // dynamic memory ends at the end of NV memory
415 s_evictNvEnd = NV_MEMORY_SIZE;
416
417 return;
418 }
8.4.6.2 NvInit()
This function initializes the NV system at pre-install time.
This function should only be called in a manufacturing environment or in a simulation.
The layout of NV memory space is an implementation choice.
419 void
420 NvInit(
421 void
422 )
423 {
424 UINT32 nullPointer = 0;
425 UINT64 zeroCounter = 0;
426
427 // Initialize static variables
428 NvInitStatic();
429
430 // Initialize RAM index space as unused
431 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexSizeAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &nullPointer);
432
433 // Initialize max counter value to 0
434 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_maxCountAddr, sizeof(UINT64), &zeroCounter);
435
436 // Initialize the next offset of the first entry in evict/index list to 0
437 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_evictNvStart, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &nullPointer);
438
439 return;
440
441 }
8.4.6.3 NvReadReserved()
This function is used to move reserved data from NV memory to RAM.
442 void
443 NvReadReserved(
444 NV_RESERVE type, // IN: type of reserved data
445 void *buffer // OUT: buffer receives the data.
446 )
447 {
448 // Input type should be valid
449 pAssert(type >= 0 && type < NV_RESERVE_LAST);
450
451 _plat__NvMemoryRead(s_reservedAddr[type], s_reservedSize[type], buffer);
452 return;
453 }
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8.4.6.4 NvWriteReserved()
This function is used to post a reserved data for writing to NV memory. Before the TPM completes the
operation, the value will be written.
454 void
455 NvWriteReserved(
456 NV_RESERVE type, // IN: type of reserved data
457 void *buffer // IN: data buffer
458 )
459 {
460 // Input type should be valid
461 pAssert(type >= 0 && type < NV_RESERVE_LAST);
462
463 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_reservedAddr[type], s_reservedSize[type], buffer);
464
465 // Set the flag that a NV write happens
466 g_updateNV = TRUE;
467 return;
468 }
8.4.6.5 NvReadPersistent()
This function reads persistent data to the RAM copy of the gp structure.
469 void
470 NvReadPersistent(
471 void
472 )
473 {
474 // Hierarchy persistent data
475 NvReadReserved(NV_DISABLE_CLEAR, &gp.disableClear);
476 NvReadReserved(NV_OWNER_ALG, &gp.ownerAlg);
477 NvReadReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_ALG, &gp.endorsementAlg);
478 NvReadReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_ALG, &gp.lockoutAlg);
479 NvReadReserved(NV_OWNER_POLICY, &gp.ownerPolicy);
480 NvReadReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_POLICY, &gp.endorsementPolicy);
481 NvReadReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_POLICY, &gp.lockoutPolicy);
482 NvReadReserved(NV_OWNER_AUTH, &gp.ownerAuth);
483 NvReadReserved(NV_ENDORSEMENT_AUTH, &gp.endorsementAuth);
484 NvReadReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH, &gp.lockoutAuth);
485 NvReadReserved(NV_EP_SEED, &gp.EPSeed);
486 NvReadReserved(NV_SP_SEED, &gp.SPSeed);
487 NvReadReserved(NV_PP_SEED, &gp.PPSeed);
488 NvReadReserved(NV_PH_PROOF, &gp.phProof);
489 NvReadReserved(NV_SH_PROOF, &gp.shProof);
490 NvReadReserved(NV_EH_PROOF, &gp.ehProof);
491
492 // Time persistent data
493 NvReadReserved(NV_TOTAL_RESET_COUNT, &gp.totalResetCount);
494 NvReadReserved(NV_RESET_COUNT, &gp.resetCount);
495
496 // PCR persistent data
497 NvReadReserved(NV_PCR_POLICIES, &gp.pcrPolicies);
498 NvReadReserved(NV_PCR_ALLOCATED, &gp.pcrAllocated);
499
500 // Physical Presence persistent data
501 NvReadReserved(NV_PP_LIST, &gp.ppList);
502
503 // Dictionary attack values persistent data
504 NvReadReserved(NV_FAILED_TRIES, &gp.failedTries);
505 NvReadReserved(NV_MAX_TRIES, &gp.maxTries);
506 NvReadReserved(NV_RECOVERY_TIME, &gp.recoveryTime);
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507 NvReadReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY, &gp.lockoutRecovery);
508 NvReadReserved(NV_LOCKOUT_AUTH_ENABLED, &gp.lockOutAuthEnabled);
509
510 // Orderly State persistent data
511 NvReadReserved(NV_ORDERLY, &gp.orderlyState);
512
513 // Command audit values persistent data
514 NvReadReserved(NV_AUDIT_COMMANDS, &gp.auditComands);
515 NvReadReserved(NV_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, &gp.auditHashAlg);
516 NvReadReserved(NV_AUDIT_COUNTER, &gp.auditCounter);
517
518 // Algorithm selection persistent data
519 NvReadReserved(NV_ALGORITHM_SET, &gp.algorithmSet);
520
521 // Firmware version persistent data
522 NvReadReserved(NV_FIRMWARE_V1, &gp.firmwareV1);
523 NvReadReserved(NV_FIRMWARE_V2, &gp.firmwareV2);
524
525 return;
526 }
8.4.6.6 NvIsPlatformPersistentHandle()
This function indicates if a handle references a persistent object in the range belonging to the platform.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE handle references a platform persistent object
FALSE handle does not reference platform persistent object and may
reference an owner persistent object either
527 BOOL
528 NvIsPlatformPersistentHandle(
529 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: handle
530 )
531 {
532 return (handle >= PLATFORM_PERSISTENT && handle <= PERSISTENT_LAST);
533 }
8.4.6.7 NvIsOwnerPersistentHandle()
This function indicates if a handle references a persistent object in the range belonging to the owner.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE handle is owner persistent handle
FALSE handle is not owner persistent handle and may not be a persistent
handle at all
534 BOOL
535 NvIsOwnerPersistentHandle(
536 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: handle
537 )
538 {
539 return (handle >= PERSISTENT_FIRST && handle < PLATFORM_PERSISTENT);
540 }
8.4.6.8 NvNextIndex()
This function returns the offset in NV of the next NV Index entry. A value of 0 indicates the end of the list.
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541 static UINT32
542 NvNextIndex(
543 NV_ITER *iter
544 )
545 {
546 UINT32 addr;
547 TPM_HANDLE handle;
548
549 while((addr = NvNext(iter)) != 0)
550 {
551 // Read handle
552 _plat__NvMemoryRead(addr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &handle);
553 if(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX)
554 return addr;
555 }
556
557 pAssert(addr == 0);
558 return addr;
559 }
8.4.6.9 NvNextEvict()
This function returns the offset in NV of the next evict object entry. A value of 0 indicates the end of the
list.
560 static UINT32
561 NvNextEvict(
562 NV_ITER *iter
563 )
564 {
565 UINT32 addr;
566 TPM_HANDLE handle;
567
568 while((addr = NvNext(iter)) != 0)
569 {
570 // Read handle
571 _plat__NvMemoryRead(addr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &handle);
572 if(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT)
573 return addr;
574 }
575
576 pAssert(addr == 0);
577 return addr;
578 }
8.4.6.10 NvFindHandle()
this function returns the offset in NV memory of the entity associated with the input handle. A value of
zero indicates that handle does not exist reference an existing persistent object or defined NV Index.
579 static UINT32
580 NvFindHandle(
581 TPM_HANDLE handle
582 )
583 {
584 UINT32 addr;
585 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
586
587 while((addr = NvNext(&iter)) != 0)
588 {
589 TPM_HANDLE entityHandle;
590 // Read handle
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591 _plat__NvMemoryRead(addr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &entityHandle);
592 if(entityHandle == handle)
593 return addr;
594 }
595
596 pAssert(addr == 0);
597 return addr;
598 }
8.4.6.11 NvPowerOn()
This function is called at _TPM_Init() to initialize the NV environment.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE all NV was initialized
FALSE the NV containing saved state had an error and
TPM2_Startup(CLEAR) is required
599 BOOL
600 NvPowerOn(
601 void
602 )
603 {
604 int nvError = 0;
605 // If power was lost, need to re-establish the RAM data that is loaded from
606 // NV and initialize the static variables
607 if(_plat__WasPowerLost(TRUE))
608 {
609 if((nvError = _plat__NVEnable(0)) < 0)
610 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_NV_UNRECOVERABLE);
611
612 NvInitStatic();
613 }
614
615 return nvError == 0;
616 }
8.4.6.12 NvStateSave()
This function is used to cause the memory containing the RAM backed NV Indices to be written to NV.
617 void
618 NvStateSave(
619 void
620 )
621 {
622 // Write RAM backed NV Index info to NV
623 // No need to save s_ramIndexSize because we save it to NV whenever it is
624 // updated.
625 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(s_ramIndexAddr, RAM_INDEX_SPACE, s_ramIndex);
626
627 // Set the flag so that an NV write happens before the command completes.
628 g_updateNV = TRUE;
629
630 return;
631 }
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8.4.6.13 NvEntityStartup()
This function is called at TPM_Startup(). If the startup completes a TPM Resume cycle, no action is
taken. If the startup is a TPM Reset or a TPM Restart, then this function will:
a) clear read/write lock;
b) reset NV Index data that has TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR SET; and
c) set the lower bits in orderly counters to 1 for a non-orderly startup
It is a prerequisite that NV be available for writing before this function is called.
632 void
633 NvEntityStartup(
634 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: start up type
635 )
636 {
637 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
638 UINT32 currentAddr; // offset points to the current entity
639
640 // Restore RAM index data
641 _plat__NvMemoryRead(s_ramIndexSizeAddr, sizeof(UINT32), &s_ramIndexSize);
642 _plat__NvMemoryRead(s_ramIndexAddr, RAM_INDEX_SPACE, s_ramIndex);
643
644 // If recovering from state save, do nothing
645 if(type == SU_RESUME)
646 return;
647
648 // Iterate all the NV Index to clear the locks
649 while((currentAddr = NvNextIndex(&iter)) != 0)
650 {
651 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
652 UINT32 indexAddr; // NV address points to index info
653 TPMA_NV attributes;
654
655 indexAddr = currentAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE);
656
657 // Read NV Index info structure
658 _plat__NvMemoryRead(indexAddr, sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
659 attributes = nvIndex.publicArea.attributes;
660
661 // Clear read/write lock
662 if(attributes.TPMA_NV_READLOCKED == SET)
663 attributes.TPMA_NV_READLOCKED = CLEAR;
664
665 if( attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED == SET
666 && ( attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == CLEAR
667 || attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITEDEFINE == CLEAR
668 )
669 )
670 attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED = CLEAR;
671
672 // Reset NV data for TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR
673 if(attributes.TPMA_NV_CLEAR_STCLEAR == SET)
674 {
675 attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN = CLEAR;
676 attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED = CLEAR;
677 }
678
679 // Reset NV data for orderly values that are not counters
680 // NOTE: The function has already exited on a TPM Resume, so the only
681 // things being processed are TPM Restart and TPM Reset
682 if( type == SU_RESET
683 && attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET
684 && attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == CLEAR
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685 )
686 attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN = CLEAR;
687
688 // Write NV Index info back if it has changed
689 if(*((UINT32 *)&attributes) != *((UINT32 *)&nvIndex.publicArea.attributes))
690 {
691 nvIndex.publicArea.attributes = attributes;
692 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(indexAddr, sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
693
694 // Set the flag that a NV write happens
695 g_updateNV = TRUE;
696 }
697 // Set the lower bits in an orderly counter to 1 for a non-orderly startup
698 if( g_prevOrderlyState == SHUTDOWN_NONE
699 && attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET)
700 {
701 if( attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET
702 && attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET)
703 {
704 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nvHandle;
705 UINT64 counter;
706
707 // Read NV handle
708 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &nvHandle);
709
710 // Read the counter value saved to NV upon the last roll over.
711 // Do not use RAM backed storage for this once.
712 nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY = CLEAR;
713 NvGetIntIndexData(nvHandle, &nvIndex, &counter);
714 nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY = SET;
715
716 // Set the lower bits of counter to 1's
717 counter |= MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT;
718
719 // Write back to RAM
720 NvWriteIndexData(nvHandle, &nvIndex, 0, sizeof(counter), &counter);
721
722 // No write to NV because an orderly shutdown will update the
723 // counters.
724
725 }
726 }
727 }
728
729 return;
730
731 }
8.4.7 NV Access Functions
8.4.7.1 Introduction
This set of functions provide accessing NV Index and persistent objects based using a handle for
reference to the entity.
8.4.7.2 NvIsUndefinedIndex()
This function is used to verify that an NV Index is not defined. This is only used by
TPM2_NV_DefineSpace().
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE the handle points to an existing NV Index
FALSE the handle points to a non-existent Index
732 BOOL
733 NvIsUndefinedIndex(
734 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle // IN: handle
735 )
736 {
737 UINT32 entityAddr; // offset points to the entity
738
739 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX);
740
741 // Find the address of index
742 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
743
744 // If handle is not found, return TPM_RC_SUCCESS
745 if(entityAddr == 0)
746 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
747
748 // NV Index is defined
749 return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED;
750 }
8.4.7.3 NvIndexIsAccessible()
This function validates that a handle references a defined NV Index and that the Index is currently
accessible.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_HANDLE the handle points to an undefined NV Index If shEnable is CLEAR,
this would include an index created using ownerAuth. If phEnableNV
is CLEAR, this would include and index created using platform auth
TPM_RC_NV_READLOCKED Index is present but locked for reading and command does not write
to the index
TPM_RC_NV_WRITELOCKED Index is present but locked for writing and command writes to the
index
751 TPM_RC
752 NvIndexIsAccessible(
753 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
754 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: the command
755 )
756 {
757 UINT32 entityAddr; // offset points to the entity
758 NV_INDEX nvIndex; //
759
760 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX);
761
762 // Find the address of index
763 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
764
765 // If handle is not found, return TPM_RC_HANDLE
766 if(entityAddr == 0)
767 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
768
769 // Read NV Index info structure
770 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entityAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), sizeof(NV_INDEX),
771 &nvIndex);
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772
773 if(gc.shEnable == FALSE || gc.phEnableNV == FALSE)
774 {
775 // if shEnable is CLEAR, an ownerCreate NV Index should not be
776 // indicated as present
777 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE == CLEAR)
778 {
779 if(gc.shEnable == FALSE)
780 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
781 }
782 // if phEnableNV is CLEAR, a platform created Index should not
783 // be visible
784 else if(gc.phEnableNV == FALSE)
785 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
786 }
787
788 // If the Index is write locked and this is an NV Write operation...
789 if( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED
790 && IsWriteOperation(commandCode))
791 {
792 // then return a locked indication unless the command is TPM2_NV_WriteLock
793 if(commandCode != TPM_CC_NV_WriteLock)
794 return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED;
795 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
796 }
797 // If the Index is read locked and this is an NV Read operation...
798 if( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_READLOCKED
799 && IsReadOperation(commandCode))
800 {
801 // then return a locked indication unless the command is TPM2_NV_ReadLock
802 if(commandCode != TPM_CC_NV_ReadLock)
803 return TPM_RC_NV_LOCKED;
804 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
805 }
806
807 // NV Index is accessible
808 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
809 }
8.4.7.4 NvIsUndefinedEvictHandle()
This function indicates if a handle does not reference an existing persistent object. This function requires
that the handle be in the proper range for persistent objects.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE handle does not reference an existing persistent object
FALSE handle does reference an existing persistent object
810 static BOOL
811 NvIsUndefinedEvictHandle(
812 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: handle
813 )
814 {
815 UINT32 entityAddr; // offset points to the entity
816 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT);
817
818 // Find the address of evict object
819 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
820
821 // If handle is not found, return TRUE
822 if(entityAddr == 0)
823 return TRUE;
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824 else
825 return FALSE;
826 }
8.4.7.5 NvGetEvictObject()
This function is used to dereference an evict object handle and get a pointer to the object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_HANDLE the handle does not point to an existing persistent object
827 TPM_RC
828 NvGetEvictObject(
829 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: handle
830 OBJECT *object // OUT: object data
831 )
832 {
833 UINT32 entityAddr; // offset points to the entity
834 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
835
836 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT);
837
838 // Find the address of evict object
839 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
840
841 // If handle is not found, return an error
842 if(entityAddr == 0)
843 result = TPM_RC_HANDLE;
844 else
845 // Read evict object
846 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entityAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE),
847 sizeof(OBJECT),
848 object);
849
850 // whether there is an error or not, make sure that the evict
851 // status of the object is set so that the slot will get freed on exit
852 object->attributes.evict = SET;
853
854 return result;
855 }
8.4.7.6 NvGetIndexInfo()
This function is used to retrieve the contents of an NV Index.
An implementation is allowed to save the NV Index in a vendor-defined format. If the format is different
from the default used by the reference code, then this function would be changed to reformat the data into
the default format.
A prerequisite to calling this function is that the handle must be known to reference a defined NV Index.
856 void
857 NvGetIndexInfo(
858 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
859 NV_INDEX *nvIndex // OUT: NV index structure
860 )
861 {
862 UINT32 entityAddr; // offset points to the entity
863
864 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX);
865
866 // Find the address of NV index
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867 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
868 pAssert(entityAddr != 0);
869
870 // This implementation uses the default format so just
871 // read the data in
872 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entityAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), sizeof(NV_INDEX),
873 nvIndex);
874
875 return;
876 }
8.4.7.7 NvInitialCounter()
This function returns the value to be used when a counter index is initialized. It will scan the NV counters
and find the highest value in any active counter. It will use that value as the starting point. If there are no
active counters, it will use the value of the previous largest counter.
877 UINT64
878 NvInitialCounter(
879 void
880 )
881 {
882 UINT64 maxCount;
883 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
884 UINT32 currentAddr;
885
886 // Read the maxCount value
887 maxCount = NvReadMaxCount();
888
889 // Iterate all existing counters
890 while((currentAddr = NvNextIndex(&iter)) != 0)
891 {
892 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nvHandle;
893 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
894
895 // Read NV handle
896 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &nvHandle);
897
898 // Get NV Index
899 NvGetIndexInfo(nvHandle, &nvIndex);
900 if( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET
901 && nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET)
902 {
903 UINT64 countValue;
904 // Read counter value
905 NvGetIntIndexData(nvHandle, &nvIndex, &countValue);
906 if(countValue > maxCount)
907 maxCount = countValue;
908 }
909 }
910 // Initialize the new counter value to be maxCount + 1
911 // A counter is only initialized the first time it is written. The
912 // way to write a counter is with TPM2_NV_INCREMENT(). Since the
913 // "initial" value of a defined counter is the largest count value that
914 // may have existed in this index previously, then the first use would
915 // add one to that value.
916 return maxCount;
917 }
8.4.7.8 NvGetIndexData()
This function is used to access the data in an NV Index. The data is returned as a byte sequence. Since
counter values are kept in native format, they are converted to canonical form before being returned.
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This function requires that the NV Index be defined, and that the required data is within the data range. It
also requires that TPMA_NV_WRITTEN of the Index is SET.
918 void
919 NvGetIndexData(
920 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
921 NV_INDEX *nvIndex, // IN: RAM image of index header
922 UINT32 offset, // IN: offset of NV data
923 UINT16 size, // IN: size of NV data
924 void *data // OUT: data buffer
925 )
926 {
927
928 pAssert(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET);
929
930 if( nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_BITS == SET
931 || nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET)
932 {
933 // Read bit or counter data in canonical form
934 UINT64 dataInInt;
935 NvGetIntIndexData(handle, nvIndex, &dataInInt);
936 UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(dataInInt, (BYTE *)data);
937 }
938 else
939 {
940 if(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
941 {
942 UINT32 ramAddr;
943
944 // Get data from RAM buffer
945 ramAddr = NvGetRAMIndexOffset(handle);
946 MemoryCopy(data, s_ramIndex + ramAddr + offset, size, size);
947 }
948 else
949 {
950 UINT32 entityAddr;
951 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
952 // Get data from NV
953 // Skip NV Index info, read data buffer
954 entityAddr += sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX) + offset;
955 // Read the data
956 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entityAddr, size, data);
957 }
958 }
959 return;
960 }
8.4.7.9 NvGetIntIndexData()
Get data in integer format of a bit or counter NV Index.
This function requires that the NV Index is defined and that the NV Index previously has been written.
961 void
962 NvGetIntIndexData(
963 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
964 NV_INDEX *nvIndex, // IN: RAM image of NV Index header
965 UINT64 *data // IN: UINT64 pointer for counter or bit
966 )
967 {
968 // Validate that index has been written and is the right type
969 pAssert( nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET
970 && ( nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_BITS == SET
971 || nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET
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972 )
973 );
974
975 // bit and counter value is store in native format for TPM CPU. So we directly
976 // copy the contents of NV to output data buffer
977 if(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
978 {
979 UINT32 ramAddr;
980
981 // Get data from RAM buffer
982 ramAddr = NvGetRAMIndexOffset(handle);
983 MemoryCopy(data, s_ramIndex + ramAddr, sizeof(*data), sizeof(*data));
984 }
985 else
986 {
987 UINT32 entityAddr;
988 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
989
990 // Get data from NV
991 // Skip NV Index info, read data buffer
992 _plat__NvMemoryRead(
993 entityAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX),
994 sizeof(UINT64), data);
995 }
996
997 return;
998 }
8.4.7.10 NvWriteIndexInfo()
This function is called to queue the write of NV Index data to persistent memory.
This function requires that NV Index is defined.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is rate limiting so retry
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is not available
999 TPM_RC
1000 NvWriteIndexInfo(
1001 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
1002 NV_INDEX *nvIndex // IN: NV Index info to be written
1003 )
1004 {
1005 UINT32 entryAddr;
1006 TPM_RC result;
1007
1008 // Get the starting offset for the index in the RAM image of NV
1009 entryAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
1010 pAssert(entryAddr != 0);
1011
1012 // Step over the link value
1013 entryAddr = entryAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE);
1014
1015 // If the index data is actually changed, then a write to NV is required
1016 if(_plat__NvIsDifferent(entryAddr, sizeof(NV_INDEX),nvIndex))
1017 {
1018 // Make sure that NV is available
1019 result = NvIsAvailable();
1020 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1021 return result;
1022 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(entryAddr, sizeof(NV_INDEX), nvIndex);
1023 g_updateNV = TRUE;
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1024 }
1025 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1026 }
8.4.7.11 NvWriteIndexData()
This function is used to write NV index data.
This function requires that the NV Index is defined, and the data is within the defined data range for the
index.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_RATE NV is rate limiting so retry
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE NV is not available
1027 TPM_RC
1028 NvWriteIndexData(
1029 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle
1030 NV_INDEX *nvIndex, // IN: RAM copy of NV Index
1031 UINT32 offset, // IN: offset of NV data
1032 UINT32 size, // IN: size of NV data
1033 void *data // OUT: data buffer
1034 )
1035 {
1036 TPM_RC result;
1037 // Validate that write falls within range of the index
1038 pAssert(nvIndex->publicArea.dataSize >= offset + size);
1039
1040 // Update TPMA_NV_WRITTEN bit if necessary
1041 if(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == CLEAR)
1042 {
1043 nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN = SET;
1044 result = NvWriteIndexInfo(handle, nvIndex);
1045 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1046 return result;
1047 }
1048
1049 // Check to see if process for an orderly index is required.
1050 if(nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
1051 {
1052 UINT32 ramAddr;
1053
1054 // Write data to RAM buffer
1055 ramAddr = NvGetRAMIndexOffset(handle);
1056 MemoryCopy(s_ramIndex + ramAddr + offset, data, size,
1057 sizeof(s_ramIndex) - ramAddr - offset);
1058
1059 // NV update does not happen for orderly index. Have
1060 // to clear orderlyState to reflect that we have changed the
1061 // NV and an orderly shutdown is required. Only going to do this if we
1062 // are not processing a counter that has just rolled over
1063 if(g_updateNV == FALSE)
1064 g_clearOrderly = TRUE;
1065 }
1066 // Need to process this part if the Index isn't orderly or if it is
1067 // an orderly counter that just rolled over.
1068 if(g_updateNV || nvIndex->publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == CLEAR)
1069 {
1070 // Processing for an index with TPMA_NV_ORDERLY CLEAR
1071 UINT32 entryAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
1072
1073 pAssert(entryAddr != 0);
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1074
1075 // Offset into the index to the first byte of the data to be written
1076 entryAddr += sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX) + offset;
1077
1078 // If the data is actually changed, then a write to NV is required
1079 if(_plat__NvIsDifferent(entryAddr, size, data))
1080 {
1081 // Make sure that NV is available
1082 result = NvIsAvailable();
1083 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
1084 return result;
1085 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(entryAddr, size, data);
1086 g_updateNV = TRUE;
1087 }
1088 }
1089 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1090 }
8.4.7.12 NvGetName()
This function is used to compute the Name of an NV Index.
The name buffer receives the bytes of the Name and the return value is the number of octets in the
Name.
This function requires that the NV Index is defined.
1091 UINT16
1092 NvGetName(
1093 TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX handle, // IN: handle of the index
1094 NAME *name // OUT: name of the index
1095 )
1096 {
1097 UINT16 dataSize, digestSize;
1098 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
1099 BYTE marshalBuffer[sizeof(TPMS_NV_PUBLIC)];
1100 BYTE *buffer;
1101 HASH_STATE hashState;
1102
1103 // Get NV public info
1104 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
1105
1106 // Marshal public area
1107 buffer = marshalBuffer;
1108 dataSize = TPMS_NV_PUBLIC_Marshal(&nvIndex.publicArea, &buffer, NULL);
1109
1110 // hash public area
1111 digestSize = CryptStartHash(nvIndex.publicArea.nameAlg, &hashState);
1112 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, dataSize, marshalBuffer);
1113
1114 // Complete digest leaving room for the nameAlg
1115 CryptCompleteHash(&hashState, digestSize, &((BYTE *)name)[2]);
1116
1117 // Include the nameAlg
1118 UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(nvIndex.publicArea.nameAlg, (BYTE *)name);
1119 return digestSize + 2;
1120 }
8.4.7.13 NvDefineIndex()
This function is used to assign NV memory to an NV Index.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_SPACE insufficient NV space
1121 TPM_RC
1122 NvDefineIndex(
1123 TPMS_NV_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN: A template for an area to create.
1124 TPM2B_AUTH *authValue // IN: The initial authorization value
1125 )
1126 {
1127 // The buffer to be written to NV memory
1128 BYTE nvBuffer[sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX)];
1129
1130 NV_INDEX *nvIndex; // a pointer to the NV_INDEX data in
1131 // nvBuffer
1132 UINT16 entrySize; // size of entry
1133
1134 entrySize = sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX) + publicArea->dataSize;
1135
1136 // Check if we have enough space to create the NV Index
1137 // In this implementation, the only resource limitation is the available NV
1138 // space. Other implementation may have other limitation on counter or on
1139 // NV slot
1140 if(!NvTestSpace(entrySize, TRUE)) return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE;
1141
1142 // if the index to be defined is RAM backed, check RAM space availability
1143 // as well
1144 if(publicArea->attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET
1145 && !NvTestRAMSpace(publicArea->dataSize))
1146 return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE;
1147
1148 // Copy input value to nvBuffer
1149 // Copy handle
1150 * (TPM_HANDLE *) nvBuffer = publicArea->nvIndex;
1151
1152 // Copy NV_INDEX
1153 nvIndex = (NV_INDEX *) (nvBuffer + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE));
1154 nvIndex->publicArea = *publicArea;
1155 nvIndex->authValue = *authValue;
1156
1157 // Add index to NV memory
1158 NvAdd(entrySize, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(NV_INDEX), nvBuffer);
1159
1160 // If the data of NV Index is RAM backed, add the data area in RAM as well
1161 if(publicArea->attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
1162 NvAddRAM(publicArea->nvIndex, publicArea->dataSize);
1163
1164 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1165 }
8.4.7.14 NvAddEvictObject()
This function is used to assign NV memory to a persistent object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NV_HANDLE the requested handle is already in use
TPM_RC_NV_SPACE insufficient NV space
1166 TPM_RC
1167 NvAddEvictObject(
1168 TPMI_DH_OBJECT evictHandle, // IN: new evict handle
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1169 OBJECT *object // IN: object to be added
1170 )
1171 {
1172 // The buffer to be written to NV memory
1173 BYTE nvBuffer[sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(OBJECT)];
1174
1175 OBJECT *nvObject; // a pointer to the OBJECT data in
1176 // nvBuffer
1177 UINT16 entrySize; // size of entry
1178
1179 // evict handle type should match the object hierarchy
1180 pAssert( ( NvIsPlatformPersistentHandle(evictHandle)
1181 && object->attributes.ppsHierarchy == SET)
1182 || ( NvIsOwnerPersistentHandle(evictHandle)
1183 && ( object->attributes.spsHierarchy == SET
1184 || object->attributes.epsHierarchy == SET)));
1185
1186 // An evict needs 4 bytes of handle + sizeof OBJECT
1187 entrySize = sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(OBJECT);
1188
1189 // Check if we have enough space to add the evict object
1190 // An evict object needs 8 bytes in index table + sizeof OBJECT
1191 // In this implementation, the only resource limitation is the available NV
1192 // space. Other implementation may have other limitation on evict object
1193 // handle space
1194 if(!NvTestSpace(entrySize, FALSE)) return TPM_RC_NV_SPACE;
1195
1196 // Allocate a new evict handle
1197 if(!NvIsUndefinedEvictHandle(evictHandle))
1198 return TPM_RC_NV_DEFINED;
1199
1200 // Copy evict object to nvBuffer
1201 // Copy handle
1202 * (TPM_HANDLE *) nvBuffer = evictHandle;
1203
1204 // Copy OBJECT
1205 nvObject = (OBJECT *) (nvBuffer + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE));
1206 *nvObject = *object;
1207
1208 // Set evict attribute and handle
1209 nvObject->attributes.evict = SET;
1210 nvObject->evictHandle = evictHandle;
1211
1212 // Add evict to NV memory
1213 NvAdd(entrySize, entrySize, nvBuffer);
1214
1215 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1216
1217 }
8.4.7.15 NvDeleteEntity()
This function will delete a NV Index or an evict object.
This function requires that the index/evict object has been defined.
1218 void
1219 NvDeleteEntity(
1220 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: handle of entity to be deleted
1221 )
1222 {
1223 UINT32 entityAddr; // pointer to entity
1224
1225 entityAddr = NvFindHandle(handle);
1226 pAssert(entityAddr != 0);
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1227
1228 if(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX)
1229 {
1230 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
1231
1232 // Read the NV Index info
1233 _plat__NvMemoryRead(entityAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), sizeof(NV_INDEX),
1234 &nvIndex);
1235
1236 // If the entity to be deleted is a counter with the maximum counter
1237 // value, record it in NV memory
1238 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET
1239 && nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITTEN == SET)
1240 {
1241 UINT64 countValue;
1242 UINT64 maxCount;
1243 NvGetIntIndexData(handle, &nvIndex, &countValue);
1244 maxCount = NvReadMaxCount();
1245 if(countValue > maxCount)
1246 NvWriteMaxCount(countValue);
1247 }
1248 // If the NV Index is RAM back, delete the RAM data as well
1249 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
1250 NvDeleteRAM(handle);
1251 }
1252 NvDelete(entityAddr);
1253
1254 return;
1255
1256 }
8.4.7.16 NvFlushHierarchy()
This function will delete persistent objects belonging to the indicated If the storage hierarchy is selected,
the function will also delete any NV Index define using ownerAuth.
1257 void
1258 NvFlushHierarchy(
1259 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy // IN: hierarchy to be flushed.
1260 )
1261 {
1262 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1263 UINT32 currentAddr;
1264
1265 while((currentAddr = NvNext(&iter)) != 0)
1266 {
1267 TPM_HANDLE entityHandle;
1268
1269 // Read handle information.
1270 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &entityHandle);
1271
1272 if(HandleGetType(entityHandle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX)
1273 {
1274 // Handle NV Index
1275 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
1276
1277 // If flush endorsement or platform hierarchy, no NV Index would be
1278 // flushed
1279 if(hierarchy == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT || hierarchy == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
1280 continue;
1281 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE),
1282 sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
1283
1284 // For storage hierarchy, flush OwnerCreated index
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1285 if( nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE == CLEAR)
1286 {
1287 // Delete the NV Index
1288 NvDelete(currentAddr);
1289
1290 // Re-iterate from beginning after a delete
1291 iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1292
1293 // If the NV Index is RAM back, delete the RAM data as well
1294 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_ORDERLY == SET)
1295 NvDeleteRAM(entityHandle);
1296 }
1297 }
1298 else if(HandleGetType(entityHandle) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT)
1299 {
1300 OBJECT object;
1301
1302 // Get evict object
1303 NvGetEvictObject(entityHandle, &object);
1304
1305 // If the evict object belongs to the hierarchy to be flushed
1306 if( ( hierarchy == TPM_RH_PLATFORM
1307 && object.attributes.ppsHierarchy == SET)
1308 || ( hierarchy == TPM_RH_OWNER
1309 && object.attributes.spsHierarchy == SET)
1310 || ( hierarchy == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
1311 && object.attributes.epsHierarchy == SET)
1312 )
1313 {
1314 // Delete the evict object
1315 NvDelete(currentAddr);
1316
1317 // Re-iterate from beginning after a delete
1318 iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1319 }
1320 }
1321 else
1322 {
1323 pAssert(FALSE);
1324 }
1325 }
1326
1327 return;
1328 }
8.4.7.17 NvSetGlobalLock()
This function is used to SET the TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED attribute for all NV Indices that have
TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK SET. This function is use by TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock().
1329 void
1330 NvSetGlobalLock(
1331 void
1332 )
1333 {
1334 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1335 UINT32 currentAddr;
1336
1337 // Check all Indices
1338 while((currentAddr = NvNextIndex(&iter)) != 0)
1339 {
1340 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
1341
1342 // Read the index data
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1343 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE),
1344 sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
1345
1346 // See if it should be locked
1347 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_GLOBALLOCK == SET)
1348 {
1349
1350 // if so, lock it
1351 nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_WRITELOCKED = SET;
1352
1353 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(currentAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE),
1354 sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
1355 // Set the flag that a NV write happens
1356 g_updateNV = TRUE;
1357 }
1358 }
1359
1360 return;
1361
1362 }
8.4.7.18 InsertSort()
Sort a handle into handle list in ascending order. The total handle number in the list should not exceed
MAX_CAP_HANDLES
1363 static void
1364 InsertSort(
1365 TPML_HANDLE *handleList, // IN/OUT: sorted handle list
1366 UINT32 count, // IN: maximum count in the handle list
1367 TPM_HANDLE entityHandle // IN: handle to be inserted
1368 )
1369 {
1370 UINT32 i, j;
1371 UINT32 originalCount;
1372
1373 // For a corner case that the maximum count is 0, do nothing
1374 if(count == 0) return;
1375
1376 // For empty list, add the handle at the beginning and return
1377 if(handleList->count == 0)
1378 {
1379 handleList->handle[0] = entityHandle;
1380 handleList->count++;
1381 return;
1382 }
1383
1384 // Check if the maximum of the list has been reached
1385 originalCount = handleList->count;
1386 if(originalCount < count)
1387 handleList->count++;
1388
1389 // Insert the handle to the list
1390 for(i = 0; i < originalCount; i++)
1391 {
1392 if(handleList->handle[i] > entityHandle)
1393 {
1394 for(j = handleList->count - 1; j > i; j--)
1395 {
1396 handleList->handle[j] = handleList->handle[j-1];
1397 }
1398 break;
1399 }
1400 }
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1401
1402 // If a slot was found, insert the handle in this position
1403 if(i < originalCount || handleList->count > originalCount)
1404 handleList->handle[i] = entityHandle;
1405
1406 return;
1407 }
8.4.7.19 NvCapGetPersistent()
This function is used to get a list of handles of the persistent objects, starting at handle.
Handle must be in valid persistent object handle range, but does not have to reference an existing
persistent object.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
1408 TPMI_YES_NO
1409 NvCapGetPersistent(
1410 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle, // IN: start handle
1411 UINT32 count, // IN: maximum number of returned handle
1412 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
1413 )
1414 {
1415 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
1416 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1417 UINT32 currentAddr;
1418
1419 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PERSISTENT);
1420
1421 // Initialize output handle list
1422 handleList->count = 0;
1423
1424 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
1425 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
1426
1427 while((currentAddr = NvNextEvict(&iter)) != 0)
1428 {
1429 TPM_HANDLE entityHandle;
1430
1431 // Read handle information.
1432 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &entityHandle);
1433
1434 // Ignore persistent handles that have values less than the input handle
1435 if(entityHandle < handle)
1436 continue;
1437
1438 // if the handles in the list have reached the requested count, and there
1439 // are still handles need to be inserted, indicate that there are more.
1440 if(handleList->count == count)
1441 more = YES;
1442
1443 // A handle with a value larger than start handle is a candidate
1444 // for return. Insert sort it to the return list. Insert sort algorithm
1445 // is chosen here for simplicity based on the assumption that the total
1446 // number of NV Indices is small. For an implementation that may allow
1447 // large number of NV Indices, a more efficient sorting algorithm may be
1448 // used here.
1449 InsertSort(handleList, count, entityHandle);
1450
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1451 }
1452 return more;
1453 }
8.4.7.20 NvCapGetIndex()
This function returns a list of handles of NV Indices, starting from handle. Handle must be in the range of
NV Indices, but does not have to reference an existing NV Index.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles to report
NO all the available handles has been reported
1454 TPMI_YES_NO
1455 NvCapGetIndex(
1456 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle, // IN: start handle
1457 UINT32 count, // IN: maximum number of returned handle
1458 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
1459 )
1460 {
1461 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
1462 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1463 UINT32 currentAddr;
1464
1465 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_NV_INDEX);
1466
1467 // Initialize output handle list
1468 handleList->count = 0;
1469
1470 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
1471 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
1472
1473 while((currentAddr = NvNextIndex(&iter)) != 0)
1474 {
1475 TPM_HANDLE entityHandle;
1476
1477 // Read handle information.
1478 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr, sizeof(TPM_HANDLE), &entityHandle);
1479
1480 // Ignore index handles that have values less than the 'handle'
1481 if(entityHandle < handle)
1482 continue;
1483
1484 // if the count of handles in the list has reached the requested count,
1485 // and there are still handles to report, set more.
1486 if(handleList->count == count)
1487 more = YES;
1488
1489 // A handle with a value larger than start handle is a candidate
1490 // for return. Insert sort it to the return list. Insert sort algorithm
1491 // is chosen here for simplicity based on the assumption that the total
1492 // number of NV Indices is small. For an implementation that may allow
1493 // large number of NV Indices, a more efficient sorting algorithm may be
1494 // used here.
1495 InsertSort(handleList, count, entityHandle);
1496 }
1497 return more;
1498 }
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8.4.7.21 NvCapGetIndexNumber()
This function returns the count of NV Indexes currently defined.
1499 UINT32
1500 NvCapGetIndexNumber(
1501 void
1502 )
1503 {
1504 UINT32 num = 0;
1505 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1506
1507 while(NvNextIndex(&iter) != 0) num++;
1508
1509 return num;
1510 }
8.4.7.22 NvCapGetPersistentNumber()
Function returns the count of persistent objects currently in NV memory.
1511 UINT32
1512 NvCapGetPersistentNumber(
1513 void
1514 )
1515 {
1516 UINT32 num = 0;
1517 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1518
1519 while(NvNextEvict(&iter) != 0) num++;
1520
1521 return num;
1522 }
8.4.7.23 NvCapGetPersistentAvail()
This function returns an estimate of the number of additional persistent objects that could be loaded into
NV memory.
1523 UINT32
1524 NvCapGetPersistentAvail(
1525 void
1526 )
1527 {
1528 UINT32 availSpace;
1529 UINT32 objectSpace;
1530
1531 // Compute the available space in NV storage
1532 availSpace = NvGetFreeByte();
1533
1534 // Get the space needed to add a persistent object to NV storage
1535 objectSpace = NvGetEvictObjectSize();
1536
1537 return availSpace / objectSpace;
1538 }
8.4.7.24 NvCapGetCounterNumber()
Get the number of defined NV Indexes that have NV TPMA_NV_COUNTER attribute SET.
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1539 UINT32
1540 NvCapGetCounterNumber(
1541 void
1542 )
1543 {
1544 NV_ITER iter = NV_ITER_INIT;
1545 UINT32 currentAddr;
1546 UINT32 num = 0;
1547
1548 while((currentAddr = NvNextIndex(&iter)) != 0)
1549 {
1550 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
1551
1552 // Get NV Index info
1553 _plat__NvMemoryRead(currentAddr + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE),
1554 sizeof(NV_INDEX), &nvIndex);
1555 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_COUNTER == SET) num++;
1556 }
1557
1558 return num;
1559 }
8.4.7.25 NvCapGetCounterAvail()
This function returns an estimate of the number of additional counter type NV Indices that can be defined.
1560 UINT32
1561 NvCapGetCounterAvail(
1562 void
1563 )
1564 {
1565 UINT32 availNVSpace;
1566 UINT32 availRAMSpace;
1567 UINT32 counterNVSpace;
1568 UINT32 counterRAMSpace;
1569 UINT32 persistentNum = NvCapGetPersistentNumber();
1570
1571 // Get the available space in NV storage
1572 availNVSpace = NvGetFreeByte();
1573
1574 if (persistentNum < MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS)
1575 {
1576 // Some space have to be reserved for evict object. Adjust availNVSpace.
1577 UINT32 reserved = (MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS - persistentNum)
1578 * NvGetEvictObjectSize();
1579 if (reserved > availNVSpace)
1580 availNVSpace = 0;
1581 else
1582 availNVSpace -= reserved;
1583 }
1584
1585 // Get the space needed to add a counter index to NV storage
1586 counterNVSpace = NvGetCounterSize();
1587
1588 // Compute the available space in RAM
1589 availRAMSpace = RAM_INDEX_SPACE - s_ramIndexSize;
1590
1591 // Compute the space needed to add a counter index to RAM storage
1592 // It takes an size field, a handle and sizeof(UINT64) for counter data
1593 counterRAMSpace = sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(TPM_HANDLE) + sizeof(UINT64);
1594
1595 // Return the min of counter number in NV and in RAM
1596 if(availNVSpace / counterNVSpace > availRAMSpace / counterRAMSpace)
1597 return availRAMSpace / counterRAMSpace;
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1598 else
1599 return availNVSpace / counterNVSpace;
1600 }
8.5 Object.c
8.5.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions that manage the object store of the TPM.
8.5.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define OBJECT_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include <Platform.h>
8.5.3 Functions
8.5.3.1 ObjectStartup()
This function is called at TPM2_Startup() to initialize the object subsystem.
4 void
5 ObjectStartup(
6 void
7 )
8 {
9 UINT32 i;
10
11 // object slots initialization
12 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
13 {
14 //Set the slot to not occupied
15 s_objects[i].occupied = FALSE;
16 }
17 return;
18 }
8.5.3.2 ObjectCleanupEvict()
In this implementation, a persistent object is moved from NV into an object slot for processing. It is
flushed after command execution. This function is called from ExecuteCommand().
19 void
20 ObjectCleanupEvict(
21 void
22 )
23 {
24 UINT32 i;
25
26 // This has to be iterated because a command may have two handles
27 // and they may both be persistent.
28 // This could be made to be more efficient so that a search is not needed.
29 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
30 {
31 // If an object is a temporary evict object, flush it from slot
32 if(s_objects[i].object.entity.attributes.evict == SET)
33 s_objects[i].occupied = FALSE;
34 }
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35
36 return;
37 }
8.5.3.3 ObjectIsPresent()
This function checks to see if a transient handle references a loaded object. This routine should not be
called if the handle is not a transient handle. The function validates that the handle is in the
implementation-dependent allowed in range for loaded transient objects.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the handle references a loaded object
FALSE if the handle is not an object handle, or it does not reference to a
loaded object
38 BOOL
39 ObjectIsPresent(
40 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN: handle to be checked
41 )
42 {
43 UINT32 slotIndex; // index of object slot
44
45 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_TRANSIENT);
46
47 // The index in the loaded object array is found by subtracting the first
48 // object handle number from the input handle number. If the indicated
49 // slot is occupied, then indicate that there is already is a loaded
50 // object associated with the handle.
51 slotIndex = handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST;
52 if(slotIndex >= MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS)
53 return FALSE;
54
55 return s_objects[slotIndex].occupied;
56 }
8.5.3.4 ObjectIsSequence()
This function is used to check if the object is a sequence object. This function should not be called if the
handle does not reference a loaded object.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE object is an HMAC, hash, or event sequence object
FALSE object is not an HMAC, hash, or event sequence object
57 BOOL
58 ObjectIsSequence(
59 OBJECT *object // IN: handle to be checked
60 )
61 {
62 pAssert (object != NULL);
63 if( object->attributes.hmacSeq == SET
64 || object->attributes.hashSeq == SET
65 || object->attributes.eventSeq == SET)
66 return TRUE;
67 else
68 return FALSE;
69 }
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8.5.3.5 ObjectGet()
This function is used to find the object structure associated with a handle.
This function requires that handle references a loaded object.
70 OBJECT*
71 ObjectGet(
72 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN: handle of the object
73 )
74 {
75 pAssert( handle >= TRANSIENT_FIRST
76 && handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS);
77 pAssert(s_objects[handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST].occupied == TRUE);
78
79 // In this implementation, the handle is determined by the slot occupied by the
80 // object.
81 return &s_objects[handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST].object.entity;
82 }
8.5.3.6 ObjectGetName()
This function is used to access the Name of the object. In this implementation, the Name is computed
when the object is loaded and is saved in the internal representation of the object. This function copies
the Name data from the object into the buffer at name and returns the number of octets copied.
This function requires that handle references a loaded object.
83 UINT16
84 ObjectGetName(
85 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle, // IN: handle of the object
86 NAME *name // OUT: name of the object
87 )
88 {
89 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
90 if(object->publicArea.nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
91 return 0;
92
93 // Copy the Name data to the output
94 MemoryCopy(name, object->name.t.name, object->name.t.size, sizeof(NAME));
95 return object->name.t.size;
96 }
8.5.3.7 ObjectGetNameAlg()
This function is used to get the Name algorithm of a object.
This function requires that handle references a loaded object.
97 TPMI_ALG_HASH
98 ObjectGetNameAlg(
99 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN: handle of the object
100 )
101 {
102 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
103
104 return object->publicArea.nameAlg;
105 }
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8.5.3.8 ObjectGetQualifiedName()
This function returns the Qualified Name of the object. In this implementation, the Qualified Name is
computed when the object is loaded and is saved in the internal representation of the object. The
alternative would be to retain the Name of the parent and compute the QN when needed. This would take
the same amount of space so it is not recommended that the alternate be used.
This function requires that handle references a loaded object.
106 void
107 ObjectGetQualifiedName(
108 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle, // IN: handle of the object
109 TPM2B_NAME *qualifiedName // OUT: qualified name of the object
110 )
111 {
112 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
113 if(object->publicArea.nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
114 qualifiedName->t.size = 0;
115 else
116 // Copy the name
117 *qualifiedName = object->qualifiedName;
118
119 return;
120 }
8.5.3.9 ObjectDataGetHierarchy()
This function returns the handle for the hierarchy of an object.
121 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY
122 ObjectDataGetHierarchy(
123 OBJECT *object // IN :object
124 )
125 {
126 if(object->attributes.spsHierarchy)
127 {
128 return TPM_RH_OWNER;
129 }
130 else if(object->attributes.epsHierarchy)
131 {
132 return TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
133 }
134 else if(object->attributes.ppsHierarchy)
135 {
136 return TPM_RH_PLATFORM;
137 }
138 else
139 {
140 return TPM_RH_NULL;
141 }
142
143 }
8.5.3.10 ObjectGetHierarchy()
This function returns the handle of the hierarchy to which a handle belongs. This function is similar to
ObjectDataGetHierarchy() but this routine takes a handle but ObjectDataGetHierarchy() takes an pointer
to an object.
This function requires that handle references a loaded object.
144 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY
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145 ObjectGetHierarchy(
146 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN :object handle
147 )
148 {
149 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
150
151 return ObjectDataGetHierarchy(object);
152 }
8.5.3.11 ObjectAllocateSlot()
This function is used to allocate a slot in internal object array.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE allocate success
FALSE do not have free slot
153 static BOOL
154 ObjectAllocateSlot(
155 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *handle, // OUT: handle of allocated object
156 OBJECT **object // OUT: points to the allocated object
157 )
158 {
159 UINT32 i;
160
161 // find an unoccupied handle slot
162 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
163 {
164 if(!s_objects[i].occupied) // If found a free slot
165 {
166 // Mark the slot as occupied
167 s_objects[i].occupied = TRUE;
168 break;
169 }
170 }
171 // If we reach the end of object slot without finding a free one, return
172 // error.
173 if(i == MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS) return FALSE;
174
175 *handle = i + TRANSIENT_FIRST;
176 *object = &s_objects[i].object.entity;
177
178 // Initialize the object attributes
179 MemorySet(&((*object)->attributes), 0, sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES));
180
181 return TRUE;
182 }
8.5.3.12 ObjectLoad()
This function loads an object into an internal object structure. If an error is returned, the internal state is
unchanged.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_BINDING if the public and sensitive parts of the object are not matched
TPM_RC_KEY if the parameters in the public area of the object are not consistent
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY if there is no free slot for an object
TPM_RC_TYPE the public and private parts are not the same type
183 TPM_RC
184 ObjectLoad(
185 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, // IN: hierarchy to which the object belongs
186 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN: public area
187 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive area (may be null)
188 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: object's name (may be null)
189 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: handle of parent
190 BOOL skipChecks, // IN: flag to indicate if it is OK to skip
191 // consistency checks.
192 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *handle // OUT: object handle
193 )
194 {
195 OBJECT *object = NULL;
196 OBJECT *parent = NULL;
197 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
198 TPM2B_NAME parentQN; // Parent qualified name
199
200 // Try to allocate a slot for new object
201 if(!ObjectAllocateSlot(handle, &object))
202 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
203
204 // Initialize public
205 object->publicArea = *publicArea;
206 if(sensitive != NULL)
207 object->sensitive = *sensitive;
208
209 // Are the consistency checks needed
210 if(!skipChecks)
211 {
212 // Check if key size matches
213 if(!CryptObjectIsPublicConsistent(&object->publicArea))
214 {
215 result = TPM_RC_KEY;
216 goto ErrorExit;
217 }
218 if(sensitive != NULL)
219 {
220 // Check if public type matches sensitive type
221 result = CryptObjectPublicPrivateMatch(object);
222 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
223 goto ErrorExit;
224 }
225 }
226 object->attributes.publicOnly = (sensitive == NULL);
227
228 // If 'name' is NULL, then there is nothing left to do for this
229 // object as it has no qualified name and it is not a member of any
230 // hierarchy and it is temporary
231 if(name == NULL || name->t.size == 0)
232 {
233 object->qualifiedName.t.size = 0;
234 object->name.t.size = 0;
235 object->attributes.temporary = SET;
236 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
237 }
238 // If parent handle is a permanent handle, it is a primary or temporary
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239 // object
240 if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
241 {
242 // initialize QN
243 parentQN.t.size = 4;
244
245 // for a primary key, parent qualified name is the handle of hierarchy
246 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(parentHandle, parentQN.t.name);
247 }
248 else
249 {
250 // Get hierarchy and qualified name of parent
251 ObjectGetQualifiedName(parentHandle, &parentQN);
252
253 // Check for stClear object
254 parent = ObjectGet(parentHandle);
255 if( publicArea->objectAttributes.stClear == SET
256 || parent->attributes.stClear == SET)
257 object->attributes.stClear = SET;
258
259 }
260 object->name = *name;
261
262 // Compute object qualified name
263 ObjectComputeQualifiedName(&parentQN, publicArea->nameAlg,
264 name, &object->qualifiedName);
265
266 // Any object in TPM_RH_NULL hierarchy is temporary
267 if(hierarchy == TPM_RH_NULL)
268 {
269 object->attributes.temporary = SET;
270 }
271 else if(parentQN.t.size == sizeof(TPM_HANDLE))
272 {
273 // Otherwise, if the size of parent's qualified name is the size of a
274 // handle, this object is a primary object
275 object->attributes.primary = SET;
276 }
277 switch(hierarchy)
278 {
279 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
280 object->attributes.ppsHierarchy = SET;
281 break;
282 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
283 object->attributes.spsHierarchy = SET;
284 break;
285 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
286 object->attributes.epsHierarchy = SET;
287 break;
288 case TPM_RH_NULL:
289 break;
290 default:
291 pAssert(FALSE);
292 break;
293 }
294 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
295
296 ErrorExit:
297 ObjectFlush(*handle);
298 return result;
299 }
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8.5.3.13 AllocateSequenceSlot()
This function allocates a sequence slot and initializes the parts that are used by the normal objects so
that a sequence object is not inadvertently used for an operation that is not appropriate for a sequence.
300 static BOOL
301 AllocateSequenceSlot(
302 TPM_HANDLE *newHandle, // OUT: receives the allocated handle
303 HASH_OBJECT **object, // OUT: receives pointer to allocated object
304 TPM2B_AUTH *auth // IN: the authValue for the slot
305 )
306 {
307 OBJECT *objectHash; // the hash as an object
308
309 if(!ObjectAllocateSlot(newHandle, &objectHash))
310 return FALSE;
311
312 *object = (HASH_OBJECT *)objectHash;
313
314 // Validate that the proper location of the hash state data relative to the
315 // object state data.
316 pAssert(&((*object)->auth) == &objectHash->publicArea.authPolicy);
317
318 // Set the common values that a sequence object shares with an ordinary object
319 // The type is TPM_ALG_NULL
320 (*object)->type = TPM_ALG_NULL;
321
322 // This has no name algorithm and the name is the Empty Buffer
323 (*object)->nameAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
324
325 // Clear the attributes
326 MemorySet(&((*object)->objectAttributes), 0, sizeof(TPMA_OBJECT));
327
328 // A sequence object is considered to be in the NULL hierarchy so it should
329 // be marked as temporary so that it can't be persisted
330 (*object)->attributes.temporary = SET;
331
332 // A sequence object is DA exempt.
333 (*object)->objectAttributes.noDA = SET;
334
335 if(auth != NULL)
336 {
337 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros(auth);
338 (*object)->auth = *auth;
339 }
340 else
341 (*object)->auth.t.size = 0;
342 return TRUE;
343 }
8.5.3.14 ObjectCreateHMACSequence()
This function creates an internal HMAC sequence object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY if there is no free slot for an object
344 TPM_RC
345 ObjectCreateHMACSequence(
346 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
347 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: the handle associated with sequence
348 // object
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349 TPM2B_AUTH *auth, // IN: authValue
350 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *newHandle // OUT: HMAC sequence object handle
351 )
352 {
353 HASH_OBJECT *hmacObject;
354 OBJECT *keyObject;
355
356 // Try to allocate a slot for new object
357 if(!AllocateSequenceSlot(newHandle, &hmacObject, auth))
358 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
359
360 // Set HMAC sequence bit
361 hmacObject->attributes.hmacSeq = SET;
362
363 // Get pointer to the HMAC key object
364 keyObject = ObjectGet(handle);
365
366 CryptStartHMACSequence2B(hashAlg, &keyObject->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b,
367 &hmacObject->state.hmacState);
368
369 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
370 }
8.5.3.15 ObjectCreateHashSequence()
This function creates a hash sequence object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY if there is no free slot for an object
371 TPM_RC
372 ObjectCreateHashSequence(
373 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
374 TPM2B_AUTH *auth, // IN: authValue
375 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *newHandle // OUT: sequence object handle
376 )
377 {
378 HASH_OBJECT *hashObject;
379
380 // Try to allocate a slot for new object
381 if(!AllocateSequenceSlot(newHandle, &hashObject, auth))
382 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
383
384 // Set hash sequence bit
385 hashObject->attributes.hashSeq = SET;
386
387 // Start hash for hash sequence
388 CryptStartHashSequence(hashAlg, &hashObject->state.hashState[0]);
389
390 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
391 }
8.5.3.16 ObjectCreateEventSequence()
This function creates an event sequence object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY if there is no free slot for an object
392 TPM_RC
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393 ObjectCreateEventSequence(
394 TPM2B_AUTH *auth, // IN: authValue
395 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *newHandle // OUT: sequence object handle
396 )
397 {
398 HASH_OBJECT *hashObject;
399 UINT32 count;
400 TPM_ALG_ID hash;
401
402 // Try to allocate a slot for new object
403 if(!AllocateSequenceSlot(newHandle, &hashObject, auth))
404 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
405
406 // Set the event sequence attribute
407 hashObject->attributes.eventSeq = SET;
408
409 // Initialize hash states for each implemented PCR algorithms
410 for(count = 0; (hash = CryptGetHashAlgByIndex(count)) != TPM_ALG_NULL; count++)
411 {
412 // If this is a _TPM_Init or _TPM_HashStart, the sequence object will
413 // not leave the TPM so it doesn't need the sequence handling
414 if(auth == NULL)
415 CryptStartHash(hash, &hashObject->state.hashState[count]);
416 else
417 CryptStartHashSequence(hash, &hashObject->state.hashState[count]);
418 }
419 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
420 }
8.5.3.17 ObjectTerminateEvent()
This function is called to close out the event sequence and clean up the hash context states.
421 void
422 ObjectTerminateEvent(
423 void
424 )
425 {
426 HASH_OBJECT *hashObject;
427 int count;
428 BYTE buffer[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
429 hashObject = (HASH_OBJECT *)ObjectGet(g_DRTMHandle);
430
431 // Don't assume that this is a proper sequence object
432 if(hashObject->attributes.eventSeq)
433 {
434 // If it is, close any open hash contexts. This is done in case
435 // the crypto implementation has some context values that need to be
436 // cleaned up (hygiene).
437 //
438 for(count = 0; CryptGetHashAlgByIndex(count) != TPM_ALG_NULL; count++)
439 {
440 CryptCompleteHash(&hashObject->state.hashState[count], 0, buffer);
441 }
442 // Flush sequence object
443 ObjectFlush(g_DRTMHandle);
444 }
445
446 g_DRTMHandle = TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED;
447 }
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8.5.3.18 ObjectContextLoad()
This function loads an object from a saved object context.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY if there is no free slot for an object
448 TPM_RC
449 ObjectContextLoad(
450 OBJECT *object, // IN: object structure from saved context
451 TPMI_DH_OBJECT *handle // OUT: object handle
452 )
453 {
454 OBJECT *newObject;
455
456 // Try to allocate a slot for new object
457 if(!ObjectAllocateSlot(handle, &newObject))
458 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
459
460 // Copy input object data to internal structure
461 *newObject = *object;
462
463 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
464 }
8.5.3.19 ObjectFlush()
This function frees an object slot.
This function requires that the object is loaded.
465 void
466 ObjectFlush(
467 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN: handle to be freed
468 )
469 {
470 UINT32 index = handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST;
471 pAssert(ObjectIsPresent(handle));
472
473 // Mark the handle slot as unoccupied
474 s_objects[index].occupied = FALSE;
475
476 // With no attributes
477 MemorySet((BYTE*)&(s_objects[index].object.entity.attributes),
478 0, sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES));
479 return;
480 }
8.5.3.20 ObjectFlushHierarchy()
This function is called to flush all the loaded transient objects associated with a hierarchy when the
hierarchy is disabled.
481 void
482 ObjectFlushHierarchy(
483 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy // IN: hierarchy to be flush
484 )
485 {
486 UINT16 i;
487
488 // iterate object slots
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489 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
490 {
491 if(s_objects[i].occupied) // If found an occupied slot
492 {
493 switch(hierarchy)
494 {
495 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
496 if(s_objects[i].object.entity.attributes.ppsHierarchy == SET)
497 s_objects[i].occupied = FALSE;
498 break;
499 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
500 if(s_objects[i].object.entity.attributes.spsHierarchy == SET)
501 s_objects[i].occupied = FALSE;
502 break;
503 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
504 if(s_objects[i].object.entity.attributes.epsHierarchy == SET)
505 s_objects[i].occupied = FALSE;
506 break;
507 default:
508 pAssert(FALSE);
509 break;
510 }
511 }
512 }
513
514 return;
515
516 }
8.5.3.21 ObjectLoadEvict()
This function loads a persistent object into a transient object slot.
This function requires that handle is associated with a persistent object.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_HANDLE the persistent object does not exist or the associated hierarchy is
disabled.
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY no object slot
517 TPM_RC
518 ObjectLoadEvict(
519 TPM_HANDLE *handle, // IN:OUT: evict object handle. If success, it
520 // will be replace by the loaded object handle
521 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: the command being processed
522 )
523 {
524 TPM_RC result;
525 TPM_HANDLE evictHandle = *handle; // Save the evict handle
526 OBJECT *object;
527
528 // If this is an index that references a persistent object created by
529 // the platform, then return TPM_RH_HANDLE if the phEnable is FALSE
530 if(*handle >= PLATFORM_PERSISTENT)
531 {
532 // belongs to platform
533 if(g_phEnable == CLEAR)
534 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
535 }
536 // belongs to owner
537 else if(gc.shEnable == CLEAR)
538 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
539
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540 // Try to allocate a slot for an object
541 if(!ObjectAllocateSlot(handle, &object))
542 return TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY;
543
544 // Copy persistent object to transient object slot. A TPM_RC_HANDLE
545 // may be returned at this point. This will mark the slot as containing
546 // a transient object so that it will be flushed at the end of the
547 // command
548 result = NvGetEvictObject(evictHandle, object);
549
550 // Bail out if this failed
551 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
552 return result;
553
554 // check the object to see if it is in the endorsement hierarchy
555 // if it is and this is not a TPM2_EvictControl() command, indicate
556 // that the hierarchy is disabled.
557 // If the associated hierarchy is disabled, make it look like the
558 // handle is not defined
559 if( ObjectDataGetHierarchy(object) == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
560 && gc.ehEnable == CLEAR
561 && commandCode != TPM_CC_EvictControl
562 )
563 return TPM_RC_HANDLE;
564
565 return result;
566 }
8.5.3.22 ObjectComputeName()
This function computes the Name of an object from its public area.
567 void
568 ObjectComputeName(
569 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN: public area of an object
570 TPM2B_NAME *name // OUT: name of the object
571 )
572 {
573 TPM2B_PUBLIC marshalBuffer;
574 BYTE *buffer; // auxiliary marshal buffer pointer
575 HASH_STATE hashState; // hash state
576
577 // if the nameAlg is NULL then there is no name.
578 if(publicArea->nameAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
579 {
580 name->t.size = 0;
581 return;
582 }
583 // Start hash stack
584 name->t.size = CryptStartHash(publicArea->nameAlg, &hashState);
585
586 // Marshal the public area into its canonical form
587 buffer = marshalBuffer.b.buffer;
588
589 marshalBuffer.t.size = TPMT_PUBLIC_Marshal(publicArea, &buffer, NULL);
590
591 // Adding public area
592 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &marshalBuffer.b);
593
594 // Complete hash leaving room for the name algorithm
595 CryptCompleteHash(&hashState, name->t.size, &name->t.name[2]);
596
597 // set the nameAlg
598 UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(publicArea->nameAlg, name->t.name);
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599 name->t.size += 2;
600 return;
601 }
8.5.3.23 ObjectComputeQualifiedName()
This function computes the qualified name of an object.
602 void
603 ObjectComputeQualifiedName(
604 TPM2B_NAME *parentQN, // IN: parent's qualified name
605 TPM_ALG_ID nameAlg, // IN: name hash
606 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: name of the object
607 TPM2B_NAME *qualifiedName // OUT: qualified name of the object
608 )
609 {
610 HASH_STATE hashState; // hash state
611
612 // QN_A = hash_A (QN of parent || NAME_A)
613
614 // Start hash
615 qualifiedName->t.size = CryptStartHash(nameAlg, &hashState);
616
617 // Add parent's qualified name
618 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &parentQN->b);
619
620 // Add self name
621 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &name->b);
622
623 // Complete hash leaving room for the name algorithm
624 CryptCompleteHash(&hashState, qualifiedName->t.size,
625 &qualifiedName->t.name[2]);
626 UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(nameAlg, qualifiedName->t.name);
627 qualifiedName->t.size += 2;
628 return;
629 }
8.5.3.24 ObjectDataIsStorage()
This function determines if a public area has the attributes associated with a storage key. A storage key is
an asymmetric object that has its restricted and decrypt attributes SET, and sign CLEAR.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the object is a storage key
FALSE if the object is not a storage key
630 BOOL
631 ObjectDataIsStorage(
632 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area of the object
633 )
634 {
635 if( CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(publicArea->type) // must be asymmetric,
636 && publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET // restricted,
637 && publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET // decryption key
638 && publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == CLEAR // can not be sign key
639 )
640 return TRUE;
641 else
642 return FALSE;
643 }
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8.5.3.25 ObjectIsStorage()
This function determines if an object has the attributes associated with a storage key. A storage key is an
asymmetric object that has its restricted and decrypt attributes SET, and sign CLEAR.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the object is a storage key
FALSE if the object is not a storage key
644 BOOL
645 ObjectIsStorage(
646 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle // IN: object handle
647 )
648 {
649 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
650 return ObjectDataIsStorage(&object->publicArea);
651 }
8.5.3.26 ObjectCapGetLoaded()
This function returns a a list of handles of loaded object, starting from handle. Handle must be in the
range of valid transient object handles, but does not have to be the handle of a loaded transient object.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
652 TPMI_YES_NO
653 ObjectCapGetLoaded(
654 TPMI_DH_OBJECT handle, // IN: start handle
655 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned handles
656 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
657 )
658 {
659 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
660 UINT32 i;
661
662 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_TRANSIENT);
663
664 // Initialize output handle list
665 handleList->count = 0;
666
667 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
668 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
669
670 // Iterate object slots to get loaded object handles
671 for(i = handle - TRANSIENT_FIRST; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
672 {
673 if(s_objects[i].occupied == TRUE)
674 {
675 // A valid transient object can not be the copy of a persistent object
676 pAssert(s_objects[i].object.entity.attributes.evict == CLEAR);
677
678 if(handleList->count < count)
679 {
680 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this object
681 // handle to it
682 handleList->handle[handleList->count] = i + TRANSIENT_FIRST;
683 handleList->count++;
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684 }
685 else
686 {
687 // If the return list is full but we still have loaded object
688 // available, report this and stop iterating
689 more = YES;
690 break;
691 }
692 }
693 }
694
695 return more;
696 }
8.5.3.27 ObjectCapGetTransientAvail()
This function returns an estimate of the number of additional transient objects that could be loaded into
the TPM.
697 UINT32
698 ObjectCapGetTransientAvail(
699 void
700 )
701 {
702 UINT32 i;
703 UINT32 num = 0;
704
705 // Iterate object slot to get the number of unoccupied slots
706 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
707 {
708 if(s_objects[i].occupied == FALSE) num++;
709 }
710
711 return num;
712 }
8.6 PCR.c
8.6.1 Introduction
This function contains the functions needed for PCR access and manipulation.
This implementation uses a static allocation for the PCR. The amount of memory is allocated based on
the number of PCR in the implementation and the number of implemented hash algorithms. This is not
the expected implementation. PCR SPACE DEFINITIONS.
In the definitions below, the g_hashPcrMap is a bit array that indicates which of the PCR are
implemented. The g_hashPcr array is an array of digests. In this implementation, the space is allocated
whether the PCR is implemented or not.
8.6.2 Includes, Defines, and Data Definitions
1 #define PCR_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include <Platform.h>
The initial value of PCR attributes. The value of these fields should be consistent with PC Client
specification In this implementation, we assume the total number of implemented PCR is 24.
4 static const PCR_Attributes s_initAttributes[] =
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5 {
6 // PCR 0 - 15, static RTM
7 {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F},
8 {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F},
9 {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F},
10 {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F}, {1, 0, 0x1F},
11
12 {0, 0x0F, 0x1F}, // PCR 16, Debug
13 {0, 0x10, 0x1C}, // PCR 17, Locality 4
14 {0, 0x10, 0x1C}, // PCR 18, Locality 3
15 {0, 0x10, 0x0C}, // PCR 19, Locality 2
16 {0, 0x14, 0x0E}, // PCR 20, Locality 1
17 {0, 0x14, 0x04}, // PCR 21, Dynamic OS
18 {0, 0x14, 0x04}, // PCR 22, Dynamic OS
19 {0, 0x0F, 0x1F}, // PCR 23, App specific
20 {0, 0x0F, 0x1F} // PCR 24, testing policy
21 };
8.6.3 Functions
8.6.3.1 PCRBelongsAuthGroup()
This function indicates if a PCR belongs to a group that requires an authValue in order to modify the
PCR. If it does, groupIndex is set to value of the group index. This feature of PCR is decided by the
platform specification.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE: PCR belongs an auth group
FALSE: PCR does not belong an auth group
22 BOOL
23 PCRBelongsAuthGroup(
24 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: handle of PCR
25 UINT32 *groupIndex // OUT: group index if PCR belongs a
26 // group that allows authValue. If PCR
27 // does not belong to an auth group,
28 // the value in this parameter is
29 // invalid
30 )
31 {
32 #if NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
33 // Platform specification determines to which auth group a PCR belongs (if
34 // any). In this implementation, we assume there is only
35 // one auth group which contains PCR[20-22]. If the platform specification
36 // requires differently, the implementation should be changed accordingly
37 if(handle >= 20 && handle <= 22)
38 {
39 *groupIndex = 0;
40 return TRUE;
41 }
42
43 #endif
44 return FALSE;
45 }
8.6.3.2 PCRBelongsPolicyGroup()
This function indicates if a PCR belongs to a group that requires a policy authorization in order to modify
the PCR. If it does, groupIndex is set to value of the group index. This feature of PCR is decided by the
platform specification.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE: PCR belongs a policy group
FALSE: PCR does not belong a policy group
46 BOOL
47 PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(
48 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: handle of PCR
49 UINT32 *groupIndex // OUT: group index if PCR belongs a group that
50 // allows policy. If PCR does not belong to
51 // a policy group, the value in this
52 // parameter is invalid
53 )
54 {
55 #if NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP > 0
56 // Platform specification decides if a PCR belongs to a policy group and
57 // belongs to which group. In this implementation, we assume there is only
58 // one policy group which contains PCR20-22. If the platform specification
59 // requires differently, the implementation should be changed accordingly
60 if(handle >= 20 && handle <= 22)
61 {
62 *groupIndex = 0;
63 return TRUE;
64 }
65 #endif
66 return FALSE;
67 }
8.6.3.3 PCRBelongsTCBGroup()
This function indicates if a PCR belongs to the TCB group.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE: PCR belongs to TCB group
FALSE: PCR does not belong to TCB group
68 static BOOL
69 PCRBelongsTCBGroup(
70 TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: handle of PCR
71 )
72 {
73 #if ENABLE_PCR_NO_INCREMENT == YES
74 // Platform specification decides if a PCR belongs to a TCB group. In this
75 // implementation, we assume PCR[20-22] belong to TCB group. If the platform
76 // specification requires differently, the implementation should be
77 // changed accordingly
78 if(handle >= 20 && handle <= 22)
79 return TRUE;
80
81 #endif
82 return FALSE;
83 }
8.6.3.4 PCRPolicyIsAvailable()
This function indicates if a policy is available for a PCR.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE the PCR should be authorized by policy
FALSE the PCR does not allow policy
84 BOOL
85 PCRPolicyIsAvailable(
86 TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle
87 )
88 {
89 UINT32 groupIndex;
90
91 return PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(handle, &groupIndex);
92 }
8.6.3.5 PCRGetAuthValue()
This function is used to access the authValue of a PCR. If PCR does not belong to an authValue group,
an Empty Auth will be returned.
93 void
94 PCRGetAuthValue(
95 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle
96 TPM2B_AUTH *auth // OUT: authValue of PCR
97 )
98 {
99 UINT32 groupIndex;
100
101 if(PCRBelongsAuthGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
102 {
103 *auth = gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[groupIndex];
104 }
105 else
106 {
107 auth->t.size = 0;
108 }
109
110 return;
111 }
8.6.3.6 PCRGetAuthPolicy()
This function is used to access the authorization policy of a PCR. It sets policy to the authorization policy
and returns the hash algorithm for policy If the PCR does not allow a policy, TPM_ALG_NULL is returned.
112 TPMI_ALG_HASH
113 PCRGetAuthPolicy(
114 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle
115 TPM2B_DIGEST *policy // OUT: policy of PCR
116 )
117 {
118 UINT32 groupIndex;
119
120 if(PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
121 {
122 *policy = gp.pcrPolicies.policy[groupIndex];
123 return gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[groupIndex];
124 }
125 else
126 {
127 policy->t.size = 0;
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128 return TPM_ALG_NULL;
129 }
130 }
8.6.3.7 PCRSimStart()
This function is used to initialize the policies when a TPM is manufactured. This function would only be
called in a manufacturing environment or in a TPM simulator.
131 void
132 PCRSimStart(
133 void
134 )
135 {
136 UINT32 i;
137 for(i = 0; i < NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP; i++)
138 {
139 gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[i] = TPM_ALG_NULL;
140 gp.pcrPolicies.policy[i].t.size = 0;
141 }
142
143 for(i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP; i++)
144 {
145 gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[i].t.size = 0;
146 }
147
148 // We need to give an initial configuration on allocated PCR before
149 // receiving any TPM2_PCR_Allocate command to change this configuration
150 // When the simulation environment starts, we allocate all the PCRs
151 for(gp.pcrAllocated.count = 0; gp.pcrAllocated.count < HASH_COUNT;
152 gp.pcrAllocated.count++)
153 {
154 gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[gp.pcrAllocated.count].hash
155 = CryptGetHashAlgByIndex(gp.pcrAllocated.count);
156
157 gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[gp.pcrAllocated.count].sizeofSelect
158 = PCR_SELECT_MAX;
159 for(i = 0; i < PCR_SELECT_MAX; i++)
160 gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[gp.pcrAllocated.count].pcrSelect[i]
161 = 0xFF;
162 }
163
164 // Store the initial configuration to NV
165 NvWriteReserved(NV_PCR_POLICIES, &gp.pcrPolicies);
166 NvWriteReserved(NV_PCR_ALLOCATED, &gp.pcrAllocated);
167
168 return;
169 }
8.6.3.8 GetSavedPcrPointer()
This function returns the address of an array of state saved PCR based on the hash algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
NULL no such algorithm
not NULL pointer to the 0th byte of the 0th PCR
170 static BYTE *
171 GetSavedPcrPointer (
172 TPM_ALG_ID alg, // IN: algorithm for bank
173 UINT32 pcrIndex // IN: PCR index in PCR_SAVE
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174 )
175 {
176 switch(alg)
177 {
178 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
179 case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
180 return gc.pcrSave.sha1[pcrIndex];
181 break;
182 #endif
183 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
184 case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
185 return gc.pcrSave.sha256[pcrIndex];
186 break;
187 #endif
188 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
189 case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
190 return gc.pcrSave.sha384[pcrIndex];
191 break;
192 #endif
193
194 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
195 case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
196 return gc.pcrSave.sha512[pcrIndex];
197 break;
198 #endif
199 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
200 case TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
201 return gc.pcrSave.sm3_256[pcrIndex];
202 break;
203 #endif
204 default:
205 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
206 }
207 //return NULL; // Can't be reached
208 }
8.6.3.9 PcrIsAllocated()
This function indicates if a PCR number for the particular hash algorithm is allocated.
Return Value Meaning
FALSE PCR is not allocated
TRUE PCR is allocated
209 BOOL
210 PcrIsAllocated (
211 UINT32 pcr, // IN: The number of the PCR
212 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg // IN: The PCR algorithm
213 )
214 {
215 UINT32 i;
216 BOOL allocated = FALSE;
217
218 if(pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR)
219 {
220
221 for(i = 0; i < gp.pcrAllocated.count; i++)
222 {
223 if(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].hash == hashAlg)
224 {
225 if(((gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[pcr/8])
226 & (1 << (pcr % 8))) != 0)
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227 allocated = TRUE;
228 else
229 allocated = FALSE;
230 break;
231 }
232 }
233 }
234 return allocated;
235 }
8.6.3.10 GetPcrPointer()
This function returns the address of an array of PCR based on the hash algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
NULL no such algorithm
not NULL pointer to the 0th byte of the 0th PCR
236 static BYTE *
237 GetPcrPointer (
238 TPM_ALG_ID alg, // IN: algorithm for bank
239 UINT32 pcrNumber // IN: PCR number
240 )
241 {
242 static BYTE *pcr = NULL;
243
244 if(!PcrIsAllocated(pcrNumber, alg))
245 return NULL;
246
247 switch(alg)
248 {
249 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
250 case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
251 pcr = s_pcrs[pcrNumber].sha1Pcr;
252 break;
253 #endif
254 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
255 case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
256 pcr = s_pcrs[pcrNumber].sha256Pcr;
257 break;
258 #endif
259 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
260 case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
261 pcr = s_pcrs[pcrNumber].sha384Pcr;
262 break;
263 #endif
264 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
265 case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
266 pcr = s_pcrs[pcrNumber].sha512Pcr;
267 break;
268 #endif
269 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
270 case TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
271 pcr = s_pcrs[pcrNumber].sm3_256Pcr;
272 break;
273 #endif
274 default:
275 pAssert(FALSE);
276 break;
277 }
278
279 return pcr;
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280 }
8.6.3.11 IsPcrSelected()
This function indicates if an indicated PCR number is selected by the bit map in selection.
Return Value Meaning
FALSE PCR is not selected
TRUE PCR is selected
281 static BOOL
282 IsPcrSelected (
283 UINT32 pcr, // IN: The number of the PCR
284 TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *selection // IN: The selection structure
285 )
286 {
287 BOOL selected = FALSE;
288 if( pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR
289 && ((selection->pcrSelect[pcr/8]) & (1 << (pcr % 8))) != 0)
290 selected = TRUE;
291
292 return selected;
293 }
8.6.3.12 FilterPcr()
This function modifies a PCR selection array based on the implemented PCR.
294 static void
295 FilterPcr(
296 TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *selection // IN: input PCR selection
297 )
298 {
299 UINT32 i;
300 TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *allocated = NULL;
301
302 // If size of select is less than PCR_SELECT_MAX, zero the unspecified PCR
303 for(i = selection->sizeofSelect; i < PCR_SELECT_MAX; i++)
304 selection->pcrSelect[i] = 0;
305
306 // Find the internal configuration for the bank
307 for(i = 0; i < gp.pcrAllocated.count; i++)
308 {
309 if(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].hash == selection->hash)
310 {
311 allocated = &gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i];
312 break;
313 }
314 }
315
316 for (i = 0; i < selection->sizeofSelect; i++)
317 {
318 if(allocated == NULL)
319 {
320 // If the required bank does not exist, clear input selection
321 selection->pcrSelect[i] = 0;
322 }
323 else
324 selection->pcrSelect[i] &= allocated->pcrSelect[i];
325 }
326
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327 return;
328 }
8.6.3.13 PcrDrtm()
This function does the DRTM and H-CRTM processing it is called from _TPM_Hash_End().
329 void
330 PcrDrtm(
331 const TPMI_DH_PCR pcrHandle, // IN: the index of the PCR to be
332 // modified
333 const TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, // IN: the bank identifier
334 const TPM2B_DIGEST *digest // IN: the digest to modify the PCR
335 )
336 {
337 BYTE *pcrData = GetPcrPointer(hash, pcrHandle);
338
339 if(pcrData != NULL)
340 {
341 // Rest the PCR to zeros
342 MemorySet(pcrData, 0, digest->t.size);
343
344 // if the TPM has not started, then set the PCR to 0...04 and then extend
345 if(!TPMIsStarted())
346 {
347 pcrData[digest->t.size - 1] = 4;
348 }
349 // Now, extend the value
350 PCRExtend(pcrHandle, hash, digest->t.size, (BYTE *)digest->t.buffer);
351 }
352 }
8.6.3.14 PCRStartup()
This function initializes the PCR subsystem at TPM2_Startup().
353 void
354 PCRStartup(
355 STARTUP_TYPE type, // IN: startup type
356 BYTE locality // IN: startup locality
357 )
358 {
359 UINT32 pcr, j;
360 UINT32 saveIndex = 0;
361
362 g_pcrReConfig = FALSE;
363
364 if(type != SU_RESUME)
365 {
366 // PCR generation counter is cleared at TPM_RESET and TPM_RESTART
367 gr.pcrCounter = 0;
368 }
369
370 // Initialize/Restore PCR values
371 for(pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
372 {
373 // On resume, need to know if this PCR had its state saved or not
374 UINT32 stateSaved =
375 (type == SU_RESUME && s_initAttributes[pcr].stateSave == SET) ? 1 : 0;
376
377 // If this is the H-CRTM PCR and we are not doing a resume and we
378 // had an H-CRTM event, then we don't change this PCR
379 if(pcr == HCRTM_PCR && type != SU_RESUME && g_DrtmPreStartup == TRUE)
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380 continue;
381
382 // Iterate each hash algorithm bank
383 for(j = 0; j < gp.pcrAllocated.count; j++)
384 {
385 TPMI_ALG_HASH hash = gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[j].hash;
386 BYTE *pcrData = GetPcrPointer(hash, pcr);
387 UINT16 pcrSize = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hash);
388
389 if(pcrData != NULL)
390 {
391 // if state was saved
392 if(stateSaved == 1)
393 {
394 // Restore saved PCR value
395 BYTE *pcrSavedData;
396 pcrSavedData = GetSavedPcrPointer(
397 gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[j].hash,
398 saveIndex);
399 MemoryCopy(pcrData, pcrSavedData, pcrSize, pcrSize);
400 }
401 else
402 // PCR was not restored by state save
403 {
404 // If the reset locality of the PCR is 4, then
405 // the reset value is all one's, otherwise it is
406 // all zero.
407 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x10) != 0)
408 MemorySet(pcrData, 0xFF, pcrSize);
409 else
410 {
411 MemorySet(pcrData, 0, pcrSize);
412 if(pcr == HCRTM_PCR)
413 pcrData[pcrSize-1] = locality;
414 }
415 }
416 }
417 }
418 saveIndex += stateSaved;
419 }
420
421 // Reset authValues
422 if(type != SU_RESUME)
423 {
424 for(j = 0; j < NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP; j++)
425 {
426 gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[j].t.size = 0;
427 }
428 }
429
430 }
8.6.3.15 PCRStateSave()
This function is used to save the PCR values that will be restored on TPM Resume.
431 void
432 PCRStateSave(
433 TPM_SU type // IN: startup type
434 )
435 {
436 UINT32 pcr, j;
437 UINT32 saveIndex = 0;
438
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439 // if state save CLEAR, nothing to be done. Return here
440 if(type == TPM_SU_CLEAR) return;
441
442 // Copy PCR values to the structure that should be saved to NV
443 for(pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
444 {
445 UINT32 stateSaved = (s_initAttributes[pcr].stateSave == SET) ? 1 : 0;
446
447 // Iterate each hash algorithm bank
448 for(j = 0; j < gp.pcrAllocated.count; j++)
449 {
450 BYTE *pcrData;
451 UINT32 pcrSize;
452
453 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[j].hash, pcr);
454
455 if(pcrData != NULL)
456 {
457 pcrSize
458 = CryptGetHashDigestSize(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[j].hash);
459
460 if(stateSaved == 1)
461 {
462 // Restore saved PCR value
463 BYTE *pcrSavedData;
464 pcrSavedData
465 = GetSavedPcrPointer(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[j].hash,
466 saveIndex);
467 MemoryCopy(pcrSavedData, pcrData, pcrSize, pcrSize);
468 }
469 }
470 }
471 saveIndex += stateSaved;
472 }
473
474 return;
475 }
8.6.3.16 PCRIsStateSaved()
This function indicates if the selected PCR is a PCR that is state saved on TPM2_Shutdown(STATE). The
return value is based on PCR attributes.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE PCR is state saved
FALSE PCR is not state saved
476 BOOL
477 PCRIsStateSaved(
478 TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle to be extended
479 )
480 {
481 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
482
483 if(s_initAttributes[pcr].stateSave == SET)
484 return TRUE;
485 else
486 return FALSE;
487 }
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8.6.3.17 PCRIsResetAllowed()
This function indicates if a PCR may be reset by the current command locality. The return value is based
on PCR attributes, and not the PCR allocation.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE TPM2_PCR_Reset() is allowed
FALSE TPM2_PCR_Reset() is not allowed
488 BOOL
489 PCRIsResetAllowed(
490 TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle to be extended
491 )
492 {
493 UINT8 commandLocality;
494 UINT8 localityBits = 1;
495 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
496
497 // Check for the locality
498 commandLocality = _plat__LocalityGet();
499
500 #ifdef DRTM_PCR
501 // For a TPM that does DRTM, Reset is not allowed at locality 4
502 if(commandLocality == 4)
503 return FALSE;
504 #endif
505
506 localityBits = localityBits << commandLocality;
507 if((localityBits & s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality) == 0)
508 return FALSE;
509 else
510 return TRUE;
511
512 }
8.6.3.18 PCRChanged()
This function checks a PCR handle to see if the attributes for the PCR are set so that any change to the
PCR causes an increment of the pcrCounter. If it does, then the function increments the counter.
513 void
514 PCRChanged(
515 TPM_HANDLE pcrHandle // IN: the handle of the PCR that changed.
516 )
517 {
518 // For the reference implementation, the only change that does not cause
519 // increment is a change to a PCR in the TCB group.
520 if(!PCRBelongsTCBGroup(pcrHandle))
521 gr.pcrCounter++;
522 }
8.6.3.19 PCRIsExtendAllowed()
This function indicates a PCR may be extended at the current command locality. The return value is
based on PCR attributes, and not the PCR allocation.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE extend is allowed
FALSE extend is not allowed
523 BOOL
524 PCRIsExtendAllowed(
525 TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle to be extended
526 )
527 {
528 UINT8 commandLocality;
529 UINT8 localityBits = 1;
530 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
531
532 // Check for the locality
533 commandLocality = _plat__LocalityGet();
534 localityBits = localityBits << commandLocality;
535 if((localityBits & s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality) == 0)
536 return FALSE;
537 else
538 return TRUE;
539
540 }
8.6.3.20 PCRExtend()
This function is used to extend a PCR in a specific bank.
541 void
542 PCRExtend(
543 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle to be extended
544 TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, // IN: hash algorithm of PCR
545 UINT32 size, // IN: size of data to be extended
546 BYTE *data // IN: data to be extended
547 )
548 {
549 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
550 BYTE *pcrData;
551 HASH_STATE hashState;
552 UINT16 pcrSize;
553
554 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(hash, pcr);
555
556 // Extend PCR if it is allocated
557 if(pcrData != NULL)
558 {
559 pcrSize = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hash);
560 CryptStartHash(hash, &hashState);
561 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, pcrSize, pcrData);
562 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, size, data);
563 CryptCompleteHash(&hashState, pcrSize, pcrData);
564
565 // If PCR does not belong to TCB group, increment PCR counter
566 if(!PCRBelongsTCBGroup(handle))
567 gr.pcrCounter++;
568 }
569
570 return;
571 }
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8.6.3.21 PCRComputeCurrentDigest()
This function computes the digest of the selected PCR.
As a side-effect, selection is modified so that only the implemented PCR will have their bits still set.
572 void
573 PCRComputeCurrentDigest(
574 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to compute digest
575 TPML_PCR_SELECTION *selection, // IN/OUT: PCR selection (filtered on
576 // output)
577 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest // OUT: digest
578 )
579 {
580 HASH_STATE hashState;
581 TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *select;
582 BYTE *pcrData; // will point to a digest
583 UINT32 pcrSize;
584 UINT32 pcr;
585 UINT32 i;
586
587 // Initialize the hash
588 digest->t.size = CryptStartHash(hashAlg, &hashState);
589 pAssert(digest->t.size > 0 && digest->t.size < UINT16_MAX);
590
591 // Iterate through the list of PCR selection structures
592 for(i = 0; i < selection->count; i++)
593 {
594 // Point to the current selection
595 select = &selection->pcrSelections[i]; // Point to the current selection
596 FilterPcr(select); // Clear out the bits for unimplemented PCR
597
598 // Need the size of each digest
599 pcrSize = CryptGetHashDigestSize(selection->pcrSelections[i].hash);
600
601 // Iterate through the selection
602 for(pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
603 {
604 if(IsPcrSelected(pcr, select)) // Is this PCR selected
605 {
606 // Get pointer to the digest data for the bank
607 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(selection->pcrSelections[i].hash, pcr);
608 pAssert(pcrData != NULL);
609 CryptUpdateDigest(&hashState, pcrSize, pcrData); // add to digest
610 }
611 }
612 }
613 // Complete hash stack
614 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &digest->b);
615
616 return;
617 }
8.6.3.22 PCRRead()
This function is used to read a list of selected PCR. If the requested PCR number exceeds the maximum
number that can be output, the selection is adjusted to reflect the actual output PCR.
618 void
619 PCRRead(
620 TPML_PCR_SELECTION *selection, // IN/OUT: PCR selection (filtered on
621 // output)
622 TPML_DIGEST *digest, // OUT: digest
623 UINT32 *pcrCounter // OUT: the current value of PCR generation
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624 // number
625 )
626 {
627 TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *select;
628 BYTE *pcrData; // will point to a digest
629 UINT32 pcr;
630 UINT32 i;
631
632 digest->count = 0;
633
634 // Iterate through the list of PCR selection structures
635 for(i = 0; i < selection->count; i++)
636 {
637 // Point to the current selection
638 select = &selection->pcrSelections[i]; // Point to the current selection
639 FilterPcr(select); // Clear out the bits for unimplemented PCR
640
641 // Iterate through the selection
642 for (pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
643 {
644 if(IsPcrSelected(pcr, select)) // Is this PCR selected
645 {
646 // Check if number of digest exceed upper bound
647 if(digest->count > 7)
648 {
649 // Clear rest of the current select bitmap
650 while( pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR
651 // do not round up!
652 && (pcr / 8) < select->sizeofSelect)
653 {
654 // do not round up!
655 select->pcrSelect[pcr/8] &= (BYTE) ~(1 << (pcr % 8));
656 pcr++;
657 }
658 // Exit inner loop
659 break;;
660 }
661 // Need the size of each digest
662 digest->digests[digest->count].t.size =
663 CryptGetHashDigestSize(selection->pcrSelections[i].hash);
664
665 // Get pointer to the digest data for the bank
666 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(selection->pcrSelections[i].hash, pcr);
667 pAssert(pcrData != NULL);
668 // Add to the data to digest
669 MemoryCopy(digest->digests[digest->count].t.buffer,
670 pcrData,
671 digest->digests[digest->count].t.size,
672 digest->digests[digest->count].t.size);
673 digest->count++;
674 }
675 }
676 // If we exit inner loop because we have exceed the output upper bound
677 if(digest->count > 7 && pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR)
678 {
679 // Clear rest of the selection
680 while(i < selection->count)
681 {
682 MemorySet(selection->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect, 0,
683 selection->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect);
684 i++;
685 }
686 // exit outer loop
687 break;
688 }
689 }
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690
691 *pcrCounter = gr.pcrCounter;
692
693 return;
694 }
8.6.3.23 PcrWrite()
This function is used by _TPM_Hash_End() to set a PCR to the computed hash of the H-CRTM event.
695 void
696 PcrWrite(
697 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle to be extended
698 TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, // IN: hash algorithm of PCR
699 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest // IN: the new value
700 )
701 {
702 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
703 BYTE *pcrData;
704
705 // Copy value to the PCR if it is allocated
706 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(hash, pcr);
707 if(pcrData != NULL)
708 {
709 MemoryCopy(pcrData, digest->t.buffer, digest->t.size, digest->t.size); ;
710 }
711
712 return;
713 }
8.6.3.24 PCRAllocate()
This function is used to change the PCR allocation.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SUCCESS allocate success
TPM_RC_NO_RESULTS allocate failed
TPM_RC_PCR improper allocation
714 TPM_RC
715 PCRAllocate(
716 TPML_PCR_SELECTION *allocate, // IN: required allocation
717 UINT32 *maxPCR, // OUT: Maximum number of PCR
718 UINT32 *sizeNeeded, // OUT: required space
719 UINT32 *sizeAvailable // OUT: available space
720 )
721 {
722 UINT32 i, j, k;
723 TPML_PCR_SELECTION newAllocate;
724 // Initialize the flags to indicate if HCRTM PCR and DRTM PCR are allocated.
725 BOOL pcrHcrtm = FALSE;
726 BOOL pcrDrtm = FALSE;
727
728 // Create the expected new PCR allocation based on the existing allocation
729 // and the new input:
730 // 1. if a PCR bank does not appear in the new allocation, the existing
731 // allocation of this PCR bank will be preserved.
732 // 2. if a PCR bank appears multiple times in the new allocation, only the
733 // last one will be in effect.
734 newAllocate = gp.pcrAllocated;
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735 for(i = 0; i < allocate->count; i++)
736 {
737 for(j = 0; j < newAllocate.count; j++)
738 {
739 // If hash matches, the new allocation covers the old allocation
740 // for this particular bank.
741 // The assumption is the initial PCR allocation (from manufacture)
742 // has all the supported hash algorithms with an assigned bank
743 // (possibly empty). So there must be a match for any new bank
744 // allocation from the input.
745 if(newAllocate.pcrSelections[j].hash ==
746 allocate->pcrSelections[i].hash)
747 {
748 newAllocate.pcrSelections[j] = allocate->pcrSelections[i];
749 break;
750 }
751 }
752 // The j loop must exit with a match.
753 pAssert(j < newAllocate.count);
754 }
755
756 // Max PCR in a bank is MIN(implemented PCR, PCR with attributes defined)
757 *maxPCR = sizeof(s_initAttributes) / sizeof(PCR_Attributes);
758 if(*maxPCR > IMPLEMENTATION_PCR)
759 *maxPCR = IMPLEMENTATION_PCR;
760
761 // Compute required size for allocation
762 *sizeNeeded = 0;
763 for(i = 0; i < newAllocate.count; i++)
764 {
765 UINT32 digestSize
766 = CryptGetHashDigestSize(newAllocate.pcrSelections[i].hash);
767 #if defined(DRTM_PCR)
768 // Make sure that we end up with at least one DRTM PCR
769 # define PCR_DRTM (PCR_FIRST + DRTM_PCR) // for cosmetics
770 pcrDrtm = pcrDrtm || TEST_BIT(PCR_DRTM, newAllocate.pcrSelections[i]);
771 #else // if DRTM PCR is not required, indicate that the allocation is OK
772 pcrDrtm = TRUE;
773 #endif
774
775 #if defined(HCRTM_PCR)
776 // and one HCRTM PCR (since this is usually PCR 0...)
777 # define PCR_HCRTM (PCR_FIRST + HCRTM_PCR)
778 pcrHcrtm = pcrDrtm || TEST_BIT(PCR_HCRTM, newAllocate.pcrSelections[i]);
779 #else
780 pcrHcrtm = TRUE;
781 #endif
782 for(j = 0; j < newAllocate.pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect; j++)
783 {
784 BYTE mask = 1;
785 for(k = 0; k < 8; k++)
786 {
787 if((newAllocate.pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[j] & mask) != 0)
788 *sizeNeeded += digestSize;
789 mask = mask << 1;
790 }
791 }
792 }
793
794 if(!pcrDrtm || !pcrHcrtm)
795 return TPM_RC_PCR;
796
797 // In this particular implementation, we always have enough space to
798 // allocate PCR. Different implementation may return a sizeAvailable less
799 // than the sizeNeed.
800 *sizeAvailable = sizeof(s_pcrs);
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801
802 // Save the required allocation to NV. Note that after NV is written, the
803 // PCR allocation in NV is no longer consistent with the RAM data
804 // gp.pcrAllocated. The NV version reflect the allocate after next
805 // TPM_RESET, while the RAM version reflects the current allocation
806 NvWriteReserved(NV_PCR_ALLOCATED, &newAllocate);
807
808 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
809
810 }
8.6.3.25 PCRSetValue()
This function is used to set the designated PCR in all banks to an initial value. The initial value is signed
and will be sign extended into the entire PCR.
811 void
812 PCRSetValue(
813 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: the handle of the PCR to set
814 INT8 initialValue // IN: the value to set
815 )
816 {
817 int i;
818 UINT32 pcr = handle - PCR_FIRST;
819 TPMI_ALG_HASH hash;
820 UINT16 digestSize;
821 BYTE *pcrData;
822
823 // Iterate supported PCR bank algorithms to reset
824 for(i = 0; i < HASH_COUNT; i++)
825 {
826 hash = CryptGetHashAlgByIndex(i);
827 // Prevent runaway
828 if(hash == TPM_ALG_NULL)
829 break;
830
831 // Get a pointer to the data
832 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].hash, pcr);
833
834 // If the PCR is allocated
835 if(pcrData != NULL)
836 {
837 // And the size of the digest
838 digestSize = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hash);
839
840 // Set the LSO to the input value
841 pcrData[digestSize - 1] = initialValue;
842
843 // Sign extend
844 if(initialValue >= 0)
845 MemorySet(pcrData, 0, digestSize - 1);
846 else
847 MemorySet(pcrData, -1, digestSize - 1);
848 }
849 }
850 }
8.6.3.26 PCRResetDynamics
This function is used to reset a dynamic PCR to 0. This function is used in DRTM sequence.
851 void
852 PCRResetDynamics(
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853 void
854 )
855 {
856 UINT32 pcr, i;
857
858 // Initialize PCR values
859 for(pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
860 {
861 // Iterate each hash algorithm bank
862 for(i = 0; i < gp.pcrAllocated.count; i++)
863 {
864 BYTE *pcrData;
865 UINT32 pcrSize;
866
867 pcrData = GetPcrPointer(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].hash, pcr);
868
869 if(pcrData != NULL)
870 {
871 pcrSize =
872 CryptGetHashDigestSize(gp.pcrAllocated.pcrSelections[i].hash);
873
874 // Reset PCR
875 // Any PCR can be reset by locality 4 should be reset to 0
876 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x10) != 0)
877 MemorySet(pcrData, 0, pcrSize);
878 }
879 }
880 }
881 return;
882 }
8.6.3.27 PCRCapGetAllocation()
This function is used to get the current allocation of PCR banks.
Return Value Meaning
YES: if the return count is 0
NO: if the return count is not 0
883 TPMI_YES_NO
884 PCRCapGetAllocation(
885 UINT32 count, // IN: count of return
886 TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcrSelection // OUT: PCR allocation list
887 )
888 {
889 if(count == 0)
890 {
891 pcrSelection->count = 0;
892 return YES;
893 }
894 else
895 {
896 *pcrSelection = gp.pcrAllocated;
897 return NO;
898 }
899 }
8.6.3.28 PCRSetSelectBit()
This function sets a bit in a bitmap array.
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900 static void
901 PCRSetSelectBit(
902 UINT32 pcr, // IN: PCR number
903 BYTE *bitmap // OUT: bit map to be set
904 )
905 {
906 bitmap[pcr / 8] |= (1 << (pcr % 8));
907 return;
908 }
8.6.3.29 PCRGetProperty()
This function returns the selected PCR property.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE the property type is implemented
FALSE the property type is not implemented
909 static BOOL
910 PCRGetProperty(
911 TPM_PT_PCR property,
912 TPMS_TAGGED_PCR_SELECT *select
913 )
914 {
915 UINT32 pcr;
916 UINT32 groupIndex;
917
918 select->tag = property;
919 // Always set the bitmap to be the size of all PCR
920 select->sizeofSelect = (IMPLEMENTATION_PCR + 7) / 8;
921
922 // Initialize bitmap
923 MemorySet(select->pcrSelect, 0, select->sizeofSelect);
924
925 // Collecting properties
926 for(pcr = 0; pcr < IMPLEMENTATION_PCR; pcr++)
927 {
928 switch(property)
929 {
930 case TPM_PT_PCR_SAVE:
931 if(s_initAttributes[pcr].stateSave == SET)
932 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
933 break;
934 case TPM_PT_PCR_EXTEND_L0:
935 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality & 0x01) != 0)
936 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
937 break;
938 case TPM_PT_PCR_RESET_L0:
939 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x01) != 0)
940 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
941 break;
942 case TPM_PT_PCR_EXTEND_L1:
943 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality & 0x02) != 0)
944 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
945 break;
946 case TPM_PT_PCR_RESET_L1:
947 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x02) != 0)
948 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
949 break;
950 case TPM_PT_PCR_EXTEND_L2:
951 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality & 0x04) != 0)
952 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
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953 break;
954 case TPM_PT_PCR_RESET_L2:
955 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x04) != 0)
956 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
957 break;
958 case TPM_PT_PCR_EXTEND_L3:
959 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality & 0x08) != 0)
960 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
961 break;
962 case TPM_PT_PCR_RESET_L3:
963 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x08) != 0)
964 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
965 break;
966 case TPM_PT_PCR_EXTEND_L4:
967 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].extendLocality & 0x10) != 0)
968 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
969 break;
970 case TPM_PT_PCR_RESET_L4:
971 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x10) != 0)
972 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
973 break;
974 case TPM_PT_PCR_DRTM_RESET:
975 // DRTM reset PCRs are the PCR reset by locality 4
976 if((s_initAttributes[pcr].resetLocality & 0x10) != 0)
977 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
978 break;
979 #if NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP > 0
980 case TPM_PT_PCR_POLICY:
981 if(PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(pcr + PCR_FIRST, &groupIndex))
982 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
983 break;
984 #endif
985 #if NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
986 case TPM_PT_PCR_AUTH:
987 if(PCRBelongsAuthGroup(pcr + PCR_FIRST, &groupIndex))
988 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
989 break;
990 #endif
991 #if ENABLE_PCR_NO_INCREMENT == YES
992 case TPM_PT_PCR_NO_INCREMENT:
993 if(PCRBelongsTCBGroup(pcr + PCR_FIRST))
994 PCRSetSelectBit(pcr, select->pcrSelect);
995 break;
996 #endif
997 default:
998 // If property is not supported, stop scanning PCR attributes
999 // and return.
1000 return FALSE;
1001 break;
1002 }
1003 }
1004 return TRUE;
1005 }
8.6.3.30 PCRCapGetProperties()
This function returns a list of PCR properties starting at property.
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Return Value Meaning
YES: if no more property is available
NO: if there are more properties not reported
1006 TPMI_YES_NO
1007 PCRCapGetProperties(
1008 TPM_PT_PCR property, // IN: the starting PCR property
1009 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned propertie
1010 TPML_TAGGED_PCR_PROPERTY *select // OUT: PCR select
1011 )
1012 {
1013 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
1014 UINT32 i;
1015
1016 // Initialize output property list
1017 select->count = 0;
1018
1019 // The maximum count of properties we may return is MAX_PCR_PROPERTIES
1020 if(count > MAX_PCR_PROPERTIES) count = MAX_PCR_PROPERTIES;
1021
1022 // TPM_PT_PCR_FIRST is defined as 0 in spec. It ensures that property
1023 // value would never be less than TPM_PT_PCR_FIRST
1024 pAssert(TPM_PT_PCR_FIRST == 0);
1025
1026 // Iterate PCR properties. TPM_PT_PCR_LAST is the index of the last property
1027 // implemented on the TPM.
1028 for(i = property; i <= TPM_PT_PCR_LAST; i++)
1029 {
1030 if(select->count < count)
1031 {
1032 // If we have not filled up the return list, add more properties to it
1033 if(PCRGetProperty(i, &select->pcrProperty[select->count]))
1034 // only increment if the property is implemented
1035 select->count++;
1036 }
1037 else
1038 {
1039 // If the return list is full but we still have properties
1040 // available, report this and stop iterating.
1041 more = YES;
1042 break;
1043 }
1044 }
1045 return more;
1046 }
8.6.3.31 PCRCapGetHandles()
This function is used to get a list of handles of PCR, started from handle. If handle exceeds the maximum
PCR handle range, an empty list will be returned and the return value will be NO.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
1047 TPMI_YES_NO
1048 PCRCapGetHandles(
1049 TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: start handle
1050 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned handle
1051 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
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1052 )
1053 {
1054 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
1055 UINT32 i;
1056
1057 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PCR);
1058
1059 // Initialize output handle list
1060 handleList->count = 0;
1061
1062 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
1063 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
1064
1065 // Iterate PCR handle range
1066 for(i = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK; i <= PCR_LAST; i++)
1067 {
1068 if(handleList->count < count)
1069 {
1070 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this PCR
1071 // handle to it
1072 handleList->handle[handleList->count] = i + PCR_FIRST;
1073 handleList->count++;
1074 }
1075 else
1076 {
1077 // If the return list is full but we still have PCR handle
1078 // available, report this and stop iterating
1079 more = YES;
1080 break;
1081 }
1082 }
1083 return more;
1084 }
8.7 PP.c
8.7.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions that support the physical presence operations of the TPM.
8.7.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
8.7.3 Functions
8.7.3.1 PhysicalPresencePreInstall_Init()
This function is used to initialize the array of commands that require confirmation with physical presence.
The array is an array of bits that has a correspondence with the command code.
This command should only ever be executable in a manufacturing setting or in a simulation.
2 void
3 PhysicalPresencePreInstall_Init(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 // Clear all the PP commands
8 MemorySet(&gp.ppList, 0,
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9 ((TPM_CC_PP_LAST - TPM_CC_PP_FIRST + 1) + 7) / 8);
10
11 // TPM_CC_PP_Commands always requires PP
12 if(CommandIsImplemented(TPM_CC_PP_Commands))
13 PhysicalPresenceCommandSet(TPM_CC_PP_Commands);
14
15 // Write PP list to NV
16 NvWriteReserved(NV_PP_LIST, &gp.ppList);
17
18 return;
19 }
8.7.3.2 PhysicalPresenceCommandSet()
This function is used to indicate a command that requires PP confirmation.
20 void
21 PhysicalPresenceCommandSet(
22 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
23 )
24 {
25 UINT32 bitPos;
26
27 // Assume command is implemented. It should be checked before this
28 // function is called
29 pAssert(CommandIsImplemented(commandCode));
30
31 // If the command is not a PP command, ignore it
32 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_PP_FIRST || commandCode > TPM_CC_PP_LAST)
33 return;
34
35 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_PP_FIRST;
36
37 // Set bit
38 gp.ppList[bitPos/8] |= 1 << (bitPos % 8);
39
40 return;
41 }
8.7.3.3 PhysicalPresenceCommandClear()
This function is used to indicate a command that no longer requires PP confirmation.
42 void
43 PhysicalPresenceCommandClear(
44 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
45 )
46 {
47 UINT32 bitPos;
48
49 // Assume command is implemented. It should be checked before this
50 // function is called
51 pAssert(CommandIsImplemented(commandCode));
52
53 // If the command is not a PP command, ignore it
54 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_PP_FIRST || commandCode > TPM_CC_PP_LAST)
55 return;
56
57 // if the input code is TPM_CC_PP_Commands, it can not be cleared
58 if(commandCode == TPM_CC_PP_Commands)
59 return;
60
61 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_PP_FIRST;
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62
63 // Set bit
64 gp.ppList[bitPos/8] |= (1 << (bitPos % 8));
65 // Flip it to off
66 gp.ppList[bitPos/8] ^= (1 << (bitPos % 8));
67
68 return;
69 }
8.7.3.4 PhysicalPresenceIsRequired()
This function indicates if PP confirmation is required for a command.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if physical presence is required
FALSE if physical presence is not required
70 BOOL
71 PhysicalPresenceIsRequired(
72 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
73 )
74 {
75 UINT32 bitPos;
76
77 // if the input commandCode is not a PP command, return FALSE
78 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_PP_FIRST || commandCode > TPM_CC_PP_LAST)
79 return FALSE;
80
81 bitPos = commandCode - TPM_CC_PP_FIRST;
82
83 // Check the bit map. If the bit is SET, PP authorization is required
84 return ((gp.ppList[bitPos/8] & (1 << (bitPos % 8))) != 0);
85
86 }
8.7.3.5 PhysicalPresenceCapGetCCList()
This function returns a list of commands that require PP confirmation. The list starts from the first
implemented command that has a command code that the same or greater than commandCode.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more command codes available
NO all the available command codes have been returned
87 TPMI_YES_NO
88 PhysicalPresenceCapGetCCList(
89 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: start command code
90 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned TPM_CC
91 TPML_CC *commandList // OUT: list of TPM_CC
92 )
93 {
94 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
95 UINT32 i;
96
97 // Initialize output handle list
98 commandList->count = 0;
99
100 // The maximum count of command we may return is MAX_CAP_CC
101 if(count > MAX_CAP_CC) count = MAX_CAP_CC;
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102
103 // Collect PP commands
104 for(i = commandCode; i <= TPM_CC_PP_LAST; i++)
105 {
106 if(PhysicalPresenceIsRequired(i))
107 {
108 if(commandList->count < count)
109 {
110 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this command
111 // code to it
112 commandList->commandCodes[commandList->count] = i;
113 commandList->count++;
114 }
115 else
116 {
117 // If the return list is full but we still have PP command
118 // available, report this and stop iterating
119 more = YES;
120 break;
121 }
122 }
123 }
124 return more;
125 }
8.8 Session.c
8.8.1 Introduction
The code in this file is used to manage the session context counter. The scheme implemented here is a
"truncated counter". This scheme allows the TPM to not need TPM_SU_CLEAR for a very long period of
time and still not have the context count for a session repeated.
The counter (contextCounter)in this implementation is a UINT64 but can be smaller. The "tracking array"
(contextArray) only has 16-bits per context. The tracking array is the data that needs to be saved and
restored across TPM_SU_STATE so that sessions are not lost when the system enters the sleep state.
Also, when the TPM is active, the tracking array is kept in RAM making it important that the number of
bytes for each entry be kept as small as possible.
The TPM prevents collisions of these truncated values by not allowing a contextID to be assigned if it
would be the same as an existing value. Since the array holds 16 bits, after a context has been saved,
an additional 2^16-1 contexts may be saved before the count would again match. The normal
expectation is that the context will be flushed before its count value is needed again but it is always
possible to have long-lived sessions.
The contextID is assigned when the context is saved (TPM2_ContextSave()). At that time, the TPM will
compare the low-order 16 bits of contextCounter to the existing values in contextArray and if one
matches, the TPM will return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP (by construction, the entry that contains the
matching value is the oldest context).
The expected remediation by the TRM is to load the oldest saved session context (the one found by the
TPM), and save it. Since loading the oldest session also eliminates its contextID value from contextArray,
there TPM will always be able to load and save the oldest existing context.
In the worst case, software may have to load and save several contexts in order to save an additional
one. This should happen very infrequently.
When the TPM searches contextArray and finds that none of the contextIDs match the low-order 16-bits
of contextCount, the TPM can copy the low bits to the contextArray associated with the session, and
increment contextCount.
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There is one entry in contextArray for each of the active sessions allowed by the TPM implementation.
This array contains either a context count, an index, or a value indicating the slot is available (0).
The index into the contextArray is the handle for the session with the region selector byte of the session
set to zero. If an entry in contextArray contains 0, then the corresponding handle may be assigned to a
session. If the entry contains a value that is less than or equal to the number of loaded sessions for the
TPM, then the array entry is the slot in which the context is loaded.
EXAMPLE: If the TPM allows 8 loaded sessions, then the slot numbers would be 1-8 and a contextArrary value in that
range would represent the loaded session.
NOTE: When the TPM firmware determines that the array entry is for a loaded session, it will subtract 1 to create the
zero-based slot number.
There is one significant corner case in this scheme. When the contextCount is equal to a value in the
contextArray, the oldest session needs to be recycled or flushed. In order to recycle the session, it must
be loaded. To be loaded, there must be an available slot. Rather than require that a spare slot be
available all the time, the TPM will check to see if the contextCount is equal to some value in the
contextArray when a session is created. This prevents the last session slot from being used when it is
likely that a session will need to be recycled.
If a TPM with both 1.2 and 2.0 functionality uses this scheme for both 1.2 and 2.0 sessions, and the list of
active contexts is read with TPM_GetCapabiltiy(), the TPM will create 32-bit representations of the list that
contains 16-bit values (the TPM2_GetCapability() returns a list of handles for active sessions rather than
a list of contextID). The full contextID has high-order bits that are either the same as the current
contextCount or one less. It is one less if the 16-bits of the contextArray has a value that is larger than
the low-order 16 bits of contextCount.
8.8.2 Includes, Defines, and Local Variables
1 #define SESSION_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include "Platform.h"
4 #include "SessionProcess_fp.h"
8.8.3 File Scope Function -- ContextIdSetOldest()
This function is called when the oldest contextID is being loaded or deleted. Once a saved context
becomes the oldest, it stays the oldest until it is deleted.
Finding the oldest is a bit tricky. It is not just the numeric comparison of values but is dependent on the
value of contextCounter.
Assume we have a small contextArray with 8, 4-bit values with values 1 and 2 used to indicate the loaded
context slot number. Also assume that the array contains hex values of (0 0 1 0 3 0 9 F) and that the
contextCounter is an 8-bit counter with a value of 0x37. Since the low nibble is 7, that means that values
above 7 are older than values below it and, in this example, 9 is the oldest value.
Note if we subtract the counter value, from each slot that contains a saved contextID we get (- - - - B - 2 -
8) and the oldest entry is now easy to find.
5 static void
6 ContextIdSetOldest(
7 void
8 )
9 {
10 CONTEXT_SLOT lowBits;
11 CONTEXT_SLOT entry;
12 CONTEXT_SLOT smallest = ((CONTEXT_SLOT) ~0);
13 UINT32 i;
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14
15 // Set oldestSaveContext to a value indicating none assigned
16 s_oldestSavedSession = MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS + 1;
17
18 lowBits = (CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter;
19 for(i = 0; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
20 {
21 entry = gr.contextArray[i];
22
23 // only look at entries that are saved contexts
24 if(entry > MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS)
25 {
26 // Use a less than or equal in case the oldest
27 // is brand new (= lowBits-1) and equal to our initial
28 // value for smallest.
29 if(((CONTEXT_SLOT) (entry - lowBits)) <= smallest)
30 {
31 smallest = (entry - lowBits);
32 s_oldestSavedSession = i;
33 }
34 }
35 }
36 // When we finish, either the s_oldestSavedSession still has its initial
37 // value, or it has the index of the oldest saved context.
38 }
8.8.4 Startup Function -- SessionStartup()
This function initializes the session subsystem on TPM2_Startup().
39 void
40 SessionStartup(
41 STARTUP_TYPE type
42 )
43 {
44 UINT32 i;
45
46 // Initialize session slots. At startup, all the in-memory session slots
47 // are cleared and marked as not occupied
48 for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS; i++)
49 s_sessions[i].occupied = FALSE; // session slot is not occupied
50
51 // The free session slots the number of maximum allowed loaded sessions
52 s_freeSessionSlots = MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS;
53
54 // Initialize context ID data. On a ST_SAVE or hibernate sequence, it will
55 // scan the saved array of session context counts, and clear any entry that
56 // references a session that was in memory during the state save since that
57 // memory was not preserved over the ST_SAVE.
58 if(type == SU_RESUME || type == SU_RESTART)
59 {
60 // On ST_SAVE we preserve the contexts that were saved but not the ones
61 // in memory
62 for (i = 0; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
63 {
64 // If the array value is unused or references a loaded session then
65 // that loaded session context is lost and the array entry is
66 // reclaimed.
67 if (gr.contextArray[i] <= MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS)
68 gr.contextArray[i] = 0;
69 }
70 // Find the oldest session in context ID data and set it in
71 // s_oldestSavedSession
72 ContextIdSetOldest();
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73 }
74 else
75 {
76 // For STARTUP_CLEAR, clear out the contextArray
77 for (i = 0; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
78 gr.contextArray[i] = 0;
79
80 // reset the context counter
81 gr.contextCounter = MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS + 1;
82
83 // Initialize oldest saved session
84 s_oldestSavedSession = MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS + 1;
85 }
86 return;
87 }
8.8.5 Access Functions
8.8.5.1 SessionIsLoaded()
This function test a session handle references a loaded session. The handle must have previously been
checked to make sure that it is a valid handle for an authorization session.
NOTE: A PWAP authorization does not have a session.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if session is loaded
FALSE if it is not loaded
88 BOOL
89 SessionIsLoaded(
90 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: session handle
91 )
92 {
93 pAssert( HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
94 || HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION);
95
96 handle = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK;
97
98 // if out of range of possible active session, or not assigned to a loaded
99 // session return false
100 if( handle >= MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS
101 || gr.contextArray[handle] == 0
102 || gr.contextArray[handle] > MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS
103 )
104 return FALSE;
105
106 return TRUE;
107 }
8.8.5.2 SessionIsSaved()
This function test a session handle references a saved session. The handle must have previously been
checked to make sure that it is a valid handle for an authorization session.
NOTE: An password authorization does not have a session.
This function requires that the handle be a valid session handle.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE if session is saved
FALSE if it is not saved
108 BOOL
109 SessionIsSaved(
110 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: session handle
111 )
112 {
113 pAssert( HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
114 || HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION);
115
116 handle = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK;
117 // if out of range of possible active session, or not assigned, or
118 // assigned to a loaded session, return false
119 if( handle >= MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS
120 || gr.contextArray[handle] == 0
121 || gr.contextArray[handle] <= MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS
122 )
123 return FALSE;
124
125 return TRUE;
126 }
8.8.5.3 SessionPCRValueIsCurrent()
This function is used to check if PCR values have been updated since the last time they were checked in
a policy session.
This function requires the session is loaded.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if PCR value is current
FALSE if PCR value is not current
127 BOOL
128 SessionPCRValueIsCurrent(
129 TPMI_SH_POLICY handle // IN: session handle
130 )
131 {
132 SESSION *session;
133
134 pAssert(SessionIsLoaded(handle));
135
136 session = SessionGet(handle);
137 if( session->pcrCounter != 0
138 && session->pcrCounter != gr.pcrCounter
139 )
140 return FALSE;
141 else
142 return TRUE;
143 }
8.8.5.4 SessionGet()
This function returns a pointer to the session object associated with a session handle.
The function requires that the session is loaded.
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144 SESSION *
145 SessionGet(
146 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: session handle
147 )
148 {
149 CONTEXT_SLOT sessionIndex;
150
151 pAssert( HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
152 || HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION
153 );
154
155 pAssert((handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK) < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS);
156
157 // get the contents of the session array. Because session is loaded, we
158 // should always get a valid sessionIndex
159 sessionIndex = gr.contextArray[handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK] - 1;
160
161 pAssert(sessionIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS);
162
163 return &s_sessions[sessionIndex].session;
164 }
8.8.6 Utility Functions
8.8.6.1 ContextIdSessionCreate()
This function is called when a session is created. It will check to see if the current gap would prevent a
context from being saved. If so it will return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP. Otherwise, it will try to find an
open slot in contextArray, set contextArray to the slot.
This routine requires that the caller has determined the session array index for the session.
return type TPM_RC
TPM_RC_SUCCESS context ID was assigned
TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP can't assign a new contextID until the oldest saved session context is
recycled
TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLE there is no slot available in the context array for tracking of this
session context
165 static TPM_RC
166 ContextIdSessionCreate (
167 TPM_HANDLE *handle, // OUT: receives the assigned handle. This will
168 // be an index that must be adjusted by the
169 // caller according to the type of the
170 // session created
171 UINT32 sessionIndex // IN: The session context array entry that will
172 // be occupied by the created session
173 )
174 {
175
176 pAssert(sessionIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS);
177
178 // check to see if creating the context is safe
179 // Is this going to be an assignment for the last session context
180 // array entry? If so, then there will be no room to recycle the
181 // oldest context if needed. If the gap is not at maximum, then
182 // it will be possible to save a context if it becomes necessary.
183 if( s_oldestSavedSession < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS
184 && s_freeSessionSlots == 1)
185 {
186 // See if the gap is at maximum
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187 if( (CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter
188 == gr.contextArray[s_oldestSavedSession])
189
190 // Note: if this is being used on a TPM.combined, this return
191 // code should be transformed to an appropriate 1.2 error
192 // code for this case.
193 return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP;
194 }
195
196 // Find an unoccupied entry in the contextArray
197 for(*handle = 0; *handle < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; (*handle)++)
198 {
199 if(gr.contextArray[*handle] == 0)
200 {
201 // indicate that the session associated with this handle
202 // references a loaded session
203 gr.contextArray[*handle] = (CONTEXT_SLOT)(sessionIndex+1);
204 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
205 }
206 }
207 return TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLES;
208 }
8.8.6.2 SessionCreate()
This function does the detailed work for starting an authorization session. This is done in a support
routine rather than in the action code because the session management may differ in implementations.
This implementation uses a fixed memory allocation to hold sessions and a fixed allocation to hold the
contextID for the saved contexts.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP need to recycle sessions
TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLE active session space is full
TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY loaded session space is full
209 TPM_RC
210 SessionCreate(
211 TPM_SE sessionType, // IN: the session type
212 TPMI_ALG_HASH authHash, // IN: the hash algorithm
213 TPM2B_NONCE *nonceCaller, // IN: initial nonceCaller
214 TPMT_SYM_DEF *symmetric, // IN: the symmetric algorithm
215 TPMI_DH_ENTITY bind, // IN: the bind object
216 TPM2B_DATA *seed, // IN: seed data
217 TPM_HANDLE *sessionHandle // OUT: the session handle
218 )
219 {
220 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
221 CONTEXT_SLOT slotIndex;
222 SESSION *session = NULL;
223
224 pAssert( sessionType == TPM_SE_HMAC
225 || sessionType == TPM_SE_POLICY
226 || sessionType == TPM_SE_TRIAL);
227
228 // If there are no open spots in the session array, then no point in searching
229 if(s_freeSessionSlots == 0)
230 return TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY;
231
232 // Find a space for loading a session
233 for(slotIndex = 0; slotIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS; slotIndex++)
234 {
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235 // Is this available?
236 if(s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied == FALSE)
237 {
238 session = &s_sessions[slotIndex].session;
239 break;
240 }
241 }
242 // if no spot found, then this is an internal error
243 pAssert (slotIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS);
244
245 // Call context ID function to get a handle. TPM_RC_SESSION_HANDLE may be
246 // returned from ContextIdHandelAssign()
247 result = ContextIdSessionCreate(sessionHandle, slotIndex);
248 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
249 return result;
250
251 //*** Only return from this point on is TPM_RC_SUCCESS
252
253 // Can now indicate that the session array entry is occupied.
254 s_freeSessionSlots--;
255 s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied = TRUE;
256
257 // Initialize the session data
258 MemorySet(session, 0, sizeof(SESSION));
259
260 // Initialize internal session data
261 session->authHashAlg = authHash;
262 // Initialize session type
263 if(sessionType == TPM_SE_HMAC)
264 {
265 *sessionHandle += HMAC_SESSION_FIRST;
266
267 }
268 else
269 {
270 *sessionHandle += POLICY_SESSION_FIRST;
271
272 // For TPM_SE_POLICY or TPM_SE_TRIAL
273 session->attributes.isPolicy = SET;
274 if(sessionType == TPM_SE_TRIAL)
275 session->attributes.isTrialPolicy = SET;
276
277 // Initialize policy session data
278 SessionInitPolicyData(session);
279 }
280 // Create initial session nonce
281 session->nonceTPM.t.size = nonceCaller->t.size;
282 CryptGenerateRandom(session->nonceTPM.t.size, session->nonceTPM.t.buffer);
283
284 // Set up session parameter encryption algorithm
285 session->symmetric = *symmetric;
286
287 // If there is a bind object or a session secret, then need to compute
288 // a sessionKey.
289 if(bind != TPM_RH_NULL || seed->t.size != 0)
290 {
291 // sessionKey = KDFa(hash, (authValue || seed), "ATH", nonceTPM,
292 // nonceCaller, bits)
293 // The HMAC key for generating the sessionSecret can be the concatenation
294 // of an authorization value and a seed value
295 TPM2B_TYPE(KEY, (sizeof(TPMT_HA) + sizeof(seed->t.buffer)));
296 TPM2B_KEY key;
297
298 UINT16 hashSize; // The size of the hash used by the
299 // session crated by this command
300 TPM2B_AUTH entityAuth; // The authValue of the entity
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301 // associated with HMAC session
302
303 // Get hash size, which is also the length of sessionKey
304 hashSize = CryptGetHashDigestSize(session->authHashAlg);
305
306 // Get authValue of associated entity
307 entityAuth.t.size = EntityGetAuthValue(bind, &entityAuth.t.buffer);
308
309 // Concatenate authValue and seed
310 pAssert(entityAuth.t.size + seed->t.size <= sizeof(key.t.buffer));
311 MemoryCopy2B(&key.b, &entityAuth.b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
312 MemoryConcat2B(&key.b, &seed->b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
313
314 session->sessionKey.t.size = hashSize;
315
316 // Compute the session key
317 KDFa(session->authHashAlg, &key.b, "ATH", &session->nonceTPM.b,
318 &nonceCaller->b, hashSize * 8, session->sessionKey.t.buffer, NULL);
319 }
320
321 // Copy the name of the entity that the HMAC session is bound to
322 // Policy session is not bound to an entity
323 if(bind != TPM_RH_NULL && sessionType == TPM_SE_HMAC)
324 {
325 session->attributes.isBound = SET;
326 SessionComputeBoundEntity(bind, &session->u1.boundEntity);
327 }
328 // If there is a bind object and it is subject to DA, then use of this session
329 // is subject to DA regardless of how it is used.
330 session->attributes.isDaBound = (bind != TPM_RH_NULL)
331 && (IsDAExempted(bind) == FALSE);
332
333 // If the session is bound, then check to see if it is bound to lockoutAuth
334 session->attributes.isLockoutBound = (session->attributes.isDaBound == SET)
335 && (bind == TPM_RH_LOCKOUT);
336 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
337
338 }
8.8.6.3 SessionContextSave()
This function is called when a session context is to be saved. The contextID of the saved session is
returned. If no contextID can be assigned, then the routine returns TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP. If the
function completes normally, the session slot will be freed.
This function requires that handle references a loaded session. Otherwise, it should not be called at the
first place.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP a contextID could not be assigned.
TPM_RC_TOO_MANY_CONTEXTS the counter maxed out
339 TPM_RC
340 SessionContextSave (
341 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: session handle
342 CONTEXT_COUNTER *contextID // OUT: assigned contextID
343 )
344 {
345 UINT32 contextIndex;
346 CONTEXT_SLOT slotIndex;
347
348 pAssert(SessionIsLoaded(handle));
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349
350 // check to see if the gap is already maxed out
351 // Need to have a saved session
352 if( s_oldestSavedSession < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS
353 // if the oldest saved session has the same value as the low bits
354 // of the contextCounter, then the GAP is maxed out.
355 && gr.contextArray[s_oldestSavedSession] == (CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter)
356 return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP;
357
358 // if the caller wants the context counter, set it
359 if(contextID != NULL)
360 *contextID = gr.contextCounter;
361
362 pAssert((handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK) < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS);
363
364 contextIndex = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK;
365
366 // Extract the session slot number referenced by the contextArray
367 // because we are going to overwrite this with the low order
368 // contextID value.
369 slotIndex = gr.contextArray[contextIndex] - 1;
370
371 // Set the contextID for the contextArray
372 gr.contextArray[contextIndex] = (CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter;
373
374 // Increment the counter
375 gr.contextCounter++;
376
377 // In the unlikely event that the 64-bit context counter rolls over...
378 if(gr.contextCounter == 0)
379 {
380 // back it up
381 gr.contextCounter--;
382 // return an error
383 return TPM_RC_TOO_MANY_CONTEXTS;
384 }
385 // if the low-order bits wrapped, need to advance the value to skip over
386 // the values used to indicate that a session is loaded
387 if(((CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter) == 0)
388 gr.contextCounter += MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS + 1;
389
390 // If no other sessions are saved, this is now the oldest.
391 if(s_oldestSavedSession >= MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS)
392 s_oldestSavedSession = contextIndex;
393
394 // Mark the session slot as unoccupied
395 s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied = FALSE;
396
397 // and indicate that there is an additional open slot
398 s_freeSessionSlots++;
399
400 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
401 }
8.8.6.4 SessionContextLoad()
This function is used to load a session from saved context. The session handle must be for a saved
context.
If the gap is at a maximum, then the only session that can be loaded is the oldest session, otherwise
TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP is returned.
This function requires that handle references a valid saved session.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY no free session slots
TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP the gap count is maximum and this is not the oldest saved context
402 TPM_RC
403 SessionContextLoad(
404 SESSION *session, // IN: session structure from saved context
405 TPM_HANDLE *handle // IN/OUT: session handle
406 )
407 {
408 UINT32 contextIndex;
409 CONTEXT_SLOT slotIndex;
410
411 pAssert( HandleGetType(*handle) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
412 || HandleGetType(*handle) == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION);
413
414 // Don't bother looking if no openings
415 if(s_freeSessionSlots == 0)
416 return TPM_RC_SESSION_MEMORY;
417
418 // Find a free session slot to load the session
419 for(slotIndex = 0; slotIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS; slotIndex++)
420 if(s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied == FALSE) break;
421
422 // if no spot found, then this is an internal error
423 pAssert (slotIndex < MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS);
424
425 contextIndex = *handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK; // extract the index
426
427 // If there is only one slot left, and the gap is at maximum, the only session
428 // context that we can safely load is the oldest one.
429 if( s_oldestSavedSession < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS
430 && s_freeSessionSlots == 1
431 && (CONTEXT_SLOT)gr.contextCounter == gr.contextArray[s_oldestSavedSession]
432 && contextIndex != s_oldestSavedSession
433 )
434 return TPM_RC_CONTEXT_GAP;
435
436 pAssert(contextIndex < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS);
437
438 // set the contextArray value to point to the session slot where
439 // the context is loaded
440 gr.contextArray[contextIndex] = slotIndex + 1;
441
442 // if this was the oldest context, find the new oldest
443 if(contextIndex == s_oldestSavedSession)
444 ContextIdSetOldest();
445
446 // Copy session data to session slot
447 s_sessions[slotIndex].session = *session;
448
449 // Set session slot as occupied
450 s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied = TRUE;
451
452 // Reduce the number of open spots
453 s_freeSessionSlots--;
454
455 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
456 }
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8.8.6.5 SessionFlush()
This function is used to flush a session referenced by its handle. If the session associated with handle is
loaded, the session array entry is marked as available.
This function requires that handle be a valid active session.
457 void
458 SessionFlush(
459 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: loaded or saved session handle
460 )
461 {
462 CONTEXT_SLOT slotIndex;
463 UINT32 contextIndex; // Index into contextArray
464
465 pAssert( ( HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION
466 || HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION
467 )
468 && (SessionIsLoaded(handle) || SessionIsSaved(handle))
469 );
470
471 // Flush context ID of this session
472 // Convert handle to an index into the contextArray
473 contextIndex = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK;
474
475 pAssert(contextIndex < sizeof(gr.contextArray)/sizeof(gr.contextArray[0]));
476
477 // Get the current contents of the array
478 slotIndex = gr.contextArray[contextIndex];
479
480 // Mark context array entry as available
481 gr.contextArray[contextIndex] = 0;
482
483 // Is this a saved session being flushed
484 if(slotIndex > MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS)
485 {
486 // Flushing the oldest session?
487 if(contextIndex == s_oldestSavedSession)
488 // If so, find a new value for oldest.
489 ContextIdSetOldest();
490 }
491 else
492 {
493 // Adjust slot index to point to session array index
494 slotIndex -= 1;
495
496 // Free session array index
497 s_sessions[slotIndex].occupied = FALSE;
498 s_freeSessionSlots++;
499 }
500
501 return;
502 }
8.8.6.6 SessionComputeBoundEntity()
This function computes the binding value for a session. The binding value for a reserved handle is the
handle itself. For all the other entities, the authValue at the time of binding is included to prevent
squatting. For those values, the Name and the authValue are concatenated into the bind buffer. If they
will not both fit, the will be overlapped by XORing() bytes. If XOR is required, the bind value will be full.
503 void
504 SessionComputeBoundEntity(
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505 TPMI_DH_ENTITY entityHandle, // IN: handle of entity
506 TPM2B_NAME *bind // OUT: binding value
507 )
508 {
509 TPM2B_AUTH auth;
510 INT16 overlap;
511
512 // Get name
513 bind->t.size = EntityGetName(entityHandle, &bind->t.name);
514
515 // // The bound value of a reserved handle is the handle itself
516 // if(bind->t.size == sizeof(TPM_HANDLE)) return;
517
518 // For all the other entities, concatenate the auth value to the name.
519 // Get a local copy of the auth value because some overlapping
520 // may be necessary.
521 auth.t.size = EntityGetAuthValue(entityHandle, &auth.t.buffer);
522 pAssert(auth.t.size <= sizeof(TPMU_HA));
523
524 // Figure out if there will be any overlap
525 overlap = bind->t.size + auth.t.size - sizeof(bind->t.name);
526
527 // There is overlap if the combined sizes are greater than will fit
528 if(overlap > 0)
529 {
530 // The overlap area is at the end of the Name
531 BYTE *result = &bind->t.name[bind->t.size - overlap];
532 int i;
533
534 // XOR the auth value into the Name for the overlap area
535 for(i = 0; i < overlap; i++)
536 result[i] ^= auth.t.buffer[i];
537 }
538 else
539 {
540 // There is no overlap
541 overlap = 0;
542 }
543 //copy the remainder of the authData to the end of the name
544 MemoryCopy(&bind->t.name[bind->t.size], &auth.t.buffer[overlap],
545 auth.t.size - overlap, sizeof(bind->t.name) - bind->t.size);
546
547 // Increase the size of the bind data by the size of the auth - the overlap
548 bind->t.size += auth.t.size-overlap;
549
550 return;
551 }
8.8.6.7 SessionInitPolicyData()
This function initializes the portions of the session policy data that are not set by the allocation of a
session.
552 void
553 SessionInitPolicyData(
554 SESSION *session // IN: session handle
555 )
556 {
557 // Initialize start time
558 session->startTime = go.clock;
559
560 // Initialize policyDigest. policyDigest is initialized with a string of 0 of
561 // session algorithm digest size. Since the policy already contains all zeros
562 // it is only necessary to set the size
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563 session->u2.policyDigest.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(session->authHashAlg);
564 return;
565 }
8.8.6.8 SessionResetPolicyData()
This function is used to reset the policy data without changing the nonce or the start time of the session.
566 void
567 SessionResetPolicyData(
568 SESSION *session // IN: the session to reset
569 )
570 {
571 session->commandCode = 0; // No command
572
573 // No locality selected
574 MemorySet(&session->commandLocality, 0, sizeof(session->commandLocality));
575
576 // The cpHash size to zero
577 session->u1.cpHash.b.size = 0;
578
579 // No timeout
580 session->timeOut = 0;
581
582 // Reset the pcrCounter
583 session->pcrCounter = 0;
584
585 // Reset the policy hash
586 MemorySet(&session->u2.policyDigest.t.buffer, 0,
587 session->u2.policyDigest.t.size);
588
589 // Reset the session attributes
590 MemorySet(&session->attributes, 0, sizeof(SESSION_ATTRIBUTES));
591
592 // set the policy attribute
593 session->attributes.isPolicy = SET;
594 }
8.8.6.9 SessionCapGetLoaded()
This function returns a list of handles of loaded session, started from input handle
Handle must be in valid loaded session handle range, but does not have to point to a loaded session.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
595 TPMI_YES_NO
596 SessionCapGetLoaded(
597 TPMI_SH_POLICY handle, // IN: start handle
598 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned handle
599 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
600 )
601 {
602 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
603 UINT32 i;
604
605 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_LOADED_SESSION);
606
607 // Initialize output handle list
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608 handleList->count = 0;
609
610 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
611 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
612
613 // Iterate session context ID slots to get loaded session handles
614 for(i = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
615 {
616 // If session is active
617 if(gr.contextArray[i] != 0)
618 {
619 // If session is loaded
620 if (gr.contextArray[i] <= MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS)
621 {
622 if(handleList->count < count)
623 {
624 SESSION *session;
625
626 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this
627 // session handle to it
628 // assume that this is going to be an HMAC session
629 handle = i + HMAC_SESSION_FIRST;
630 session = SessionGet(handle);
631 if(session->attributes.isPolicy)
632 handle = i + POLICY_SESSION_FIRST;
633 handleList->handle[handleList->count] = handle;
634 handleList->count++;
635 }
636 else
637 {
638 // If the return list is full but we still have loaded object
639 // available, report this and stop iterating
640 more = YES;
641 break;
642 }
643 }
644 }
645 }
646
647 return more;
648
649 }
8.8.6.10 SessionCapGetSaved()
This function returns a list of handles for saved session, starting at handle.
Handle must be in a valid handle range, but does not have to point to a saved session
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
650 TPMI_YES_NO
651 SessionCapGetSaved(
652 TPMI_SH_HMAC handle, // IN: start handle
653 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned handle
654 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
655 )
656 {
657 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
658 UINT32 i;
659
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660 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_ACTIVE_SESSION);
661
662 // Initialize output handle list
663 handleList->count = 0;
664
665 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
666 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
667
668 // Iterate session context ID slots to get loaded session handles
669 for(i = handle & HR_HANDLE_MASK; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
670 {
671 // If session is active
672 if(gr.contextArray[i] != 0)
673 {
674 // If session is saved
675 if (gr.contextArray[i] > MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS)
676 {
677 if(handleList->count < count)
678 {
679 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this
680 // session handle to it
681 handleList->handle[handleList->count] = i + HMAC_SESSION_FIRST;
682 handleList->count++;
683 }
684 else
685 {
686 // If the return list is full but we still have loaded object
687 // available, report this and stop iterating
688 more = YES;
689 break;
690 }
691 }
692 }
693 }
694
695 return more;
696
697 }
8.8.6.11 SessionCapGetLoadedNumber()
This function return the number of authorization sessions currently loaded into TPM RAM.
698 UINT32
699 SessionCapGetLoadedNumber(
700 void
701 )
702 {
703 return MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS - s_freeSessionSlots;
704 }
8.8.6.12 SessionCapGetLoadedAvail()
This function returns the number of additional authorization sessions, of any type, that could be loaded
into TPM RAM.
NOTE: In other implementations, this number may just be an estimate. The only requirement for the estimate is, if it is
one or more, then at least one session must be loadable.
705 UINT32
706 SessionCapGetLoadedAvail(
707 void
708 )
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709 {
710 return s_freeSessionSlots;
711 }
8.8.6.13 SessionCapGetActiveNumber()
This function returns the number of active authorization sessions currently being tracked by the TPM.
712 UINT32
713 SessionCapGetActiveNumber(
714 void
715 )
716 {
717 UINT32 i;
718 UINT32 num = 0;
719
720 // Iterate the context array to find the number of non-zero slots
721 for(i = 0; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
722 {
723 if(gr.contextArray[i] != 0) num++;
724 }
725
726 return num;
727 }
8.8.6.14 SessionCapGetActiveAvail()
This function returns the number of additional authorization sessions, of any type, that could be created.
This not the number of slots for sessions, but the number of additional sessions that the TPM is capable
of tracking.
728 UINT32
729 SessionCapGetActiveAvail(
730 void
731 )
732 {
733 UINT32 i;
734 UINT32 num = 0;
735
736 // Iterate the context array to find the number of zero slots
737 for(i = 0; i < MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS; i++)
738 {
739 if(gr.contextArray[i] == 0) num++;
740 }
741
742 return num;
743 }
8.9 Time.c
8.9.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions relating to the TPM's time functions including the interface to the
implementation-specific time functions.
8.9.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 #include "Platform.h"
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8.9.3 Functions
8.9.3.1 TimePowerOn()
This function initialize time info at _TPM_Init().
3 void
4 TimePowerOn(
5 void
6 )
7 {
8 TPM_SU orderlyShutDown;
9
10 // Read orderly data info from NV memory
11 NvReadReserved(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, &go);
12
13 // Read orderly shut down state flag
14 NvReadReserved(NV_ORDERLY, &orderlyShutDown);
15
16 // If the previous cycle is orderly shut down, the value of the safe bit
17 // the same as previously saved. Otherwise, it is not safe.
18 if(orderlyShutDown == SHUTDOWN_NONE)
19 go.clockSafe= NO;
20 else
21 go.clockSafe = YES;
22
23 // Set the initial state of the DRBG
24 CryptDrbgGetPutState(PUT_STATE);
25
26 // Clear time since TPM power on
27 g_time = 0;
28
29 return;
30 }
8.9.3.2 TimeStartup()
This function updates the resetCount and restartCount components of TPMS_CLOCK_INFO structure at
TPM2_Startup().
31 void
32 TimeStartup(
33 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: start up type
34 )
35 {
36 if(type == SU_RESUME)
37 {
38 // Resume sequence
39 gr.restartCount++;
40 }
41 else
42 {
43 if(type == SU_RESTART)
44 {
45 // Hibernate sequence
46 gr.clearCount++;
47 gr.restartCount++;
48 }
49 else
50 {
51 // Reset sequence
52 // Increase resetCount
53 gp.resetCount++;
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54
55 // Write resetCount to NV
56 NvWriteReserved(NV_RESET_COUNT, &gp.resetCount);
57 gp.totalResetCount++;
58
59 // We do not expect the total reset counter overflow during the life
60 // time of TPM. if it ever happens, TPM will be put to failure mode
61 // and there is no way to recover it.
62 // The reason that there is no recovery is that we don't increment
63 // the NV totalResetCount when incrementing would make it 0. When the
64 // TPM starts up again, the old value of totalResetCount will be read
65 // and we will get right back to here with the increment failing.
66 if(gp.totalResetCount == 0)
67 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
68
69 // Write total reset counter to NV
70 NvWriteReserved(NV_TOTAL_RESET_COUNT, &gp.totalResetCount);
71
72 // Reset restartCount
73 gr.restartCount = 0;
74 }
75 }
76
77 return;
78 }
8.9.3.3 TimeUpdateToCurrent()
This function updates the Time and Clock in the global TPMS_TIME_INFO structure.
In this implementation, Time and Clock are updated at the beginning of each command and the values
are unchanged for the duration of the command.
Because Clock updates may require a write to NV memory, Time and Clock are not allowed to advance if
NV is not available. When clock is not advancing, any function that uses Clock will fail and return
TPM_RC_NV_UNAVAILABLE or TPM_RC_NV_RATE.
This implementations does not do rate limiting. If the implementation does do rate limiting, then the Clock
update should not be inhibited even when doing rather limiting.
79 void
80 TimeUpdateToCurrent(
81 void
82 )
83 {
84 UINT64 oldClock;
85 UINT64 elapsed;
86 #define CLOCK_UPDATE_MASK ((1ULL << NV_CLOCK_UPDATE_INTERVAL)- 1)
87
88 // Can't update time during the dark interval or when rate limiting.
89 if(NvIsAvailable() != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
90 return;
91
92 // Save the old clock value
93 oldClock = go.clock;
94
95 // Update the time info to current
96 elapsed = _plat__ClockTimeElapsed();
97 go.clock += elapsed;
98 g_time += elapsed;
99
100 // Check to see if the update has caused a need for an nvClock update
101 // CLOCK_UPDATE_MASK is measured by second, while the value in go.clock is
102 // recorded by millisecond. Align the clock value to second before the bit
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103 // operations
104 if( ((go.clock/1000) | CLOCK_UPDATE_MASK)
105 > ((oldClock/1000) | CLOCK_UPDATE_MASK))
106 {
107 // Going to update the time state so the safe flag
108 // should be set
109 go.clockSafe = YES;
110
111 // Get the DRBG state before updating orderly data
112 CryptDrbgGetPutState(GET_STATE);
113
114 NvWriteReserved(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, &go);
115 }
116
117 // Call self healing logic for dictionary attack parameters
118 DASelfHeal();
119
120 return;
121 }
8.9.3.4 TimeSetAdjustRate()
This function is used to perform rate adjustment on Time and Clock.
122 void
123 TimeSetAdjustRate(
124 TPM_CLOCK_ADJUST adjust // IN: adjust constant
125 )
126 {
127 switch(adjust)
128 {
129 case TPM_CLOCK_COARSE_SLOWER:
130 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE);
131 break;
132 case TPM_CLOCK_COARSE_FASTER:
133 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(-CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE);
134 break;
135 case TPM_CLOCK_MEDIUM_SLOWER:
136 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM);
137 break;
138 case TPM_CLOCK_MEDIUM_FASTER:
139 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(-CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM);
140 break;
141 case TPM_CLOCK_FINE_SLOWER:
142 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE);
143 break;
144 case TPM_CLOCK_FINE_FASTER:
145 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(-CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE);
146 break;
147 case TPM_CLOCK_NO_CHANGE:
148 break;
149 default:
150 pAssert(FALSE);
151 break;
152 }
153
154 return;
155 }
8.9.3.5 TimeGetRange()
This function is used to access TPMS_TIME_INFO. The TPMS_TIME_INFO structure is treaded as an
array of bytes, and a byte offset and length determine what bytes are returned.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_RANGE invalid data range
156 TPM_RC
157 TimeGetRange(
158 UINT16 offset, // IN: offset in TPMS_TIME_INFO
159 UINT16 size, // IN: size of data
160 TIME_INFO *dataBuffer // OUT: result buffer
161 )
162 {
163 TPMS_TIME_INFO timeInfo;
164 UINT16 infoSize;
165 BYTE infoData[sizeof(TPMS_TIME_INFO)];
166 BYTE *buffer;
167
168 // Fill TPMS_TIME_INFO structure
169 timeInfo.time = g_time;
170 TimeFillInfo(&timeInfo.clockInfo);
171
172 // Marshal TPMS_TIME_INFO to canonical form
173 buffer = infoData;
174 infoSize = TPMS_TIME_INFO_Marshal(&timeInfo, &buffer, NULL);
175
176 // Check if the input range is valid
177 if(offset + size > infoSize) return TPM_RC_RANGE;
178
179 // Copy info data to output buffer
180 MemoryCopy(dataBuffer, infoData + offset, size, sizeof(TIME_INFO));
181
182 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
183 }
8.9.3.6 TimeFillInfo
This function gathers information to fill in a TPMS_CLOCK_INFO structure.
184 void
185 TimeFillInfo(
186 TPMS_CLOCK_INFO *clockInfo
187 )
188 {
189 clockInfo->clock = go.clock;
190 clockInfo->resetCount = gp.resetCount;
191 clockInfo->restartCount = gr.restartCount;
192
193 // If NV is not available, clock stopped advancing and the value reported is
194 // not "safe".
195 if(NvIsAvailable() == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
196 clockInfo->safe = go.clockSafe;
197 else
198 clockInfo->safe = NO;
199
200 return;
201 }
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9 Support
9.1 AlgorithmCap.c
9.1.1 Description
This file contains the algorithm property definitions for the algorithms and the code for the
TPM2_GetCapability() to return the algorithm properties.
9.1.2 Includes and Defines
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
2 typedef struct
3 {
4 TPM_ALG_ID algID;
5 TPMA_ALGORITHM attributes;
6 } ALGORITHM;
7 static const ALGORITHM s_algorithms[] =
8 {
9 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
10 {TPM_ALG_RSA, {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
11 #endif
12 #ifdef TPM_ALG_DES
13 {TPM_ALG_DES, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
14 #endif
15 #ifdef TPM_ALG_3DES
16 {TPM_ALG__3DES, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
17 #endif
18 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
19 {TPM_ALG_SHA1, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
20 #endif
21 #ifdef TPM_ALG_HMAC
22 {TPM_ALG_HMAC, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}},
23 #endif
24 #ifdef TPM_ALG_AES
25 {TPM_ALG_AES, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
26 #endif
27 #ifdef TPM_ALG_MGF1
28 {TPM_ALG_MGF1, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}},
29 #endif
30
31 {TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH, {0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0}},
32
33 #ifdef TPM_ALG_XOR
34 {TPM_ALG_XOR, {0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
35 #endif
36
37 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
38 {TPM_ALG_SHA256, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
39 #endif
40 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
41 {TPM_ALG_SHA384, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
42 #endif
43 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
44 {TPM_ALG_SHA512, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
45 #endif
46 #ifdef TPM_ALG_WHIRLPOOL512
47 {TPM_ALG_WHIRLPOOL512, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
48 #endif
49 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
50 {TPM_ALG_SM3_256, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
51 #endif
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52 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4
53 {TPM_ALG_SM4, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
54 #endif
55 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSASSA
56 {TPM_ALG_RSASSA, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}},
57 #endif
58 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSAES
59 {TPM_ALG_RSAES, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
60 #endif
61 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSAPSS
62 {TPM_ALG_RSAPSS, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}},
63 #endif
64 #ifdef TPM_ALG_OAEP
65 {TPM_ALG_OAEP, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
66 #endif
67 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDSA
68 {TPM_ALG_ECDSA, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0}},
69 #endif
70 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDH
71 {TPM_ALG_ECDH, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}},
72 #endif
73 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDAA
74 {TPM_ALG_ECDAA, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}},
75 #endif
76 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR
77 {TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR, {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}},
78 #endif
79 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56a
80 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56a,{0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}},
81 #endif
82 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KDF2
83 {TPM_ALG_KDF2, {0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}},
84 #endif
85 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108
86 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108,{0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0}},
87 #endif
88 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
89 {TPM_ALG_ECC, {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
90 #endif
91
92 {TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER, {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}},
93
94 #ifdef TPM_ALG_CTR
95 {TPM_ALG_CTR, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
96 #endif
97 #ifdef TPM_ALG_OFB
98 {TPM_ALG_OFB, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
99 #endif
100 #ifdef TPM_ALG_CBC
101 {TPM_ALG_CBC, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
102 #endif
103 #ifdef TPM_ALG_CFB
104 {TPM_ALG_CFB, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
105 #endif
106 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECB
107 {TPM_ALG_ECB, {0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}},
108 #endif
109 };
9.1.3 AlgorithmCapGetImplemented()
This function is used by TPM2_GetCapability() to return a list of the implemented algorithms.
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Return Value Meaning
YES more algorithms to report
NO no more algorithms to report
110 TPMI_YES_NO
111 AlgorithmCapGetImplemented(
112 TPM_ALG_ID algID, // IN: the starting algorithm ID
113 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned algorithms
114 TPML_ALG_PROPERTY *algList // OUT: algorithm list
115 )
116 {
117 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
118 UINT32 i;
119 UINT32 algNum;
120
121 // initialize output algorithm list
122 algList->count = 0;
123
124 // The maximum count of algorithms we may return is MAX_CAP_ALGS.
125 if(count > MAX_CAP_ALGS)
126 count = MAX_CAP_ALGS;
127
128 // Compute how many algorithms are defined in s_algorithms array.
129 algNum = sizeof(s_algorithms) / sizeof(s_algorithms[0]);
130
131 // Scan the implemented algorithm list to see if there is a match to 'algID'.
132 for(i = 0; i < algNum; i++)
133 {
134 // If algID is less than the starting algorithm ID, skip it
135 if(s_algorithms[i].algID < algID)
136 continue;
137 if(algList->count < count)
138 {
139 // If we have not filled up the return list, add more algorithms
140 // to it
141 algList->algProperties[algList->count].alg = s_algorithms[i].algID;
142 algList->algProperties[algList->count].algProperties =
143 s_algorithms[i].attributes;
144 algList->count++;
145 }
146 else
147 {
148 // If the return list is full but we still have algorithms
149 // available, report this and stop scanning.
150 more = YES;
151 break;
152 }
153
154 }
155
156 return more;
157
158 }
159 LIB_EXPORT
160 void
161 AlgorithmGetImplementedVector(
162 ALGORITHM_VECTOR *implemented // OUT: the implemented bits are SET
163 )
164 {
165 int index;
166
167 // Nothing implemented until we say it is
168 MemorySet(implemented, 0, sizeof(ALGORITHM_VECTOR));
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169
170 for(index = (sizeof(s_algorithms) / sizeof(s_algorithms[0])) - 1;
171 index >= 0;
172 index--)
173 SET_BIT(s_algorithms[index].algID, *implemented);
174 return;
175 }
9.2 Bits.c
9.2.1 Introduction
This file contains bit manipulation routines. They operate on bit arrays.
The 0th bit in the array is the right-most bit in the 0th octet in the array.
NOTE: If pAssert() is defined, the functions will assert if the indicated bit number is outside of the range of bArray. How
the assert is handled is implementation dependent.
9.2.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
9.2.3 Functions
9.2.3.1 BitIsSet()
This function is used to check the setting of a bit in an array of bits.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE bit is set
FALSE bit is not set
2 BOOL
3 BitIsSet(
4 unsigned int bitNum, // IN: number of the bit in 'bArray'
5 BYTE *bArray, // IN: array containing the bit
6 unsigned int arraySize // IN: size in bytes of 'bArray'
7 )
8 {
9 pAssert(arraySize > (bitNum >> 3));
10 return((bArray[bitNum >> 3] & (1 << (bitNum & 7))) != 0);
11 }
9.2.3.2 BitSet()
This function will set the indicated bit in bArray.
12 void
13 BitSet(
14 unsigned int bitNum, // IN: number of the bit in 'bArray'
15 BYTE *bArray, // IN: array containing the bit
16 unsigned int arraySize // IN: size in bytes of 'bArray'
17 )
18 {
19 pAssert(arraySize > bitNum/8);
20 bArray[bitNum >> 3] |= (1 << (bitNum & 7));
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21 }
9.2.3.3 BitClear()
This function will clear the indicated bit in bArray.
22 void
23 BitClear(
24 unsigned int bitNum, // IN: number of the bit in 'bArray'.
25 BYTE *bArray, // IN: array containing the bit
26 unsigned int arraySize // IN: size in bytes of 'bArray'
27 )
28 {
29 pAssert(arraySize > bitNum/8);
30 bArray[bitNum >> 3] &= ~(1 << (bitNum & 7));
31 }
9.3 CommandAttributeData.c
This is the command code attribute array for GetCapability(). Both this array and s_commandAttributes
provides command code attributes, but tuned for different purpose
1 static const TPMA_CC s_ccAttr [] = {
2 {0x011f, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial
3 {0x0120, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_EvictControl
4 {0x0121, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_HierarchyControl
5 {0x0122, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpace
6 {0x0123, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // No command
7 {0x0124, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ChangeEPS
8 {0x0125, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ChangePPS
9 {0x0126, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Clear
10 {0x0127, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ClearControl
11 {0x0128, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ClockSet
12 {0x0129, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_HierarchyChangeAuth
13 {0x012a, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_DefineSpace
14 {0x012b, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_Allocate
15 {0x012c, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy
16 {0x012d, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PP_Commands
17 {0x012e, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SetPrimaryPolicy
18 {0x012f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeStart
19 {0x0130, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ClockRateAdjust
20 {0x0131, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_CreatePrimary
21 {0x0132, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock
22 {0x0133, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
23 {0x0134, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_Increment
24 {0x0135, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_SetBits
25 {0x0136, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_Extend
26 {0x0137, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_Write
27 {0x0138, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_WriteLock
28 {0x0139, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset
29 {0x013a, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackParameters
30 {0x013b, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_ChangeAuth
31 {0x013c, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_Event
32 {0x013d, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_Reset
33 {0x013e, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SequenceComplete
34 {0x013f, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SetAlgorithmSet
35 {0x0140, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus
36 {0x0141, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData
37 {0x0142, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_IncrementalSelfTest
38 {0x0143, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SelfTest
39 {0x0144, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Startup
40 {0x0145, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Shutdown
41 {0x0146, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_StirRandom
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42 {0x0147, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ActivateCredential
43 {0x0148, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Certify
44 {0x0149, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyNV
45 {0x014a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_CertifyCreation
46 {0x014b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Duplicate
47 {0x014c, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetTime
48 {0x014d, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetSessionAuditDigest
49 {0x014e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_Read
50 {0x014f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_ReadLock
51 {0x0150, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ObjectChangeAuth
52 {0x0151, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicySecret
53 {0x0152, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Rewrap
54 {0x0153, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Create
55 {0x0154, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ECDH_ZGen
56 {0x0155, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_HMAC
57 {0x0156, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Import
58 {0x0157, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Load
59 {0x0158, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Quote
60 {0x0159, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_RSA_Decrypt
61 {0x015a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // No command
62 {0x015b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_HMAC_Start
63 {0x015c, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_SequenceUpdate
64 {0x015d, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Sign
65 {0x015e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Unseal
66 {0x015f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // No command
67 {0x0160, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicySigned
68 {0x0161, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ContextLoad
69 {0x0162, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ContextSave
70 {0x0163, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ECDH_KeyGen
71 {0x0164, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_EncryptDecrypt
72 {0x0165, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_FlushContext
73 {0x0166, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // No command
74 {0x0167, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_LoadExternal
75 {0x0168, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_MakeCredential
76 {0x0169, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_ReadPublic
77 {0x016a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize
78 {0x016b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue
79 {0x016c, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode
80 {0x016d, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer
81 {0x016e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash
82 {0x016f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyLocality
83 {0x0170, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash
84 {0x0171, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyOR
85 {0x0172, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyTicket
86 {0x0173, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ReadPublic
87 {0x0174, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_RSA_Encrypt
88 {0x0175, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // No command
89 {0x0176, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_StartAuthSession
90 {0x0177, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_VerifySignature
91 {0x0178, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ECC_Parameters
92 {0x0179, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_FirmwareRead
93 {0x017a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetCapability
94 {0x017b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetRandom
95 {0x017c, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_GetTestResult
96 {0x017d, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Hash
97 {0x017e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_Read
98 {0x017f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyPCR
99 {0x0180, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyRestart
100 {0x0181, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ReadClock
101 {0x0182, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_Extend
102 {0x0183, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthValue
103 {0x0184, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_NV_Certify
104 {0x0185, 0, 1, 0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_EventSequenceComplete
105 {0x0186, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_HashSequenceStart
106 {0x0187, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence
107 {0x0188, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect
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108 {0x0189, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyGetDigest
109 {0x018a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_TestParms
110 {0x018b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_Commit
111 {0x018c, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_PolicyPassword
112 {0x018d, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_ZGen_2Phase
113 {0x018e, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, // TPM_CC_EC_Ephemeral
114 {0x018f, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0} // TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten
115 };
116 typedef UINT16 _ATTR_;
117 #define NOT_IMPLEMENTED (_ATTR_)(0)
118 #define ENCRYPT_2 (_ATTR_)(1 << 0)
119 #define ENCRYPT_4 (_ATTR_)(1 << 1)
120 #define DECRYPT_2 (_ATTR_)(1 << 2)
121 #define DECRYPT_4 (_ATTR_)(1 << 3)
122 #define HANDLE_1_USER (_ATTR_)(1 << 4)
123 #define HANDLE_1_ADMIN (_ATTR_)(1 << 5)
124 #define HANDLE_1_DUP (_ATTR_)(1 << 6)
125 #define HANDLE_2_USER (_ATTR_)(1 << 7)
126 #define PP_COMMAND (_ATTR_)(1 << 8)
127 #define IS_IMPLEMENTED (_ATTR_)(1 << 9)
128 #define NO_SESSIONS (_ATTR_)(1 << 10)
129 #define NV_COMMAND (_ATTR_)(1 << 11)
130 #define PP_REQUIRED (_ATTR_)(1 << 12)
131 #define R_HANDLE (_ATTR_)(1 << 13)
This is the command code attribute structure.
132 typedef UINT16 COMMAND_ATTRIBUTES;
133 static const COMMAND_ATTRIBUTES s_commandAttributes [] = {
134 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_ADMIN+HANDLE_2_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x011f
135 (_ATTR_)(CC_EvictControl *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0120
136 (_ATTR_)(CC_HierarchyControl *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0121
137 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_UndefineSpace *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0122
138 (_ATTR_) (NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
// 0x0123 - Not assigned
139 (_ATTR_)(CC_ChangeEPS *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0124
140 (_ATTR_)(CC_ChangePPS *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0125
141 (_ATTR_)(CC_Clear *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0126
142 (_ATTR_)(CC_ClearControl *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0127
143 (_ATTR_)(CC_ClockSet *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0128
144 (_ATTR_)(CC_HierarchyChangeAuth *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0129
145 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_DefineSpace *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x012a
146 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_Allocate *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x012b
147 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x012c
148 (_ATTR_)(CC_PP_Commands *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_REQUIRED)), // 0x012d
149 (_ATTR_)(CC_SetPrimaryPolicy *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x012e
150 (_ATTR_)(CC_FieldUpgradeStart *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_ADMIN+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x012f
151 (_ATTR_)(CC_ClockRateAdjust *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0130
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152 (_ATTR_)(CC_CreatePrimary *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND+ENCRYPT_2+R_HANDLE)), // 0x0131
153 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0132
154 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetCommandAuditDigest *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0133
155 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_Increment * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x0134
156 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_SetBits * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x0135
157 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_Extend *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x0136
158 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_Write *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x0137
159 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_WriteLock * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x0138
160 (_ATTR_)(CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x0139
161 (_ATTR_)(CC_DictionaryAttackParameters * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x013a
162 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_ChangeAuth *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_ADMIN)), // 0x013b
163 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_Event *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x013c
164 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_Reset * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x013d
165 (_ATTR_)(CC_SequenceComplete *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x013e
166 (_ATTR_)(CC_SetAlgorithmSet * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x013f
167 (_ATTR_)(CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+PP_COMMAND)), // 0x0140
168 (_ATTR_)(CC_FieldUpgradeData * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0141
169 (_ATTR_)(CC_IncrementalSelfTest * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0142
170 (_ATTR_)(CC_SelfTest * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0143
171 (_ATTR_)(CC_Startup * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+NO_SESSIONS)),
// 0x0144
172 (_ATTR_)(CC_Shutdown * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0145
173 (_ATTR_)(CC_StirRandom * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0146
174 (_ATTR_)(CC_ActivateCredential *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_ADMIN+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0147
175 (_ATTR_)(CC_Certify *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_ADMIN+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0148
176 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyNV *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x0149
177 (_ATTR_)(CC_CertifyCreation *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x014a
178 (_ATTR_)(CC_Duplicate *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_DUP+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x014b
179 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetTime *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x014c
180 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetSessionAuditDigest *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x014d
181 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_Read *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x014e
182 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_ReadLock * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x014f
183 (_ATTR_)(CC_ObjectChangeAuth *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_ADMIN+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0150
184 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicySecret *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0151
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185 (_ATTR_)(CC_Rewrap *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0152
186 (_ATTR_)(CC_Create *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0153
187 (_ATTR_)(CC_ECDH_ZGen *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0154
188 (_ATTR_)(CC_HMAC *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0155
189 (_ATTR_)(CC_Import *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0156
190 (_ATTR_)(CC_Load *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2+R_HANDLE)), // 0x0157
191 (_ATTR_)(CC_Quote *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0158
192 (_ATTR_)(CC_RSA_Decrypt *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0159
193 (_ATTR_) (NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
// 0x015a - Not assigned
194 (_ATTR_)(CC_HMAC_Start *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+R_HANDLE)), // 0x015b
195 (_ATTR_)(CC_SequenceUpdate *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x015c
196 (_ATTR_)(CC_Sign *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x015d
197 (_ATTR_)(CC_Unseal *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x015e
198 (_ATTR_) (NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
// 0x015f - Not assigned
199 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicySigned * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0160
200 (_ATTR_)(CC_ContextLoad * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+NO_SESSIONS+R_HANDLE)),
// 0x0161
201 (_ATTR_)(CC_ContextSave * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+NO_SESSIONS)),
// 0x0162
202 (_ATTR_)(CC_ECDH_KeyGen * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0163
203 (_ATTR_)(CC_EncryptDecrypt *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0164
204 (_ATTR_)(CC_FlushContext * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+NO_SESSIONS)),
// 0x0165
205 (_ATTR_) (NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
// 0x0166 - Not assigned
206 (_ATTR_)(CC_LoadExternal *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2+R_HANDLE)), // 0x0167
207 (_ATTR_)(CC_MakeCredential * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0168
208 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_ReadPublic * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0169
209 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyAuthorize * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x016a
210 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyAuthValue * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x016b
211 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyCommandCode * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x016c
212 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyCounterTimer * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x016d
213 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyCpHash * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x016e
214 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyLocality * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x016f
215 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyNameHash * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0170
216 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyOR * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0171
217 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyTicket * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0172
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218 (_ATTR_)(CC_ReadPublic * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0173
219 (_ATTR_)(CC_RSA_Encrypt * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0174
220 (_ATTR_) (NOT_IMPLEMENTED),
// 0x0175 - Not assigned
221 (_ATTR_)(CC_StartAuthSession *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2+R_HANDLE)), // 0x0176
222 (_ATTR_)(CC_VerifySignature * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0177
223 (_ATTR_)(CC_ECC_Parameters * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0178
224 (_ATTR_)(CC_FirmwareRead * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0179
225 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetCapability * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x017a
226 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetRandom * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x017b
227 (_ATTR_)(CC_GetTestResult * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x017c
228 (_ATTR_)(CC_Hash * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x017d
229 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_Read * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x017e
230 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyPCR * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x017f
231 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyRestart * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0180
232 (_ATTR_)(CC_ReadClock * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+NO_SESSIONS)),
// 0x0181
233 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_Extend * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+HANDLE_1_USER)),
// 0x0182
234 (_ATTR_)(CC_PCR_SetAuthValue *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER)), // 0x0183
235 (_ATTR_)(CC_NV_Certify *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+HANDLE_2_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x0184
236 (_ATTR_)(CC_EventSequenceComplete *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+HANDLE_2_USER)), // 0x0185
237 (_ATTR_)(CC_HashSequenceStart * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+R_HANDLE)),
// 0x0186
238 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x0187
239 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2)),
// 0x0188
240 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyGetDigest * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x0189
241 (_ATTR_)(CC_TestParms * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x018a
242 (_ATTR_)(CC_Commit *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x018b
243 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyPassword * (IS_IMPLEMENTED)),
// 0x018c
244 (_ATTR_)(CC_ZGen_2Phase *
(IS_IMPLEMENTED+DECRYPT_2+HANDLE_1_USER+ENCRYPT_2)), // 0x018d
245 (_ATTR_)(CC_EC_Ephemeral * (IS_IMPLEMENTED+ENCRYPT_2)),
// 0x018e
246 (_ATTR_)(CC_PolicyNvWritten * (IS_IMPLEMENTED))
// 0x018f
247 };
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Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
9.4 CommandCodeAttributes.c
9.4.1 Introduction
This file contains the functions for testing various command properties.
9.4.2 Includes and Defines
1 #include "Tpm.h"
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 typedef UINT16 ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
The following file is produced from the command tables in part 3 of the specification. It defines the
attributes for each of the commands.
NOTE: This file is currently produced by an automated process. Files produced from Part 2 or Part 3 tables through
automated processes are not included in the specification so that their is no ambiguity about the table
containing the information being the normative definition.
4 #include "CommandAttributeData.c"
9.4.3 Command Attribute Functions
9.4.3.1 CommandAuthRole()
This function returns the authorization role required of a handle.
Return Value Meaning
AUTH_NONE no authorization is required
AUTH_USER user role authorization is required
AUTH_ADMIN admin role authorization is required
AUTH_DUP duplication role authorization is required
5 AUTH_ROLE
6 CommandAuthRole(
7 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: command code
8 UINT32 handleIndex // IN: handle index (zero based)
9 )
10 {
11 if(handleIndex > 1)
12 return AUTH_NONE;
13 if(handleIndex == 0) {
14 ATTRIBUTE_TYPE properties = s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST];
15 if(properties & HANDLE_1_USER) return AUTH_USER;
16 if(properties & HANDLE_1_ADMIN) return AUTH_ADMIN;
17 if(properties & HANDLE_1_DUP) return AUTH_DUP;
18 return AUTH_NONE;
19 }
20 if(s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST] & HANDLE_2_USER) return
AUTH_USER;
21 return AUTH_NONE;
22 }
9.4.3.2 CommandIsImplemented()
This function indicates if a command is implemented.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the command is implemented
FALSE if the command is not implemented
23 BOOL
24 CommandIsImplemented(
25 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
26 )
27 {
28 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_FIRST || commandCode > TPM_CC_LAST)
29 return FALSE;
30 if((s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST] & IS_IMPLEMENTED))
31 return TRUE;
32 else
33 return FALSE;
34 }
9.4.3.3 CommandGetAttribute()
return a TPMA_CC structure for the given command code
35 TPMA_CC
36 CommandGetAttribute(
37 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: command code
38 )
39 {
40 UINT32 size = sizeof(s_ccAttr) / sizeof(s_ccAttr[0]);
41 UINT32 i;
42 for(i = 0; i < size; i++) {
43 if(s_ccAttr[i].commandIndex == (UINT16) commandCode)
44 return s_ccAttr[i];
45 }
46
47 // This function should be called in the way that the command code
48 // attribute is available.
49 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
50 }
9.4.3.4 EncryptSize()
This function returns the size of the decrypt size field. This function returns 0 if encryption is not allowed
Return Value Meaning
0 encryption not allowed
2 size field is two bytes
4 size field is four bytes
51 int
52 EncryptSize(
53 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: commandCode
54 )
55 {
56 COMMAND_ATTRIBUTES ca = s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST];
57 if(ca & ENCRYPT_2)
58 return 2;
59 if(ca & ENCRYPT_4)
60 return 4;
61 return 0;
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62 }
9.4.3.5 DecryptSize()
This function returns the size of the decrypt size field. This function returns 0 if decryption is not allowed
Return Value Meaning
0 encryption not allowed
2 size field is two bytes
4 size field is four bytes
63 int
64 DecryptSize(
65 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: commandCode
66 )
67 {
68 COMMAND_ATTRIBUTES ca = s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST];
69
70 if(ca & DECRYPT_2)
71 return 2;
72 if(ca & DECRYPT_4)
73 return 4;
74 return 0;
75 }
9.4.3.6 IsSessionAllowed()
This function indicates if the command is allowed to have sessions.
This function must not be called if the command is not known to be implemented.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE session is allowed with this command
FALSE session is not allowed with this command
76 BOOL
77 IsSessionAllowed(
78 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: the command to be checked
79 )
80 {
81 if(s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST] & NO_SESSIONS)
82 return FALSE;
83 else
84 return TRUE;
85 }
9.4.3.7 IsHandleInResponse()
86 BOOL
87 IsHandleInResponse(
88 TPM_CC commandCode
89 )
90 {
91 if(s_commandAttributes[commandCode - TPM_CC_FIRST] & R_HANDLE)
92 return TRUE;
93 else
94 return FALSE;
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95 }
9.4.3.8 IsWriteOperation()
Checks to see if an operation will write to NV memory
96 BOOL
97 IsWriteOperation(
98 TPM_CC command // IN: Command to check
99 )
100 {
101 switch (command)
102 {
103 case TPM_CC_NV_Write:
104 case TPM_CC_NV_Increment:
105 case TPM_CC_NV_SetBits:
106 case TPM_CC_NV_Extend:
107 // Nv write lock counts as a write operation for authorization purposes.
108 // We check to see if the NV is write locked before we do the authorization
109 // If it is locked, we fail the command early.
110 case TPM_CC_NV_WriteLock:
111 return TRUE;
112 default:
113 break;
114 }
115 return FALSE;
116 }
9.4.3.9 IsReadOperation()
Checks to see if an operation will write to NV memory
117 BOOL
118 IsReadOperation(
119 TPM_CC command // IN: Command to check
120 )
121 {
122 switch (command)
123 {
124 case TPM_CC_NV_Read:
125 case TPM_CC_PolicyNV:
126 case TPM_CC_NV_Certify:
127 // Nv read lock counts as a read operation for authorization purposes.
128 // We check to see if the NV is read locked before we do the authorization
129 // If it is locked, we fail the command early.
130 case TPM_CC_NV_ReadLock:
131 return TRUE;
132 default:
133 break;
134 }
135 return FALSE;
136 }
9.4.3.10 CommandCapGetCCList()
This function returns a list of implemented commands and command attributes starting from the
command in commandCode.
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Return Value Meaning
YES more command attributes are available
NO no more command attributes are available
137 TPMI_YES_NO
138 CommandCapGetCCList(
139 TPM_CC commandCode, // IN: start command code
140 UINT32 count, // IN: maximum count for number of entries in
141 // 'commandList'
142 TPML_CCA *commandList // OUT: list of TPMA_CC
143 )
144 {
145 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
146 UINT32 i;
147
148 // initialize output handle list count
149 commandList->count = 0;
150
151 // The maximum count of commands that may be return is MAX_CAP_CC.
152 if(count > MAX_CAP_CC) count = MAX_CAP_CC;
153
154 // If the command code is smaller than TPM_CC_FIRST, start from TPM_CC_FIRST
155 if(commandCode < TPM_CC_FIRST) commandCode = TPM_CC_FIRST;
156
157 // Collect command attributes
158 for(i = commandCode; i <= TPM_CC_LAST; i++)
159 {
160 if(CommandIsImplemented(i))
161 {
162 if(commandList->count < count)
163 {
164 // If the list is not full, add the attributes for this command.
165 commandList->commandAttributes[commandList->count]
166 = CommandGetAttribute(i);
167 commandList->count++;
168 }
169 else
170 {
171 // If the list is full but there are more commands to report,
172 // indicate this and return.
173 more = YES;
174 break;
175 }
176 }
177 }
178 return more;
179 }
9.5 DRTM.c
9.5.1 Description
This file contains functions that simulate the DRTM events. Its primary purpose is to isolate the name
space of the simulator from the name space of the TPM. This is only an issue with the parameters to
_TPM_Hash_Data().
9.5.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
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9.5.3 Functions
9.5.3.1 Signal_Hash_Start()
This function interfaces between the platform code and _TPM_Hash_Start().
2 LIB_EXPORT void
3 Signal_Hash_Start(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 _TPM_Hash_Start();
8 return;
9 }
9.5.3.2 Signal_Hash_Data()
This function interfaces between the platform code and _TPM_Hash_Data().
10 LIB_EXPORT void
11 Signal_Hash_Data(
12 unsigned int size,
13 unsigned char *buffer
14 )
15 {
16 _TPM_Hash_Data(size, buffer);
17 return;
18 }
9.5.3.3 Signal_Hash_End()
This function interfaces between the platform code and _TPM_Hash_End().
19 LIB_EXPORT void
20 Signal_Hash_End(
21 void
22 )
23 {
24 _TPM_Hash_End();
25 return;
26 }
9.6 Entity.c
9.6.1 Description
The functions in this file are used for accessing properties for handles of various types. Functions in other
files require handles of a specific type but the functions in this file allow use of any handle type.
9.6.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
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9.6.3 Functions
9.6.3.1 EntityGetLoadStatus()
This function will indicate if the entity associated with a handle is present in TPM memory. If the handle is
a persistent object handle, and the object exists, the persistent object is moved from NV memory into a
RAM object slot and the persistent handle is replaced with the transient object handle for the slot.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_HANDLE handle type does not match
TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0 entity is not present
TPM_RC_HIERARCHY entity belongs to a disabled hierarchy
TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY handle is an evict object but there is no space to load it to RAM
2 TPM_RC
3 EntityGetLoadStatus(
4 TPM_HANDLE *handle, // IN/OUT: handle of the entity
5 TPM_CC commandCode // IN: the commmandCode
6 )
7 {
8 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
9
10 switch(HandleGetType(*handle))
11 {
12 // For handles associated with hierarchies, the entity is present
13 // only if the associated enable is SET.
14 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
15 switch(*handle)
16 {
17 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
18 if(!gc.shEnable)
19 result = TPM_RC_HIERARCHY;
20 break;
21
22 #ifdef VENDOR_PERMANENT
23 case VENDOR_PERMANENT:
24 #endif
25 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
26 if(!gc.ehEnable)
27 result = TPM_RC_HIERARCHY;
28 break;
29 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
30 if(!g_phEnable)
31 result = TPM_RC_HIERARCHY;
32 break;
33 // null handle, PW session handle and lockout
34 // handle are always available
35 case TPM_RH_NULL:
36 case TPM_RS_PW:
37 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
38 break;
39 default:
40 // handling of the manufacture_specific handles
41 if( ((TPM_RH)*handle >= TPM_RH_AUTH_00)
42 && ((TPM_RH)*handle <= TPM_RH_AUTH_FF))
43 // use the value that would have been returned from
44 // unmarshaling if it did the handle filtering
45 result = TPM_RC_VALUE;
46 else
47 pAssert(FALSE);
48 break;
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49 }
50 break;
51 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
52 // For a transient object, check if the handle is associated
53 // with a loaded object.
54 if(!ObjectIsPresent(*handle))
55 result = TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0;
56 break;
57 case TPM_HT_PERSISTENT:
58 // Persistent object
59 // Copy the persistent object to RAM and replace the handle with the
60 // handle of the assigned slot. A TPM_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY,
61 // TPM_RC_HIERARCHY or TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0 error may be returned by
62 // ObjectLoadEvict()
63 result = ObjectLoadEvict(handle, commandCode);
64 break;
65 case TPM_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
66 // For an HMAC session, see if the session is loaded
67 // and if the session in the session slot is actually
68 // an HMAC session.
69 if(SessionIsLoaded(*handle))
70 {
71 SESSION *session;
72 session = SessionGet(*handle);
73 // Check if the session is a HMAC session
74 if(session->attributes.isPolicy == SET)
75 result = TPM_RC_HANDLE;
76 }
77 else
78 result = TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0;
79 break;
80 case TPM_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
81 // For a policy session, see if the session is loaded
82 // and if the session in the session slot is actually
83 // a policy session.
84 if(SessionIsLoaded(*handle))
85 {
86 SESSION *session;
87 session = SessionGet(*handle);
88 // Check if the session is a policy session
89 if(session->attributes.isPolicy == CLEAR)
90 result = TPM_RC_HANDLE;
91 }
92 else
93 result = TPM_RC_REFERENCE_H0;
94 break;
95 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
96 // For an NV Index, use the platform-specific routine
97 // to search the IN Index space.
98 result = NvIndexIsAccessible(*handle, commandCode);
99 break;
100 case TPM_HT_PCR:
101 // Any PCR handle that is unmarshaled successfully referenced
102 // a PCR that is defined.
103 break;
104 default:
105 // Any other handle type is a defect in the unmarshaling code.
106 pAssert(FALSE);
107 break;
108 }
109 return result;
110 }
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9.6.3.2 EntityGetAuthValue()
This function is used to access the authValue associated with a handle. This function assumes that the
handle references an entity that is accessible and the handle is not for a persistent objects. That is
EntityGetLoadStatus() should have been called. Also, the accessibility of the authValue should have been
verified by IsAuthValueAvailable().
This function copies the authorization value of the entity to auth.
Return value is the number of octets copied to auth.
111 UINT16
112 EntityGetAuthValue(
113 TPMI_DH_ENTITY handle, // IN: handle of entity
114 AUTH_VALUE *auth // OUT: authValue of the entity
115 )
116 {
117 TPM2B_AUTH authValue = {0};
118
119 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
120 {
121 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
122 switch(handle)
123 {
124 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
125 // ownerAuth for TPM_RH_OWNER
126 authValue = gp.ownerAuth;
127 break;
128 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
129 // endorsementAuth for TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
130 authValue = gp.endorsementAuth;
131 break;
132 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
133 // platformAuth for TPM_RH_PLATFORM
134 authValue = gc.platformAuth;
135 break;
136 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
137 // lockoutAuth for TPM_RH_LOCKOUT
138 authValue = gp.lockoutAuth;
139 break;
140 case TPM_RH_NULL:
141 // nullAuth for TPM_RH_NULL. Return 0 directly here
142 return 0;
143 break;
144 #ifdef VENDOR_PERMANENT
145 case VENDOR_PERMANENT:
146 // vendor auth value
147 authValue = g_platformUniqueDetails;
148 #endif
149 default:
150 // If any other permanent handle is present it is
151 // a code defect.
152 pAssert(FALSE);
153 break;
154 }
155 break;
156 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
157 // authValue for an object
158 // A persistent object would have been copied into RAM
159 // and would have an transient object handle here.
160 {
161 OBJECT *object;
162 object = ObjectGet(handle);
163 // special handling if this is a sequence object
164 if(ObjectIsSequence(object))
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165 {
166 authValue = ((HASH_OBJECT *)object)->auth;
167 }
168 else
169 {
170 // Auth value is available only when the private portion of
171 // the object is loaded. The check should be made before
172 // this function is called
173 pAssert(object->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR);
174 authValue = object->sensitive.authValue;
175 }
176 }
177 break;
178 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
179 // authValue for an NV index
180 {
181 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
182 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
183 authValue = nvIndex.authValue;
184 }
185 break;
186 case TPM_HT_PCR:
187 // authValue for PCR
188 PCRGetAuthValue(handle, &authValue);
189 break;
190 default:
191 // If any other handle type is present here, then there is a defect
192 // in the unmarshaling code.
193 pAssert(FALSE);
194 break;
195 }
196
197 // Copy the authValue
198 pAssert(authValue.t.size <= sizeof(authValue.t.buffer));
199 MemoryCopy(auth, authValue.t.buffer, authValue.t.size, sizeof(TPMU_HA));
200
201 return authValue.t.size;
202 }
9.6.3.3 EntityGetAuthPolicy()
This function is used to access the authPolicy associated with a handle. This function assumes that the
handle references an entity that is accessible and the handle is not for a persistent objects. That is
EntityGetLoadStatus() should have been called. Also, the accessibility of the authPolicy should have
been verified by IsAuthPolicyAvailable().
This function copies the authorization policy of the entity to authPolicy.
The return value is the hash algorithm for the policy.
203 TPMI_ALG_HASH
204 EntityGetAuthPolicy(
205 TPMI_DH_ENTITY handle, // IN: handle of entity
206 TPM2B_DIGEST *authPolicy // OUT: authPolicy of the entity
207 )
208 {
209 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
210
211 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
212 {
213 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
214 switch(handle)
215 {
216 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
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217 // ownerPolicy for TPM_RH_OWNER
218 *authPolicy = gp.ownerPolicy;
219 hashAlg = gp.ownerAlg;
220 break;
221 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
222 // endorsementPolicy for TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
223 *authPolicy = gp.endorsementPolicy;
224 hashAlg = gp.endorsementAlg;
225 break;
226 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
227 // platformPolicy for TPM_RH_PLATFORM
228 *authPolicy = gc.platformPolicy;
229 hashAlg = gc.platformAlg;
230 break;
231 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
232 // lockoutPolicy for TPM_RH_LOCKOUT
233 *authPolicy = gp.lockoutPolicy;
234 hashAlg = gp.lockoutAlg;
235 break;
236 default:
237 // If any other permanent handle is present it is
238 // a code defect.
239 pAssert(FALSE);
240 break;
241 }
242 break;
243 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
244 // authPolicy for an object
245 {
246 OBJECT *object = ObjectGet(handle);
247 *authPolicy = object->publicArea.authPolicy;
248 hashAlg = object->publicArea.nameAlg;
249 }
250 break;
251 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
252 // authPolicy for a NV index
253 {
254 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
255 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
256 *authPolicy = nvIndex.publicArea.authPolicy;
257 hashAlg = nvIndex.publicArea.nameAlg;
258 }
259 break;
260 case TPM_HT_PCR:
261 // authPolicy for a PCR
262 hashAlg = PCRGetAuthPolicy(handle, authPolicy);
263 break;
264 default:
265 // If any other handle type is present it is a code defect.
266 pAssert(FALSE);
267 break;
268 }
269 return hashAlg;
270 }
9.6.3.4 EntityGetName()
This function returns the Name associated with a handle. It will set name to the Name and return the size
of the Name string.
271 UINT16
272 EntityGetName(
273 TPMI_DH_ENTITY handle, // IN: handle of entity
274 NAME *name // OUT: name of entity
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275 )
276 {
277 UINT16 nameSize;
278
279 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
280 {
281 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
282 // Name for an object
283 nameSize = ObjectGetName(handle, name);
284 break;
285 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
286 // Name for a NV index
287 nameSize = NvGetName(handle, name);
288 break;
289 default:
290 // For all other types, the handle is the Name
291 nameSize = TPM_HANDLE_Marshal(&handle, (BYTE **)&name, NULL);
292 break;
293 }
294 return nameSize;
295 }
9.6.3.5 EntityGetHierarchy()
This function returns the hierarchy handle associated with an entity.
a) A handle that is a hierarchy handle is associated with itself.
b) An NV index belongs to TPM_RH_PLATFORM if TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE, is SET,
otherwise it belongs to TPM_RH_OWNER
c) An object handle belongs to its hierarchy. All other handles belong to the platform hierarchy. or an NV
Index.
296 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY
297 EntityGetHierarchy(
298 TPMI_DH_ENTITY handle // IN :handle of entity
299 )
300 {
301 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarcy = TPM_RH_NULL;
302
303 switch(HandleGetType(handle))
304 {
305 case TPM_HT_PERMANENT:
306 // hierarchy for a permanent handle
307 switch(handle)
308 {
309 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
310 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
311 case TPM_RH_NULL:
312 hierarcy = handle;
313 break;
314 // all other permanent handles are associated with the owner
315 // hierarchy. (should only be TPM_RH_OWNER and TPM_RH_LOCKOUT)
316 default:
317 hierarcy = TPM_RH_OWNER;
318 break;
319 }
320 break;
321 case TPM_HT_NV_INDEX:
322 // hierarchy for NV index
323 {
324 NV_INDEX nvIndex;
325 NvGetIndexInfo(handle, &nvIndex);
326 // If only the platform can delete the index, then it is
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327 // considered to be in the platform hierarchy, otherwise it
328 // is in the owner hierarchy.
329 if(nvIndex.publicArea.attributes.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE == SET)
330 hierarcy = TPM_RH_PLATFORM;
331 else
332 hierarcy = TPM_RH_OWNER;
333 }
334 break;
335 case TPM_HT_TRANSIENT:
336 // hierarchy for an object
337 {
338 OBJECT *object;
339 object = ObjectGet(handle);
340 if(object->attributes.ppsHierarchy)
341 {
342 hierarcy = TPM_RH_PLATFORM;
343 }
344 else if(object->attributes.epsHierarchy)
345 {
346 hierarcy = TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
347 }
348 else if(object->attributes.spsHierarchy)
349 {
350 hierarcy = TPM_RH_OWNER;
351 }
352
353 }
354 break;
355 case TPM_HT_PCR:
356 hierarcy = TPM_RH_OWNER;
357 break;
358 default:
359 pAssert(0);
360 break;
361 }
362 // this is unreachable but it provides a return value for the default
363 // case which makes the complier happy
364 return hierarcy;
365 }
9.7 Global.c
9.7.1 Description
This file will instance the TPM variables that are not stack allocated. The descriptions for these variables
is in Global.h.
9.7.2 Includes and Defines
1 #define GLOBAL_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
9.7.3 Global Data Values
These values are visible across multiple modules.
3 BOOL g_phEnable;
4 const UINT16 g_rcIndex[15] = {TPM_RC_1, TPM_RC_2, TPM_RC_3, TPM_RC_4,
5 TPM_RC_5, TPM_RC_6, TPM_RC_7, TPM_RC_8,
6 TPM_RC_9, TPM_RC_A, TPM_RC_B, TPM_RC_C,
7 TPM_RC_D, TPM_RC_E, TPM_RC_F
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8 };
9 TPM_HANDLE g_exclusiveAuditSession;
10 UINT64 g_time;
11 BOOL g_pcrReConfig;
12 TPMI_DH_OBJECT g_DRTMHandle;
13 BOOL g_DrtmPreStartup;
14 BOOL g_StartupLocality3;
15 BOOL g_clearOrderly;
16 TPM_SU g_prevOrderlyState;
17 BOOL g_updateNV;
18 BOOL g_nvOk;
19 TPM2B_AUTH g_platformUniqueDetails;
20 STATE_CLEAR_DATA gc;
21 STATE_RESET_DATA gr;
22 PERSISTENT_DATA gp;
23 ORDERLY_DATA go;
9.7.4 Private Values
9.7.4.1 SessionProcess.c
24 #ifndef __IGNORE_STATE__ // DO NOT DEFINE THIS VALUE
These values do not need to be retained between commands.
25 TPM_HANDLE s_sessionHandles[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
26 TPMA_SESSION s_attributes[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
27 TPM_HANDLE s_associatedHandles[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
28 TPM2B_NONCE s_nonceCaller[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
29 TPM2B_AUTH s_inputAuthValues[MAX_SESSION_NUM];
30 UINT32 s_encryptSessionIndex;
31 UINT32 s_decryptSessionIndex;
32 UINT32 s_auditSessionIndex;
33 TPM2B_DIGEST s_cpHashForAudit;
34 UINT32 s_sessionNum;
35 #endif // __IGNORE_STATE__
36 BOOL s_DAPendingOnNV;
37 #ifdef TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest
38 TPM2B_DIGEST s_cpHashForCommandAudit;
39 #endif
9.7.4.2 DA.c
40 UINT64 s_selfHealTimer;
41 UINT64 s_lockoutTimer;
9.7.4.3 NV.c
42 UINT32 s_reservedAddr[NV_RESERVE_LAST];
43 UINT32 s_reservedSize[NV_RESERVE_LAST];
44 UINT32 s_ramIndexSize;
45 BYTE s_ramIndex[RAM_INDEX_SPACE];
46 UINT32 s_ramIndexSizeAddr;
47 UINT32 s_ramIndexAddr;
48 UINT32 s_maxCountAddr;
49 UINT32 s_evictNvStart;
50 UINT32 s_evictNvEnd;
51 TPM_RC s_NvStatus;
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9.7.4.4 Object.c
52 OBJECT_SLOT s_objects[MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS];
9.7.4.5 PCR.c
53 PCR s_pcrs[IMPLEMENTATION_PCR];
9.7.4.6 Session.c
54 SESSION_SLOT s_sessions[MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS];
55 UINT32 s_oldestSavedSession;
56 int s_freeSessionSlots;
9.7.4.7 Manufacture.c
57 BOOL g_manufactured = FALSE;
9.7.4.8 Power.c
58 BOOL s_initialized = FALSE;
9.7.4.9 MemoryLib.c
The s_actionOutputBuffer should not be modifiable by the host system until the TPM has returned a
response code. The s_actionOutputBuffer should not be accessible until response parameter encryption,
if any, is complete. This memory is not used between commands
59 #ifndef __IGNORE_STATE__ // DO NOT DEFINE THIS VALUE
60 UINT32 s_actionInputBuffer[1024]; // action input buffer
61 UINT32 s_actionOutputBuffer[1024]; // action output buffer
62 BYTE s_responseBuffer[MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE];// response buffer
63 #endif
9.7.4.10 SelfTest.c
Define these values here if the AlgorithmTests() project is not used
64 #ifndef SELF_TEST
65 ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_implementedAlgorithms;
66 ALGORITHM_VECTOR g_toTest;
67 #endif
9.7.4.11 TpmFail.c
68 jmp_buf g_jumpBuffer;
69 BOOL g_forceFailureMode;
70 BOOL g_inFailureMode;
71 UINT32 s_failFunction;
72 UINT32 s_failLine;
73 UINT32 s_failCode;
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9.8 Handle.c
9.8.1 Description
This file contains the functions that return the type of a handle.
9.8.2 Includes
1 #include "Tpm.h"
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
9.8.3 Functions
9.8.3.1 HandleGetType()
This function returns the type of a handle which is the MSO of the handle.
3 TPM_HT
4 HandleGetType(
5 TPM_HANDLE handle // IN: a handle to be checked
6 )
7 {
8 // return the upper bytes of input data
9 return (TPM_HT) ((handle & HR_RANGE_MASK) >> HR_SHIFT);
10 }
9.8.3.2 NextPermanentHandle()
This function returns the permanent handle that is equal to the input value or is the next higher value. If
there is no handle with the input value and there is no next higher value, it returns 0:
Return Value Meaning
11 TPM_HANDLE
12 NextPermanentHandle(
13 TPM_HANDLE inHandle // IN: the handle to check
14 )
15 {
16 // If inHandle is below the start of the range of permanent handles
17 // set it to the start and scan from there
18 if(inHandle < TPM_RH_FIRST)
19 inHandle = TPM_RH_FIRST;
20 // scan from input value untill we find an implemented permanent handle
21 // or go out of range
22 for(; inHandle <= TPM_RH_LAST; inHandle++)
23 {
24 switch (inHandle)
25 {
26 case TPM_RH_OWNER:
27 case TPM_RH_NULL:
28 case TPM_RS_PW:
29 case TPM_RH_LOCKOUT:
30 case TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
31 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM:
32 case TPM_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
33 #ifdef VENDOR_PERMANENT
34 case VENDOR_PERMANENT:
35 #endif
36 return inHandle;
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37 break;
38 default:
39 break;
40 }
41 }
42 // Out of range on the top
43 return 0;
44 }
9.8.3.3 PermanentCapGetHandles()
This function returns a list of the permanent handles of PCR, started from handle. If handle is larger than
the largest permanent handle, an empty list will be returned with more set to NO.
Return Value Meaning
YES if there are more handles available
NO all the available handles has been returned
45 TPMI_YES_NO
46 PermanentCapGetHandles(
47 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: start handle
48 UINT32 count, // IN: count of returned handle
49 TPML_HANDLE *handleList // OUT: list of handle
50 )
51 {
52 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
53 UINT32 i;
54
55 pAssert(HandleGetType(handle) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT);
56
57 // Initialize output handle list
58 handleList->count = 0;
59
60 // The maximum count of handles we may return is MAX_CAP_HANDLES
61 if(count > MAX_CAP_HANDLES) count = MAX_CAP_HANDLES;
62
63 // Iterate permanent handle range
64 for(i = NextPermanentHandle(handle);
65 i != 0; i = NextPermanentHandle(i+1))
66 {
67 if(handleList->count < count)
68 {
69 // If we have not filled up the return list, add this permanent
70 // handle to it
71 handleList->handle[handleList->count] = i;
72 handleList->count++;
73 }
74 else
75 {
76 // If the return list is full but we still have permanent handle
77 // available, report this and stop iterating
78 more = YES;
79 break;
80 }
81 }
82 return more;
83 }
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9.9 Locality.c
9.9.1 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
9.9.2 LocalityGetAttributes()
This function will convert a locality expressed as an integer into TPMA_LOCALITY form.
The function returns the locality attribute.
2 TPMA_LOCALITY
3 LocalityGetAttributes(
4 UINT8 locality // IN: locality value
5 )
6 {
7 TPMA_LOCALITY locality_attributes;
8 BYTE *localityAsByte = (BYTE *)&locality_attributes;
9
10 MemorySet(&locality_attributes, 0, sizeof(TPMA_LOCALITY));
11 switch(locality)
12 {
13 case 0:
14 locality_attributes.TPM_LOC_ZERO = SET;
15 break;
16 case 1:
17 locality_attributes.TPM_LOC_ONE = SET;
18 break;
19 case 2:
20 locality_attributes.TPM_LOC_TWO = SET;
21 break;
22 case 3:
23 locality_attributes.TPM_LOC_THREE = SET;
24 break;
25 case 4:
26 locality_attributes.TPM_LOC_FOUR = SET;
27 break;
28 default:
29 pAssert(locality < 256 && locality > 31);
30 *localityAsByte = locality;
31 break;
32 }
33 return locality_attributes;
34 }
9.10 Manufacture.c
9.10.1 Description
This file contains the function that performs the manufacturing of the TPM in a simulated environment.
These functions should not be used outside of a manufacturing or simulation environment.
9.10.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define MANUFACTURE_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include "Global.h"
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9.10.3 Functions
9.10.3.1 TPM_Manufacture()
This function initializes the TPM values in preparation for the TPM's first use. This function will fail if
previously called. The TPM can be re-manufactured by calling TPM_Teardown() first and then calling this
function again.
Return Value Meaning
0 success
1 manufacturing process previously performed
4 LIB_EXPORT int
5 TPM_Manufacture(
6 BOOL firstTime // IN: indicates if this is the first call from
7 // main()
8 )
9 {
10 TPM_SU orderlyShutdown;
11 UINT64 totalResetCount = 0;
12
13 // If TPM has been manufactured, return indication.
14 if(!firstTime && g_manufactured)
15 return 1;
16
17 // initialize crypto units
18 //CryptInitUnits();
19
20 //
21 s_selfHealTimer = 0;
22 s_lockoutTimer = 0;
23 s_DAPendingOnNV = FALSE;
24
25 // initialize NV
26 NvInit();
27
28 #ifdef _DRBG_STATE_SAVE
29 // Initialize the drbg. This needs to come before the install
30 // of the hierarchies
31 if(!_cpri__Startup()) // Have to start the crypto units first
32 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
33 _cpri__DrbgGetPutState(PUT_STATE, 0, NULL);
34 #endif
35
36 // default configuration for PCR
37 PCRSimStart();
38
39 // initialize pre-installed hierarchy data
40 // This should happen after NV is initialized because hierarchy data is
41 // stored in NV.
42 HierarchyPreInstall_Init();
43
44 // initialize dictionary attack parameters
45 DAPreInstall_Init();
46
47 // initialize PP list
48 PhysicalPresencePreInstall_Init();
49
50 // initialize command audit list
51 CommandAuditPreInstall_Init();
52
53 // first start up is required to be Startup(CLEAR)
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54 orderlyShutdown = TPM_SU_CLEAR;
55 NvWriteReserved(NV_ORDERLY, &orderlyShutdown);
56
57 // initialize the firmware version
58 gp.firmwareV1 = FIRMWARE_V1;
59 #ifdef FIRMWARE_V2
60 gp.firmwareV2 = FIRMWARE_V2;
61 #else
62 gp.firmwareV2 = 0;
63 #endif
64 NvWriteReserved(NV_FIRMWARE_V1, &gp.firmwareV1);
65 NvWriteReserved(NV_FIRMWARE_V2, &gp.firmwareV2);
66
67 // initialize the total reset counter to 0
68 NvWriteReserved(NV_TOTAL_RESET_COUNT, &totalResetCount);
69
70 // initialize the clock stuff
71 go.clock = 0;
72 go.clockSafe = YES;
73
74 #ifdef _DRBG_STATE_SAVE
75 // initialize the current DRBG state in NV
76
77 _cpri__DrbgGetPutState(GET_STATE, sizeof(go.drbgState), (BYTE *)&go.drbgState);
78 #endif
79
80 NvWriteReserved(NV_ORDERLY_DATA, &go);
81
82 // Commit NV writes. Manufacture process is an artificial process existing
83 // only in simulator environment and it is not defined in the specification
84 // that what should be the expected behavior if the NV write fails at this
85 // point. Therefore, it is assumed the NV write here is always success and
86 // no return code of this function is checked.
87 NvCommit();
88
89 g_manufactured = TRUE;
90
91 return 0;
92 }
9.10.3.2 TPM_TearDown()
This function prepares the TPM for re-manufacture. It should not be implemented in anything other than a
simulated TPM.
In this implementation, all that is needs is to stop the cryptographic units and set a flag to indicate that the
TPM can be re-manufactured. This should be all that is necessary to start the manufacturing process
again.
Return Value Meaning
0 success
1 TPM not previously manufactured
93 LIB_EXPORT int
94 TPM_TearDown(
95 void
96 )
97 {
98 // stop crypt units
99 CryptStopUnits();
100
101 g_manufactured = FALSE;
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102 return 0;
103 }
9.11 Marshal.c
9.11.1 Introduction
This file contains the marshaling and unmarshaling code.
The marshaling and unmarshaling code and function prototypes are not listed, as the code is repetitive,
long, and not very useful to read. Examples of a few unmarshaling routines are provided. Most of the
others are similar.
Depending on the table header flags, a type will have an unmarshaling routine and a marshaling routine
The table header flags that control the generation of the unmarshaling and marshaling code are delimited
by angle brackets ("<>") in the table header. If no brackets are present, then both unmarshaling and
marshaling code is generated (i.e., generation of both marshaling and unmarshaling code is the default).
9.11.2 Unmarshal and Marshal a Value
In TPM 2.0 Part 2, a TPMI_DI_OBJECT is defined by this table:
Table xxx — Definition of (TPM_HANDLE) TPMI_DH_OBJECT Type
Values Comments
{TRANSIENT_FIRST:TRANSIENT_LAST} allowed range for transient objects
{PERSISTENT_FIRST:PERSISTENT_LAST} allowed range for persistent objects
+TPM_RH_NULL the null handle
#TPM_RC_VALUE
This generates the following unmarshaling code:
1 TPM_RC
2 TPMI_DH_OBJECT_Unmarshal(TPMI_DH_OBJECT *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,
3 bool flag)
4 {
5 TPM_RC result;
6 result = TPM_HANDLE_Unmarshal((TPM_HANDLE *)target, buffer, size);
7 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
8 return result;
9 if (*target == TPM_RH_NULL) {
10 if(flag)
11 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
12 else
13 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
14 }
15 if((*target < TRANSIENT_FIRST) || (*target > TRANSIENT_LAST))
16 if((*target < PERSISTENT_FIRST) || (*target > PERSISTENT_LAST))
17 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
18 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
19 }
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and the following marshaling code:
NOTE The marshaling code does not do parameter checking, as the TPM is the source of the marshaling data.
1 UINT16
2 TPMI_DH_OBJECT_Marshal(TPMI_DH_OBJECT *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
3 {
4 return UINT32_Marshal((UINT32 *)source, buffer, size);
5 }
9.11.3 Unmarshal and Marshal a Union
In TPM 2.0 Part 2, a TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS union is defined by:
Table xxx — Definition of TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS Union <IN/OUT, S>
Parameter Type Selector Description
keyedHash TPMS_KEYEDHASH_PARMS TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH sign | encrypt | neither
symDetail TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER a symmetric block cipher
rsaDetail TPMS_RSA_PARMS TPM_ALG_RSA decrypt + sign
eccDetail TPMS_ECC_PARMS TPM_ALG_ECC decrypt + sign
asymDetail TPMS_ASYM_PARMS common scheme structure
for RSA and ECC keys
NOTE The Description column indicates which of TPMA_OBJECT.decrypt or TPMA_OBJECT.sign may be set.
“+” indicates that both may be set but one shall be set. “|” indicates the optional settings.
From this table, the following unmarshaling code is generated.
1 TPM_RC
2 TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Unmarshal(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,
3 UINT32 selector)
4 {
5 switch(selector) {
6 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH
7 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
8 return TPMS_KEYEDHASH_PARMS_Unmarshal(
9 (TPMS_KEYEDHASH_PARMS *)&(target->keyedHash), buffer, size);
10 #endif
11 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER
12 case TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER:
13 return TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT_Unmarshal(
14 (TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *)&(target->symDetail), buffer, size, FALSE);
15 #endif
16 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
17 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
18 return TPMS_RSA_PARMS_Unmarshal(
19 (TPMS_RSA_PARMS *)&(target->rsaDetail), buffer, size);
20 #endif
21 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
22 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
23 return TPMS_ECC_PARMS_Unmarshal(
24 (TPMS_ECC_PARMS *)&(target->eccDetail), buffer, size);
25 #endif
26 }
27 return TPM_RC_SELECTOR;
28 }
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NOTE The #ifdef/#endif directives are added whenever a value is dependent on an algorithm ID so that
removing the algorithm definition will remove the related code.
The marshaling code for the union is:
1 UINT16
2 TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,
3 UINT32 selector)
4 {
5 switch(selector) {
6 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH
7 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
8 return TPMS_KEYEDHASH_PARMS_Marshal(
9 (TPMS_KEYEDHASH_PARMS *)&(source->keyedHash), buffer, size);
10 #endif
11 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER
12 case TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER:
13 return TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT_Marshal(
14 (TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *)&(source->symDetail), buffer, size);
15 #endif
16 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
17 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
18 return TPMS_RSA_PARMS_Marshal(
19 (TPMS_RSA_PARMS *)&(source->rsaDetail), buffer, size);
20 #endif
21 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
22 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
23 return TPMS_ECC_PARMS_Marshal(
24 (TPMS_ECC_PARMS *)&(source->eccDetail), buffer, size);
25 #endif
26 }
27 assert(1);
28 return 0;
29 }
For the marshaling and unmarshaling code, a value in the structure containing the union provides the
value used for selector. The example in the next section illustrates this.
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9.11.4 Unmarshal and Marshal a Structure
In TPM 2.0 Part 2, the TPMT_PUBLiC structure is defined by:
Table xxx — Definition of TPMT_PUBLIC Structure
Parameter Type Description
type TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC “algorithm” associated with this object
nameAlg +TPMI_ALG_HASH algorithm used for computing the Name of the object
NOTE The "+" indicates that the instance of a TPMT_PUBLIC may have
a "+" to indicate that the nameAlg may be TPM_ALG_NULL.
objectAttributes TPMA_OBJECT attributes that, along with type, determine the manipulations of this
object
authPolicy TPM2B_DIGEST optional policy for using this key
The policy is computed using the nameAlg of the object.
NOTE shall be the Empty Buffer if no authorization policy is present
[type]parameters TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS the algorithm or structure details
[type]unique TPMU_PUBLIC_ID the unique identifier of the structure
For an asymmetric key, this would be the public key.
This structure is tagged (the first value indicates the structure type), and that tag is used to determine how
the parameters and unique fields are unmarshaled and marshaled. The use of the type for specifying the
union selector is emphasized below.
The unmarshaling code for the structure in the table above is:
1 TPM_RC
2 TPMT_PUBLIC_Unmarshal(TPMT_PUBLIC *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, bool flag)
3 {
4 TPM_RC result;
5 result = TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC_Unmarshal((TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC *)&(target->type),
6 buffer, size);
7 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
8 return result;
9 result = TPMI_ALG_HASH_Unmarshal((TPMI_ALG_HASH *)&(target->nameAlg),
10 buffer, size, flag);
11 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
12 return result;
13 result = TPMA_OBJECT_Unmarshal((TPMA_OBJECT *)&(target->objectAttributes),
14 buffer, size);
15 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
16 return result;
17 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal((TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(target->authPolicy),
18 buffer, size);
19 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
20 return result;
21
22 result = TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Unmarshal((TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *)&(target->parameters),
23 buffer, size, );
24 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
25 return result;
26
27 result = TPMU_PUBLIC_ID_Unmarshal((TPMU_PUBLIC_ID *)&(target->unique),
28 buffer, size, )
29 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
30 return result;
31
32 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
33 }
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The marshaling code for the TPMT_PUBLIC structure is:
1 UINT16
2 TPMT_PUBLIC_Marshal(TPMT_PUBLIC *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
3 {
4 UINT16 result = 0;
5 result = (UINT16)(result + TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC_Marshal(
6 (TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC *)&(source->type), buffer, size));
7 result = (UINT16)(result + TPMI_ALG_HASH_Marshal(
8 (TPMI_ALG_HASH *)&(source->nameAlg), buffer, size))
9 ;
10 result = (UINT16)(result + TPMA_OBJECT_Marshal(
11 (TPMA_OBJECT *)&(source->objectAttributes), buffer, size));
12
13 result = (UINT16)(result + TPM2B_DIGEST_Marshal(
14 (TPM2B_DIGEST *)&(source->authPolicy), buffer, size));
15
16 result = (UINT16)(result + TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS_Marshal(
17 (TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *)&(source->parameters), buffer, size,
18 ));
19
20 result = (UINT16)(result + TPMU_PUBLIC_ID_Marshal(
21 (TPMU_PUBLIC_ID *)&(source->unique), buffer, size,
22 ));
23
24 return result;
25 }
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9.11.5 Unmarshal and Marshal an Array
In TPM 2.0 Part 2, the TPML_DIGEST is defined by:
Table xxx — Definition of TPML_DIGEST Structure
Parameter Type Description
count {2:} UINT32 number of digests in the list, minimum is two
digests[count]{:8} TPM2B_DIGEST a list of digests
For TPM2_PolicyOR(), all digests will have been
computed using the digest of the policy session. For
TPM2_PCR_Read(), each digest will be the size of the
digest for the bank containing the PCR.
#TPM_RC_SIZE response code when count is not at least two or is
greater than 8
The digests parameter is an array of up to count structures (TPM2B_DIGESTS). The auto-generated code
to Unmarshal this structure is:
1 TPM_RC
2 TPML_DIGEST_Unmarshal(TPML_DIGEST *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
3 {
4 TPM_RC result;
5 result = UINT32_Unmarshal((UINT32 *)&(target->count), buffer, size);
6 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
7 return result;
8
9 if( (target->count < 2)) // This check is triggered by the {2:} notation
10 // on ‘count’
11 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
12
13 if((target->count) > 8) // This check is triggered by the {:8} notation
14 // on ‘digests’.
15 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
16
17 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Array_Unmarshal((TPM2B_DIGEST *)(target->digests),
18 buffer, size, );
19 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
20 return result;
21
22 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
23 }
The routine unmarshals a count value and passes that value to a routine that unmarshals an array of
TPM2B_DIGEST values. The unmarshaling code for the array is:
1 TPM_RC
2 TPM2B_DIGEST_Array_Unmarshal(TPM2B_DIGEST *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,
3 INT32 count)
4 {
5 TPM_RC result;
6 INT32 i;
7 for(i = 0; i < count; i++) {
8 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&target[i], buffer, size);
9 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
10 return result;
11 }
12 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
13 }
14
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Marshaling of the TPML_DIGEST uses a similar scheme with a structure specifying the number of
elements in an array and a subsequent call to a routine to marshal an array of that type.
1 UINT16
2 TPML_DIGEST_Marshal(TPML_DIGEST *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
3 {
4 UINT16 result = 0;
5 result = (UINT16)(result + UINT32_Marshal((UINT32 *)&(source->count), buffer,
6 size));
7 result = (UINT16)(result + TPM2B_DIGEST_Array_Marshal(
8 (TPM2B_DIGEST *)(source->digests), buffer, size,
9 (INT32)(source->count)));
10
11 return result;
12 }
The marshaling code for the array is:
1 TPM_RC
2 TPM2B_DIGEST_Array_Unmarshal(TPM2B_DIGEST *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size,
3 INT32 count)
4 {
5 TPM_RC result;
6 INT32 i;
7 for(i = 0; i < count; i++) {
8 result = TPM2B_DIGEST_Unmarshal(&target[i], buffer, size);
9 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
10 return result;
11 }
12 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
13 }
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9.11.6 TPM2B Handling
A TPM2B structure is handled as a special case. The unmarshaling code is similar to what is shown in
10.11.5 but the unmarshaling/marshaling is to a union element. Each TPM2B is a union of two sized
buffers, one of which is type specific (the ‘t’ element) and the other is a generic value (the ‘b’ element).
This allows each of the TPM2B structures to have some inheritance property with all other TPM2B. The
purpose is to allow functions that have parameters that can be any TPM2B structure while allowing other
functions to be specific about the type of the TPM2B that is used. When the generic structure is allowed,
the input parameter would use the ‘b’ element and when the type-specific structure is required, the ‘t’
element is used.
Table xxx — Definition of TPM2B_EVENT Structure
Parameter Type Description
size UINT16 Size of the operand
buffer [size] {:1024} BYTE The operand
1 TPM_RC
2 TPM2B_EVENT_Unmarshal(TPM2B_EVENT *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
3 {
4 TPM_RC result;
5 result = UINT16_Unmarshal((UINT16 *)&(target->t.size), buffer, size);
6 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
7 return result;
8
9 // if size equal to 0, the rest of the structure is a zero buffer. Stop
processing
10 if(target->t.size == 0)
11 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
12
13 if((target->t.size) > 1024) // This check is triggered by the {:1024} notation
14 // on ‘buffer’
15 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
16
17 result = BYTE_Array_Unmarshal((BYTE *)(target->t.buffer), buffer, size,
18 (INT32)(target->t.size));
19 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
20 return result;
21
22 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
23 }
Which use these structure definitions:
1 typedef struct {
2 UINT16 size;
3 BYTE buffer[1];
4 } TPM2B;
5
6 typedef struct {
7 UINT16 size;
8 BYTE buffer[1024];
9 } EVENT_2B;
10
11 typedef union {
12 EVENT_2B t; // The type-specific union member
13 TPM2B b; // The generic union member
14 } TPM2B_EVENT;
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9.12 MemoryLib.c
9.12.1 Description
This file contains a set of miscellaneous memory manipulation routines. Many of the functions have the
same semantics as functions defined in string.h. Those functions are not used in the TPM in order to
avoid namespace contamination.
9.12.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define MEMORY_LIB_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
These buffers are set aside to hold command and response values. In this implementation, it is not
guaranteed that the code will stop accessing the s_actionInputBuffer before starting to put values in the
s_actionOutputBuffer so different buffers are required. However, the s_actionInputBuffer and
s_responseBuffer are not needed at the same time and they could be the same buffer.
9.12.3 Functions on BYTE Arrays
9.12.3.1 MemoryMove()
This function moves data from one place in memory to another. No safety checks of any type are
performed. If source and data buffer overlap, then the move is done as if an intermediate buffer were
used.
NOTE: This function is used by MemoryCopy(), MemoryCopy2B(), and MemoryConcat2b() and requires that the caller
know the maximum size of the destination buffer so that there is no possibility of buffer overrun.
3 LIB_EXPORT void
4 MemoryMove(
5 void *destination, // OUT: move destination
6 const void *source, // IN: move source
7 UINT32 size, // IN: number of octets to moved
8 UINT32 dSize // IN: size of the receive buffer
9 )
10 {
11 const BYTE *p = (BYTE *)source;
12 BYTE *q = (BYTE *)destination;
13
14 if(destination == NULL || source == NULL)
15 return;
16
17 pAssert(size <= dSize);
18 // if the destination buffer has a lower address than the
19 // source, then moving bytes in ascending order is safe.
20 dSize -= size;
21
22 if (p>q || (p+size <= q))
23 {
24 while(size--)
25 *q++ = *p++;
26 }
27 // If the destination buffer has a higher address than the
28 // source, then move bytes from the end to the beginning.
29 else if (p < q)
30 {
31 p += size;
32 q += size;
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33 while (size--)
34 *--q = *--p;
35 }
36
37 // If the source and destination address are the same, nothing to move.
38 return;
39 }
9.12.3.2 MemoryCopy()
This function moves data from one place in memory to another. No safety checks of any type are
performed. If the destination and source overlap, then the results are unpredictable. void MemoryCopy(
void *destination, // OUT: copy destination
void *source, // IN: copy source
UINT32 size, // IN: number of octets being copied
UINT32 dSize // IN: size of the receive buffer
MemoryMove(destination, source, size, dSize);
40 //%#define MemoryCopy(destination, source, size, destSize) \
41 //% MemoryMove((destination), (source), (size), (destSize))
9.12.3.3 MemoryEqual()
This function indicates if two buffers have the same values in the indicated number of bytes.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE all octets are the same
FALSE all octets are not the same
42 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
43 MemoryEqual(
44 const void *buffer1, // IN: compare buffer1
45 const void *buffer2, // IN: compare buffer2
46 UINT32 size // IN: size of bytes being compared
47 )
48 {
49 BOOL equal = TRUE;
50 const BYTE *b1, *b2;
51
52 b1 = (BYTE *)buffer1;
53 b2 = (BYTE *)buffer2;
54
55 // Compare all bytes so that there is no leakage of information
56 // due to timing differences.
57 for(; size > 0; size--)
58 equal = (*b1++ == *b2++) && equal;
59
60 return equal;
61 }
9.12.3.4 MemoryCopy2B()
This function copies a TPM2B. This can be used when the TPM2B types are the same or different. No
size checking is done on the destination so the caller should make sure that the destination is large
enough.
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This function returns the number of octets in the data buffer of the TPM2B.
62 LIB_EXPORT INT16
63 MemoryCopy2B(
64 TPM2B *dest, // OUT: receiving TPM2B
65 const TPM2B *source, // IN: source TPM2B
66 UINT16 dSize // IN: size of the receiving buffer
67 )
68 {
69
70 if(dest == NULL)
71 return 0;
72 if(source == NULL)
73 dest->size = 0;
74 else
75 {
76 dest->size = source->size;
77 MemoryMove(dest->buffer, source->buffer, dest->size, dSize);
78 }
79 return dest->size;
80 }
9.12.3.5 MemoryConcat2B()
This function will concatenate the buffer contents of a TPM2B to an the buffer contents of another TPM2B
and adjust the size accordingly (a := (a | b)).
81 LIB_EXPORT void
82 MemoryConcat2B(
83 TPM2B *aInOut, // IN/OUT: destination 2B
84 TPM2B *bIn, // IN: second 2B
85 UINT16 aSize // IN: The size of aInOut.buffer (max values for
86 // aInOut.size)
87 )
88 {
89 MemoryMove(&aInOut->buffer[aInOut->size],
90 bIn->buffer,
91 bIn->size,
92 aSize - aInOut->size);
93 aInOut->size = aInOut->size + bIn->size;
94 return;
95 }
9.12.3.6 Memory2BEqual()
This function will compare two TPM2B structures. To be equal, they need to be the same size and the
buffer contexts need to be the same in all octets.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE size and buffer contents are the same
FALSE size or buffer contents are not the same
96 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
97 Memory2BEqual(
98 const TPM2B *aIn, // IN: compare value
99 const TPM2B *bIn // IN: compare value
100 )
101 {
102 if(aIn->size != bIn->size)
103 return FALSE;
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104
105 return MemoryEqual(aIn->buffer, bIn->buffer, aIn->size);
106 }
9.12.3.7 MemorySet()
This function will set all the octets in the specified memory range to the specified octet value.
NOTE: the dSize parameter forces the caller to know how big the receiving buffer is to make sure that there is no
possibility that the caller will inadvertently run over the end of the buffer.
107 LIB_EXPORT void
108 MemorySet(
109 void *destination, // OUT: memory destination
110 char value, // IN: fill value
111 UINT32 size // IN: number of octets to fill
112 )
113 {
114 char *p = (char *)destination;
115 while (size--)
116 *p++ = value;
117 return;
118 }
9.12.3.8 MemoryGetActionInputBuffer()
This function returns the address of the buffer into which the command parameters will be unmarshaled in
preparation for calling the command actions.
119 BYTE *
120 MemoryGetActionInputBuffer(
121 UINT32 size // Size, in bytes, required for the input
122 // unmarshaling
123 )
124 {
125 BYTE *buf = NULL;
126
127 if(size > 0)
128 {
129 // In this implementation, a static buffer is set aside for action output.
130 // Other implementations may apply additional optimization based on command
131 // code or other factors.
132 UINT32 *p = s_actionInputBuffer;
133 buf = (BYTE *)p;
134 pAssert(size < sizeof(s_actionInputBuffer));
135
136 // size of an element in the buffer
137 #define SZ sizeof(s_actionInputBuffer[0])
138
139 for(size = (size + SZ - 1) / SZ; size > 0; size--)
140 *p++ = 0;
141 #undef SZ
142 }
143 return buf;
144 }
9.12.3.9 MemoryGetActionOutputBuffer()
This function returns the address of the buffer into which the command action code places its output
values.
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145 void *
146 MemoryGetActionOutputBuffer(
147 TPM_CC command // Command that requires the buffer
148 )
149 {
150 // In this implementation, a static buffer is set aside for action output.
151 // Other implementations may apply additional optimization based on the command
152 // code or other factors.
153 command = 0; // Unreferenced parameter
154 return s_actionOutputBuffer;
155 }
9.12.3.10 MemoryGetResponseBuffer()
This function returns the address into which the command response is marshaled from values in the
action output buffer.
156 BYTE *
157 MemoryGetResponseBuffer(
158 TPM_CC command // Command that requires the buffer
159 )
160 {
161 // In this implementation, a static buffer is set aside for responses.
162 // Other implementation may apply additional optimization based on the command
163 // code or other factors.
164 command = 0; // Unreferenced parameter
165 return s_responseBuffer;
166 }
9.12.3.11 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros()
This function is used to adjust the length of an authorization value. It adjusts the size of the TPM2B so
that it does not include octets at the end of the buffer that contain zero. The function returns the number
of non-zero octets in the buffer.
167 UINT16
168 MemoryRemoveTrailingZeros (
169 TPM2B_AUTH *auth // IN/OUT: value to adjust
170 )
171 {
172 BYTE *a = &auth->t.buffer[auth->t.size-1];
173 for(; auth->t.size > 0; auth->t.size--)
174 {
175 if(*a--)
176 break;
177 }
178 return auth->t.size;
179 }
9.13 Power.c
9.13.1 Description
This file contains functions that receive the simulated power state transitions of the TPM.
9.13.2 Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define POWER_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
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9.13.3 Functions
9.13.3.1 TPMInit()
This function is used to process a power on event.
3 void
4 TPMInit(
5 void
6 )
7 {
8 // Set state as not initialized. This means that Startup is required
9 s_initialized = FALSE;
10
11 return;
12 }
9.13.3.2 TPMRegisterStartup()
This function registers the fact that the TPM has been initialized (a TPM2_Startup() has completed
successfully).
13 void
14 TPMRegisterStartup(
15 void
16 )
17 {
18 s_initialized = TRUE;
19
20 return;
21 }
9.13.3.3 TPMIsStarted()
Indicates if the TPM has been initialized (a TPM2_Startup() has completed successfully after a
_TPM_Init()).
Return Value Meaning
TRUE TPM has been initialized
FALSE TPM has not been initialized
22 BOOL
23 TPMIsStarted(
24 void
25 )
26 {
27 return s_initialized;
28 }
9.14 PropertyCap.c
9.14.1 Description
This file contains the functions that are used for accessing the TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTY values.
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9.14.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
9.14.3 Functions
9.14.3.1 PCRGetProperty()
This function accepts a property selection and, if so, sets value to the value of the property.
All the fixed values are vendor dependent or determined by a platform-specific specification. The values
in the table below are examples and should be changed by the vendor.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE referenced property exists and value set
FALSE referenced property does not exist
2 static BOOL
3 TPMPropertyIsDefined(
4 TPM_PT property, // IN: property
5 UINT32 *value // OUT: property value
6 )
7 {
8 switch(property)
9 {
10 case TPM_PT_FAMILY_INDICATOR:
11 // from the title page of the specification
12 // For this specification, the value is "2.0".
13 *value = TPM_SPEC_FAMILY;
14 break;
15 case TPM_PT_LEVEL:
16 // from the title page of the specification
17 *value = TPM_SPEC_LEVEL;
18 break;
19 case TPM_PT_REVISION:
20 // from the title page of the specification
21 *value = TPM_SPEC_VERSION;
22 break;
23 case TPM_PT_DAY_OF_YEAR:
24 // computed from the date value on the title page of the specification
25 *value = TPM_SPEC_DAY_OF_YEAR;
26 break;
27 case TPM_PT_YEAR:
28 // from the title page of the specification
29 *value = TPM_SPEC_YEAR;
30 break;
31 case TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER:
32 // vendor ID unique to each TPM manufacturer
33 *value = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(MANUFACTURER);
34 break;
35 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1:
36 // first four characters of the vendor ID string
37 *value = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(VENDOR_STRING_1);
38 break;
39 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2:
40 // second four characters of the vendor ID string
41 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_2
42 *value = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(VENDOR_STRING_2);
43 #else
44 *value = 0;
45 #endif
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46 break;
47 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3:
48 // third four characters of the vendor ID string
49 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_3
50 *value = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(VENDOR_STRING_3);
51 #else
52 *value = 0;
53 #endif
54 break;
55 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4:
56 // fourth four characters of the vendor ID string
57 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_4
58 *value = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(VENDOR_STRING_4);
59 #else
60 *value = 0;
61 #endif
62 break;
63 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_TPM_TYPE:
64 // vendor-defined value indicating the TPM model
65 *value = 1;
66 break;
67 case TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1:
68 // more significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value
69 *value = gp.firmwareV1;
70 break;
71 case TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2:
72 // less significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value
73 *value = gp.firmwareV2;
74 break;
75 case TPM_PT_INPUT_BUFFER:
76 // maximum size of TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER
77 *value = MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER;
78 break;
79 case TPM_PT_HR_TRANSIENT_MIN:
80 // minimum number of transient objects that can be held in TPM
81 // RAM
82 *value = MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS;
83 break;
84 case TPM_PT_HR_PERSISTENT_MIN:
85 // minimum number of persistent objects that can be held in
86 // TPM NV memory
87 // In this implementation, there is no minimum number of
88 // persistent objects.
89 *value = MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS;
90 break;
91 case TPM_PT_HR_LOADED_MIN:
92 // minimum number of authorization sessions that can be held in
93 // TPM RAM
94 *value = MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS;
95 break;
96 case TPM_PT_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_MAX:
97 // number of authorization sessions that may be active at a time
98 *value = MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS;
99 break;
100 case TPM_PT_PCR_COUNT:
101 // number of PCR implemented
102 *value = IMPLEMENTATION_PCR;
103 break;
104 case TPM_PT_PCR_SELECT_MIN:
105 // minimum number of bytes in a TPMS_PCR_SELECT.sizeOfSelect
106 *value = PCR_SELECT_MIN;
107 break;
108 case TPM_PT_CONTEXT_GAP_MAX:
109 // maximum allowed difference (unsigned) between the contextID
110 // values of two saved session contexts
111 *value = (1 << (sizeof(CONTEXT_SLOT) * 8)) - 1;
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112 break;
113 case TPM_PT_NV_COUNTERS_MAX:
114 // maximum number of NV indexes that are allowed to have the
115 // TPMA_NV_COUNTER attribute SET
116 // In this implementation, there is no limitation on the number
117 // of counters, except for the size of the NV Index memory.
118 *value = 0;
119 break;
120 case TPM_PT_NV_INDEX_MAX:
121 // maximum size of an NV index data area
122 *value = MAX_NV_INDEX_SIZE;
123 break;
124 case TPM_PT_MEMORY:
125 // a TPMA_MEMORY indicating the memory management method for the TPM
126 {
127 TPMA_MEMORY attributes = {0};
128 attributes.sharedNV = SET;
129 attributes.objectCopiedToRam = SET;
130
131 // Note: Different compilers may require a different method to cast
132 // a bit field structure to a UINT32.
133 *value = * (UINT32 *) &attributes;
134 break;
135 }
136 case TPM_PT_CLOCK_UPDATE:
137 // interval, in seconds, between updates to the copy of
138 // TPMS_TIME_INFO .clock in NV
139 *value = (1 << NV_CLOCK_UPDATE_INTERVAL);
140 break;
141 case TPM_PT_CONTEXT_HASH:
142 // algorithm used for the integrity hash on saved contexts and
143 // for digesting the fuData of TPM2_FirmwareRead()
144 *value = CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG;
145 break;
146 case TPM_PT_CONTEXT_SYM:
147 // algorithm used for encryption of saved contexts
148 *value = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG;
149 break;
150 case TPM_PT_CONTEXT_SYM_SIZE:
151 // size of the key used for encryption of saved contexts
152 *value = CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS;
153 break;
154 case TPM_PT_ORDERLY_COUNT:
155 // maximum difference between the volatile and non-volatile
156 // versions of TPMA_NV_COUNTER that have TPMA_NV_ORDERLY SET
157 *value = MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT;
158 break;
159 case TPM_PT_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE:
160 // maximum value for 'commandSize'
161 *value = MAX_COMMAND_SIZE;
162 break;
163 case TPM_PT_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE:
164 // maximum value for 'responseSize'
165 *value = MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE;
166 break;
167 case TPM_PT_MAX_DIGEST:
168 // maximum size of a digest that can be produced by the TPM
169 *value = sizeof(TPMU_HA);
170 break;
171 case TPM_PT_MAX_OBJECT_CONTEXT:
172 // maximum size of a TPMS_CONTEXT that will be returned by
173 // TPM2_ContextSave for object context
174 *value = 0;
175
176 // adding sequence, saved handle and hierarchy
177 *value += sizeof(UINT64) + sizeof(TPMI_DH_CONTEXT) +
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178 sizeof(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY);
179 // add size field in TPM2B_CONTEXT
180 *value += sizeof(UINT16);
181
182 // add integrity hash size
183 *value += sizeof(UINT16) +
184 CryptGetHashDigestSize(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG);
185
186 // Add fingerprint size, which is the same as sequence size
187 *value += sizeof(UINT64);
188
189 // Add OBJECT structure size
190 *value += sizeof(OBJECT);
191 break;
192 case TPM_PT_MAX_SESSION_CONTEXT:
193 // the maximum size of a TPMS_CONTEXT that will be returned by
194 // TPM2_ContextSave for object context
195 *value = 0;
196
197 // adding sequence, saved handle and hierarchy
198 *value += sizeof(UINT64) + sizeof(TPMI_DH_CONTEXT) +
199 sizeof(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY);
200 // Add size field in TPM2B_CONTEXT
201 *value += sizeof(UINT16);
202
203 // Add integrity hash size
204 *value += sizeof(UINT16) +
205 CryptGetHashDigestSize(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG);
206 // Add fingerprint size, which is the same as sequence size
207 *value += sizeof(UINT64);
208
209 // Add SESSION structure size
210 *value += sizeof(SESSION);
211 break;
212 case TPM_PT_PS_FAMILY_INDICATOR:
213 // platform specific values for the TPM_PT_PS parameters from
214 // the relevant platform-specific specification
215 // In this reference implementation, all of these values are 0.
216 *value = 0;
217 break;
218 case TPM_PT_PS_LEVEL:
219 // level of the platform-specific specification
220 *value = 0;
221 break;
222 case TPM_PT_PS_REVISION:
223 // specification Revision times 100 for the platform-specific
224 // specification
225 *value = 0;
226 break;
227 case TPM_PT_PS_DAY_OF_YEAR:
228 // platform-specific specification day of year using TCG calendar
229 *value = 0;
230 break;
231 case TPM_PT_PS_YEAR:
232 // platform-specific specification year using the CE
233 *value = 0;
234 break;
235 case TPM_PT_SPLIT_MAX:
236 // number of split signing operations supported by the TPM
237 *value = 0;
238 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
239 *value = sizeof(gr.commitArray) * 8;
240 #endif
241 break;
242 case TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS:
243 // total number of commands implemented in the TPM
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244 // Since the reference implementation does not have any
245 // vendor-defined commands, this will be the same as the
246 // number of library commands.
247 {
248 UINT32 i;
249 *value = 0;
250
251 // calculate implemented command numbers
252 for(i = TPM_CC_FIRST; i <= TPM_CC_LAST; i++)
253 {
254 if(CommandIsImplemented(i)) (*value)++;
255 }
256 break;
257 }
258 case TPM_PT_LIBRARY_COMMANDS:
259 // number of commands from the TPM library that are implemented
260 {
261 UINT32 i;
262 *value = 0;
263
264 // calculate implemented command numbers
265 for(i = TPM_CC_FIRST; i <= TPM_CC_LAST; i++)
266 {
267 if(CommandIsImplemented(i)) (*value)++;
268 }
269 break;
270 }
271 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_COMMANDS:
272 // number of vendor commands that are implemented
273 *value = 0;
274 break;
275 case TPM_PT_PERMANENT:
276 // TPMA_PERMANENT
277 {
278 TPMA_PERMANENT flags = {0};
279 if(gp.ownerAuth.t.size != 0)
280 flags.ownerAuthSet = SET;
281 if(gp.endorsementAuth.t.size != 0)
282 flags.endorsementAuthSet = SET;
283 if(gp.lockoutAuth.t.size != 0)
284 flags.lockoutAuthSet = SET;
285 if(gp.disableClear)
286 flags.disableClear = SET;
287 if(gp.failedTries >= gp.maxTries)
288 flags.inLockout = SET;
289 // In this implementation, EPS is always generated by TPM
290 flags.tpmGeneratedEPS = SET;
291
292 // Note: Different compilers may require a different method to cast
293 // a bit field structure to a UINT32.
294 *value = * (UINT32 *) &flags;
295 break;
296 }
297 case TPM_PT_STARTUP_CLEAR:
298 // TPMA_STARTUP_CLEAR
299 {
300 TPMA_STARTUP_CLEAR flags = {0};
301 if(g_phEnable)
302 flags.phEnable = SET;
303 if(gc.shEnable)
304 flags.shEnable = SET;
305 if(gc.ehEnable)
306 flags.ehEnable = SET;
307 if(gc.phEnableNV)
308 flags.phEnableNV = SET;
309 if(g_prevOrderlyState != SHUTDOWN_NONE)
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310 flags.orderly = SET;
311
312 // Note: Different compilers may require a different method to cast
313 // a bit field structure to a UINT32.
314 *value = * (UINT32 *) &flags;
315 break;
316 }
317 case TPM_PT_HR_NV_INDEX:
318 // number of NV indexes currently defined
319 *value = NvCapGetIndexNumber();
320 break;
321 case TPM_PT_HR_LOADED:
322 // number of authorization sessions currently loaded into TPM
323 // RAM
324 *value = SessionCapGetLoadedNumber();
325 break;
326 case TPM_PT_HR_LOADED_AVAIL:
327 // number of additional authorization sessions, of any type,
328 // that could be loaded into TPM RAM
329 *value = SessionCapGetLoadedAvail();
330 break;
331 case TPM_PT_HR_ACTIVE:
332 // number of active authorization sessions currently being
333 // tracked by the TPM
334 *value = SessionCapGetActiveNumber();
335 break;
336 case TPM_PT_HR_ACTIVE_AVAIL:
337 // number of additional authorization sessions, of any type,
338 // that could be created
339 *value = SessionCapGetActiveAvail();
340 break;
341 case TPM_PT_HR_TRANSIENT_AVAIL:
342 // estimate of the number of additional transient objects that
343 // could be loaded into TPM RAM
344 *value = ObjectCapGetTransientAvail();
345 break;
346 case TPM_PT_HR_PERSISTENT:
347 // number of persistent objects currently loaded into TPM
348 // NV memory
349 *value = NvCapGetPersistentNumber();
350 break;
351 case TPM_PT_HR_PERSISTENT_AVAIL:
352 // number of additional persistent objects that could be loaded
353 // into NV memory
354 *value = NvCapGetPersistentAvail();
355 break;
356 case TPM_PT_NV_COUNTERS:
357 // number of defined NV indexes that have NV TPMA_NV_COUNTER
358 // attribute SET
359 *value = NvCapGetCounterNumber();
360 break;
361 case TPM_PT_NV_COUNTERS_AVAIL:
362 // number of additional NV indexes that can be defined with their
363 // TPMA_NV_COUNTER attribute SET
364 *value = NvCapGetCounterAvail();
365 break;
366 case TPM_PT_ALGORITHM_SET:
367 // region code for the TPM
368 *value = gp.algorithmSet;
369 break;
370
371 case TPM_PT_LOADED_CURVES:
372 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
373 // number of loaded ECC curves
374 *value = CryptCapGetEccCurveNumber();
375 #else // TPM_ALG_ECC
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376 *value = 0;
377 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
378 break;
379
380 case TPM_PT_LOCKOUT_COUNTER:
381 // current value of the lockout counter
382 *value = gp.failedTries;
383 break;
384 case TPM_PT_MAX_AUTH_FAIL:
385 // number of authorization failures before DA lockout is invoked
386 *value = gp.maxTries;
387 break;
388 case TPM_PT_LOCKOUT_INTERVAL:
389 // number of seconds before the value reported by
390 // TPM_PT_LOCKOUT_COUNTER is decremented
391 *value = gp.recoveryTime;
392 break;
393 case TPM_PT_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY:
394 // number of seconds after a lockoutAuth failure before use of
395 // lockoutAuth may be attempted again
396 *value = gp.lockoutRecovery;
397 break;
398 case TPM_PT_AUDIT_COUNTER_0:
399 // high-order 32 bits of the command audit counter
400 *value = (UINT32) (gp.auditCounter >> 32);
401 break;
402 case TPM_PT_AUDIT_COUNTER_1:
403 // low-order 32 bits of the command audit counter
404 *value = (UINT32) (gp.auditCounter);
405 break;
406 default:
407 // property is not defined
408 return FALSE;
409 break;
410 }
411
412 return TRUE;
413 }
9.14.3.2 TPMCapGetProperties()
This function is used to get the TPM_PT values. The search of properties will start at property and
continue until propertyList has as many values as will fit, or the last property has been reported, or the list
has as many values as requested in count.
Return Value Meaning
YES more properties are available
NO no more properties to be reported
414 TPMI_YES_NO
415 TPMCapGetProperties(
416 TPM_PT property, // IN: the starting TPM property
417 UINT32 count, // IN: maximum number of returned
418 // propertie
419 TPML_TAGGED_TPM_PROPERTY *propertyList // OUT: property list
420 )
421 {
422 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
423 UINT32 i;
424
425 // initialize output property list
426 propertyList->count = 0;
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427
428 // maximum count of properties we may return is MAX_PCR_PROPERTIES
429 if(count > MAX_TPM_PROPERTIES) count = MAX_TPM_PROPERTIES;
430
431 // If property is less than PT_FIXED, start from PT_FIXED.
432 if(property < PT_FIXED) property = PT_FIXED;
433
434 // Scan through the TPM properties of the requested group.
435 // The size of TPM property group is PT_GROUP * 2 for fix and
436 // variable groups.
437 for(i = property; i <= PT_FIXED + PT_GROUP * 2; i++)
438 {
439 UINT32 value;
440 if(TPMPropertyIsDefined((TPM_PT) i, &value))
441 {
442 if(propertyList->count < count)
443 {
444
445 // If the list is not full, add this property
446 propertyList->tpmProperty[propertyList->count].property =
447 (TPM_PT) i;
448 propertyList->tpmProperty[propertyList->count].value = value;
449 propertyList->count++;
450 }
451 else
452 {
453 // If the return list is full but there are more properties
454 // available, set the indication and exit the loop.
455 more = YES;
456 break;
457 }
458 }
459 }
460 return more;
461 }
9.15 TpmFail.c
9.15.1 Includes, Defines, and Types
1 #define TPM_FAIL_C
2 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
3 #include <assert.h>
On MS C compiler, can save the alignment state and set the alignment to 1 for the duration of the
TPM_Types.h include. This will avoid a lot of alignment warnings from the compiler for the unaligned
structures. The alignment of the structures is not important as this function does not use any of the
structures in TPM_Types.h and only include it for the #defines of the capabilities, properties, and
command code values.
4 #pragma pack(push, 1)
5 #include "TPM_Types.h"
6 #pragma pack (pop)
7 #include "swap.h"
9.15.2 Typedefs
These defines are used primarily for sizing of the local response buffer.
8 #pragma pack(push,1)
9 typedef struct {
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10 TPM_ST tag;
11 UINT32 size;
12 TPM_RC code;
13 } HEADER;
14 typedef struct {
15 UINT16 size;
16 struct {
17 UINT32 function;
18 UINT32 line;
19 UINT32 code;
20 } values;
21 TPM_RC returnCode;
22 } GET_TEST_RESULT_PARAMETERS;
23 typedef struct {
24 TPMI_YES_NO moreData;
25 TPM_CAP capability; // Always TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES
26 TPML_TAGGED_TPM_PROPERTY tpmProperty; // a single tagged property
27 } GET_CAPABILITY_PARAMETERS;
28 typedef struct {
29 HEADER header;
30 GET_TEST_RESULT_PARAMETERS getTestResult;
31 } TEST_RESPONSE;
32 typedef struct {
33 HEADER header;
34 GET_CAPABILITY_PARAMETERS getCap;
35 } CAPABILITY_RESPONSE;
36 typedef union {
37 TEST_RESPONSE test;
38 CAPABILITY_RESPONSE cap;
39 } RESPONSES;
40 #pragma pack(pop)
Buffer to hold the responses. This may be a little larger than required due to padding that a compiler
might add.
NOTE: This is not in Global.c because of the specialized data definitions above. Since the data contained in this
structure is not relevant outside of the execution of a single command (when the TPM is in failure mode. There
is no compelling reason to move all the typedefs to Global.h and this structure to Global.c.
41 #ifndef __IGNORE_STATE__ // Don't define this value
42 static BYTE response[sizeof(RESPONSES)];
43 #endif
9.15.3 Local Functions
9.15.3.1 MarshalUint16()
Function to marshal a 16 bit value to the output buffer.
44 static INT32
45 MarshalUint16(
46 UINT16 integer,
47 BYTE **buffer
48 )
49 {
50 return UINT16_Marshal(&integer, buffer, NULL);
51 }
9.15.3.2 MarshalUint32()
Function to marshal a 32 bit value to the output buffer.
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52 static INT32
53 MarshalUint32(
54 UINT32 integer,
55 BYTE **buffer
56 )
57 {
58 return UINT32_Marshal(&integer, buffer, NULL);
59 }
9.15.3.3 UnmarshalHeader()
Funtion to unmarshal the 10-byte command header.
60 static BOOL
61 UnmarshalHeader(
62 HEADER *header,
63 BYTE **buffer,
64 INT32 *size
65 )
66 {
67 UINT32 usize;
68 TPM_RC ucode;
69 if( UINT16_Unmarshal(&header->tag, buffer, size) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS
70 || UINT32_Unmarshal(&usize, buffer, size) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS
71 || UINT32_Unmarshal(&ucode, buffer, size) != TPM_RC_SUCCESS
72 )
73 return FALSE;
74 header->size = usize;
75 header->code = ucode;
76 return TRUE;
77 }
9.15.4 Public Functions
9.15.4.1 SetForceFailureMode()
This function is called by the simulator to enable failure mode testing.
78 LIB_EXPORT void
79 SetForceFailureMode(
80 void
81 )
82 {
83 g_forceFailureMode = TRUE;
84 return;
85 }
9.15.4.2 TpmFail()
This function is called by TPM.lib when a failure occurs. It will set up the failure values to be returned on
TPM2_GetTestResult().
86 void
87 TpmFail(
88 const char *function,
89 int line, int code
90 )
91 {
92 // Save the values that indicate where the error occurred.
93 // On a 64-bit machine, this may truncate the address of the string
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94 // of the function name where the error occurred.
95 s_failFunction = *(UINT32*)&function;
96 s_failLine = line;
97 s_failCode = code;
98
99 // if asserts are enabled, then do an assert unless the failure mode code
100 // is being tested
101 assert(g_forceFailureMode);
102
103 // Clear this flag
104 g_forceFailureMode = FALSE;
105
106 // Jump to the failure mode code.
107 // Note: only get here if asserts are off or if we are testing failure mode
108 longjmp(&g_jumpBuffer[0], 1);
109 }
9.15.5 TpmFailureMode
This function is called by the interface code when the platform is in failure mode.
110 void
111 TpmFailureMode (
112 unsigned int inRequestSize, // IN: command buffer size
113 unsigned char *inRequest, // IN: command buffer
114 unsigned int *outResponseSize, // OUT: response buffer size
115 unsigned char **outResponse // OUT: response buffer
116 )
117 {
118 BYTE *buffer;
119 UINT32 marshalSize;
120 UINT32 capability;
121 HEADER header; // unmarshaled command header
122 UINT32 pt; // unmarshaled property type
123 UINT32 count; // unmarshaled property count
124
125 // If there is no command buffer, then just return TPM_RC_FAILURE
126 if(inRequestSize == 0 || inRequest == NULL)
127 goto FailureModeReturn;
128
129 // If the header is not correct for TPM2_GetCapability() or
130 // TPM2_GetTestResult() then just return the in failure mode response;
131 buffer = inRequest;
132 if(!UnmarshalHeader(&header, &inRequest, (INT32 *)&inRequestSize))
133 goto FailureModeReturn;
134 if( header.tag != TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS
135 || header.size < 10)
136 goto FailureModeReturn;
137
138 switch (header.code) {
139 case TPM_CC_GetTestResult:
140
141 // make sure that the command size is correct
142 if(header.size != 10)
143 goto FailureModeReturn;
144 buffer = &response[10];
145 marshalSize = MarshalUint16(3 * sizeof(UINT32), &buffer);
146 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(s_failFunction, &buffer);
147 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(s_failLine, &buffer);
148 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(s_failCode, &buffer);
149 if(s_failCode == FATAL_ERROR_NV_UNRECOVERABLE)
150 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED, &buffer);
151 else
152 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(TPM_RC_FAILURE, &buffer);
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153 break;
154
155 case TPM_CC_GetCapability:
156 // make sure that the size of the command is exactly the size
157 // returned for the capability, property, and count
158 if( header.size!= (10 + (3 * sizeof(UINT32)))
159 // also verify that this is requesting TPM properties
160 || (UINT32_Unmarshal(&capability, &inRequest,
161 (INT32 *)&inRequestSize)
162 != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
163 || (capability != TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES)
164 || (UINT32_Unmarshal(&pt, &inRequest, (INT32 *)&inRequestSize)
165 != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
166 || (UINT32_Unmarshal(&count, &inRequest, (INT32 *)&inRequestSize)
167 != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
168 )
169
170 goto FailureModeReturn;
171
172 // If in failure mode because of an unrecoverable read error, and the
173 // property is 0 and the count is 0, then this is an indication to
174 // re-manufacture the TPM. Do the re-manufacture but stay in failure
175 // mode until the TPM is reset.
176 // Note: this behavior is not required by the specification and it is
177 // OK to leave the TPM permanently bricked due to an unrecoverable NV
178 // error.
179 if( count == 0 && pt == 0 && s_failCode == FATAL_ERROR_NV_UNRECOVERABLE)
180 {
181 g_manufactured = FALSE;
182 TPM_Manufacture(0);
183 }
184
185 if(count > 0)
186 count = 1;
187 else if(pt > TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2)
188 count = 0;
189 if(pt < TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER)
190 pt = TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER;
191
192 // set up for return
193 buffer = &response[10];
194 // if the request was for a PT less than the last one
195 // then we indicate more, otherwise, not.
196 if(pt < TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2)
197 *buffer++ = YES;
198 else
199 *buffer++ = NO;
200
201 marshalSize = 1;
202
203 // indicate the capability type
204 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(capability, &buffer);
205 // indicate the number of values that are being returned (0 or 1)
206 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(count, &buffer);
207 // indicate the property
208 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(pt, &buffer);
209
210 if(count > 0)
211 switch (pt) {
212 case TPM_PT_MANUFACTURER:
213 // the vendor ID unique to each TPM manufacturer
214 #ifdef MANUFACTURER
215 pt = *(UINT32*)MANUFACTURER;
216 #else
217 pt = 0;
218 #endif
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219 break;
220 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1:
221 // the first four characters of the vendor ID string
222 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_1
223 pt = *(UINT32*)VENDOR_STRING_1;
224 #else
225 pt = 0;
226 #endif
227 break;
228 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2:
229 // the second four characters of the vendor ID string
230 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_2
231 pt = *(UINT32*)VENDOR_STRING_2;
232 #else
233 pt = 0;
234 #endif
235 break;
236 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3:
237 // the third four characters of the vendor ID string
238 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_3
239 pt = *(UINT32*)VENDOR_STRING_3;
240 #else
241 pt = 0;
242 #endif
243 break;
244 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4:
245 // the fourth four characters of the vendor ID string
246 #ifdef VENDOR_STRING_4
247 pt = *(UINT32*)VENDOR_STRING_4;
248 #else
249 pt = 0;
250 #endif
251
252 break;
253 case TPM_PT_VENDOR_TPM_TYPE:
254 // vendor-defined value indicating the TPM model
255 // We just make up a number here
256 pt = 1;
257 break;
258 case TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1:
259 // the more significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value
260 // indicating the version of the firmware
261 #ifdef FIRMWARE_V1
262 pt = FIRMWARE_V1;
263 #else
264 pt = 0;
265 #endif
266 break;
267 default: // TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2:
268 // the less significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value
269 // indicating the version of the firmware
270 #ifdef FIRMWARE_V2
271 pt = FIRMWARE_V2;
272 #else
273 pt = 0;
274 #endif
275 break;
276 }
277 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(pt, &buffer);
278 break;
279 default: // default for switch (cc)
280 goto FailureModeReturn;
281 }
282 // Now do the header
283 buffer = response;
284 marshalSize = marshalSize + 10; // Add the header size to the
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285 // stuff already marshaled
286 MarshalUint16(TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS, &buffer); // structure tag
287 MarshalUint32(marshalSize, &buffer); // responseSize
288 MarshalUint32(TPM_RC_SUCCESS, &buffer); // response code
289
290 *outResponseSize = marshalSize;
291 *outResponse = (unsigned char *)&response;
292 return;
293
294 FailureModeReturn:
295
296 buffer = response;
297
298 marshalSize = MarshalUint16(TPM_ST_NO_SESSIONS, &buffer);
299 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(10, &buffer);
300 marshalSize += MarshalUint32(TPM_RC_FAILURE, &buffer);
301
302 *outResponseSize = marshalSize;
303 *outResponse = (unsigned char *)response;
304 return;
305 }
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10 Cryptographic Functions
10.1 Introduction
The files in this section provide cryptographic support for the other functions in the TPM and the interface
to the Crypto Engine.
10.2 CryptUtil.c
10.2.1 Includes
1 #include "TPM_Types.h"
2 #include "CryptoEngine.h" // types shared by CryptUtil and CryptoEngine.
3 // Includes the function prototypes for the
4 // CryptoEngine functions.
5 #include "Global.h"
6 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
7 #include "MemoryLib_fp.h"
8 //#include "CryptSelfTest_fp.h"
10.2.2 TranslateCryptErrors()
This function converts errors from the cryptographic library into TPM_RC_VALUES.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_VALUE CRYPT_FAIL
TPM_RC_NO_RESULT CRYPT_NO_RESULT
TPM_RC_SCHEME CRYPT_SCHEME
TPM_RC_VALUE CRYPT_PARAMETER
TPM_RC_SIZE CRYPT_UNDERFLOW
TPM_RC_ECC_POINT CRYPT_POINT
TPM_RC_CANCELLED CRYPT_CANCEL
9 static TPM_RC
10 TranslateCryptErrors (
11 CRYPT_RESULT retVal // IN: crypt error to evaluate
12 )
13 {
14 switch (retVal)
15 {
16 case CRYPT_SUCCESS:
17 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
18 case CRYPT_FAIL:
19 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
20 case CRYPT_NO_RESULT:
21 return TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;
22 case CRYPT_SCHEME:
23 return TPM_RC_SCHEME;
24 case CRYPT_PARAMETER:
25 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
26 case CRYPT_UNDERFLOW:
27 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
28 case CRYPT_POINT:
29 return TPM_RC_ECC_POINT;
30 case CRYPT_CANCEL:
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31 return TPM_RC_CANCELED;
32 default: // Other unknown warnings
33 return TPM_RC_FAILURE;
34 }
35 }
10.2.3 Random Number Generation Functions
36 #ifdef TPM_ALG_NULL //%
37 #ifdef _DRBG_STATE_SAVE //%
10.2.3.1 CryptDrbgGetPutState()
Read or write the current state from the DRBG in the cryptoEngine.
38 void
39 CryptDrbgGetPutState(
40 GET_PUT direction // IN: Get from or put to DRBG
41 )
42 {
43 _cpri__DrbgGetPutState(direction,
44 sizeof(go.drbgState),
45 (BYTE *)&go.drbgState);
46 }
47 #else //% 00
48 //%#define CryptDrbgGetPutState(ignored) // If not doing state save, turn this
49 //% // into a null macro
50 #endif //%
10.2.3.2 CryptStirRandom()
Stir random entropy
51 void
52 CryptStirRandom(
53 UINT32 entropySize, // IN: size of entropy buffer
54 BYTE *buffer // IN: entropy buffer
55 )
56 {
57 // RNG self testing code may be inserted here
58
59 // Call crypto engine random number stirring function
60 _cpri__StirRandom(entropySize, buffer);
61
62 return;
63 }
10.2.3.3 CryptGenerateRandom()
This is the interface to _cpri__GenerateRandom().
64 UINT16
65 CryptGenerateRandom(
66 UINT16 randomSize, // IN: size of random number
67 BYTE *buffer // OUT: buffer of random number
68 )
69 {
70 UINT16 result;
71 pAssert(randomSize <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES || randomSize <= PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE);
72 if(randomSize == 0)
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73 return 0;
74
75 // Call crypto engine random number generation
76 result = _cpri__GenerateRandom(randomSize, buffer);
77 if(result != randomSize)
78 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
79
80 return result;
81 }
82 #endif //TPM_ALG_NULL //%
10.2.4 Hash/HMAC Functions
10.2.4.1 CryptGetContextAlg()
This function returns the hash algorithm associated with a hash context.
83 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH //% 1
84 TPM_ALG_ID
85 CryptGetContextAlg(
86 void *state // IN: the context to check
87 )
88 {
89 HASH_STATE *context = (HASH_STATE *)state;
90 return _cpri__GetContextAlg(&context->state);
91 }
10.2.4.2 CryptStartHash()
This function starts a hash and return the size, in bytes, of the digest.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
92 UINT16
93 CryptStartHash(
94 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
95 HASH_STATE *hashState // OUT: the state of hash stack. It will be used
96 // in hash update and completion
97 )
98 {
99 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = 0;
100
101 pAssert(hashState != NULL);
102
103 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
104
105 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
106
107 // Call crypto engine start hash function
108 if((retVal = _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState->state)) > 0)
109 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_HASH;
110
111 return retVal;
112 }
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10.2.4.3 CryptStartHashSequence()
Start a hash stack for a sequence object and return the size, in bytes, of the digest. This call uses the
form of the hash state that requires context save and restored.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
113 UINT16
114 CryptStartHashSequence(
115 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
116 HASH_STATE *hashState // OUT: the state of hash stack. It will be used
117 // in hash update and completion
118 )
119 {
120 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = 0;
121
122 pAssert(hashState != NULL);
123
124 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
125
126 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
127
128 // Call crypto engine start hash function
129 if((retVal = _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, TRUE, &hashState->state)) > 0)
130 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_HASH;
131
132 return retVal;
133
134 }
10.2.4.4 CryptStartHMAC()
This function starts an HMAC sequence and returns the size of the digest that will be produced.
The caller must provide a block of memory in which the hash sequence state is kept. The caller should
not alter the contents of this buffer until the hash sequence is completed or abandoned.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
135 UINT16
136 CryptStartHMAC(
137 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
138 UINT16 keySize, // IN: the size of HMAC key in byte
139 BYTE *key, // IN: HMAC key
140 HMAC_STATE *hmacState // OUT: the state of HMAC stack. It will be used
141 // in HMAC update and completion
142 )
143 {
144 HASH_STATE *hashState = (HASH_STATE *)hmacState;
145 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
146
147 // This has to come before the pAssert in case we all calling this function
148 // during testing. If so, the first instance will have no arguments but the
149 // hash algorithm. The call from the test routine will have arguments. When
150 // the second call is done, then we return to the test dispatcher.
151 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
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152
153 pAssert(hashState != NULL);
154
155 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
156
157 if((retVal = _cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState->state, keySize, key,
158 &hmacState->hmacKey.b)) > 0)
159 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_HMAC;
160
161 return retVal;
162 }
10.2.4.5 CryptStartHMACSequence()
This function starts an HMAC sequence and returns the size of the digest that will be produced.
The caller must provide a block of memory in which the hash sequence state is kept. The caller should
not alter the contents of this buffer until the hash sequence is completed or abandoned.
This call is used to start a sequence HMAC that spans multiple TPM commands.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
163 UINT16
164 CryptStartHMACSequence(
165 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
166 UINT16 keySize, // IN: the size of HMAC key in byte
167 BYTE *key, // IN: HMAC key
168 HMAC_STATE *hmacState // OUT: the state of HMAC stack. It will be used
169 // in HMAC update and completion
170 )
171 {
172 HASH_STATE *hashState = (HASH_STATE *)hmacState;
173 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
174
175 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
176
177 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
178
179 if((retVal = _cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, TRUE, &hashState->state,
180 keySize, key, &hmacState->hmacKey.b)) > 0)
181 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_HMAC;
182
183 return retVal;
184 }
10.2.4.6 CryptStartHMAC2B()
This function starts an HMAC and returns the size of the digest that will be produced.
This function is provided to support the most common use of starting an HMAC with a TPM2B key.
The caller must provide a block of memory in which the hash sequence state is kept. The caller should
not alter the contents of this buffer until the hash sequence is completed or abandoned.
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Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
185 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
186 CryptStartHMAC2B(
187 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
188 TPM2B *key, // IN: HMAC key
189 HMAC_STATE *hmacState // OUT: the state of HMAC stack. It will be used
190 // in HMAC update and completion
191 )
192 {
193 return CryptStartHMAC(hashAlg, key->size, key->buffer, hmacState);
194 }
10.2.4.7 CryptStartHMACSequence2B()
This function starts an HMAC sequence and returns the size of the digest that will be produced.
This function is provided to support the most common use of starting an HMAC with a TPM2B key.
The caller must provide a block of memory in which the hash sequence state is kept. The caller should
not alter the contents of this buffer until the hash sequence is completed or abandoned.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the digest size of the algorithm
=0 the hashAlg was TPM_ALG_NULL
195 UINT16
196 CryptStartHMACSequence2B(
197 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
198 TPM2B *key, // IN: HMAC key
199 HMAC_STATE *hmacState // OUT: the state of HMAC stack. It will be used
200 // in HMAC update and completion
201 )
202 {
203 return CryptStartHMACSequence(hashAlg, key->size, key->buffer, hmacState);
204 }
10.2.4.8 CryptUpdateDigest()
This function updates a digest (hash or HMAC) with an array of octets.
This function can be used for both HMAC and hash functions so the digestState is void so that either
state type can be passed.
205 LIB_EXPORT void
206 CryptUpdateDigest(
207 void *digestState, // IN: the state of hash stack
208 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: the size of data
209 BYTE *data // IN: data to be hashed
210 )
211 {
212 HASH_STATE *hashState = (HASH_STATE *)digestState;
213
214 pAssert(digestState != NULL);
215
216 if(hashState->type != HASH_STATE_EMPTY && data != NULL && dataSize != 0)
217 {
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218 // Call crypto engine update hash function
219 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState->state, dataSize, data);
220 }
221 return;
222 }
10.2.4.9 CryptUpdateDigest2B()
This function updates a digest (hash or HMAC) with a TPM2B.
This function can be used for both HMAC and hash functions so the digestState is void so that either
state type can be passed.
223 LIB_EXPORT void
224 CryptUpdateDigest2B(
225 void *digestState, // IN: the digest state
226 TPM2B *bIn // IN: 2B containing the data
227 )
228 {
229 // Only compute the digest if a pointer to the 2B is provided.
230 // In CryptUpdateDigest(), if size is zero or buffer is NULL, then no change
231 // to the digest occurs. This function should not provide a buffer if bIn is
232 // not provided.
233 if(bIn != NULL)
234 CryptUpdateDigest(digestState, bIn->size, bIn->buffer);
235 return;
236 }
10.2.4.10 CryptUpdateDigestInt()
This function is used to include an integer value to a hash stack. The function marshals the integer into its
canonical form before calling CryptUpdateHash().
237 LIB_EXPORT void
238 CryptUpdateDigestInt(
239 void *state, // IN: the state of hash stack
240 UINT32 intSize, // IN: the size of 'intValue' in byte
241 void *intValue // IN: integer value to be hashed
242 )
243 {
244
245 #if BIG_ENDIAN_TPM == YES
246 pAssert( intValue != NULL && (intSize == 1 || intSize == 2
247 || intSize == 4 || intSize == 8));
248 CryptUpdateHash(state, inSize, (BYTE *)intValue);
249 #else
250
251 BYTE marshalBuffer[8];
252 // Point to the big end of an little-endian value
253 BYTE *p = &((BYTE *)intValue)[intSize - 1];
254 // Point to the big end of an big-endian value
255 BYTE *q = marshalBuffer;
256
257 pAssert(intValue != NULL);
258 switch (intSize)
259 {
260 case 8:
261 *q++ = *p--;
262 *q++ = *p--;
263 *q++ = *p--;
264 *q++ = *p--;
265 case 4:
266 *q++ = *p--;
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267 *q++ = *p--;
268 case 2:
269 *q++ = *p--;
270 case 1:
271 *q = *p;
272 // Call update the hash
273 CryptUpdateDigest(state, intSize, marshalBuffer);
274 break;
275 default:
276 FAIL(0);
277 }
278
279 #endif
280 return;
281 }
10.2.4.11 CryptCompleteHash()
This function completes a hash sequence and returns the digest.
This function can be called to complete either an HMAC or hash sequence. The state type determines if
the context type is a hash or HMAC. If an HMAC, then the call is forwarded to CryptCompleteHash().
If digestSize is smaller than the digest size of hash/HMAC algorithm, the most significant bytes of
required size will be returned
Return Value Meaning
>=0 the number of bytes placed in digest
282 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
283 CryptCompleteHash(
284 void *state, // IN: the state of hash stack
285 UINT16 digestSize, // IN: size of digest buffer
286 BYTE *digest // OUT: hash digest
287 )
288 {
289 HASH_STATE *hashState = (HASH_STATE *)state; // local value
290
291 // If the session type is HMAC, then could forward this to
292 // the HMAC processing and not cause an error. However, if no
293 // function calls this routine to forward it, then we can't get
294 // test coverage. The decision is to assert if this is called with
295 // the type == HMAC and fix anything that makes the wrong call.
296 pAssert(hashState->type == HASH_STATE_HASH);
297
298 // Set the state to empty so that it doesn't get used again
299 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
300
301 // Call crypto engine complete hash function
302 return _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState->state, digestSize, digest);
303 }
10.2.4.12 CryptCompleteHash2B()
This function is the same as CypteCompleteHash() but the digest is placed in a TPM2B. This is the most
common use and this is provided for specification clarity. 'digest.size' should be set to indicate the number
of bytes to place in the buffer
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Return Value Meaning
>=0 the number of bytes placed in 'digest.buffer'
304 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
305 CryptCompleteHash2B(
306 void *state, // IN: the state of hash stack
307 TPM2B *digest // IN: the size of the buffer Out: requested
308 // number of byte
309 )
310 {
311 UINT16 retVal = 0;
312
313 if(digest != NULL)
314 retVal = CryptCompleteHash(state, digest->size, digest->buffer);
315
316 return retVal;
317 }
10.2.4.13 CryptHashBlock()
Hash a block of data and return the results. If the digest is larger than retSize, it is truncated and with the
least significant octets dropped.
Return Value Meaning
>=0 the number of bytes placed in ret
318 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
319 CryptHashBlock(
320 TPM_ALG_ID algId, // IN: the hash algorithm to use
321 UINT16 blockSize, // IN: size of the data block
322 BYTE *block, // IN: address of the block to hash
323 UINT16 retSize, // IN: size of the return buffer
324 BYTE *ret // OUT: address of the buffer
325 )
326 {
327 TEST_HASH(algId);
328
329 return _cpri__HashBlock(algId, blockSize, block, retSize, ret);
330 }
10.2.4.14 CryptCompleteHMAC()
This function completes a HMAC sequence and returns the digest. If digestSize is smaller than the digest
size of the HMAC algorithm, the most significant bytes of required size will be returned.
Return Value Meaning
>=0 the number of bytes placed in digest
331 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
332 CryptCompleteHMAC(
333 HMAC_STATE *hmacState, // IN: the state of HMAC stack
334 UINT32 digestSize, // IN: size of digest buffer
335 BYTE *digest // OUT: HMAC digest
336 )
337 {
338 HASH_STATE *hashState;
339
340 pAssert(hmacState != NULL);
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341 hashState = &hmacState->hashState;
342
343 pAssert(hashState->type == HASH_STATE_HMAC);
344
345 hashState->type = HASH_STATE_EMPTY;
346
347 return _cpri__CompleteHMAC(&hashState->state, &hmacState->hmacKey.b,
348 digestSize, digest);
349
350 }
10.2.4.15 CryptCompleteHMAC2B()
This function is the same as CryptCompleteHMAC() but the HMAC result is returned in a TPM2B which is
the most common use.
Return Value Meaning
>=0 the number of bytes placed in digest
351 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
352 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(
353 HMAC_STATE *hmacState, // IN: the state of HMAC stack
354 TPM2B *digest // OUT: HMAC
355 )
356 {
357 UINT16 retVal = 0;
358 if(digest != NULL)
359 retVal = CryptCompleteHMAC(hmacState, digest->size, digest->buffer);
360 return retVal;
361 }
10.2.4.16 CryptHashStateImportExport()
This function is used to prepare a hash state context for LIB_EXPORT or to import it into the internal
format. It is used by TPM2_ContextSave() and TPM2_ContextLoad() via SequenceDataImportExport().
This is just a pass-through function to the crypto library.
362 void
363 CryptHashStateImportExport(
364 HASH_STATE *internalFmt, // IN: state to LIB_EXPORT
365 HASH_STATE *externalFmt, // OUT: exported state
366 IMPORT_EXPORT direction
367 )
368 {
369 _cpri__ImportExportHashState(&internalFmt->state,
370 (EXPORT_HASH_STATE *)&externalFmt->state,
371 direction);
372 }
10.2.4.17 CryptGetHashDigestSize()
This function returns the digest size in bytes for a hash algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
0 digest size for TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 digest size
373 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
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374 CryptGetHashDigestSize(
375 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg // IN: hash algorithm
376 )
377 {
378 return _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
379 }
10.2.4.18 CryptGetHashBlockSize()
Get the digest size in byte of a hash algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
0 block size for TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 block size
380 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
381 CryptGetHashBlockSize(
382 TPM_ALG_ID hash // IN: hash algorithm to look up
383 )
384 {
385 return _cpri__GetHashBlockSize(hash);
386 }
10.2.4.19 CryptGetHashAlgByIndex()
This function is used to iterate through the hashes. TPM_ALG_NULL is returned for all indexes that are
not valid hashes. If the TPM implements 3 hashes, then an index value of 0 will return the first
implemented hash and an index value of 2 will return the last implemented hash. All other index values
will return TPM_ALG_NULL.
Return Value Meaning
TPM_ALG_xxx() a hash algorithm
TPM_ALG_NULL this can be used as a stop value
387 LIB_EXPORT TPM_ALG_ID
388 CryptGetHashAlgByIndex(
389 UINT32 index // IN: the index
390 )
391 {
392 return _cpri__GetHashAlgByIndex(index);
393 }
10.2.4.20 CryptSignHMAC()
Sign a digest using an HMAC key. This an HMAC of a digest, not an HMAC of a message.
Error Returns Meaning
394 static TPM_RC
395 CryptSignHMAC(
396 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: HMAC key sign the hash
397 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme, // IN: signing scheme
398 TPM2B_DIGEST *hashData, // IN: hash to be signed
399 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // OUT: signature
400 )
401 {
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402 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
403 UINT32 digestSize;
404
405 // HMAC algorithm self testing code may be inserted here
406
407 digestSize = CryptStartHMAC2B(scheme->details.hmac.hashAlg,
408 &signKey->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b,
409 &hmacState);
410
411 // The hash algorithm must be a valid one.
412 pAssert(digestSize > 0);
413
414 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &hashData->b);
415
416 CryptCompleteHMAC(&hmacState, digestSize,
417 (BYTE *) &signature->signature.hmac.digest);
418
419 // Set HMAC algorithm
420 signature->signature.hmac.hashAlg = scheme->details.hmac.hashAlg;
421
422 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
423 }
10.2.4.21 CryptHMACVerifySignature()
This function will verify a signature signed by a HMAC key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIGNATURE if invalid input or signature is not genuine
424 static TPM_RC
425 CryptHMACVerifySignature(
426 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: HMAC key signed the hash
427 TPM2B_DIGEST *hashData, // IN: digest being verified
428 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // IN: signature to be verified
429 )
430 {
431 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
432 TPM2B_DIGEST digestToCompare;
433
434 digestToCompare.t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(signature->signature.hmac.hashAlg,
435 &signKey->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b, &hmacState);
436
437 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &hashData->b);
438
439 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &digestToCompare.b);
440
441 // Compare digest
442 if(MemoryEqual(digestToCompare.t.buffer,
443 (BYTE *) &signature->signature.hmac.digest,
444 digestToCompare.t.size))
445 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
446 else
447 return TPM_RC_SIGNATURE;
448
449 }
10.2.4.22 CryptGenerateKeyedHash()
This function creates a keyedHash object.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIZE sensitive data size is larger than allowed for the scheme
450 static TPM_RC
451 CryptGenerateKeyedHash(
452 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: the public area template
453 // for the new key.
454 TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitiveCreate, // IN: sensitive creation data
455 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // OUT: sensitive area
456 TPM_ALG_ID kdfHashAlg, // IN: algorithm for the KDF
457 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: the seed
458 TPM2B_NAME *name // IN: name of the object
459 )
460 {
461 TPMT_KEYEDHASH_SCHEME *scheme;
462 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg;
463 UINT16 hashBlockSize;
464
465 scheme = &publicArea->parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme;
466
467 pAssert(publicArea->type == TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
468
469 // Pick the limiting hash algorithm
470 if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
471 hashAlg = publicArea->nameAlg;
472 else if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_XOR)
473 hashAlg = scheme->details.xor.hashAlg;
474 else
475 hashAlg = scheme->details.hmac.hashAlg;
476 hashBlockSize = CryptGetHashBlockSize(hashAlg);
477
478 // if this is a signing or a decryption key, then then the limit
479 // for the data size is the block size of the hash. This limit
480 // is set because larger values have lower entropy because of the
481 // HMAC function.
482 if(publicArea->objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin == CLEAR)
483 {
484 if( ( publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt
485 || publicArea->objectAttributes.sign)
486 && sensitiveCreate->data.t.size > hashBlockSize)
487
488 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
489 }
490 else
491 {
492 // If the TPM is going to generate the data, then set the size to be the
493 // size of the digest of the algorithm
494 sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
495 sensitiveCreate->data.t.size = 0;
496 }
497
498 // Fill in the sensitive area
499 CryptGenerateNewSymmetric(sensitiveCreate, sensitive, kdfHashAlg,
500 seed, name);
501
502 // Create unique area in public
503 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique(publicArea->nameAlg,
504 sensitive, &publicArea->unique.sym);
505
506 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
507 }
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10.2.4.23 CryptKDFa()
This function generates a key using the KDFa() formulation in Part 1 of the TPM specification. In this
implementation, this is a macro invocation of _cpri__KDFa() in the hash module of the CryptoEngine().
This macro sets once to FALSE so that KDFa() will iterate as many times as necessary to generate
sizeInBits number of bits.
508 //%#define CryptKDFa(hashAlg, key, label, contextU, contextV, \
509 //% sizeInBits, keyStream, counterInOut) \
510 //% TEST_HASH(hashAlg); \
511 //% _cpri__KDFa( \
512 //% ((TPM_ALG_ID)hashAlg), \
513 //% ((TPM2B *)key), \
514 //% ((const char *)label), \
515 //% ((TPM2B *)contextU), \
516 //% ((TPM2B *)contextV), \
517 //% ((UINT32)sizeInBits), \
518 //% ((BYTE *)keyStream), \
519 //% ((UINT32 *)counterInOut), \
520 //% ((BOOL) FALSE) \
521 //% )
522 //%
10.2.4.24 CryptKDFaOnce()
This function generates a key using the KDFa() formulation in Part 1 of the TPM specification. In this
implementation, this is a macro invocation of _cpri__KDFa() in the hash module of the CryptoEngine().
This macro will call _cpri__KDFa() with once TRUE so that only one iteration is performed, regardless of
sizeInBits.
523 //%#define CryptKDFaOnce(hashAlg, key, label, contextU, contextV, \
524 //% sizeInBits, keyStream, counterInOut) \
525 //% TEST_HASH(hashAlg); \
526 //% _cpri__KDFa( \
527 //% ((TPM_ALG_ID)hashAlg), \
528 //% ((TPM2B *)key), \
529 //% ((const char *)label), \
530 //% ((TPM2B *)contextU), \
531 //% ((TPM2B *)contextV), \
532 //% ((UINT32)sizeInBits), \
533 //% ((BYTE *)keyStream), \
534 //% ((UINT32 *)counterInOut), \
535 //% ((BOOL) TRUE) \
536 //% )
537 //%
10.2.4.25 KDFa()
This function is used by functions outside of CryptUtil() to access _cpri_KDFa().
538 void
539 KDFa(
540 TPM_ALG_ID hash, // IN: hash algorithm used in HMAC
541 TPM2B *key, // IN: HMAC key
542 const char *label, // IN: a null-terminated label for KDF
543 TPM2B *contextU, // IN: context U
544 TPM2B *contextV, // IN: context V
545 UINT32 sizeInBits, // IN: size of generated key in bit
546 BYTE *keyStream, // OUT: key buffer
547 UINT32 *counterInOut // IN/OUT: caller may provide the iteration
548 // counter for incremental operations to
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549 // avoid large intermediate buffers.
550 )
551 {
552 CryptKDFa(hash, key, label, contextU, contextV, sizeInBits,
553 keyStream, counterInOut);
554 }
10.2.4.26 CryptKDFe()
This function generates a key using the KDFa() formulation in Part 1 of the TPM specification. In this
implementation, this is a macro invocation of _cpri__KDFe() in the hash module of the CryptoEngine().
555 //%#define CryptKDFe(hashAlg, Z, label, partyUInfo, partyVInfo, \
556 //% sizeInBits, keyStream) \
557 //% TEST_HASH(hashAlg); \
558 //% _cpri__KDFe( \
559 //% ((TPM_ALG_ID)hashAlg), \
560 //% ((TPM2B *)Z), \
561 //% ((const char *)label), \
562 //% ((TPM2B *)partyUInfo), \
563 //% ((TPM2B *)partyVInfo), \
564 //% ((UINT32)sizeInBits), \
565 //% ((BYTE *)keyStream) \
566 //% )
567 //%
568 #endif //TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH //% 1
10.2.5 RSA Functions
10.2.5.1 BuildRSA()
Function to set the cryptographic elements of an RSA key into a structure to simplify the interface to
_cpri__ RSA function. This can/should be eliminated by building this structure into the object structure.
569 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA //% 2
570 static void
571 BuildRSA(
572 OBJECT *rsaKey,
573 RSA_KEY *key
574 )
575 {
576 key->exponent = rsaKey->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.exponent;
577 if(key->exponent == 0)
578 key->exponent = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
579 key->publicKey = &rsaKey->publicArea.unique.rsa.b;
580
581 if(rsaKey->attributes.publicOnly || rsaKey->privateExponent.t.size == 0)
582 key->privateKey = NULL;
583 else
584 key->privateKey = &(rsaKey->privateExponent.b);
585 }
10.2.5.2 CryptTestKeyRSA()
This function provides the interface to _cpri__TestKeyRSA(). If both p and q are provided, n will be set to
p*q.
If only p is provided, q is computed by q = n/p. If n mod p != 0, TPM_RC_BINDING is returned.
The key is validated by checking that a d can be found such that e d mod ((p-1)*(q-1)) = 1. If d is found
that satisfies this requirement, it will be placed in d.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_BINDING the public and private portions of the key are not matched
586 TPM_RC
587 CryptTestKeyRSA(
588 TPM2B *d, // OUT: receives the private exponent
589 UINT32 e, // IN: public exponent
590 TPM2B *n, // IN/OUT: public modulu
591 TPM2B *p, // IN: a first prime
592 TPM2B *q // IN: an optional second prime
593 )
594 {
595 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
596
597 TEST(ALG_NULL_VALUE);
598
599 pAssert(d != NULL && n != NULL && p != NULL);
600 // Set the exponent
601 if(e == 0)
602 e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
603 // CRYPT_PARAMETER
604 retVal =_cpri__TestKeyRSA(d, e, n, p, q);
605 if(retVal == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
606 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
607 else
608 return TPM_RC_BINDING; // convert CRYPT_PARAMETER
609 }
10.2.5.3 CryptGenerateKeyRSA()
This function is called to generate an RSA key from a provided seed. It calls _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA()
to perform the computations. The implementation is vendor specific.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_RANGE the exponent value is not supported
TPM_RC_CANCELLED key generation has been canceled
TPM_RC_VALUE exponent is not prime or is less than 3; or could not find a prime using
the provided parameters
610 static TPM_RC
611 CryptGenerateKeyRSA(
612 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: The public area template for
613 // the new key. The public key
614 // area will be replaced by the
615 // product of two primes found by
616 // this function
617 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // OUT: the sensitive area will be
618 // updated to contain the first
619 // prime and the symmetric
620 // encryption key
621 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the hash algorithm for the KDF
622 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: Seed for the creation
623 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: Object name
624 UINT32 *counter // OUT: last iteration of the counter
625 )
626 {
627 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
628 UINT32 exponent = publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.exponent;
629
630 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
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631 TEST(ALG_NULL_VALUE);
632
633 // In this implementation, only the default exponent is allowed
634 if(exponent != 0 && exponent != RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)
635 return TPM_RC_RANGE;
636 exponent = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
637
638 *counter = 0;
639
640 // _cpri_GenerateKeyRSA can return CRYPT_CANCEL or CRYPT_FAIL
641 retVal = _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA(&publicArea->unique.rsa.b,
642 &sensitive->sensitive.rsa.b,
643 publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits,
644 exponent,
645 hashAlg,
646 &seed->b,
647 "RSA key by vendor",
648 &name->b,
649 counter);
650
651 // CRYPT_CANCEL -> TPM_RC_CANCELLED; CRYPT_FAIL -> TPM_RC_VALUE
652 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
653
654 }
10.2.5.4 CryptLoadPrivateRSA()
This function is called to generate the private exponent of an RSA key. It uses CryptTestKeyRSA().
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_BINDING public and private parts of rsaKey are not matched
655 TPM_RC
656 CryptLoadPrivateRSA(
657 OBJECT *rsaKey // IN: the RSA key object
658 )
659 {
660 TPM_RC result;
661 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea = &rsaKey->publicArea;
662 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive = &rsaKey->sensitive;
663
664 // Load key by computing the private exponent
665 // TPM_RC_BINDING
666 result = CryptTestKeyRSA(&(rsaKey->privateExponent.b),
667 publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.exponent,
668 &(publicArea->unique.rsa.b),
669 &(sensitive->sensitive.rsa.b),
670 NULL);
671 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
672 rsaKey->attributes.privateExp = SET;
673
674 return result;
675 }
10.2.5.5 CryptSelectRSAScheme()
This function is used by TPM2_RSA_Decrypt() and TPM2_RSA_Encrypt(). It sets up the rules to select a
scheme between input and object default. This function assume the RSA object is loaded. If a default
scheme is defined in object, the default scheme should be chosen, otherwise, the input scheme should
be chosen. In the case that both the object and scheme are not TPM_ALG_NULL, then if the schemes
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are the same, the input scheme will be chosen. if the scheme are not compatible, a NULL pointer will be
returned.
The return pointer may point to a TPM_ALG_NULL scheme.
676 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT*
677 CryptSelectRSAScheme(
678 TPMI_DH_OBJECT rsaHandle, // IN: handle of sign key
679 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT *scheme // IN: a sign or decrypt scheme
680 )
681 {
682 OBJECT *rsaObject;
683 TPMT_ASYM_SCHEME *keyScheme;
684 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT *retVal = NULL;
685
686 // Get sign object pointer
687 rsaObject = ObjectGet(rsaHandle);
688 keyScheme = &rsaObject->publicArea.parameters.asymDetail.scheme;
689
690 // if the default scheme of the object is TPM_ALG_NULL, then select the
691 // input scheme
692 if(keyScheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
693 {
694 retVal = scheme;
695 }
696 // if the object scheme is not TPM_ALG_NULL and the input scheme is
697 // TPM_ALG_NULL, then select the default scheme of the object.
698 else if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
699 {
700 // if input scheme is NULL
701 retVal = (TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT *)keyScheme;
702 }
703 // get here if both the object scheme and the input scheme are
704 // not TPM_ALG_NULL. Need to insure that they are the same.
705 // IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: This could cause problems if future versions have
706 // schemes that have more values than just a hash algorithm. A new function
707 // (IsSchemeSame()) might be needed then.
708 else if( keyScheme->scheme == scheme->scheme
709 && keyScheme->details.anySig.hashAlg == scheme->details.anySig.hashAlg)
710 {
711 retVal = scheme;
712 }
713 // two different, incompatible schemes specified will return NULL
714 return retVal;
715 }
10.2.5.6 CryptDecryptRSA()
This function is the interface to _cpri__DecryptRSA(). It handles the return codes from that function and
converts them from CRYPT_RESULT to TPM_RC values. The rsaKey parameter must reference an RSA
decryption key
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_BINDING Public and private parts of the key are not cryptographically bound.
TPM_RC_SIZE Size of data to decrypt is not the same as the key size.
TPM_RC_VALUE Numeric value of the encrypted data is greater than the public
exponent, or output buffer is too small for the decrypted message.
716 TPM_RC
717 CryptDecryptRSA(
718 UINT16 *dataOutSize, // OUT: size of plain text in byte
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719 BYTE *dataOut, // OUT: plain text
720 OBJECT *rsaKey, // IN: internal RSA key
721 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT *scheme, // IN: selects the padding scheme
722 UINT16 cipherInSize, // IN: size of cipher text in byte
723 BYTE *cipherIn, // IN: cipher text
724 const char *label // IN: a label, when needed
725 )
726 {
727 RSA_KEY key;
728 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
729 UINT32 dSize; // Place to put temporary value for the
730 // returned data size
731 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL; // hash algorithm in the selected
732 // padding scheme
733 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
734
735 // pointer checks
736 pAssert( (dataOutSize != NULL) && (dataOut != NULL)
737 && (rsaKey != NULL) && (cipherIn != NULL));
738
739 // The public type is a RSA decrypt key
740 pAssert( (rsaKey->publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_RSA
741 && rsaKey->publicArea.objectAttributes.decrypt == SET));
742
743 // Must have the private portion loaded. This check is made before this
744 // function is called.
745 pAssert(rsaKey->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR);
746
747 // decryption requires that the private modulus be present
748 if(rsaKey->attributes.privateExp == CLEAR)
749 {
750
751 // Load key by computing the private exponent
752 // CryptLoadPrivateRSA may return TPM_RC_BINDING
753 result = CryptLoadPrivateRSA(rsaKey);
754 }
755
756 // the input buffer must be the size of the key
757 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
758 {
759 if(cipherInSize != rsaKey->publicArea.unique.rsa.t.size)
760 result = TPM_RC_SIZE;
761 else
762 {
763 BuildRSA(rsaKey, &key);
764
765 // Initialize the dOutSize parameter
766 dSize = *dataOutSize;
767
768 // For OAEP scheme, initialize the hash algorithm for padding
769 if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_OAEP)
770 {
771 hashAlg = scheme->details.oaep.hashAlg;
772 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
773 }
774 // See if the padding mode needs to be tested
775 TEST(scheme->scheme);
776
777 // _cpri__DecryptRSA may return CRYPT_PARAMETER CRYPT_FAIL CRYPT_SCHEME
778 retVal = _cpri__DecryptRSA(&dSize, dataOut, &key, scheme->scheme,
779 cipherInSize, cipherIn, hashAlg, label);
780
781 // Scheme must have been validated when the key was loaded/imported
782 pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_SCHEME);
783
784 // Set the return size
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785 pAssert(dSize <= UINT16_MAX);
786 *dataOutSize = (UINT16)dSize;
787
788 // CRYPT_PARAMETER -> TPM_RC_VALUE, CRYPT_FAIL -> TPM_RC_VALUE
789 result = TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
790 }
791 }
792 return result;
793 }
10.2.5.7 CryptEncryptRSA()
This function provides the interface to _cpri__EncryptRSA(). The object referenced by rsaKey is required
to be an RSA decryption key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SCHEME scheme is not supported
TPM_RC_VALUE numeric value of dataIn is greater than the key modulus
794 TPM_RC
795 CryptEncryptRSA(
796 UINT16 *cipherOutSize, // OUT: size of cipher text in byte
797 BYTE *cipherOut, // OUT: cipher text
798 OBJECT *rsaKey, // IN: internal RSA key
799 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT *scheme, // IN: selects the padding scheme
800 UINT16 dataInSize, // IN: size of plain text in byte
801 BYTE *dataIn, // IN: plain text
802 const char *label // IN: an optional label
803 )
804 {
805 RSA_KEY key;
806 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
807 UINT32 cOutSize; // Conversion variable
808 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL; // hash algorithm in selected
809 // padding scheme
810
811 // must have a pointer to a key and some data to encrypt
812 pAssert(rsaKey != NULL && dataIn != NULL);
813
814 // The public type is a RSA decryption key
815 pAssert( rsaKey->publicArea.type == TPM_ALG_RSA
816 && rsaKey->publicArea.objectAttributes.decrypt == SET);
817
818 // If the cipher buffer must be provided and it must be large enough
819 // for the result
820 pAssert( cipherOut != NULL
821 && cipherOutSize != NULL
822 && *cipherOutSize >= rsaKey->publicArea.unique.rsa.t.size);
823
824 // Only need the public key and exponent for encryption
825 BuildRSA(rsaKey, &key);
826
827 // Copy the size to the conversion buffer
828 cOutSize = *cipherOutSize;
829
830 // For OAEP scheme, initialize the hash algorithm for padding
831 if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_OAEP)
832 {
833 hashAlg = scheme->details.oaep.hashAlg;
834 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
835 }
836
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837 // This is a public key operation and does not require that the private key
838 // be loaded. To verify this, need to do the full algorithm
839 TEST(scheme->scheme);
840
841 // Encrypt the data with the public exponent
842 // _cpri__EncryptRSA may return CRYPT_PARAMETER or CRYPT_SCHEME
843 retVal = _cpri__EncryptRSA(&cOutSize,cipherOut, &key, scheme->scheme,
844 dataInSize, dataIn, hashAlg, label);
845
846 pAssert (cOutSize <= UINT16_MAX);
847 *cipherOutSize = (UINT16)cOutSize;
848 // CRYPT_PARAMETER -> TPM_RC_VALUE, CRYPT_SCHEME -> TPM_RC_SCHEME
849 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
850 }
10.2.5.8 CryptSignRSA()
This function is used to sign a digest with an RSA signing key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_BINDING public and private part of signKey are not properly bound
TPM_RC_SCHEME scheme is not supported
TPM_RC_VALUE hashData is larger than the modulus of signKey, or the size of
hashData does not match hash algorithm in scheme
851 static TPM_RC
852 CryptSignRSA(
853 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: RSA key signs the hash
854 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme, // IN: sign scheme
855 TPM2B_DIGEST *hashData, // IN: hash to be signed
856 TPMT_SIGNATURE *sig // OUT: signature
857 )
858 {
859 UINT32 signSize;
860 RSA_KEY key;
861 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
862 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
863
864 pAssert( (signKey != NULL) && (scheme != NULL)
865 && (hashData != NULL) && (sig != NULL));
866
867 // assume that the key has private part loaded and that it is a signing key.
868 pAssert( (signKey->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR)
869 && (signKey->publicArea.objectAttributes.sign == SET));
870
871 // check if the private exponent has been computed
872 if(signKey->attributes.privateExp == CLEAR)
873 // May return TPM_RC_BINDING
874 result = CryptLoadPrivateRSA(signKey);
875
876 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
877 {
878 BuildRSA(signKey, &key);
879
880 // Make sure that the hash is tested
881 TEST_HASH(sig->signature.any.hashAlg);
882
883 // Run a test of the RSA sign
884 TEST(scheme->scheme);
885
886 // _crypi__SignRSA can return CRYPT_SCHEME and CRYPT_PARAMETER
887 retVal = _cpri__SignRSA(&signSize,
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888 sig->signature.rsassa.sig.t.buffer,
889 &key,
890 sig->sigAlg,
891 sig->signature.any.hashAlg,
892 hashData->t.size, hashData->t.buffer);
893 pAssert(signSize <= UINT16_MAX);
894 sig->signature.rsassa.sig.t.size = (UINT16)signSize;
895
896 // CRYPT_SCHEME -> TPM_RC_SCHEME; CRYPT_PARAMTER -> TPM_RC_VALUE
897 result = TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
898 }
899 return result;
900 }
10.2.5.9 CryptRSAVerifySignature()
This function is used to verify signature signed by a RSA key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIGNATURE if signature is not genuine
TPM_RC_SCHEME signature scheme not supported
901 static TPM_RC
902 CryptRSAVerifySignature(
903 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: RSA key signed the hash
904 TPM2B_DIGEST *digestData, // IN: digest being signed
905 TPMT_SIGNATURE *sig // IN: signature to be verified
906 )
907 {
908 RSA_KEY key;
909 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
910 TPM_RC result;
911
912 // Validate parameter assumptions
913 pAssert((signKey != NULL) && (digestData != NULL) && (sig != NULL));
914
915 TEST_HASH(sig->signature.any.hashAlg);
916 TEST(sig->sigAlg);
917
918 // This is a public-key-only operation
919 BuildRSA(signKey, &key);
920
921 // Call crypto engine to verify signature
922 // _cpri_ValidateSignaturRSA may return CRYPT_FAIL or CRYPT_SCHEME
923 retVal = _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA(&key,
924 sig->sigAlg,
925 sig->signature.any.hashAlg,
926 digestData->t.size,
927 digestData->t.buffer,
928 sig->signature.rsassa.sig.t.size,
929 sig->signature.rsassa.sig.t.buffer,
930 0);
931 // _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA can return CRYPT_SUCCESS, CRYPT_FAIL, or
932 // CRYPT_SCHEME. Translate CRYPT_FAIL to TPM_RC_SIGNATURE
933 if(retVal == CRYPT_FAIL)
934 result = TPM_RC_SIGNATURE;
935 else
936 // CRYPT_SCHEME -> TPM_RC_SCHEME
937 result = TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
938
939 return result;
940 }
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941 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA //% 2
10.2.6 ECC Functions
10.2.6.1 CryptEccGetCurveDataPointer()
This function returns a pointer to an ECC_CURVE_VALUES structure that contains the parameters for
the key size and schemes for a given curve.
942 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC //% 3
943 static const ECC_CURVE *
944 CryptEccGetCurveDataPointer(
945 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID // IN: id of the curve
946 )
947 {
948 return _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(curveID);
949 }
10.2.6.2 CryptEccGetKeySizeInBits()
This function returns the size in bits of the key associated with a curve.
950 UINT16
951 CryptEccGetKeySizeInBits(
952 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID // IN: id of the curve
953 )
954 {
955 const ECC_CURVE *curve = CryptEccGetCurveDataPointer(curveID);
956 UINT16 keySizeInBits = 0;
957
958 if(curve != NULL)
959 keySizeInBits = curve->keySizeBits;
960
961 return keySizeInBits;
962 }
10.2.6.3 CryptEccGetKeySizeBytes()
This macro returns the size of the ECC key in bytes. It uses CryptEccGetKeySizeInBits().
963 // The next lines will be placed in CyrptUtil_fp.h with the //% removed
964 //% #define CryptEccGetKeySizeInBytes(curve) \
965 //% ((CryptEccGetKeySizeInBits(curve)+7)/8)
10.2.6.4 CryptEccGetParameter()
This function returns a pointer to an ECC curve parameter. The parameter is selected by a single
character designator from the set of {pnabxyh}.
966 LIB_EXPORT const TPM2B *
967 CryptEccGetParameter(
968 char p, // IN: the parameter selector
969 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId // IN: the curve id
970 )
971 {
972 const ECC_CURVE *curve = _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(curveId);
973 const TPM2B *parameter = NULL;
974
975 if(curve != NULL)
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976 {
977 switch (p)
978 {
979 case 'p':
980 parameter = curve->curveData->p;
981 break;
982 case 'n':
983 parameter = curve->curveData->n;
984 break;
985 case 'a':
986 parameter = curve->curveData->a;
987 break;
988 case 'b':
989 parameter = curve->curveData->b;
990 break;
991 case 'x':
992 parameter = curve->curveData->x;
993 break;
994 case 'y':
995 parameter = curve->curveData->y;
996 break;
997 case 'h':
998 parameter = curve->curveData->h;
999 break;
1000 default:
1001 break;
1002 }
1003 }
1004 return parameter;
1005 }
10.2.6.5 CryptGetCurveSignScheme()
This function will return a pointer to the scheme of the curve.
1006 const TPMT_ECC_SCHEME *
1007 CryptGetCurveSignScheme(
1008 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId // IN: The curve selector
1009 )
1010 {
1011 const ECC_CURVE *curve = _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(curveId);
1012 const TPMT_ECC_SCHEME *scheme = NULL;
1013
1014 if(curve != NULL)
1015 scheme = &(curve->sign);
1016 return scheme;
1017 }
10.2.6.6 CryptEccIsPointOnCurve()
This function will validate that an ECC point is on the curve of given curveID.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the point is on curve
FALSE if the point is not on curve
1018 BOOL
1019 CryptEccIsPointOnCurve(
1020 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID, // IN: ECC curve ID
1021 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Q // IN: ECC point
1022 )
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1023 {
1024 // Make sure that point multiply is working
1025 TEST(TPM_ALG_ECC);
1026 // Check point on curve logic by seeing if the test key is on the curve
1027
1028 // Call crypto engine function to check if a ECC public point is on the
1029 // given curve
1030 if(_cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve(curveID, Q))
1031 return TRUE;
1032 else
1033 return FALSE;
1034 }
10.2.6.7 CryptNewEccKey()
This function creates a random ECC key that is not derived from other parameters as is a Primary Key.
1035 TPM_RC
1036 CryptNewEccKey(
1037 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID, // IN: ECC curve
1038 TPMS_ECC_POINT *publicPoint, // OUT: public point
1039 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sensitive // OUT: private area
1040 )
1041 {
1042 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1043 // _cpri__GetEphemeralECC may return CRYPT_PARAMETER
1044 if(_cpri__GetEphemeralEcc(publicPoint, sensitive, curveID) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1045 // Something is wrong with the key.
1046 result = TPM_RC_KEY;
1047
1048 return result;
1049 }
10.2.6.8 CryptEccPointMultiply()
This function is used to perform a point multiply R = [d]Q. If Q is not provided, the multiplication is
performed using the generator point of the curve.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ECC_POINT invalid optional ECC point pIn
TPM_RC_NO_RESULT multiplication resulted in a point at infinity
TPM_RC_CANCELED if a self-test was done, it might have been aborted
1050 TPM_RC
1051 CryptEccPointMultiply(
1052 TPMS_ECC_POINT *pOut, // OUT: output point
1053 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: curve selector
1054 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: public scalar
1055 TPMS_ECC_POINT *pIn // IN: optional point
1056 )
1057 {
1058 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *n = NULL;
1059 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1060
1061 pAssert(pOut != NULL && dIn != NULL);
1062
1063 if(pIn != NULL)
1064 {
1065 n = dIn;
1066 dIn = NULL;
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1067 }
1068 // Do a test of point multiply
1069 TEST(TPM_ALG_ECC);
1070
1071 // _cpri__EccPointMultiply may return CRYPT_POINT or CRYPT_NO_RESULT
1072 retVal = _cpri__EccPointMultiply(pOut, curveId, dIn, pIn, n);
1073
1074 // CRYPT_POINT->TPM_RC_ECC_POINT and CRYPT_NO_RESULT->TPM_RC_NO_RESULT
1075 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
1076 }
10.2.6.9 CryptGenerateKeyECC()
This function generates an ECC key from a seed value.
The method here may not work for objects that have an order (G) that with a different size than a private
key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_VALUE hash algorithm is not supported
1077 static TPM_RC
1078 CryptGenerateKeyECC(
1079 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: The public area template for the new
1080 // key.
1081 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN/OUT: the sensitive area
1082 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm for the KDF
1083 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: the seed value
1084 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: the name of the object
1085 UINT32 *counter // OUT: the iteration counter
1086 )
1087 {
1088 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1089
1090 TEST_HASH(hashAlg);
1091 TEST(ALG_ECDSA_VALUE); // ECDSA is used to verify each key
1092
1093 // The iteration counter has no meaning for ECC key generation. The parameter
1094 // will be overloaded for those implementations that have a requirement for
1095 // doing pair-wise consistency checks on signing keys. If the counter parameter
1096 // is 0 or NULL, then no consistency check is done. If it is other than 0, then
1097 // a consistency check is run. This modification allow this code to work with
1098 // the existing versions of the CrytpoEngine and with FIPS-compliant versions
1099 // as well.
1100 *counter = (UINT32)(publicArea->objectAttributes.sign == SET);
1101
1102 // _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc only has one error return (CRYPT_PARAMETER) which means
1103 // that the hash algorithm is not supported. This should not be possible
1104 retVal = _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc(&publicArea->unique.ecc,
1105 &sensitive->sensitive.ecc,
1106 publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1107 hashAlg, &seed->b, "ECC key by vendor",
1108 &name->b, counter);
1109 // This will only be useful if _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc return CRYPT_CANCEL
1110 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
1111 }
10.2.6.10 CryptSignECC()
This function is used for ECC signing operations. If the signing scheme is a split scheme, and the signing
operation is successful, the commit value is retired.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SCHEME unsupported scheme
TPM_RC_VALUE invalid commit status (in case of a split scheme) or failed to generate
r value.
1112 static TPM_RC
1113 CryptSignECC(
1114 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: ECC key to sign the hash
1115 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme, // IN: sign scheme
1116 TPM2B_DIGEST *hashData, // IN: hash to be signed
1117 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // OUT: signature
1118 )
1119 {
1120 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER r;
1121 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *pr = NULL;
1122 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1123
1124 // Run a test of the ECC sign and verify if it has not already been run
1125 TEST_HASH(scheme->details.any.hashAlg);
1126 TEST(scheme->scheme);
1127
1128 if(CryptIsSplitSign(scheme->scheme))
1129 {
1130 // When this code was written, the only split scheme was ECDAA
1131 // (which can also be used for U-Prove).
1132 if(!CryptGenerateR(&r,
1133 &scheme->details.ecdaa.count,
1134 signKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1135 &signKey->name))
1136 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
1137 pr = &r;
1138 }
1139 // Call crypto engine function to sign
1140 // _cpri__SignEcc may return CRYPT_SCHEME
1141 retVal = _cpri__SignEcc(&signature->signature.ecdsa.signatureR,
1142 &signature->signature.ecdsa.signatureS,
1143 scheme->scheme,
1144 scheme->details.any.hashAlg,
1145 signKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1146 &signKey->sensitive.sensitive.ecc,
1147 &hashData->b,
1148 pr
1149 );
1150 if(CryptIsSplitSign(scheme->scheme) && retVal == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1151 CryptEndCommit(scheme->details.ecdaa.count);
1152 // CRYPT_SCHEME->TPM_RC_SCHEME
1153 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
1154 }
10.2.6.11 CryptECCVerifySignature()
This function is used to verify a signature created with an ECC key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIGNATURE if signature is not valid
TPM_RC_SCHEME the signing scheme or hashAlg is not supported
1155 static TPM_RC
1156 CryptECCVerifySignature(
1157 OBJECT *signKey, // IN: ECC key signed the hash
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1158 TPM2B_DIGEST *digestData, // IN: digest being signed
1159 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // IN: signature to be verified
1160 )
1161 {
1162 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1163
1164 TEST_HASH(signature->signature.any.hashAlg);
1165 TEST(signature->sigAlg);
1166
1167 // This implementation uses the fact that all the defined ECC signing
1168 // schemes have the hash as the first parameter.
1169 // _cpriValidateSignatureEcc may return CRYPT_FAIL or CRYP_SCHEME
1170 retVal = _cpri__ValidateSignatureEcc(&signature->signature.ecdsa.signatureR,
1171 &signature->signature.ecdsa.signatureS,
1172 signature->sigAlg,
1173 signature->signature.any.hashAlg,
1174 signKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1175 &signKey->publicArea.unique.ecc,
1176 &digestData->b);
1177 if(retVal == CRYPT_FAIL)
1178 return TPM_RC_SIGNATURE;
1179 // CRYPT_SCHEME->TPM_RC_SCHEME
1180 return TranslateCryptErrors(retVal);
1181 }
10.2.6.12 CryptGenerateR()
This function computes the commit random value for a split signing scheme.
If c is NULL, it indicates that r is being generated for TPM2_Commit(). If c is not NULL, the TPM will
validate that the gr.commitArray bit associated with the input value of c is SET. If not, the TPM returns
FALSE and no r value is generated.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE r value computed
FALSE no r value computed
1182 BOOL
1183 CryptGenerateR(
1184 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *r, // OUT: the generated random value
1185 UINT16 *c, // IN/OUT: count value.
1186 TPMI_ECC_CURVE curveID, // IN: the curve for the value
1187 TPM2B_NAME *name // IN: optional name of a key to
1188 // associate with 'r'
1189 )
1190 {
1191 // This holds the marshaled g_commitCounter.
1192 TPM2B_TYPE(8B, 8);
1193 TPM2B_8B cntr = {8,{0}};
1194
1195 UINT32 iterations;
1196 const TPM2B *n;
1197 UINT64 currentCount = gr.commitCounter;
1198 // This is just to suppress a compiler warning about a conditional expression
1199 // being a constant. This is because of the macro expansion of ryptKDFa
1200 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg = CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG;
1201
1202 n = CryptEccGetParameter('n', curveID);
1203 pAssert(r != NULL && n != NULL);
1204
1205 // If this is the commit phase, use the current value of the commit counter
1206 if(c != NULL)
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1207 {
1208
1209 UINT16 t1;
1210 // if the array bit is not set, can't use the value.
1211 if(!BitIsSet((*c & COMMIT_INDEX_MASK), gr.commitArray,
1212 sizeof(gr.commitArray)))
1213 return FALSE;
1214
1215 // If it is the sign phase, figure out what the counter value was
1216 // when the commitment was made.
1217 //
1218 // When gr.commitArray has less than 64K bits, the extra
1219 // bits of 'c' are used as a check to make sure that the
1220 // signing operation is not using an out of range count value
1221 t1 = (UINT16)currentCount;
1222
1223 // If the lower bits of c are greater or equal to the lower bits of t1
1224 // then the upper bits of t1 must be one more than the upper bits
1225 // of c
1226 if((*c & COMMIT_INDEX_MASK) >= (t1 & COMMIT_INDEX_MASK))
1227 // Since the counter is behind, reduce the current count
1228 currentCount = currentCount - (COMMIT_INDEX_MASK + 1);
1229
1230 t1 = (UINT16)currentCount;
1231 if((t1 & ~COMMIT_INDEX_MASK) != (*c & ~COMMIT_INDEX_MASK))
1232 return FALSE;
1233 // set the counter to the value that was
1234 // present when the commitment was made
1235 currentCount = (currentCount & 0xffffffffffff0000) | *c;
1236
1237 }
1238 // Marshal the count value to a TPM2B buffer for the KDF
1239 cntr.t.size = sizeof(currentCount);
1240 UINT64_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(currentCount, cntr.t.buffer);
1241
1242 // Now can do the KDF to create the random value for the signing operation
1243 // During the creation process, we may generate an r that does not meet the
1244 // requirements of the random value.
1245 // want to generate a new r.
1246
1247 r->t.size = n->size;
1248
1249 // Arbitrary upper limit on the number of times that we can look for
1250 // a suitable random value. The normally number of tries will be 1.
1251 for(iterations = 1; iterations < 1000000;)
1252 {
1253 BYTE *pr = &r->b.buffer[0];
1254 int i;
1255 CryptKDFa(hashAlg, &gr.commitNonce.b, "ECDAA Commit",
1256 name, &cntr.b, n->size * 8, r->t.buffer, &iterations);
1257
1258 // random value must be less than the prime
1259 if(CryptCompare(r->b.size, r->b.buffer, n->size, n->buffer) >= 0)
1260 continue;
1261
1262 // in this implementation it is required that at least bit
1263 // in the upper half of the number be set
1264 for(i = n->size/2; i > 0; i--)
1265 if(*pr++ != 0)
1266 return TRUE;
1267 }
1268 return FALSE;
1269 }
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10.2.6.13 CryptCommit()
This function is called when the count value is committed. The gr.commitArray value associated with the
current count value is SET and g_commitCounter is incremented. The low-order 16 bits of old value of the
counter is returned.
1270 UINT16
1271 CryptCommit(
1272 void
1273 )
1274 {
1275 UINT16 oldCount = (UINT16)gr.commitCounter;
1276 gr.commitCounter++;
1277 BitSet(oldCount & COMMIT_INDEX_MASK, gr.commitArray, sizeof(gr.commitArray));
1278 return oldCount;
1279 }
10.2.6.14 CryptEndCommit()
This function is called when the signing operation using the committed value is completed. It clears the
gr.commitArray bit associated with the count value so that it can't be used again.
1280 void
1281 CryptEndCommit(
1282 UINT16 c // IN: the counter value of the commitment
1283 )
1284 {
1285 BitClear((c & COMMIT_INDEX_MASK), gr.commitArray, sizeof(gr.commitArray));
1286 }
10.2.6.15 CryptCommitCompute()
This function performs the computations for the TPM2_Commit() command. This could be a macro.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_NO_RESULT K, L, or E is the point at infinity
TPM_RC_CANCELLED command was canceled
1287 TPM_RC
1288 CryptCommitCompute(
1289 TPMS_ECC_POINT *K, // OUT: [d]B
1290 TPMS_ECC_POINT *L, // OUT: [r]B
1291 TPMS_ECC_POINT *E, // OUT: [r]M
1292 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID, // IN: The curve for the computation
1293 TPMS_ECC_POINT *M, // IN: M (P1)
1294 TPMS_ECC_POINT *B, // IN: B (x2, y2)
1295 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *d, // IN: the private scalar
1296 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *r // IN: the computed r value
1297 )
1298 {
1299 TEST(ALG_ECDH_VALUE);
1300 // CRYPT_NO_RESULT->TPM_RC_NO_RESULT CRYPT_CANCEL->TPM_RC_CANCELLED
1301 return TranslateCryptErrors(
1302 _cpri__EccCommitCompute(K, L , E, curveID, M, B, d, r));
1303 }
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10.2.6.16 CryptEccGetParameters()
This function returns the ECC parameter details of the given curve
Return Value Meaning
TRUE Get parameters success
FALSE Unsupported ECC curve ID
1304 BOOL
1305 CryptEccGetParameters(
1306 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: ECC curve ID
1307 TPMS_ALGORITHM_DETAIL_ECC *parameters // OUT: ECC parameter
1308 )
1309 {
1310 const ECC_CURVE *curve = _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(curveId);
1311 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *data;
1312 BOOL found = curve != NULL;
1313
1314 if(found)
1315 {
1316
1317 data = curve->curveData;
1318
1319 parameters->curveID = curve->curveId;
1320
1321 // Key size in bit
1322 parameters->keySize = curve->keySizeBits;
1323
1324 // KDF
1325 parameters->kdf = curve->kdf;
1326
1327 // Sign
1328 parameters->sign = curve->sign;
1329
1330 // Copy p value
1331 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->p.b, data->p, sizeof(parameters->p.t.buffer));
1332
1333 // Copy a value
1334 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->a.b, data->a, sizeof(parameters->a.t.buffer));
1335
1336 // Copy b value
1337 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->b.b, data->b, sizeof(parameters->b.t.buffer));
1338
1339 // Copy Gx value
1340 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->gX.b, data->x, sizeof(parameters->gX.t.buffer));
1341
1342 // Copy Gy value
1343 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->gY.b, data->y, sizeof(parameters->gY.t.buffer));
1344
1345 // Copy n value
1346 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->n.b, data->n, sizeof(parameters->n.t.buffer));
1347
1348 // Copy h value
1349 MemoryCopy2B(&parameters->h.b, data->h, sizeof(parameters->h.t.buffer));
1350 }
1351 return found;
1352 }
1353 #if CC_ZGen_2Phase == YES
CryptEcc2PhaseKeyExchange() This is the interface to the key exchange function.
1354 TPM_RC
1355 CryptEcc2PhaseKeyExchange(
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1356 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ1, // OUT: the computed point
1357 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ2, // OUT: optional second point
1358 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the key exchange scheme
1359 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computation
1360 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dsA, // IN: static private TPM key
1361 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *deA, // IN: ephemeral private TPM key
1362 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QsB, // IN: static public party B key
1363 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QeB // IN: ephemeral public party B key
1364 )
1365 {
1366 return (TranslateCryptErrors(_cpri__C_2_2_KeyExchange(outZ1,
1367 outZ2,
1368 scheme,
1369 curveId,
1370 dsA,
1371 deA,
1372 QsB,
1373 QeB)));
1374 }
1375 #endif // CC_ZGen_2Phase
1376 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC //% 3
10.2.6.17 CryptIsSchemeAnonymous()
This function is used to test a scheme to see if it is an anonymous scheme The only anonymous scheme
is ECDAA. ECDAA can be used to do things like U-Prove.
1377 BOOL
1378 CryptIsSchemeAnonymous(
1379 TPM_ALG_ID scheme // IN: the scheme algorithm to test
1380 )
1381 {
1382 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDAA
1383 return (scheme == TPM_ALG_ECDAA);
1384 #else
1385 UNREFERENCED(scheme);
1386 return 0;
1387 #endif
1388 }
10.2.7 Symmetric Functions
10.2.7.1 ParmDecryptSym()
This function performs parameter decryption using symmetric block cipher.
1389 void
1390 ParmDecryptSym(
1391 TPM_ALG_ID symAlg, // IN: the symmetric algorithm
1392 TPM_ALG_ID hash, // IN: hash algorithm for KDFa
1393 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: key key size in bit
1394 TPM2B *key, // IN: KDF HMAC key
1395 TPM2B *nonceCaller, // IN: nonce caller
1396 TPM2B *nonceTpm, // IN: nonce TPM
1397 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: size of parameter buffer
1398 BYTE *data // OUT: buffer to be decrypted
1399 )
1400 {
1401 // KDF output buffer
1402 // It contains parameters for the CFB encryption
1403 // From MSB to LSB, they are the key and iv
1404 BYTE symParmString[MAX_SYM_KEY_BYTES + MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE];
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1405 // Symmetric key size in byte
1406 UINT16 keySize = (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8;
1407 TPM2B_IV iv;
1408
1409 iv.t.size = CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keySizeInBits);
1410 // If there is decryption to do...
1411 if(iv.t.size > 0)
1412 {
1413 // Generate key and iv
1414 CryptKDFa(hash, key, "CFB", nonceCaller, nonceTpm,
1415 keySizeInBits + (iv.t.size * 8), symParmString, NULL);
1416 MemoryCopy(iv.t.buffer, &symParmString[keySize], iv.t.size,
1417 sizeof(iv.t.buffer));
1418
1419 CryptSymmetricDecrypt(data, symAlg, keySizeInBits, TPM_ALG_CFB,
1420 symParmString, &iv, dataSize, data);
1421 }
1422 return;
1423 }
10.2.7.2 ParmEncryptSym()
This function performs parameter encryption using symmetric block cipher.
1424 void
1425 ParmEncryptSym(
1426 TPM_ALG_ID symAlg, // IN: symmetric algorithm
1427 TPM_ALG_ID hash, // IN: hash algorithm for KDFa
1428 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: AES key size in bit
1429 TPM2B *key, // IN: KDF HMAC key
1430 TPM2B *nonceCaller, // IN: nonce caller
1431 TPM2B *nonceTpm, // IN: nonce TPM
1432 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: size of parameter buffer
1433 BYTE *data // OUT: buffer to be encrypted
1434 )
1435 {
1436 // KDF output buffer
1437 // It contains parameters for the CFB encryption
1438 BYTE symParmString[MAX_SYM_KEY_BYTES + MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE];
1439
1440 // Symmetric key size in bytes
1441 UINT16 keySize = (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8;
1442
1443 TPM2B_IV iv;
1444
1445 iv.t.size = CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symAlg, keySizeInBits);
1446 // See if there is any encryption to do
1447 if(iv.t.size > 0)
1448 {
1449 // Generate key and iv
1450 CryptKDFa(hash, key, "CFB", nonceTpm, nonceCaller,
1451 keySizeInBits + (iv.t.size * 8), symParmString, NULL);
1452
1453 MemoryCopy(iv.t.buffer, &symParmString[keySize], iv.t.size,
1454 sizeof(iv.t.buffer));
1455
1456 CryptSymmetricEncrypt(data, symAlg, keySizeInBits, TPM_ALG_CFB,
1457 symParmString, &iv, dataSize, data);
1458 }
1459 return;
1460 }
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10.2.7.3 CryptGenerateNewSymmetric()
This function creates the sensitive symmetric values for an HMAC or symmetric key. If the sensitive area
is zero, then the sensitive creation key data is copied. If it is not zero, then the TPM will generate a
random value of the selected size.
1461 void
1462 CryptGenerateNewSymmetric(
1463 TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitiveCreate, // IN: sensitive creation data
1464 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // OUT: sensitive area
1465 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for the KDF
1466 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: seed used in creation
1467 TPM2B_NAME *name // IN: name of the object
1468 )
1469 {
1470 // This function is called to create a key and obfuscation value for a
1471 // symmetric key that can either be a block cipher or an XOR key. The buffer
1472 // in sensitive->sensitive will hold either. When we call the function
1473 // to copy the input value or generated value to the sensitive->sensitive
1474 // buffer we will need to have a size for the output buffer. This define
1475 // computes the maximum that it might need to be and uses that. It will always
1476 // be smaller than the largest value that will fit.
1477 #define MAX_SENSITIVE_SIZE \
1478 (MAX(sizeof(sensitive->sensitive.bits.t.buffer), \
1479 sizeof(sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.buffer)))
1480
1481 // set the size of the obfuscation value
1482 sensitive->seedValue.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hashAlg);
1483
1484 // If the input sensitive size is zero, then create both the sensitive data
1485 // and the obfuscation value
1486 if(sensitiveCreate->data.t.size == 0)
1487 {
1488 BYTE symValues[MAX(MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, MAX_SYM_KEY_BYTES)
1489 + MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
1490 UINT16 requestSize;
1491
1492 // Set the size of the request to be the size of the key and the
1493 // obfuscation value
1494 requestSize = sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size
1495 + sensitive->seedValue.t.size;
1496 pAssert(requestSize <= sizeof(symValues));
1497
1498 requestSize = _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom(requestSize, symValues, hashAlg,
1499 &seed->b,
1500 "symmetric sensitive", &name->b,
1501 NULL);
1502 pAssert(requestSize != 0);
1503
1504 // Copy the new key
1505 MemoryCopy(sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.buffer,
1506 symValues, sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size,
1507 MAX_SENSITIVE_SIZE);
1508
1509 // copy the obfuscation value
1510 MemoryCopy(sensitive->seedValue.t.buffer,
1511 &symValues[sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size],
1512 sensitive->seedValue.t.size,
1513 sizeof(sensitive->seedValue.t.buffer));
1514 }
1515 else
1516 {
1517 // Copy input symmetric key to sensitive area as long as it will fit
1518 MemoryCopy2B(&sensitive->sensitive.sym.b, &sensitiveCreate->data.b,
1519 MAX_SENSITIVE_SIZE);
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1520
1521 // Create the obfuscation value
1522 _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom(sensitive->seedValue.t.size,
1523 sensitive->seedValue.t.buffer,
1524 hashAlg, &seed->b,
1525 "symmetric obfuscation", &name->b, NULL);
1526 }
1527 return;
1528 }
10.2.7.4 CryptGenerateKeySymmetric()
This function derives a symmetric cipher key from the provided seed.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE key size in the public area does not match the size in the sensitive
creation area
1529 static TPM_RC
1530 CryptGenerateKeySymmetric(
1531 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: The public area template
1532 // for the new key.
1533 TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitiveCreate, // IN: sensitive creation data
1534 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // OUT: sensitive area
1535 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for the KDF
1536 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: seed used in creation
1537 TPM2B_NAME *name // IN: name of the object
1538 )
1539 {
1540 // If this is not a new key, then the provided key data must be the right size
1541 if(publicArea->objectAttributes.sensitiveDataOrigin == CLEAR)
1542 {
1543 if( (sensitiveCreate->data.t.size * 8)
1544 != publicArea->parameters.symDetail.sym.keyBits.sym)
1545 return TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE;
1546 // Make sure that the key size is OK.
1547 // This implementation only supports symmetric key sizes that are
1548 // multiples of 8
1549 if(publicArea->parameters.symDetail.sym.keyBits.sym % 8 != 0)
1550 return TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE;
1551 }
1552 else
1553 {
1554 // TPM is going to generate the key so set the size
1555 sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size
1556 = publicArea->parameters.symDetail.sym.keyBits.sym / 8;
1557 sensitiveCreate->data.t.size = 0;
1558 }
1559 // Fill in the sensitive area
1560 CryptGenerateNewSymmetric(sensitiveCreate, sensitive, hashAlg,
1561 seed, name);
1562
1563 // Create unique area in public
1564 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique(publicArea->nameAlg,
1565 sensitive, &publicArea->unique.sym);
1566
1567 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1568 }
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10.2.7.5 CryptXORObfuscation()
This function implements XOR obfuscation. It should not be called if the hash algorithm is not
implemented. The only return value from this function is TPM_RC_SUCCESS.
1569 #ifdef TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH //% 5
1570 void
1571 CryptXORObfuscation(
1572 TPM_ALG_ID hash, // IN: hash algorithm for KDF
1573 TPM2B *key, // IN: KDF key
1574 TPM2B *contextU, // IN: contextU
1575 TPM2B *contextV, // IN: contextV
1576 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: size of data buffer
1577 BYTE *data // IN/OUT: data to be XORed in place
1578 )
1579 {
1580 BYTE mask[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; // Allocate a digest sized buffer
1581 BYTE *pm;
1582 UINT32 i;
1583 UINT32 counter = 0;
1584 UINT16 hLen = CryptGetHashDigestSize(hash);
1585 UINT32 requestSize = dataSize * 8;
1586 INT32 remainBytes = (INT32) dataSize;
1587
1588 pAssert((key != NULL) && (data != NULL) && (hLen != 0));
1589
1590 // Call KDFa to generate XOR mask
1591 for(; remainBytes > 0; remainBytes -= hLen)
1592 {
1593 // Make a call to KDFa to get next iteration
1594 CryptKDFaOnce(hash, key, "XOR", contextU, contextV,
1595 requestSize, mask, &counter);
1596
1597 // XOR next piece of the data
1598 pm = mask;
1599 for(i = hLen < remainBytes ? hLen : remainBytes; i > 0; i--)
1600 *data++ ^= *pm++;
1601 }
1602 return;
1603 }
1604 #endif //TPM_ALG_KEYED_HASH //%5
10.2.8 Initialization and shut down
10.2.8.1 CryptInitUnits()
This function is called when the TPM receives a _TPM_Init() indication. After function returns, the hash
algorithms should be available.
NOTE: The hash algorithms do not have to be tested, they just need to be available. They have to be tested before the
TPM can accept HMAC authorization or return any result that relies on a hash algorithm.
1605 void
1606 CryptInitUnits(
1607 void
1608 )
1609 {
1610 // Initialize the vector of implemented algorithms
1611 AlgorithmGetImplementedVector(&g_implementedAlgorithms);
1612
1613 // Indicate that all test are necessary
1614 CryptInitializeToTest();
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1615
1616 // Call crypto engine unit initialization
1617 // It is assumed that crypt engine initialization should always succeed.
1618 // Otherwise, TPM should go to failure mode.
1619 if(_cpri__InitCryptoUnits(&TpmFail) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1620 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1621 return;
1622 }
10.2.8.2 CryptStopUnits()
This function is only used in a simulated environment. There should be no reason to shut down the
cryptography on an actual TPM other than loss of power. After receiving TPM2_Startup(), the TPM should
be able to accept commands until it loses power and, unless the TPM is in Failure Mode, the
cryptographic algorithms should be available.
1623 void
1624 CryptStopUnits(
1625 void
1626 )
1627 {
1628 // Call crypto engine unit stopping
1629 _cpri__StopCryptoUnits();
1630
1631 return;
1632 }
10.2.8.3 CryptUtilStartup()
This function is called by TPM2_Startup() to initialize the functions in this crypto library and in the
provided CryptoEngine(). In this implementation, the only initialization required in this library is
initialization of the Commit nonce on TPM Reset.
This function returns false if some problem prevents the functions from starting correctly. The TPM should
go into failure mode.
1633 BOOL
1634 CryptUtilStartup(
1635 STARTUP_TYPE type // IN: the startup type
1636 )
1637 {
1638 // Make sure that the crypto library functions are ready.
1639 // NOTE: need to initialize the crypto before loading
1640 // the RND state may trigger a self-test which
1641 // uses the
1642 if( !_cpri__Startup())
1643 return FALSE;
1644
1645 // Initialize the state of the RNG.
1646 CryptDrbgGetPutState(PUT_STATE);
1647
1648 if(type == SU_RESET)
1649 {
1650 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
1651 // Get a new random commit nonce
1652 gr.commitNonce.t.size = sizeof(gr.commitNonce.t.buffer);
1653 _cpri__GenerateRandom(gr.commitNonce.t.size, gr.commitNonce.t.buffer);
1654 // Reset the counter and commit array
1655 gr.commitCounter = 0;
1656 MemorySet(gr.commitArray, 0, sizeof(gr.commitArray));
1657 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
1658 }
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1659
1660 // If the shutdown was orderly, then the values recovered from NV will
1661 // be OK to use. If the shutdown was not orderly, then a TPM Reset was required
1662 // and we would have initialized in the code above.
1663
1664 return TRUE;
1665 }
10.2.9 Algorithm-Independent Functions
10.2.9.1 Introduction
These functions are used generically when a function of a general type (e.g., symmetric encryption) is
required. The functions will modify the parameters as required to interface to the indicated algorithms.
10.2.9.2 CryptIsAsymAlgorithm()
This function indicates if an algorithm is an asymmetric algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if it is an asymmetric algorithm
FALSE if it is not an asymmetric algorithm
1666 BOOL
1667 CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(
1668 TPM_ALG_ID algID // IN: algorithm ID
1669 )
1670 {
1671 return (
1672 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
1673 algID == TPM_ALG_RSA
1674 #endif
1675 #if defined TPM_ALG_RSA && defined TPM_ALG_ECC
1676 ||
1677 #endif
1678 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
1679 algID == TPM_ALG_ECC
1680 #endif
1681 );
1682 }
10.2.9.3 CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize()
This function returns the size in octets of the symmetric encryption block used by an algorithm and key
size combination.
1683 INT16
1684 CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(
1685 TPMI_ALG_SYM algorithm, // IN: symmetric algorithm
1686 UINT16 keySize // IN: key size in bit
1687 )
1688 {
1689 return _cpri__GetSymmetricBlockSize(algorithm, keySize);
1690 }
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10.2.9.4 CryptSymmetricEncrypt()
This function does in-place encryption of a buffer using the indicated symmetric algorithm, key, IV, and
mode. If the symmetric algorithm and mode are not defined, the TPM will fail.
1691 void
1692 CryptSymmetricEncrypt(
1693 BYTE *encrypted, // OUT: the encrypted data
1694 TPM_ALG_ID algorithm, // IN: algorithm for encryption
1695 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
1696 TPMI_ALG_SYM_MODE mode, // IN: symmetric encryption mode
1697 BYTE *key, // IN: encryption key
1698 TPM2B_IV *ivIn, // IN/OUT: Input IV and output chaining
1699 // value for the next block
1700 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: data size in byte
1701 BYTE *data // IN/OUT: data buffer
1702 )
1703 {
1704
1705 TPM2B_IV defaultIv = {0};
1706 TPM2B_IV *iv = (ivIn != NULL) ? ivIn : &defaultIv;
1707
1708 TEST(algorithm);
1709
1710 pAssert(encrypted != NULL && key != NULL);
1711
1712 // this check can pass but the case below can fail. ALG_xx_VALUE values are
1713 // defined for all algorithms but the TPM_ALG_xx might not be.
1714 if(algorithm == ALG_AES_VALUE || algorithm == ALG_SM4_VALUE)
1715 {
1716 if(mode != TPM_ALG_ECB)
1717 defaultIv.t.size = 16;
1718 // A provided IV has to be the right size
1719 pAssert(mode == TPM_ALG_ECB || iv->t.size == 16);
1720 }
1721 switch(algorithm)
1722 {
1723 #ifdef TPM_ALG_AES
1724 case TPM_ALG_AES:
1725 {
1726 switch (mode)
1727 {
1728 case TPM_ALG_CTR:
1729 _cpri__AESEncryptCTR(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1730 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1731 break;
1732 case TPM_ALG_OFB:
1733 _cpri__AESEncryptOFB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1734 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1735 break;
1736 case TPM_ALG_CBC:
1737 _cpri__AESEncryptCBC(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1738 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1739 break;
1740 case TPM_ALG_CFB:
1741 _cpri__AESEncryptCFB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1742 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1743 break;
1744 case TPM_ALG_ECB:
1745 _cpri__AESEncryptECB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1746 dataSize, data);
1747 break;
1748 default:
1749 pAssert(0);
1750 }
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1751 }
1752 break;
1753 #endif
1754 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4
1755 case TPM_ALG_SM4:
1756 {
1757 switch (mode)
1758 {
1759 case TPM_ALG_CTR:
1760 _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1761 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1762 break;
1763 case TPM_ALG_OFB:
1764 _cpri__SM4EncryptOFB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1765 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1766 break;
1767 case TPM_ALG_CBC:
1768 _cpri__SM4EncryptCBC(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1769 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1770 break;
1771
1772 case TPM_ALG_CFB:
1773 _cpri__SM4EncryptCFB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1774 iv->t.buffer, dataSize, data);
1775 break;
1776 case TPM_ALG_ECB:
1777 _cpri__SM4EncryptECB(encrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1778 dataSize, data);
1779 break;
1780 default:
1781 pAssert(0);
1782 }
1783 }
1784 break;
1785
1786 #endif
1787 default:
1788 pAssert(FALSE);
1789 break;
1790 }
1791
1792 return;
1793
1794 }
10.2.9.5 CryptSymmetricDecrypt()
This function does in-place decryption of a buffer using the indicated symmetric algorithm, key, IV, and
mode. If the symmetric algorithm and mode are not defined, the TPM will fail.
1795 void
1796 CryptSymmetricDecrypt(
1797 BYTE *decrypted,
1798 TPM_ALG_ID algorithm, // IN: algorithm for encryption
1799 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
1800 TPMI_ALG_SYM_MODE mode, // IN: symmetric encryption mode
1801 BYTE *key, // IN: encryption key
1802 TPM2B_IV *ivIn, // IN/OUT: IV for next block
1803 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: data size in byte
1804 BYTE *data // IN/OUT: data buffer
1805 )
1806 {
1807 BYTE *iv = NULL;
1808 BYTE defaultIV[sizeof(TPMT_HA)];
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1809
1810 TEST(algorithm);
1811
1812 if(
1813 #ifdef TPM_ALG_AES
1814 algorithm == TPM_ALG_AES
1815 #endif
1816 #if defined TPM_ALG_AES && defined TPM_ALG_SM4
1817 ||
1818 #endif
1819 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4
1820 algorithm == TPM_ALG_SM4
1821 #endif
1822 )
1823 {
1824 // Both SM4 and AES have block size of 128 bits
1825 // If the iv is not provided, create a default of 0
1826 if(ivIn == NULL)
1827 {
1828 // Initialize the default IV
1829 iv = defaultIV;
1830 MemorySet(defaultIV, 0, 16);
1831 }
1832 else
1833 {
1834 // A provided IV has to be the right size
1835 pAssert(mode == TPM_ALG_ECB || ivIn->t.size == 16);
1836 iv = &(ivIn->t.buffer[0]);
1837 }
1838 }
1839
1840 switch(algorithm)
1841 {
1842 #ifdef TPM_ALG_AES
1843 case TPM_ALG_AES:
1844 {
1845
1846 switch (mode)
1847 {
1848 case TPM_ALG_CTR:
1849 _cpri__AESDecryptCTR(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1850 dataSize, data);
1851 break;
1852 case TPM_ALG_OFB:
1853 _cpri__AESDecryptOFB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1854 dataSize, data);
1855 break;
1856 case TPM_ALG_CBC:
1857 _cpri__AESDecryptCBC(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1858 dataSize, data);
1859 break;
1860 case TPM_ALG_CFB:
1861 _cpri__AESDecryptCFB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1862 dataSize, data);
1863 break;
1864 case TPM_ALG_ECB:
1865 _cpri__AESDecryptECB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1866 dataSize, data);
1867 break;
1868 default:
1869 pAssert(0);
1870 }
1871 break;
1872 }
1873 #endif //TPM_ALG_AES
1874 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4
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1875 case TPM_ALG_SM4 :
1876 switch (mode)
1877 {
1878 case TPM_ALG_CTR:
1879 _cpri__SM4DecryptCTR(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1880 dataSize, data);
1881 break;
1882 case TPM_ALG_OFB:
1883 _cpri__SM4DecryptOFB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1884 dataSize, data);
1885 break;
1886 case TPM_ALG_CBC:
1887 _cpri__SM4DecryptCBC(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1888 dataSize, data);
1889 break;
1890 case TPM_ALG_CFB:
1891 _cpri__SM4DecryptCFB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key, iv,
1892 dataSize, data);
1893 break;
1894 case TPM_ALG_ECB:
1895 _cpri__SM4DecryptECB(decrypted, keySizeInBits, key,
1896 dataSize, data);
1897 break;
1898 default:
1899 pAssert(0);
1900 }
1901 break;
1902 #endif //TPM_ALG_SM4
1903
1904 default:
1905 pAssert(FALSE);
1906 break;
1907 }
1908 return;
1909 }
10.2.9.6 CryptSecretEncrypt()
This function creates a secret value and its associated secret structure using an asymmetric algorithm.
This function is used by TPM2_Rewrap() TPM2_MakeCredential(), and TPM2_Duplicate().
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES keyHandle does not reference a valid decryption key
TPM_RC_KEY invalid ECC key (public point is not on the curve)
TPM_RC_SCHEME RSA key with an unsupported padding scheme
TPM_RC_VALUE numeric value of the data to be decrypted is greater than the RSA
key modulus
1910 TPM_RC
1911 CryptSecretEncrypt(
1912 TPMI_DH_OBJECT keyHandle, // IN: encryption key handle
1913 const char *label, // IN: a null-terminated string as L
1914 TPM2B_DATA *data, // OUT: secret value
1915 TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *secret // OUT: secret structure
1916 )
1917 {
1918 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
1919 OBJECT *encryptKey = ObjectGet(keyHandle); // TPM key used for encrypt
1920
1921 pAssert(data != NULL && secret != NULL);
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1922
1923 // The output secret value has the size of the digest produced by the nameAlg.
1924 data->t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(encryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg);
1925
1926 pAssert(encryptKey->publicArea.objectAttributes.decrypt == SET);
1927
1928 switch(encryptKey->publicArea.type)
1929 {
1930 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
1931 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
1932 {
1933 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT scheme;
1934
1935 // Use OAEP scheme
1936 scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_OAEP;
1937 scheme.details.oaep.hashAlg = encryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg;
1938
1939 // Create secret data from RNG
1940 CryptGenerateRandom(data->t.size, data->t.buffer);
1941
1942 // Encrypt the data by RSA OAEP into encrypted secret
1943 result = CryptEncryptRSA(&secret->t.size, secret->t.secret,
1944 encryptKey, &scheme,
1945 data->t.size, data->t.buffer, label);
1946 }
1947 break;
1948 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
1949
1950 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
1951 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
1952 {
1953 TPMS_ECC_POINT eccPublic;
1954 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER eccPrivate;
1955 TPMS_ECC_POINT eccSecret;
1956 BYTE *buffer = secret->t.secret;
1957
1958 // Need to make sure that the public point of the key is on the
1959 // curve defined by the key.
1960 if(!_cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve(
1961 encryptKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1962 &encryptKey->publicArea.unique.ecc))
1963 result = TPM_RC_KEY;
1964 else
1965 {
1966
1967 // Call crypto engine to create an auxiliary ECC key
1968 // We assume crypt engine initialization should always success.
1969 // Otherwise, TPM should go to failure mode.
1970 CryptNewEccKey(encryptKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1971 &eccPublic, &eccPrivate);
1972
1973 // Marshal ECC public to secret structure. This will be used by the
1974 // recipient to decrypt the secret with their private key.
1975 secret->t.size = TPMS_ECC_POINT_Marshal(&eccPublic, &buffer, NULL);
1976
1977 // Compute ECDH shared secret which is R = [d]Q where d is the
1978 // private part of the ephemeral key and Q is the public part of a
1979 // TPM key. TPM_RC_KEY error return from CryptComputeECDHSecret
1980 // because the auxiliary ECC key is just created according to the
1981 // parameters of input ECC encrypt key.
1982 if( CryptEccPointMultiply(&eccSecret,
1983 encryptKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
1984 &eccPrivate,
1985 &encryptKey->publicArea.unique.ecc)
1986 != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1987 result = TPM_RC_KEY;
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1988 else
1989
1990 // The secret value is computed from Z using KDFe as:
1991 // secret := KDFe(HashID, Z, Use, PartyUInfo, PartyVInfo, bits)
1992 // Where:
1993 // HashID the nameAlg of the decrypt key
1994 // Z the x coordinate (Px) of the product (P) of the point
1995 // (Q) of the secret and the private x coordinate (de,V)
1996 // of the decryption key
1997 // Use a null-terminated string containing "SECRET"
1998 // PartyUInfo the x coordinate of the point in the secret
1999 // (Qe,U )
2000 // PartyVInfo the x coordinate of the public key (Qs,V )
2001 // bits the number of bits in the digest of HashID
2002 // Retrieve seed from KDFe
2003
2004 CryptKDFe(encryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg, &eccSecret.x.b,
2005 label, &eccPublic.x.b,
2006 &encryptKey->publicArea.unique.ecc.x.b,
2007 data->t.size * 8, data->t.buffer);
2008 }
2009 }
2010 break;
2011 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2012
2013 default:
2014 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
2015 break;
2016 }
2017
2018 return result;
2019 }
10.2.9.7 CryptSecretDecrypt()
Decrypt a secret value by asymmetric (or symmetric) algorithm This function is used for
ActivateCredential() and Import for asymmetric decryption, and StartAuthSession() for both asymmetric
and symmetric decryption process
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_ATTRIBUTES RSA key is not a decryption key
TPM_RC_BINDING Invalid RSA key (public and private parts are not cryptographically
bound.
TPM_RC_ECC_POINT ECC point in the secret is not on the curve
TPM_RC_INSUFFICIENT failed to retrieve ECC point from the secret
TPM_RC_NO_RESULT multiplication resulted in ECC point at infinity
TPM_RC_SIZE data to decrypt is not of the same size as RSA key
TPM_RC_VALUE For RSA key, numeric value of the encrypted data is greater than the
modulus, or the recovered data is larger than the output buffer. For
keyedHash or symmetric key, the secret is larger than the size of the
digest produced by the name algorithm.
TPM_RC_FAILURE internal error
2020 TPM_RC
2021 CryptSecretDecrypt(
2022 TPM_HANDLE tpmKey, // IN: decrypt key
2023 TPM2B_NONCE *nonceCaller, // IN: nonceCaller. It is needed for
2024 // symmetric decryption. For
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2025 // asymmetric decryption, this
2026 // parameter is NULL
2027 const char *label, // IN: a null-terminated string as L
2028 TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *secret, // IN: input secret
2029 TPM2B_DATA *data // OUT: decrypted secret value
2030 )
2031 {
2032 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2033 OBJECT *decryptKey = ObjectGet(tpmKey); //TPM key used for decrypting
2034
2035 // Decryption for secret
2036 switch(decryptKey->publicArea.type)
2037 {
2038
2039 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2040 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2041 {
2042 TPMT_RSA_DECRYPT scheme;
2043
2044 // Use OAEP scheme
2045 scheme.scheme = TPM_ALG_OAEP;
2046 scheme.details.oaep.hashAlg = decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg;
2047
2048 // Set the output buffer capacity
2049 data->t.size = sizeof(data->t.buffer);
2050
2051 // Decrypt seed by RSA OAEP
2052 result = CryptDecryptRSA(&data->t.size, data->t.buffer, decryptKey,
2053 &scheme,
2054 secret->t.size, secret->t.secret,label);
2055 if( (result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
2056 && (data->t.size
2057 > CryptGetHashDigestSize(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg)))
2058 result = TPM_RC_VALUE;
2059 }
2060 break;
2061 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2062
2063 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2064 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2065 {
2066 TPMS_ECC_POINT eccPublic;
2067 TPMS_ECC_POINT eccSecret;
2068 BYTE *buffer = secret->t.secret;
2069 INT32 size = secret->t.size;
2070
2071 // Retrieve ECC point from secret buffer
2072 result = TPMS_ECC_POINT_Unmarshal(&eccPublic, &buffer, &size);
2073 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
2074 {
2075 result = CryptEccPointMultiply(&eccSecret,
2076 decryptKey->publicArea.parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
2077 &decryptKey->sensitive.sensitive.ecc,
2078 &eccPublic);
2079
2080 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
2081 {
2082
2083 // Set the size of the "recovered" secret value to be the size
2084 // of the digest produced by the nameAlg.
2085 data->t.size =
2086 CryptGetHashDigestSize(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg);
2087
2088 // The secret value is computed from Z using KDFe as:
2089 // secret := KDFe(HashID, Z, Use, PartyUInfo, PartyVInfo, bits)
2090 // Where:
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2091 // HashID -- the nameAlg of the decrypt key
2092 // Z -- the x coordinate (Px) of the product (P) of the point
2093 // (Q) of the secret and the private x coordinate (de,V)
2094 // of the decryption key
2095 // Use -- a null-terminated string containing "SECRET"
2096 // PartyUInfo -- the x coordinate of the point in the secret
2097 // (Qe,U )
2098 // PartyVInfo -- the x coordinate of the public key (Qs,V )
2099 // bits -- the number of bits in the digest of HashID
2100 // Retrieve seed from KDFe
2101 CryptKDFe(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg, &eccSecret.x.b, label,
2102 &eccPublic.x.b,
2103 &decryptKey->publicArea.unique.ecc.x.b,
2104 data->t.size * 8, data->t.buffer);
2105 }
2106 }
2107 }
2108 break;
2109 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2110
2111 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
2112 // The seed size can not be bigger than the digest size of nameAlg
2113 if(secret->t.size >
2114 CryptGetHashDigestSize(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg))
2115 result = TPM_RC_VALUE;
2116 else
2117 {
2118 // Retrieve seed by XOR Obfuscation:
2119 // seed = XOR(secret, hash, key, nonceCaller, nullNonce)
2120 // where:
2121 // secret the secret parameter from the TPM2_StartAuthHMAC
2122 // command
2123 // which contains the seed value
2124 // hash nameAlg of tpmKey
2125 // key the key or data value in the object referenced by
2126 // entityHandle in the TPM2_StartAuthHMAC command
2127 // nonceCaller the parameter from the TPM2_StartAuthHMAC command
2128 // nullNonce a zero-length nonce
2129 // XOR Obfuscation in place
2130 CryptXORObfuscation(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg,
2131 &decryptKey->sensitive.sensitive.bits.b,
2132 &nonceCaller->b, NULL,
2133 secret->t.size, secret->t.secret);
2134 // Copy decrypted seed
2135 MemoryCopy2B(&data->b, &secret->b, sizeof(data->t.buffer));
2136 }
2137 break;
2138 case TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER:
2139 {
2140 TPM2B_IV iv = {0};
2141 TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *symDef;
2142 // The seed size can not be bigger than the digest size of nameAlg
2143 if(secret->t.size >
2144 CryptGetHashDigestSize(decryptKey->publicArea.nameAlg))
2145 result = TPM_RC_VALUE;
2146 else
2147 {
2148 symDef = &decryptKey->publicArea.parameters.symDetail.sym;
2149 iv.t.size = CryptGetSymmetricBlockSize(symDef->algorithm,
2150 symDef->keyBits.sym);
2151 pAssert(iv.t.size != 0);
2152 if(nonceCaller->t.size >= iv.t.size)
2153 MemoryCopy(iv.t.buffer, nonceCaller->t.buffer, iv.t.size,
2154 sizeof(iv.t.buffer));
2155 else
2156 MemoryCopy(iv.b.buffer, nonceCaller->t.buffer,
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2157 nonceCaller->t.size, sizeof(iv.t.buffer));
2158 // CFB decrypt in place, using nonceCaller as iv
2159 CryptSymmetricDecrypt(secret->t.secret, symDef->algorithm,
2160 symDef->keyBits.sym, TPM_ALG_CFB,
2161 decryptKey->sensitive.sensitive.sym.t.buffer,
2162 &iv, secret->t.size, secret->t.secret);
2163
2164 // Copy decrypted seed
2165 MemoryCopy2B(&data->b, &secret->b, sizeof(data->t.buffer));
2166 }
2167 }
2168 break;
2169 default:
2170 pAssert(0);
2171 break;
2172 }
2173 return result;
2174 }
10.2.9.8 CryptParameterEncryption()
This function does in-place encryption of a response parameter.
2175 void
2176 CryptParameterEncryption(
2177 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: encrypt session handle
2178 TPM2B *nonceCaller, // IN: nonce caller
2179 UINT16 leadingSizeInByte, // IN: the size of the leading size field in
2180 // byte
2181 TPM2B_AUTH *extraKey, // IN: additional key material other than
2182 // session auth
2183 BYTE *buffer // IN/OUT: parameter buffer to be encrypted
2184 )
2185 {
2186 SESSION *session = SessionGet(handle); // encrypt session
2187 TPM2B_TYPE(SYM_KEY, ( sizeof(extraKey->t.buffer)
2188 + sizeof(session->sessionKey.t.buffer)));
2189 TPM2B_SYM_KEY key; // encryption key
2190 UINT32 cipherSize = 0; // size of cipher text
2191
2192 pAssert(session->sessionKey.t.size + extraKey->t.size <= sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2193
2194 // Retrieve encrypted data size.
2195 if(leadingSizeInByte == 2)
2196 {
2197 // Extract the first two bytes as the size field as the data size
2198 // encrypt
2199 cipherSize = (UINT32)BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(buffer);
2200 // advance the buffer
2201 buffer = &buffer[2];
2202 }
2203 #ifdef TPM4B
2204 else if(leadingSizeInByte == 4)
2205 {
2206 // use the first four bytes to indicate the number of bytes to encrypt
2207 cipherSize = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(buffer);
2208 //advance pointer
2209 buffer = &buffer[4];
2210 }
2211 #endif
2212 else
2213 {
2214 pAssert(FALSE);
2215 }
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2216
2217 // Compute encryption key by concatenating sessionAuth with extra key
2218 MemoryCopy2B(&key.b, &session->sessionKey.b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2219 MemoryConcat2B(&key.b, &extraKey->b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2220
2221 if (session->symmetric.algorithm == TPM_ALG_XOR)
2222
2223 // XOR parameter encryption formulation:
2224 // XOR(parameter, hash, sessionAuth, nonceNewer, nonceOlder)
2225 CryptXORObfuscation(session->authHashAlg, &(key.b),
2226 &(session->nonceTPM.b),
2227 nonceCaller, cipherSize, buffer);
2228 else
2229 ParmEncryptSym(session->symmetric.algorithm, session->authHashAlg,
2230 session->symmetric.keyBits.aes, &(key.b),
2231 nonceCaller, &(session->nonceTPM.b),
2232 cipherSize, buffer);
2233 return;
2234 }
10.2.9.9 CryptParameterDecryption()
This function does in-place decryption of a command parameter.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIZE The number of bytes in the input buffer is less than the number of
bytes to be decrypted.
2235 TPM_RC
2236 CryptParameterDecryption(
2237 TPM_HANDLE handle, // IN: encrypted session handle
2238 TPM2B *nonceCaller, // IN: nonce caller
2239 UINT32 bufferSize, // IN: size of parameter buffer
2240 UINT16 leadingSizeInByte, // IN: the size of the leading size field in
2241 // byte
2242 TPM2B_AUTH *extraKey, // IN: the authValue
2243 BYTE *buffer // IN/OUT: parameter buffer to be decrypted
2244 )
2245 {
2246 SESSION *session = SessionGet(handle); // encrypt session
2247 // The HMAC key is going to be the concatenation of the session key and any
2248 // additional key material (like the authValue). The size of both of these
2249 // is the size of the buffer which can contain a TPMT_HA.
2250 TPM2B_TYPE(HMAC_KEY, ( sizeof(extraKey->t.buffer)
2251 + sizeof(session->sessionKey.t.buffer)));
2252 TPM2B_HMAC_KEY key; // decryption key
2253 UINT32 cipherSize = 0; // size of cipher text
2254
2255 pAssert(session->sessionKey.t.size + extraKey->t.size <= sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2256
2257 // Retrieve encrypted data size.
2258 if(leadingSizeInByte == 2)
2259 {
2260 // The first two bytes of the buffer are the size of the
2261 // data to be decrypted
2262 cipherSize = (UINT32)BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(buffer);
2263 buffer = &buffer[2]; // advance the buffer
2264 }
2265 #ifdef TPM4B
2266 else if(leadingSizeInByte == 4)
2267 {
2268 // the leading size is four bytes so get the four byte size field
2269 cipherSize = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT32(buffer);
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2270 buffer = &buffer[4]; //advance pointer
2271 }
2272 #endif
2273 else
2274 {
2275 pAssert(FALSE);
2276 }
2277 if(cipherSize > bufferSize)
2278 return TPM_RC_SIZE;
2279
2280 // Compute decryption key by concatenating sessionAuth with extra input key
2281 MemoryCopy2B(&key.b, &session->sessionKey.b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2282 MemoryConcat2B(&key.b, &extraKey->b, sizeof(key.t.buffer));
2283
2284 if(session->symmetric.algorithm == TPM_ALG_XOR)
2285 // XOR parameter decryption formulation:
2286 // XOR(parameter, hash, sessionAuth, nonceNewer, nonceOlder)
2287 // Call XOR obfuscation function
2288 CryptXORObfuscation(session->authHashAlg, &key.b, nonceCaller,
2289 &(session->nonceTPM.b), cipherSize, buffer);
2290 else
2291 // Assume that it is one of the symmetric block ciphers.
2292 ParmDecryptSym(session->symmetric.algorithm, session->authHashAlg,
2293 session->symmetric.keyBits.sym,
2294 &key.b, nonceCaller, &session->nonceTPM.b,
2295 cipherSize, buffer);
2296
2297 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2298
2299 }
10.2.9.10 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique()
This function computes the unique field in public area for symmetric objects.
2300 void
2301 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique(
2302 TPMI_ALG_HASH nameAlg, // IN: object name algorithm
2303 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive area
2304 TPM2B_DIGEST *unique // OUT: unique buffer
2305 )
2306 {
2307 HASH_STATE hashState;
2308
2309 pAssert(sensitive != NULL && unique != NULL);
2310
2311 // Compute the public value as the hash of sensitive.symkey || unique.buffer
2312 unique->t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(nameAlg);
2313 CryptStartHash(nameAlg, &hashState);
2314
2315 // Add obfuscation value
2316 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &sensitive->seedValue.b);
2317
2318 // Add sensitive value
2319 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hashState, &sensitive->sensitive.any.b);
2320
2321 CryptCompleteHash2B(&hashState, &unique->b);
2322
2323 return;
2324 }
2325 #if 0 //%
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10.2.9.11 CryptComputeSymValue()
This function computes the seedValue field in asymmetric sensitive areas.
2326 void
2327 CryptComputeSymValue(
2328 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN: parent handle of the object to be created
2329 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: the public area template
2330 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive, // IN: sensitive area
2331 TPM2B_SEED *seed, // IN: the seed
2332 TPMI_ALG_HASH hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for KDFa
2333 TPM2B_NAME *name // IN: object name
2334 )
2335 {
2336 TPM2B_AUTH *proof = NULL;
2337
2338 if(CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(publicArea->type))
2339 {
2340 // Generate seedValue only when an asymmetric key is a storage key
2341 if(publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET
2342 && publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET)
2343 {
2344 // If this is a primary object in the endorsement hierarchy, use
2345 // ehProof in the creation of the symmetric seed so that child
2346 // objects in the endorsement hierarchy are voided on TPM2_Clear()
2347 // or TPM2_ChangeEPS()
2348 if( parentHandle == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
2349 && publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET)
2350 proof = &gp.ehProof;
2351 }
2352 else
2353 {
2354 sensitive->seedValue.t.size = 0;
2355 return;
2356 }
2357 }
2358
2359 // For all object types, the size of seedValue is the digest size of nameAlg
2360 sensitive->seedValue.t.size = CryptGetHashDigestSize(publicArea->nameAlg);
2361
2362 // Compute seedValue using implementation-dependent method
2363 _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom(sensitive->seedValue.t.size,
2364 sensitive->seedValue.t.buffer,
2365 hashAlg,
2366 &seed->b,
2367 "seedValue",
2368 &name->b,
2369 (TPM2B *)proof);
2370 return;
2371 }
2372 #endif //%
10.2.9.12 CryptCreateObject()
This function creates an object. It:
a) fills in the created key in public and sensitive area;
b) creates a random number in sensitive area for symmetric keys; and
c) compute the unique id in public area for symmetric keys.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_KEY_SIZE key size in the public area does not match the size in the sensitive
creation area for a symmetric key
TPM_RC_RANGE for an RSA key, the exponent is not supported
TPM_RC_SIZE sensitive data size is larger than allowed for the scheme for a keyed
hash object
TPM_RC_VALUE exponent is not prime or could not find a prime using the provided
parameters for an RSA key; unsupported name algorithm for an ECC
key
2373 TPM_RC
2374 CryptCreateObject(
2375 TPM_HANDLE parentHandle, // IN/OUT: indication of the seed
2376 // source
2377 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea, // IN/OUT: public area
2378 TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitiveCreate, // IN: sensitive creation
2379 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive // OUT: sensitive area
2380 )
2381 {
2382 // Next value is a placeholder for a random seed that is used in
2383 // key creation when the parent is not a primary seed. It has the same
2384 // size as the primary seed.
2385
2386 TPM2B_SEED localSeed; // data to seed key creation if this
2387 // is not a primary seed
2388
2389 TPM2B_SEED *seed = NULL;
2390 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2391
2392 TPM2B_NAME name;
2393 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg = CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG;
2394 OBJECT *parent;
2395 UINT32 counter;
2396
2397 // Set the sensitive type for the object
2398 sensitive->sensitiveType = publicArea->type;
2399 ObjectComputeName(publicArea, &name);
2400
2401 // For all objects, copy the initial auth data
2402 sensitive->authValue = sensitiveCreate->userAuth;
2403
2404 // If this is a permanent handle assume that it is a hierarchy
2405 if(HandleGetType(parentHandle) == TPM_HT_PERMANENT)
2406 {
2407 seed = HierarchyGetPrimarySeed(parentHandle);
2408 }
2409 else
2410 {
2411 // If not hierarchy handle, get parent
2412 parent = ObjectGet(parentHandle);
2413 hashAlg = parent->publicArea.nameAlg;
2414
2415 // Use random value as seed for non-primary objects
2416 localSeed.t.size = PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE;
2417 CryptGenerateRandom(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, localSeed.t.buffer);
2418 seed = &localSeed;
2419 }
2420
2421 switch(publicArea->type)
2422 {
2423 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2424 // Create RSA key
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2425 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2426 result = CryptGenerateKeyRSA(publicArea, sensitive,
2427 hashAlg, seed, &name, &counter);
2428 break;
2429 #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA
2430
2431 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2432 // Create ECC key
2433 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2434 result = CryptGenerateKeyECC(publicArea, sensitive,
2435 hashAlg, seed, &name, &counter);
2436 break;
2437 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
2438
2439 // Collect symmetric key information
2440 case TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER:
2441 return CryptGenerateKeySymmetric(publicArea, sensitiveCreate,
2442 sensitive, hashAlg, seed, &name);
2443 break;
2444 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
2445 return CryptGenerateKeyedHash(publicArea, sensitiveCreate,
2446 sensitive, hashAlg, seed, &name);
2447 break;
2448 default:
2449 pAssert(0);
2450 break;
2451 }
2452 if(result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
2453 {
2454 TPM2B_AUTH *proof = NULL;
2455
2456 if(publicArea->objectAttributes.decrypt == SET
2457 && publicArea->objectAttributes.restricted == SET)
2458 {
2459 // If this is a primary object in the endorsement hierarchy, use
2460 // ehProof in the creation of the symmetric seed so that child
2461 // objects in the endorsement hierarchy are voided on TPM2_Clear()
2462 // or TPM2_ChangeEPS()
2463 if( parentHandle == TPM_RH_ENDORSEMENT
2464 && publicArea->objectAttributes.fixedTPM == SET)
2465 proof = &gp.ehProof;
2466
2467 // For all object types, the size of seedValue is the digest size
2468 // of its nameAlg
2469 sensitive->seedValue.t.size
2470 = CryptGetHashDigestSize(publicArea->nameAlg);
2471
2472 // Compute seedValue using implementation-dependent method
2473 _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom(sensitive->seedValue.t.size,
2474 sensitive->seedValue.t.buffer,
2475 hashAlg,
2476 &seed->b,
2477 "seedValuea",
2478 &name.b,
2479 (TPM2B *)proof);
2480 }
2481 else
2482 {
2483 sensitive->seedValue.t.size = 0;
2484 }
2485 }
2486
2487 return result;
2488
2489 }
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10.2.9.13 CryptObjectIsPublicConsistent()
This function checks that the key sizes in the public area are consistent. For an asymmetric key, the size
of the public key must match the size indicated by the public->parameters.
Checks for the algorithm types matching the key type are handled by the unmarshaling operation.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE sizes are consistent
FALSE sizes are not consistent
2490 BOOL
2491 CryptObjectIsPublicConsistent(
2492 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: public area
2493 )
2494 {
2495 BOOL OK = TRUE;
2496 switch (publicArea->type)
2497 {
2498 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2499 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2500 OK = CryptAreKeySizesConsistent(publicArea);
2501 break;
2502 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2503
2504 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2505 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2506 {
2507 const ECC_CURVE *curveValue;
2508
2509 // Check that the public point is on the indicated curve.
2510 OK = CryptEccIsPointOnCurve(
2511 publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
2512 &publicArea->unique.ecc);
2513 if(OK)
2514 {
2515 curveValue = CryptEccGetCurveDataPointer(
2516 publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID);
2517 pAssert(curveValue != NULL);
2518
2519 // The input ECC curve must be a supported curve
2520 // IF a scheme is defined for the curve, then that scheme must
2521 // be used.
2522 OK = (curveValue->sign.scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL
2523 || ( publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.scheme.scheme
2524 == curveValue->sign.scheme));
2525 OK = OK && CryptAreKeySizesConsistent(publicArea);
2526 }
2527 }
2528 break;
2529 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2530
2531 default:
2532 // Symmetric object common checks
2533 // There is noting to check with a symmetric key that is public only.
2534 // Also not sure that there is anything useful to be done with it
2535 // either.
2536 break;
2537 }
2538 return OK;
2539 }
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10.2.9.14 CryptObjectPublicPrivateMatch()
This function checks the cryptographic binding between the public and sensitive areas.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_TYPE the type of the public and private areas are not the same
TPM_RC_FAILURE crypto error
TPM_RC_BINDING the public and private areas are not cryptographically matched.
2540 TPM_RC
2541 CryptObjectPublicPrivateMatch(
2542 OBJECT *object // IN: the object to check
2543 )
2544 {
2545 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea;
2546 TPMT_SENSITIVE *sensitive;
2547 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2548 BOOL isAsymmetric = FALSE;
2549
2550 pAssert(object != NULL);
2551 publicArea = &object->publicArea;
2552 sensitive = &object->sensitive;
2553 if(publicArea->type != sensitive->sensitiveType)
2554 return TPM_RC_TYPE;
2555
2556 switch(publicArea->type)
2557 {
2558 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2559 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2560 isAsymmetric = TRUE;
2561 // The public and private key sizes need to be consistent
2562 if(sensitive->sensitive.rsa.t.size != publicArea->unique.rsa.t.size/2)
2563 result = TPM_RC_BINDING;
2564 else
2565 // Load key by computing the private exponent
2566 result = CryptLoadPrivateRSA(object);
2567 break;
2568 #endif
2569 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2570 // This function is called from ObjectLoad() which has already checked to
2571 // see that the public point is on the curve so no need to repeat that
2572 // check.
2573 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2574 isAsymmetric = TRUE;
2575 if( publicArea->unique.ecc.x.t.size
2576 != sensitive->sensitive.ecc.t.size)
2577 result = TPM_RC_BINDING;
2578 else if(publicArea->nameAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL)
2579 {
2580 TPMS_ECC_POINT publicToCompare;
2581 // Compute ECC public key
2582 CryptEccPointMultiply(&publicToCompare,
2583 publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID,
2584 &sensitive->sensitive.ecc, NULL);
2585 // Compare ECC public key
2586 if( (!Memory2BEqual(&publicArea->unique.ecc.x.b,
2587 &publicToCompare.x.b))
2588 || (!Memory2BEqual(&publicArea->unique.ecc.y.b,
2589 &publicToCompare.y.b)))
2590 result = TPM_RC_BINDING;
2591 }
2592 break;
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2593 #endif
2594 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
2595 break;
2596 case TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER:
2597 if( (publicArea->parameters.symDetail.sym.keyBits.sym + 7)/8
2598 != sensitive->sensitive.sym.t.size)
2599 result = TPM_RC_BINDING;
2600 break;
2601 default:
2602 // The choice here is an assert or a return of a bad type for the object
2603 pAssert(0);
2604 break;
2605 }
2606
2607 // For asymmetric keys, the algorithm for validating the linkage between
2608 // the public and private areas is algorithm dependent. For symmetric keys
2609 // the linkage is based on hashing the symKey and obfuscation values.
2610 if( result == TPM_RC_SUCCESS && !isAsymmetric
2611 && publicArea->nameAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL)
2612 {
2613 TPM2B_DIGEST uniqueToCompare;
2614
2615 // Compute unique for symmetric key
2616 CryptComputeSymmetricUnique(publicArea->nameAlg, sensitive,
2617 &uniqueToCompare);
2618 // Compare unique
2619 if(!Memory2BEqual(&publicArea->unique.sym.b,
2620 &uniqueToCompare.b))
2621 result = TPM_RC_BINDING;
2622 }
2623 return result;
2624
2625 }
10.2.9.15 CryptGetSignHashAlg()
Get the hash algorithm of signature from a TPMT_SIGNATURE structure. It assumes the signature is not
NULL This is a function for easy access
2626 TPMI_ALG_HASH
2627 CryptGetSignHashAlg(
2628 TPMT_SIGNATURE *auth // IN: signature
2629 )
2630 {
2631 pAssert(auth->sigAlg != TPM_ALG_NULL);
2632
2633 // Get authHash algorithm based on signing scheme
2634 switch(auth->sigAlg)
2635 {
2636
2637 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2638 case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
2639 return auth->signature.rsassa.hash;
2640
2641 case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
2642 return auth->signature.rsapss.hash;
2643
2644 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2645
2646 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2647 case TPM_ALG_ECDSA:
2648 return auth->signature.ecdsa.hash;
2649
2650 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
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2651
2652 case TPM_ALG_HMAC:
2653 return auth->signature.hmac.hashAlg;
2654
2655 default:
2656 return TPM_ALG_NULL;
2657 }
2658 }
10.2.9.16 CryptIsSplitSign()
This function us used to determine if the signing operation is a split signing operation that required a
TPM2_Commit().
2659 BOOL
2660 CryptIsSplitSign(
2661 TPM_ALG_ID scheme // IN: the algorithm selector
2662 )
2663 {
2664 if( scheme != scheme
2665 # ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDAA
2666 || scheme == TPM_ALG_ECDAA
2667 # endif // TPM_ALG_ECDAA
2668
2669 )
2670 return TRUE;
2671 return FALSE;
2672 }
10.2.9.17 CryptIsSignScheme()
This function indicates if a scheme algorithm is a sign algorithm.
2673 BOOL
2674 CryptIsSignScheme(
2675 TPMI_ALG_ASYM_SCHEME scheme
2676 )
2677 {
2678 BOOL isSignScheme = FALSE;
2679
2680 switch(scheme)
2681 {
2682 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2683 // If RSA is implemented, then both signing schemes are required
2684 case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
2685 case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
2686 isSignScheme = TRUE;
2687 break;
2688 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2689
2690 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2691 // If ECC is implemented ECDSA is required
2692 case TPM_ALG_ECDSA:
2693 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDAA
2694 // ECDAA is optional
2695 case TPM_ALG_ECDAA:
2696 #endif
2697 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR
2698 // Schnorr is also optional
2699 case TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR:
2700 #endif
2701 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2
2702 case TPM_ALG_SM2:
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2703 #endif
2704 isSignScheme = TRUE;
2705 break;
2706 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2707 default:
2708 break;
2709 }
2710 return isSignScheme;
2711 }
10.2.9.18 CryptIsDecryptScheme()
This function indicate if a scheme algorithm is a decrypt algorithm.
2712 BOOL
2713 CryptIsDecryptScheme(
2714 TPMI_ALG_ASYM_SCHEME scheme
2715 )
2716 {
2717 BOOL isDecryptScheme = FALSE;
2718
2719 switch(scheme)
2720 {
2721 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2722 // If RSA is implemented, then both decrypt schemes are required
2723 case TPM_ALG_RSAES:
2724 case TPM_ALG_OAEP:
2725 isDecryptScheme = TRUE;
2726 break;
2727 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2728
2729 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2730 // If ECC is implemented ECDH is required
2731 case TPM_ALG_ECDH:
2732 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2
2733 case TPM_ALG_SM2:
2734 #endif
2735 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECMQV
2736 case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
2737 #endif
2738 isDecryptScheme = TRUE;
2739 break;
2740 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2741 default:
2742 break;
2743 }
2744 return isDecryptScheme;
2745 }
10.2.9.19 CryptSelectSignScheme()
This function is used by the attestation and signing commands. It implements the rules for selecting the
signature scheme to use in signing. This function requires that the signing key either be TPM_RH_NULL
or be loaded.
If a default scheme is defined in object, the default scheme should be chosen, otherwise, the input
scheme should be chosen. In the case that both object and input scheme has a non-NULL scheme
algorithm, if the schemes are compatible, the input scheme will be chosen.
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Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_KEY key referenced by signHandle is not a signing key
TPM_RC_SCHEME both scheme and key's default scheme are empty; or scheme is
empty while key's default scheme requires explicit input scheme (split
signing); or non-empty default key scheme differs from scheme
2746 TPM_RC
2747 CryptSelectSignScheme(
2748 TPMI_DH_OBJECT signHandle, // IN: handle of signing key
2749 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *scheme // IN/OUT: signing scheme
2750 )
2751 {
2752 OBJECT *signObject;
2753 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *objectScheme;
2754 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea;
2755 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2756
2757 // If the signHandle is TPM_RH_NULL, then the NULL scheme is used, regardless
2758 // of the setting of scheme
2759 if(signHandle == TPM_RH_NULL)
2760 {
2761 scheme->scheme = TPM_ALG_NULL;
2762 scheme->details.any.hashAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;
2763 }
2764 else
2765 {
2766 // sign handle is not NULL so...
2767 // Get sign object pointer
2768 signObject = ObjectGet(signHandle);
2769 publicArea = &signObject->publicArea;
2770
2771 // is this a signing key?
2772 if(!publicArea->objectAttributes.sign)
2773 result = TPM_RC_KEY;
2774 else
2775 {
2776 // "parms" defined to avoid long code lines.
2777 TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *parms = &publicArea->parameters;
2778 if(CryptIsAsymAlgorithm(publicArea->type))
2779 objectScheme = (TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *)&parms->asymDetail.scheme;
2780 else
2781 objectScheme = (TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *)&parms->keyedHashDetail.scheme;
2782
2783 // If the object doesn't have a default scheme, then use the
2784 // input scheme.
2785 if(objectScheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
2786 {
2787 // Input and default can't both be NULL
2788 if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
2789 result = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
2790
2791 // Assume that the scheme is compatible with the key. If not,
2792 // we will generate an error in the signing operation.
2793
2794 }
2795 else if(scheme->scheme == TPM_ALG_NULL)
2796 {
2797 // input scheme is NULL so use default
2798
2799 // First, check to see if the default requires that the caller
2800 // provided scheme data
2801 if(CryptIsSplitSign(objectScheme->scheme))
2802 result = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
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2803 else
2804 {
2805 scheme->scheme = objectScheme->scheme;
2806 scheme->details.any.hashAlg
2807 = objectScheme->details.any.hashAlg;
2808 }
2809 }
2810 else
2811 {
2812 // Both input and object have scheme selectors
2813 // If the scheme and the hash are not the same then...
2814 if( objectScheme->scheme != scheme->scheme
2815 || ( objectScheme->details.any.hashAlg
2816 != scheme->details.any.hashAlg))
2817 result = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
2818 }
2819 }
2820
2821 }
2822 return result;
2823 }
10.2.9.20 CryptSign()
Sign a digest with asymmetric key or HMAC. This function is called by attestation commands and the
generic TPM2_Sign() command. This function checks the key scheme and digest size. It does not check
if the sign operation is allowed for restricted key. It should be checked before the function is called. The
function will assert if the key is not a signing key.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SCHEME signScheme is not compatible with the signing key type
TPM_RC_VALUE digest value is greater than the modulus of signHandle or size of
hashData does not match hash algorithm insignScheme (for an RSA
key); invalid commit status or failed to generate r value (for an ECC
key)
2824 TPM_RC
2825 CryptSign(
2826 TPMI_DH_OBJECT signHandle, // IN: The handle of sign key
2827 TPMT_SIG_SCHEME *signScheme, // IN: sign scheme.
2828 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, // IN: The digest being signed
2829 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // OUT: signature
2830 )
2831 {
2832 OBJECT *signKey = ObjectGet(signHandle);
2833 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
2834
2835 // check if input handle is a sign key
2836 pAssert(signKey->publicArea.objectAttributes.sign == SET);
2837
2838 // Must have the private portion loaded. This check is made during
2839 // authorization.
2840 pAssert(signKey->attributes.publicOnly == CLEAR);
2841
2842 // Initialize signature scheme
2843 signature->sigAlg = signScheme->scheme;
2844
2845 // If the signature algorithm is TPM_ALG_NULL, then we are done
2846 if(signature->sigAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
2847 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2848
2849 // All the schemes other than TPM_ALG_NULL have a hash algorithm
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2850 TEST_HASH(signScheme->details.any.hashAlg);
2851
2852 // Initialize signature hash
2853 // Note: need to do the check for alg null first because the null scheme
2854 // doesn't have a hashAlg member.
2855 signature->signature.any.hashAlg = signScheme->details.any.hashAlg;
2856
2857 // perform sign operation based on different key type
2858 switch (signKey->publicArea.type)
2859 {
2860
2861 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2862 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2863 result = CryptSignRSA(signKey, signScheme, digest, signature);
2864 break;
2865 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2866
2867 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2868 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2869 result = CryptSignECC(signKey, signScheme, digest, signature);
2870 break;
2871 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
2872 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
2873 result = CryptSignHMAC(signKey, signScheme, digest, signature);
2874 break;
2875 default:
2876 break;
2877 }
2878
2879 return result;
2880 }
10.2.9.21 CryptVerifySignature()
This function is used to verify a signature. It is called by TPM2_VerifySignature() and
TPM2_PolicySigned().
Since this operation only requires use of a public key, no consistency checks are necessary for the key to
signature type because a caller can load any public key that they like with any scheme that they like. This
routine simply makes sure that the signature is correct, whatever the type.
This function requires that auth is not a NULL pointer.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIGNATURE the signature is not genuine
TPM_RC_SCHEME the scheme is not supported
TPM_RC_HANDLE an HMAC key was selected but the private part of the key is not
loaded
2881 TPM_RC
2882 CryptVerifySignature(
2883 TPMI_DH_OBJECT keyHandle, // IN: The handle of sign key
2884 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, // IN: The digest being validated
2885 TPMT_SIGNATURE *signature // IN: signature
2886 )
2887 {
2888 // NOTE: ObjectGet will either return a pointer to a loaded object or
2889 // will assert. It will never return a non-valid value. This makes it save
2890 // to initialize 'publicArea' with the return value from ObjectGet() without
2891 // checking it first.
2892 OBJECT *authObject = ObjectGet(keyHandle);
2893 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea = &authObject->publicArea;
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2894 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
2895
2896 // The input unmarshaling should prevent any input signature from being
2897 // a NULL signature, but just in case
2898 if(signature->sigAlg == TPM_ALG_NULL)
2899 return TPM_RC_SIGNATURE;
2900
2901 switch (publicArea->type)
2902 {
2903
2904 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
2905 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
2906 result = CryptRSAVerifySignature(authObject, digest, signature);
2907 break;
2908 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
2909
2910 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
2911 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
2912 result = CryptECCVerifySignature(authObject, digest, signature);
2913 break;
2914
2915 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
2916
2917 case TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH:
2918 if(authObject->attributes.publicOnly)
2919 result = TPM_RCS_HANDLE;
2920 else
2921 result = CryptHMACVerifySignature(authObject, digest, signature);
2922 break;
2923
2924 default:
2925 break;
2926 }
2927 return result;
2928
2929 }
10.2.10 Math functions
10.2.10.1 CryptDivide()
This function interfaces to the math library for large number divide.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SIZE quotient or remainder is too small to receive the result
2930 TPM_RC
2931 CryptDivide(
2932 TPM2B *numerator, // IN: numerator
2933 TPM2B *denominator, // IN: denominator
2934 TPM2B *quotient, // OUT: quotient = numerator / denominator.
2935 TPM2B *remainder // OUT: numerator mod denominator.
2936 )
2937 {
2938 pAssert( numerator != NULL && denominator!= NULL
2939 && (quotient != NULL || remainder != NULL)
2940 );
2941 // assume denominator is not 0
2942 pAssert(denominator->size != 0);
2943
2944 return TranslateCryptErrors(_math__Div(numerator,
2945 denominator,
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2946 quotient,
2947 remainder)
2948 );
2949 }
10.2.10.2 CryptCompare()
This function interfaces to the math library for large number, unsigned compare.
Return Value Meaning
1 if a > b
0 if a = b
-1 if a < b
2950 LIB_EXPORT int
2951 CryptCompare(
2952 const UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
2953 const BYTE *a, // IN: a buffer
2954 const UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
2955 const BYTE *b // IN: b buffer
2956 )
2957 {
2958 return _math__uComp(aSize, a, bSize, b);
2959 }
10.2.10.3 CryptCompareSigned()
This function interfaces to the math library for large number, signed compare.
Return Value Meaning
1 if a > b
0 if a = b
-1 if a < b
2960 int
2961 CryptCompareSigned(
2962 UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
2963 BYTE *a, // IN: a buffer
2964 UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
2965 BYTE *b // IN: b buffer
2966 )
2967 {
2968 return _math__Comp(aSize, a, bSize, b);
2969 }
10.2.10.4 CryptGetTestResult
This function returns the results of a self-test function.
NOTE: the behavior in this function is NOT the correct behavior for a real TPM implementation. An artificial behavior is
placed here due to the limitation of a software simulation environment. For the correct behavior, consult the
part 3 specification for TPM2_GetTestResult().
2970 TPM_RC
2971 CryptGetTestResult(
2972 TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *outData // OUT: test result data
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2973 )
2974 {
2975 outData->t.size = 0;
2976 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
2977 }
10.2.11 Capability Support
10.2.11.1 CryptCapGetECCCurve()
This function returns the list of implemented ECC curves.
Return Value Meaning
YES if no more ECC curve is available
NO if there are more ECC curves not reported
2978 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC //% 5
2979 TPMI_YES_NO
2980 CryptCapGetECCCurve(
2981 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveID, // IN: the starting ECC curve
2982 UINT32 maxCount, // IN: count of returned curve
2983 TPML_ECC_CURVE *curveList // OUT: ECC curve list
2984 )
2985 {
2986 TPMI_YES_NO more = NO;
2987 UINT16 i;
2988 UINT32 count = _cpri__EccGetCurveCount();
2989 TPM_ECC_CURVE curve;
2990
2991 // Initialize output property list
2992 curveList->count = 0;
2993
2994 // The maximum count of curves we may return is MAX_ECC_CURVES
2995 if(maxCount > MAX_ECC_CURVES) maxCount = MAX_ECC_CURVES;
2996
2997 // Scan the eccCurveValues array
2998 for(i = 0; i < count; i++)
2999 {
3000 curve = _cpri__GetCurveIdByIndex(i);
3001 // If curveID is less than the starting curveID, skip it
3002 if(curve < curveID)
3003 continue;
3004
3005 if(curveList->count < maxCount)
3006 {
3007 // If we have not filled up the return list, add more curves to
3008 // it
3009 curveList->eccCurves[curveList->count] = curve;
3010 curveList->count++;
3011 }
3012 else
3013 {
3014 // If the return list is full but we still have curves
3015 // available, report this and stop iterating
3016 more = YES;
3017 break;
3018 }
3019
3020 }
3021
3022 return more;
3023
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3024 }
10.2.11.2 CryptCapGetEccCurveNumber()
This function returns the number of ECC curves supported by the TPM.
3025 UINT32
3026 CryptCapGetEccCurveNumber(
3027 void
3028 )
3029 {
3030 // There is an array that holds the curve data. Its size divided by the
3031 // size of an entry is the number of values in the table.
3032 return _cpri__EccGetCurveCount();
3033 }
3034 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC //% 5
10.2.11.3 CryptAreKeySizesConsistent()
This function validates that the public key size values are consistent for an asymmetric key.
NOTE: This is not a comprehensive test of the public key.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE sizes are consistent
FALSE sizes are not consistent
3035 BOOL
3036 CryptAreKeySizesConsistent(
3037 TPMT_PUBLIC *publicArea // IN: the public area to check
3038 )
3039 {
3040 BOOL consistent = FALSE;
3041
3042 switch (publicArea->type)
3043 {
3044 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
3045 case TPM_ALG_RSA:
3046 // The key size in bits is filtered by the unmarshaling
3047 consistent = ( ((publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits+7)/8)
3048 == publicArea->unique.rsa.t.size);
3049 break;
3050 #endif //TPM_ALG_RSA
3051
3052 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
3053 case TPM_ALG_ECC:
3054 {
3055 UINT16 keySizeInBytes;
3056 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId = publicArea->parameters.eccDetail.curveID;
3057
3058 keySizeInBytes = CryptEccGetKeySizeInBytes(curveId);
3059
3060 consistent = keySizeInBytes > 0
3061 && publicArea->unique.ecc.x.t.size <= keySizeInBytes
3062 && publicArea->unique.ecc.y.t.size <= keySizeInBytes;
3063 }
3064 break;
3065 #endif //TPM_ALG_ECC
3066 default:
3067 break;
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3068 }
3069
3070 return consistent;
3071 }
10.2.11.4 CryptAlgSetImplemented()
This function initializes the bit vector with one bit for each implemented algorithm. This function is called
from _TPM_Init(). The vector of implemented algorithms should be generated by the part 2 parser so that
the g_implementedAlgorithms vector can be a const. That's not how it is now
3072 void
3073 CryptAlgsSetImplemented(
3074 void
3075 )
3076 {
3077 AlgorithmGetImplementedVector(&g_implementedAlgorithms);
3078 }
10.3 Ticket.c
10.3.1 Introduction
This clause contains the functions used for ticket computations.
10.3.2 Includes
1 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
10.3.3 Functions
10.3.3.1 TicketIsSafe()
This function indicates if producing a ticket is safe. It checks if the leading bytes of an input buffer is
TPM_GENERATED_VALUE or its substring of canonical form. If so, it is not safe to produce ticket for an
input buffer claiming to be TPM generated buffer
Return Value Meaning
TRUE It is safe to produce ticket
FALSE It is not safe to produce ticket
2 BOOL
3 TicketIsSafe(
4 TPM2B *buffer
5 )
6 {
7 TPM_GENERATED valueToCompare = TPM_GENERATED_VALUE;
8 BYTE bufferToCompare[sizeof(valueToCompare)];
9 BYTE *marshalBuffer;
10
11 // If the buffer size is less than the size of TPM_GENERATED_VALUE, assume
12 // it is not safe to generate a ticket
13 if(buffer->size < sizeof(valueToCompare))
14 return FALSE;
15
16 marshalBuffer = bufferToCompare;
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17 TPM_GENERATED_Marshal(&valueToCompare, &marshalBuffer, NULL);
18 if(MemoryEqual(buffer->buffer, bufferToCompare, sizeof(valueToCompare)))
19 return FALSE;
20 else
21 return TRUE;
22 }
10.3.3.2 TicketComputeVerified()
This function creates a TPMT_TK_VERIFIED ticket.
23 void
24 TicketComputeVerified(
25 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, // IN: hierarchy constant for ticket
26 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, // IN: digest
27 TPM2B_NAME *keyName, // IN: name of key that signed the value
28 TPMT_TK_VERIFIED *ticket // OUT: verified ticket
29 )
30 {
31 TPM2B_AUTH *proof;
32 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
33
34 // Fill in ticket fields
35 ticket->tag = TPM_ST_VERIFIED;
36 ticket->hierarchy = hierarchy;
37
38 // Use the proof value of the hierarchy
39 proof = HierarchyGetProof(hierarchy);
40
41 // Start HMAC
42 ticket->digest.t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG,
43 &proof->b, &hmacState);
44
45 // add TPM_ST_VERIFIED
46 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(TPM_ST), &ticket->tag);
47
48 // add digest
49 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &digest->b);
50
51 // add key name
52 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &keyName->b);
53
54 // complete HMAC
55 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &ticket->digest.b);
56
57 return;
58 }
10.3.3.3 TicketComputeAuth()
This function creates a TPMT_TK_AUTH ticket.
59 void
60 TicketComputeAuth(
61 TPM_ST type, // IN: the type of ticket.
62 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, // IN: hierarchy constant for ticket
63 UINT64 timeout, // IN: timeout
64 TPM2B_DIGEST *cpHashA, // IN: input cpHashA
65 TPM2B_NONCE *policyRef, // IN: input policyRef
66 TPM2B_NAME *entityName, // IN: name of entity
67 TPMT_TK_AUTH *ticket // OUT: Created ticket
68 )
69 {
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70 TPM2B_AUTH *proof;
71 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
72
73 // Get proper proof
74 proof = HierarchyGetProof(hierarchy);
75
76 // Fill in ticket fields
77 ticket->tag = type;
78 ticket->hierarchy = hierarchy;
79
80 // Start HMAC
81 ticket->digest.t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG,
82 &proof->b, &hmacState);
83
84 // Adding TPM_ST_AUTH
85 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(UINT16), &ticket->tag);
86
87 // Adding timeout
88 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(UINT64), &timeout);
89
90 // Adding cpHash
91 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &cpHashA->b);
92
93 // Adding policyRef
94 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &policyRef->b);
95
96 // Adding keyName
97 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &entityName->b);
98
99 // Compute HMAC
100 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &ticket->digest.b);
101
102 return;
103 }
10.3.3.4 TicketComputeHashCheck()
This function creates a TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK ticket.
104 void
105 TicketComputeHashCheck(
106 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, // IN: hierarchy constant for ticket
107 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the hash algorithm used to create
108 // 'digest'
109 TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, // IN: input digest
110 TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK *ticket // OUT: Created ticket
111 )
112 {
113 TPM2B_AUTH *proof;
114 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
115
116 // Get proper proof
117 proof = HierarchyGetProof(hierarchy);
118
119 // Fill in ticket fields
120 ticket->tag = TPM_ST_HASHCHECK;
121 ticket->hierarchy = hierarchy;
122
123 ticket->digest.t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG,
124 &proof->b, &hmacState);
125
126 // Add TPM_ST_HASHCHECK
127 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(TPM_ST), &ticket->tag);
128
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129 // Add hash algorithm
130 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(hashAlg), &hashAlg);
131
132 // Add digest
133 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &digest->b);
134
135 // Compute HMAC
136 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &ticket->digest.b);
137
138 return;
139 }
10.3.3.5 TicketComputeCreation()
This function creates a TPMT_TK_CREATION ticket.
140 void
141 TicketComputeCreation(
142 TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, // IN: hierarchy for ticket
143 TPM2B_NAME *name, // IN: object name
144 TPM2B_DIGEST *creation, // IN: creation hash
145 TPMT_TK_CREATION *ticket // OUT: created ticket
146 )
147 {
148 TPM2B_AUTH *proof;
149 HMAC_STATE hmacState;
150
151 // Get proper proof
152 proof = HierarchyGetProof(hierarchy);
153
154 // Fill in ticket fields
155 ticket->tag = TPM_ST_CREATION;
156 ticket->hierarchy = hierarchy;
157
158 ticket->digest.t.size = CryptStartHMAC2B(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG,
159 &proof->b, &hmacState);
160
161 // Add TPM_ST_CREATION
162 CryptUpdateDigestInt(&hmacState, sizeof(TPM_ST), &ticket->tag);
163
164 // Add name
165 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &name->b);
166
167 // Add creation hash
168 CryptUpdateDigest2B(&hmacState, &creation->b);
169
170 // Compute HMAC
171 CryptCompleteHMAC2B(&hmacState, &ticket->digest.b);
172
173 return;
174 }
10.4 CryptSelfTest.c
10.4.1 Introduction
The functions in this file are designed to support self-test of cryptographic functions in the TPM. The TPM
allows the user to decide whether to run self-test on a demand basis or to run all the self-tests before
proceeding.
The self-tests are controlled by a set of bit vectors. The g_untestedDecryptionAlgorithms vector has a bit
for each decryption algorithm that needs to be tested and g_untestedEncryptionAlgorithms has a bit for
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each encryption algorithm that needs to be tested. Before an algorithm is used, the appropriate vector is
checked (indexed using the algorithm ID). If the bit is SET, then the test function should be called.
1 #include "Global.h"
2 #include "CryptoEngine.h"
3 #include "InternalRoutines.h"
4 #include "AlgorithmCap_fp.h"
10.4.2 Functions
10.4.2.1 RunSelfTest()
Local function to run self-test
5 static TPM_RC
6 CryptRunSelfTests(
7 ALGORITHM_VECTOR *toTest // IN: the vector of the algorithms to test
8 )
9 {
10 TPM_ALG_ID alg;
11
12 // For each of the algorithms that are in the toTestVecor, need to run a
13 // test
14 for(alg = TPM_ALG_FIRST; alg <= TPM_ALG_LAST; alg++)
15 {
16 if(TEST_BIT(alg, *toTest))
17 {
18 TPM_RC result = CryptTestAlgorithm(alg, toTest);
19 if(result != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
20 return result;
21 }
22 }
23 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
24 }
10.4.2.2 CryptSelfTest()
This function is called to start/complete a full self-test. If fullTest is NO, then only the untested algorithms
will be run. If fullTest is YES, then g_untestedDecryptionAlgorithms is reinitialized and then all tests are
run. This implementation of the reference design does not support processing outside the framework of a
TPM command. As a consequence, this command does not complete until all tests are done. Since this
can take a long time, the TPM will check after each test to see if the command is canceled. If so, then the
TPM will returned TPM_RC_CANCELLED. To continue with the self-tests, call TPM2_SelfTest(fullTest ==
No) and the TPM will complete the testing.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_CANCELED if the command is canceled
25 LIB_EXPORT
26 TPM_RC
27 CryptSelfTest(
28 TPMI_YES_NO fullTest // IN: if full test is required
29 )
30 {
31 if(g_forceFailureMode)
32 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_FORCED);
33
34 // If the caller requested a full test, then reset the to test vector so that
35 // all the tests will be run
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36 if(fullTest == YES)
37 {
38 MemoryCopy(g_toTest,
39 g_implementedAlgorithms,
40 sizeof(g_toTest), sizeof(g_toTest));
41 }
42 return CryptRunSelfTests(&g_toTest);
43 }
10.4.2.3 CryptIncrementalSelfTest()
This function is used to perform an incremental self-test. This implementation will perform the toTest
values before returning. That is, it assumes that the TPM cannot perform background tasks between
commands.
This command may be canceled. If it is, then there is no return result. However, this command can be run
again and the incremental progress will not be lost.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_CANCELED processing of this command was canceled
TPM_RC_TESTING if toTest list is not empty
TPM_RC_VALUE an algorithm in the toTest list is not implemented
44 TPM_RC
45 CryptIncrementalSelfTest(
46 TPML_ALG *toTest, // IN: list of algorithms to be tested
47 TPML_ALG *toDoList // OUT: list of algorithms needing test
48 )
49 {
50 ALGORITHM_VECTOR toTestVector = {0};
51 TPM_ALG_ID alg;
52 UINT32 i;
53
54 pAssert(toTest != NULL && toDoList != NULL);
55 if(toTest->count > 0)
56 {
57 // Transcribe the toTest list into the toTestVector
58 for(i = 0; i < toTest->count; i++)
59 {
60 TPM_ALG_ID alg = toTest->algorithms[i];
61
62 // make sure that the algorithm value is not out of range
63 if((alg > TPM_ALG_LAST) || !TEST_BIT(alg, g_implementedAlgorithms))
64 return TPM_RC_VALUE;
65 SET_BIT(alg, toTestVector);
66 }
67 // Run the test
68 if(CryptRunSelfTests(&toTestVector) == TPM_RC_CANCELED)
69 return TPM_RC_CANCELED;
70 }
71 // Fill in the toDoList with the algorithms that are still untested
72 toDoList->count = 0;
73
74 for(alg = TPM_ALG_FIRST;
75 toDoList->count < MAX_ALG_LIST_SIZE && alg <= TPM_ALG_LAST;
76 alg++)
77 {
78 if(TEST_BIT(alg, g_toTest))
79 toDoList->algorithms[toDoList->count++] = alg;
80 }
81 return TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
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82 }
10.4.2.4 CryptInitializeToTest()
This function will initialize the data structures for testing all the algorithms. This should not be called
unless CryptAlgsSetImplemented() has been called
83 void
84 CryptInitializeToTest(
85 void
86 )
87 {
88 MemoryCopy(g_toTest,
89 g_implementedAlgorithms,
90 sizeof(g_toTest),
91 sizeof(g_toTest));
92 // Setting the algorithm to null causes the test function to just clear
93 // out any algorithms for which there is no test.
94 CryptTestAlgorithm(TPM_ALG_ERROR, &g_toTest);
95
96 return;
97 }
10.4.2.5 CryptTestAlgorithm()
Only point of contact with the actual self tests. If a self-test fails, there is no return and the TPM goes into
failure mode. The call to TestAlgorithm() uses an algorithms selector and a bit vector. When the test is
run, the corresponding bit in toTest and in g_toTest is CLEAR. If toTest is NULL, then only the bit in
g_toTest is CLEAR. There is a special case for the call to TestAlgorithm(). When alg is
TPM_ALG_ERROR, TestAlgorithm() will CLEAR any bit in toTest for which it has no test. This allows the
knowledge about which algorithms have test to be accessed through the interface that provides the test.
Error Returns Meaning
TPM_RC_SUCCESS test complete
TPM_RC_CANCELED test was canceled
98 LIB_EXPORT
99 TPM_RC
100 CryptTestAlgorithm(
101 TPM_ALG_ID alg,
102 ALGORITHM_VECTOR *toTest
103 )
104 {
105 TPM_RC result = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
106 #ifdef SELF_TEST
107 // This is the function prototype for TestAlgorithms(). It is here and not
108 // in a _fp.h file to avoid a compiler error when SELF_TEST is not defined and
109 // AlgorithmTexts.c is not part of the build.
110 TPM_RC TestAlgorithm(TPM_ALG_ID alg, ALGORITHM_VECTOR *toTest);
111 result = TestAlgorithm(alg, toTest);
112 #else
113 // If this is an attempt to determine the algorithms for which there is a
114 // self test, pretend that all of them do. We do that by not clearing any
115 // of the algorithm bits. When/if this function is called to run tests, it
116 // will over report. This can be changed so that any call to check on which
117 // algorithms have tests, 'toTest' can be cleared.
118 if(alg != TPM_ALG_ERROR)
119 {
120 CLEAR_BIT(alg, g_toTest);
121 if(toTest != NULL)
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122 CLEAR_BIT(alg, *toTest);
123 }
124 #endif
125 return result;
126 }
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Annex A
(informative)
Implementation Dependent
A.1 Introduction
This header file contains definitions that are derived from the values in the annexes of TPM 2.0 Part 2.
This file would change based on the implementation.
The values shown in this version of the file reflect the example settings in TPM 2.0 Part 2.
A.2 Implementation.h
1 #ifndef _IMPLEMENTATION_H_
2 #define _IMPLEMENTATION_H_
3 #include "BaseTypes.h"
4 #include "TPMB.h"
5 #undef TRUE
6 #undef FALSE
This table is built in to TpmStructures() Change these definitions to turn all algorithms or commands on or
off
7 #define ALG_YES YES
8 #define ALG_NO NO
9 #define CC_YES YES
10 #define CC_NO NO
From TPM 2.0 Part 2: Table 4 - Defines for Logic Values
11 #define TRUE 1
12 #define FALSE 0
13 #define YES 1
14 #define NO 0
15 #define SET 1
16 #define CLEAR 0
From Vendor-Specific: Table 1 - Defines for Processor Values
17 #define BIG_ENDIAN_TPM NO
18 #define LITTLE_ENDIAN_TPM YES
19 #define NO_AUTO_ALIGN NO
From Vendor-Specific: Table 2 - Defines for Implemented Algorithms
20 #define ALG_RSA ALG_YES
21 #define ALG_SHA1 ALG_YES
22 #define ALG_HMAC ALG_YES
23 #define ALG_AES ALG_YES
24 #define ALG_MGF1 ALG_YES
25 #define ALG_XOR ALG_YES
26 #define ALG_KEYEDHASH ALG_YES
27 #define ALG_SHA256 ALG_YES
28 #define ALG_SHA384 ALG_YES
29 #define ALG_SHA512 ALG_NO
30 #define ALG_SM3_256 ALG_NO
31 #define ALG_SM4 ALG_NO
32 #define ALG_RSASSA (ALG_YES*ALG_RSA)
33 #define ALG_RSAES (ALG_YES*ALG_RSA)
34 #define ALG_RSAPSS (ALG_YES*ALG_RSA)
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35 #define ALG_OAEP (ALG_YES*ALG_RSA)
36 #define ALG_ECC ALG_YES
37 #define ALG_ECDH (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
38 #define ALG_ECDSA (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
39 #define ALG_ECDAA (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
40 #define ALG_SM2 (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
41 #define ALG_ECSCHNORR (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
42 #define ALG_ECMQV (ALG_NO*ALG_ECC)
43 #define ALG_SYMCIPHER ALG_YES
44 #define ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A (ALG_YES*ALG_ECC)
45 #define ALG_KDF2 ALG_NO
46 #define ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 ALG_YES
47 #define ALG_CTR ALG_YES
48 #define ALG_OFB ALG_YES
49 #define ALG_CBC ALG_YES
50 #define ALG_CFB ALG_YES
51 #define ALG_ECB ALG_YES
From Vendor-Specific: Table 4 - Defines for Key Size Constants
52 #define RSA_KEY_SIZES_BITS {1024,2048}
53 #define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS_1024 RSA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_1024
54 #define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BITS_2048 RSA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_2048
55 #define MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS 2048
56 #define MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES 256
57 #define AES_KEY_SIZES_BITS {128,256}
58 #define AES_KEY_SIZE_BITS_128 AES_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128
59 #define AES_KEY_SIZE_BITS_256 AES_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_256
60 #define MAX_AES_KEY_BITS 256
61 #define MAX_AES_KEY_BYTES 32
62 #define MAX_AES_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES \
63 MAX(AES_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES, \
64 MAX(AES_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES, 0))
65 #define SM4_KEY_SIZES_BITS {128}
66 #define SM4_KEY_SIZE_BITS_128 SM4_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128
67 #define MAX_SM4_KEY_BITS 128
68 #define MAX_SM4_KEY_BYTES 16
69 #define MAX_SM4_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES \
70 MAX(SM4_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES, 0)
71 #define CAMELLIA_KEY_SIZES_BITS {128}
72 #define CAMELLIA_KEY_SIZE_BITS_128 CAMELLIA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128
73 #define MAX_CAMELLIA_KEY_BITS 128
74 #define MAX_CAMELLIA_KEY_BYTES 16
75 #define MAX_CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES \
76 MAX(CAMELLIA_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES, 0)
From Vendor-Specific: Table 5 - Defines for Implemented Curves
77 #define ECC_NIST_P256 YES
78 #define ECC_NIST_P384 YES
79 #define ECC_BN_P256 YES
80 #define ECC_CURVES {\
81 TPM_ECC_BN_P256, TPM_ECC_NIST_P256, TPM_ECC_NIST_P384}
82 #define ECC_KEY_SIZES_BITS {256, 384}
83 #define ECC_KEY_SIZE_BITS_256
84 #define ECC_KEY_SIZE_BITS_384
85 #define MAX_ECC_KEY_BITS 384
86 #define MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES 48
From Vendor-Specific: Table 6 - Defines for Implemented Commands
87 #define CC_ActivateCredential CC_YES
88 #define CC_Certify CC_YES
89 #define CC_CertifyCreation CC_YES
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90 #define CC_ChangeEPS CC_YES
91 #define CC_ChangePPS CC_YES
92 #define CC_Clear CC_YES
93 #define CC_ClearControl CC_YES
94 #define CC_ClockRateAdjust CC_YES
95 #define CC_ClockSet CC_YES
96 #define CC_Commit (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
97 #define CC_ContextLoad CC_YES
98 #define CC_ContextSave CC_YES
99 #define CC_Create CC_YES
100 #define CC_CreatePrimary CC_YES
101 #define CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset CC_YES
102 #define CC_DictionaryAttackParameters CC_YES
103 #define CC_Duplicate CC_YES
104 #define CC_ECC_Parameters (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
105 #define CC_ECDH_KeyGen (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
106 #define CC_ECDH_ZGen (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
107 #define CC_EncryptDecrypt CC_YES
108 #define CC_EventSequenceComplete CC_YES
109 #define CC_EvictControl CC_YES
110 #define CC_FieldUpgradeData CC_NO
111 #define CC_FieldUpgradeStart CC_NO
112 #define CC_FirmwareRead CC_NO
113 #define CC_FlushContext CC_YES
114 #define CC_GetCapability CC_YES
115 #define CC_GetCommandAuditDigest CC_YES
116 #define CC_GetRandom CC_YES
117 #define CC_GetSessionAuditDigest CC_YES
118 #define CC_GetTestResult CC_YES
119 #define CC_GetTime CC_YES
120 #define CC_Hash CC_YES
121 #define CC_HashSequenceStart CC_YES
122 #define CC_HierarchyChangeAuth CC_YES
123 #define CC_HierarchyControl CC_YES
124 #define CC_HMAC CC_YES
125 #define CC_HMAC_Start CC_YES
126 #define CC_Import CC_YES
127 #define CC_IncrementalSelfTest CC_YES
128 #define CC_Load CC_YES
129 #define CC_LoadExternal CC_YES
130 #define CC_MakeCredential CC_YES
131 #define CC_NV_Certify CC_YES
132 #define CC_NV_ChangeAuth CC_YES
133 #define CC_NV_DefineSpace CC_YES
134 #define CC_NV_Extend CC_YES
135 #define CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock CC_YES
136 #define CC_NV_Increment CC_YES
137 #define CC_NV_Read CC_YES
138 #define CC_NV_ReadLock CC_YES
139 #define CC_NV_ReadPublic CC_YES
140 #define CC_NV_SetBits CC_YES
141 #define CC_NV_UndefineSpace CC_YES
142 #define CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial CC_YES
143 #define CC_NV_Write CC_YES
144 #define CC_NV_WriteLock CC_YES
145 #define CC_ObjectChangeAuth CC_YES
146 #define CC_PCR_Allocate CC_YES
147 #define CC_PCR_Event CC_YES
148 #define CC_PCR_Extend CC_YES
149 #define CC_PCR_Read CC_YES
150 #define CC_PCR_Reset CC_YES
151 #define CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy CC_YES
152 #define CC_PCR_SetAuthValue CC_YES
153 #define CC_PolicyAuthorize CC_YES
154 #define CC_PolicyAuthValue CC_YES
155 #define CC_PolicyCommandCode CC_YES
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156 #define CC_PolicyCounterTimer CC_YES
157 #define CC_PolicyCpHash CC_YES
158 #define CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect CC_YES
159 #define CC_PolicyGetDigest CC_YES
160 #define CC_PolicyLocality CC_YES
161 #define CC_PolicyNameHash CC_YES
162 #define CC_PolicyNV CC_YES
163 #define CC_PolicyOR CC_YES
164 #define CC_PolicyPassword CC_YES
165 #define CC_PolicyPCR CC_YES
166 #define CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence CC_YES
167 #define CC_PolicyRestart CC_YES
168 #define CC_PolicySecret CC_YES
169 #define CC_PolicySigned CC_YES
170 #define CC_PolicyTicket CC_YES
171 #define CC_PP_Commands CC_YES
172 #define CC_Quote CC_YES
173 #define CC_ReadClock CC_YES
174 #define CC_ReadPublic CC_YES
175 #define CC_Rewrap CC_YES
176 #define CC_RSA_Decrypt (CC_YES*ALG_RSA)
177 #define CC_RSA_Encrypt (CC_YES*ALG_RSA)
178 #define CC_SelfTest CC_YES
179 #define CC_SequenceComplete CC_YES
180 #define CC_SequenceUpdate CC_YES
181 #define CC_SetAlgorithmSet CC_YES
182 #define CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus CC_YES
183 #define CC_SetPrimaryPolicy CC_YES
184 #define CC_Shutdown CC_YES
185 #define CC_Sign CC_YES
186 #define CC_StartAuthSession CC_YES
187 #define CC_Startup CC_YES
188 #define CC_StirRandom CC_YES
189 #define CC_TestParms CC_YES
190 #define CC_Unseal CC_YES
191 #define CC_VerifySignature CC_YES
192 #define CC_ZGen_2Phase (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
193 #define CC_EC_Ephemeral (CC_YES*ALG_ECC)
194 #define CC_PolicyNvWritten CC_YES
From Vendor-Specific: Table 7 - Defines for Implementation Values
195 #define FIELD_UPGRADE_IMPLEMENTED NO
196 #define BSIZE UINT16
197 #define BUFFER_ALIGNMENT 4
198 #define IMPLEMENTATION_PCR 24
199 #define PLATFORM_PCR 24
200 #define DRTM_PCR 17
201 #define HCRTM_PCR 0
202 #define NUM_LOCALITIES 5
203 #define MAX_HANDLE_NUM 3
204 #define MAX_ACTIVE_SESSIONS 64
205 #define CONTEXT_SLOT UINT16
206 #define CONTEXT_COUNTER UINT64
207 #define MAX_LOADED_SESSIONS 3
208 #define MAX_SESSION_NUM 3
209 #define MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS 3
210 #define MIN_EVICT_OBJECTS 2
211 #define PCR_SELECT_MIN ((PLATFORM_PCR+7)/8)
212 #define PCR_SELECT_MAX ((IMPLEMENTATION_PCR+7)/8)
213 #define NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP 1
214 #define NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP 1
215 #define MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE 2048
216 #define MAX_DIGEST_BUFFER 1024
217 #define MAX_NV_INDEX_SIZE 2048
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218 #define MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE 1024
219 #define MAX_CAP_BUFFER 1024
220 #define NV_MEMORY_SIZE 16384
221 #define NUM_STATIC_PCR 16
222 #define MAX_ALG_LIST_SIZE 64
223 #define TIMER_PRESCALE 100000
224 #define PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE 32
225 #define CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG TPM_ALG_AES
226 #define CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS
227 #define CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BYTES ((CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS+7)/8)
228 #define CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_ALG TPM_ALG_SHA256
229 #define CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
230 #define PROOF_SIZE CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE
231 #define NV_CLOCK_UPDATE_INTERVAL 12
232 #define NUM_POLICY_PCR 1
233 #define MAX_COMMAND_SIZE 4096
234 #define MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE 4096
235 #define ORDERLY_BITS 8
236 #define MAX_ORDERLY_COUNT ((1<<ORDERLY_BITS)-1)
237 #define ALG_ID_FIRST TPM_ALG_FIRST
238 #define ALG_ID_LAST TPM_ALG_LAST
239 #define MAX_SYM_DATA 128
240 #define MAX_RNG_ENTROPY_SIZE 64
241 #define RAM_INDEX_SPACE 512
242 #define RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00010001
243 #define ENABLE_PCR_NO_INCREMENT YES
244 #define CRT_FORMAT_RSA YES
245 #define PRIVATE_VENDOR_SPECIFIC_BYTES \
246 ((MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2)*(3+CRT_FORMAT_RSA*2))
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 2 - Definition of TPM_ALG_ID Constants
247 typedef UINT16 TPM_ALG_ID;
248 #define TPM_ALG_ERROR (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0000)
249 #define ALG_ERROR_VALUE 0x0000
250 #if defined ALG_RSA && ALG_RSA == YES
251 #define TPM_ALG_RSA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0001)
252 #endif
253 #define ALG_RSA_VALUE 0x0001
254 #if defined ALG_SHA && ALG_SHA == YES
255 #define TPM_ALG_SHA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0004)
256 #endif
257 #define ALG_SHA_VALUE 0x0004
258 #if defined ALG_SHA1 && ALG_SHA1 == YES
259 #define TPM_ALG_SHA1 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0004)
260 #endif
261 #define ALG_SHA1_VALUE 0x0004
262 #if defined ALG_HMAC && ALG_HMAC == YES
263 #define TPM_ALG_HMAC (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0005)
264 #endif
265 #define ALG_HMAC_VALUE 0x0005
266 #if defined ALG_AES && ALG_AES == YES
267 #define TPM_ALG_AES (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0006)
268 #endif
269 #define ALG_AES_VALUE 0x0006
270 #if defined ALG_MGF1 && ALG_MGF1 == YES
271 #define TPM_ALG_MGF1 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0007)
272 #endif
273 #define ALG_MGF1_VALUE 0x0007
274 #if defined ALG_KEYEDHASH && ALG_KEYEDHASH == YES
275 #define TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0008)
276 #endif
277 #define ALG_KEYEDHASH_VALUE 0x0008
278 #if defined ALG_XOR && ALG_XOR == YES
279 #define TPM_ALG_XOR (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x000A)
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280 #endif
281 #define ALG_XOR_VALUE 0x000A
282 #if defined ALG_SHA256 && ALG_SHA256 == YES
283 #define TPM_ALG_SHA256 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x000B)
284 #endif
285 #define ALG_SHA256_VALUE 0x000B
286 #if defined ALG_SHA384 && ALG_SHA384 == YES
287 #define TPM_ALG_SHA384 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x000C)
288 #endif
289 #define ALG_SHA384_VALUE 0x000C
290 #if defined ALG_SHA512 && ALG_SHA512 == YES
291 #define TPM_ALG_SHA512 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x000D)
292 #endif
293 #define ALG_SHA512_VALUE 0x000D
294 #define TPM_ALG_NULL (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0010)
295 #define ALG_NULL_VALUE 0x0010
296 #if defined ALG_SM3_256 && ALG_SM3_256 == YES
297 #define TPM_ALG_SM3_256 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0012)
298 #endif
299 #define ALG_SM3_256_VALUE 0x0012
300 #if defined ALG_SM4 && ALG_SM4 == YES
301 #define TPM_ALG_SM4 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0013)
302 #endif
303 #define ALG_SM4_VALUE 0x0013
304 #if defined ALG_RSASSA && ALG_RSASSA == YES
305 #define TPM_ALG_RSASSA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0014)
306 #endif
307 #define ALG_RSASSA_VALUE 0x0014
308 #if defined ALG_RSAES && ALG_RSAES == YES
309 #define TPM_ALG_RSAES (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0015)
310 #endif
311 #define ALG_RSAES_VALUE 0x0015
312 #if defined ALG_RSAPSS && ALG_RSAPSS == YES
313 #define TPM_ALG_RSAPSS (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0016)
314 #endif
315 #define ALG_RSAPSS_VALUE 0x0016
316 #if defined ALG_OAEP && ALG_OAEP == YES
317 #define TPM_ALG_OAEP (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0017)
318 #endif
319 #define ALG_OAEP_VALUE 0x0017
320 #if defined ALG_ECDSA && ALG_ECDSA == YES
321 #define TPM_ALG_ECDSA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0018)
322 #endif
323 #define ALG_ECDSA_VALUE 0x0018
324 #if defined ALG_ECDH && ALG_ECDH == YES
325 #define TPM_ALG_ECDH (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0019)
326 #endif
327 #define ALG_ECDH_VALUE 0x0019
328 #if defined ALG_ECDAA && ALG_ECDAA == YES
329 #define TPM_ALG_ECDAA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x001A)
330 #endif
331 #define ALG_ECDAA_VALUE 0x001A
332 #if defined ALG_SM2 && ALG_SM2 == YES
333 #define TPM_ALG_SM2 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x001B)
334 #endif
335 #define ALG_SM2_VALUE 0x001B
336 #if defined ALG_ECSCHNORR && ALG_ECSCHNORR == YES
337 #define TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x001C)
338 #endif
339 #define ALG_ECSCHNORR_VALUE 0x001C
340 #if defined ALG_ECMQV && ALG_ECMQV == YES
341 #define TPM_ALG_ECMQV (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x001D)
342 #endif
343 #define ALG_ECMQV_VALUE 0x001D
344 #if defined ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A && ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A == YES
345 #define TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0020)
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346 #endif
347 #define ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A_VALUE 0x0020
348 #if defined ALG_KDF2 && ALG_KDF2 == YES
349 #define TPM_ALG_KDF2 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0021)
350 #endif
351 #define ALG_KDF2_VALUE 0x0021
352 #if defined ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 && ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 == YES
353 #define TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0022)
354 #endif
355 #define ALG_KDF1_SP800_108_VALUE 0x0022
356 #if defined ALG_ECC && ALG_ECC == YES
357 #define TPM_ALG_ECC (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0023)
358 #endif
359 #define ALG_ECC_VALUE 0x0023
360 #if defined ALG_SYMCIPHER && ALG_SYMCIPHER == YES
361 #define TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0025)
362 #endif
363 #define ALG_SYMCIPHER_VALUE 0x0025
364 #if defined ALG_CAMELLIA && ALG_CAMELLIA == YES
365 #define TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0026)
366 #endif
367 #define ALG_CAMELLIA_VALUE 0x0026
368 #if defined ALG_CTR && ALG_CTR == YES
369 #define TPM_ALG_CTR (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0040)
370 #endif
371 #define ALG_CTR_VALUE 0x0040
372 #if defined ALG_OFB && ALG_OFB == YES
373 #define TPM_ALG_OFB (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0041)
374 #endif
375 #define ALG_OFB_VALUE 0x0041
376 #if defined ALG_CBC && ALG_CBC == YES
377 #define TPM_ALG_CBC (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0042)
378 #endif
379 #define ALG_CBC_VALUE 0x0042
380 #if defined ALG_CFB && ALG_CFB == YES
381 #define TPM_ALG_CFB (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0043)
382 #endif
383 #define ALG_CFB_VALUE 0x0043
384 #if defined ALG_ECB && ALG_ECB == YES
385 #define TPM_ALG_ECB (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0044)
386 #endif
387 #define ALG_ECB_VALUE 0x0044
388 #define TPM_ALG_FIRST (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0001)
389 #define ALG_FIRST_VALUE 0x0001
390 #define TPM_ALG_LAST (TPM_ALG_ID)(0x0044)
391 #define ALG_LAST_VALUE 0x0044
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 3 - Definition of TPM_ECC_CURVE Constants
392 typedef UINT16 TPM_ECC_CURVE;
393 #define TPM_ECC_NONE (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0000)
394 #define TPM_ECC_NIST_P192 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0001)
395 #define TPM_ECC_NIST_P224 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0002)
396 #define TPM_ECC_NIST_P256 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0003)
397 #define TPM_ECC_NIST_P384 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0004)
398 #define TPM_ECC_NIST_P521 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0005)
399 #define TPM_ECC_BN_P256 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0010)
400 #define TPM_ECC_BN_P638 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0011)
401 #define TPM_ECC_SM2_P256 (TPM_ECC_CURVE)(0x0020)
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 4 - Defines for NIST_P192 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From
TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 5 - Defines for NIST_P224 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 6 - Defines for NIST_P256 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 7 - Defines for NIST_P384 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
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Algorithm Registry: Table 8 - Defines for NIST_P521 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 9 - Defines for BN_P256 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 10 - Defines for BN_P638 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 11 - Defines for SM2_P256 ECC Values Data in CrpiEccData.c From TCG
Algorithm Registry: Table 12 - Defines for SHA1 Hash Values
402 #define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
403 #define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE 64
404 #define SHA1_DER_SIZE 15
405 #define SHA1_DER \
406 0x30,0x21,0x30,0x09,0x06,0x05,0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1A,0x05,0x00,0x04,0x14
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 13 - Defines for SHA256 Hash Values
407 #define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
408 #define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64
409 #define SHA256_DER_SIZE 19
410 #define SHA256_DER \
411
0x30,0x31,0x30,0x0D,0x06,0x09,0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x01,0x05,0x00,0
x04,0x20
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 14 - Defines for SHA384 Hash Values
412 #define SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE 48
413 #define SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE 128
414 #define SHA384_DER_SIZE 19
415 #define SHA384_DER \
416
0x30,0x41,0x30,0x0D,0x06,0x09,0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x02,0x05,0x00,0
x04,0x30
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 15 - Defines for SHA512 Hash Values
417 #define SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE 64
418 #define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128
419 #define SHA512_DER_SIZE 19
420 #define SHA512_DER \
421
0x30,0x51,0x30,0x0D,0x06,0x09,0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x03,0x05,0x00,0
x04,0x40
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 16 - Defines for SM3_256 Hash Values
422 #define SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
423 #define SM3_256_BLOCK_SIZE 64
424 #define SM3_256_DER_SIZE 18
425 #define SM3_256_DER \
426
0x30,0x30,0x30,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0x81,0x45,0x01,0x83,0x11,0x05,0x00,0x04,0
x20
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 17 - Defines for AES Symmetric Cipher Algorithm Constants
427 #define AES_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128 YES
428 #define AES_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_192 YES
429 #define AES_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_256 YES
430 #define AES_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
431 #define AES_192_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
432 #define AES_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 18 - Defines for SM4 Symmetric Cipher Algorithm Constants
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433 #define SM4_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128 YES
434 #define SM4_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
From TCG Algorithm Registry: Table 19 - Defines for CAMELLIA Symmetric Cipher Algorithm Constants
435 #define CAMELLIA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_128 YES
436 #define CAMELLIA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_192 YES
437 #define CAMELLIA_ALLOWED_KEY_SIZE_256 YES
438 #define CAMELLIA_128_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
439 #define CAMELLIA_192_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
440 #define CAMELLIA_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 16
From TPM 2.0 Part 2: Table 13 - Definition of TPM_CC Constants
441 typedef UINT32 TPM_CC;
442 #define TPM_CC_FIRST (TPM_CC)(0x0000011F)
443 #define TPM_CC_PP_FIRST (TPM_CC)(0x0000011F)
444 #if defined CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial && CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial == YES
445 #define TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial (TPM_CC)(0x0000011F)
446 #endif
447 #if defined CC_EvictControl && CC_EvictControl == YES
448 #define TPM_CC_EvictControl (TPM_CC)(0x00000120)
449 #endif
450 #if defined CC_HierarchyControl && CC_HierarchyControl == YES
451 #define TPM_CC_HierarchyControl (TPM_CC)(0x00000121)
452 #endif
453 #if defined CC_NV_UndefineSpace && CC_NV_UndefineSpace == YES
454 #define TPM_CC_NV_UndefineSpace (TPM_CC)(0x00000122)
455 #endif
456 #if defined CC_ChangeEPS && CC_ChangeEPS == YES
457 #define TPM_CC_ChangeEPS (TPM_CC)(0x00000124)
458 #endif
459 #if defined CC_ChangePPS && CC_ChangePPS == YES
460 #define TPM_CC_ChangePPS (TPM_CC)(0x00000125)
461 #endif
462 #if defined CC_Clear && CC_Clear == YES
463 #define TPM_CC_Clear (TPM_CC)(0x00000126)
464 #endif
465 #if defined CC_ClearControl && CC_ClearControl == YES
466 #define TPM_CC_ClearControl (TPM_CC)(0x00000127)
467 #endif
468 #if defined CC_ClockSet && CC_ClockSet == YES
469 #define TPM_CC_ClockSet (TPM_CC)(0x00000128)
470 #endif
471 #if defined CC_HierarchyChangeAuth && CC_HierarchyChangeAuth == YES
472 #define TPM_CC_HierarchyChangeAuth (TPM_CC)(0x00000129)
473 #endif
474 #if defined CC_NV_DefineSpace && CC_NV_DefineSpace == YES
475 #define TPM_CC_NV_DefineSpace (TPM_CC)(0x0000012A)
476 #endif
477 #if defined CC_PCR_Allocate && CC_PCR_Allocate == YES
478 #define TPM_CC_PCR_Allocate (TPM_CC)(0x0000012B)
479 #endif
480 #if defined CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy && CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy == YES
481 #define TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthPolicy (TPM_CC)(0x0000012C)
482 #endif
483 #if defined CC_PP_Commands && CC_PP_Commands == YES
484 #define TPM_CC_PP_Commands (TPM_CC)(0x0000012D)
485 #endif
486 #if defined CC_SetPrimaryPolicy && CC_SetPrimaryPolicy == YES
487 #define TPM_CC_SetPrimaryPolicy (TPM_CC)(0x0000012E)
488 #endif
489 #if defined CC_FieldUpgradeStart && CC_FieldUpgradeStart == YES
490 #define TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeStart (TPM_CC)(0x0000012F)
491 #endif
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492 #if defined CC_ClockRateAdjust && CC_ClockRateAdjust == YES
493 #define TPM_CC_ClockRateAdjust (TPM_CC)(0x00000130)
494 #endif
495 #if defined CC_CreatePrimary && CC_CreatePrimary == YES
496 #define TPM_CC_CreatePrimary (TPM_CC)(0x00000131)
497 #endif
498 #if defined CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock && CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock == YES
499 #define TPM_CC_NV_GlobalWriteLock (TPM_CC)(0x00000132)
500 #endif
501 #define TPM_CC_PP_LAST (TPM_CC)(0x00000132)
502 #if defined CC_GetCommandAuditDigest && CC_GetCommandAuditDigest == YES
503 #define TPM_CC_GetCommandAuditDigest (TPM_CC)(0x00000133)
504 #endif
505 #if defined CC_NV_Increment && CC_NV_Increment == YES
506 #define TPM_CC_NV_Increment (TPM_CC)(0x00000134)
507 #endif
508 #if defined CC_NV_SetBits && CC_NV_SetBits == YES
509 #define TPM_CC_NV_SetBits (TPM_CC)(0x00000135)
510 #endif
511 #if defined CC_NV_Extend && CC_NV_Extend == YES
512 #define TPM_CC_NV_Extend (TPM_CC)(0x00000136)
513 #endif
514 #if defined CC_NV_Write && CC_NV_Write == YES
515 #define TPM_CC_NV_Write (TPM_CC)(0x00000137)
516 #endif
517 #if defined CC_NV_WriteLock && CC_NV_WriteLock == YES
518 #define TPM_CC_NV_WriteLock (TPM_CC)(0x00000138)
519 #endif
520 #if defined CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset && CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset == YES
521 #define TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackLockReset (TPM_CC)(0x00000139)
522 #endif
523 #if defined CC_DictionaryAttackParameters && CC_DictionaryAttackParameters == YES
524 #define TPM_CC_DictionaryAttackParameters (TPM_CC)(0x0000013A)
525 #endif
526 #if defined CC_NV_ChangeAuth && CC_NV_ChangeAuth == YES
527 #define TPM_CC_NV_ChangeAuth (TPM_CC)(0x0000013B)
528 #endif
529 #if defined CC_PCR_Event && CC_PCR_Event == YES
530 #define TPM_CC_PCR_Event (TPM_CC)(0x0000013C)
531 #endif
532 #if defined CC_PCR_Reset && CC_PCR_Reset == YES
533 #define TPM_CC_PCR_Reset (TPM_CC)(0x0000013D)
534 #endif
535 #if defined CC_SequenceComplete && CC_SequenceComplete == YES
536 #define TPM_CC_SequenceComplete (TPM_CC)(0x0000013E)
537 #endif
538 #if defined CC_SetAlgorithmSet && CC_SetAlgorithmSet == YES
539 #define TPM_CC_SetAlgorithmSet (TPM_CC)(0x0000013F)
540 #endif
541 #if defined CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus && CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus == YES
542 #define TPM_CC_SetCommandCodeAuditStatus (TPM_CC)(0x00000140)
543 #endif
544 #if defined CC_FieldUpgradeData && CC_FieldUpgradeData == YES
545 #define TPM_CC_FieldUpgradeData (TPM_CC)(0x00000141)
546 #endif
547 #if defined CC_IncrementalSelfTest && CC_IncrementalSelfTest == YES
548 #define TPM_CC_IncrementalSelfTest (TPM_CC)(0x00000142)
549 #endif
550 #if defined CC_SelfTest && CC_SelfTest == YES
551 #define TPM_CC_SelfTest (TPM_CC)(0x00000143)
552 #endif
553 #if defined CC_Startup && CC_Startup == YES
554 #define TPM_CC_Startup (TPM_CC)(0x00000144)
555 #endif
556 #if defined CC_Shutdown && CC_Shutdown == YES
557 #define TPM_CC_Shutdown (TPM_CC)(0x00000145)
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558 #endif
559 #if defined CC_StirRandom && CC_StirRandom == YES
560 #define TPM_CC_StirRandom (TPM_CC)(0x00000146)
561 #endif
562 #if defined CC_ActivateCredential && CC_ActivateCredential == YES
563 #define TPM_CC_ActivateCredential (TPM_CC)(0x00000147)
564 #endif
565 #if defined CC_Certify && CC_Certify == YES
566 #define TPM_CC_Certify (TPM_CC)(0x00000148)
567 #endif
568 #if defined CC_PolicyNV && CC_PolicyNV == YES
569 #define TPM_CC_PolicyNV (TPM_CC)(0x00000149)
570 #endif
571 #if defined CC_CertifyCreation && CC_CertifyCreation == YES
572 #define TPM_CC_CertifyCreation (TPM_CC)(0x0000014A)
573 #endif
574 #if defined CC_Duplicate && CC_Duplicate == YES
575 #define TPM_CC_Duplicate (TPM_CC)(0x0000014B)
576 #endif
577 #if defined CC_GetTime && CC_GetTime == YES
578 #define TPM_CC_GetTime (TPM_CC)(0x0000014C)
579 #endif
580 #if defined CC_GetSessionAuditDigest && CC_GetSessionAuditDigest == YES
581 #define TPM_CC_GetSessionAuditDigest (TPM_CC)(0x0000014D)
582 #endif
583 #if defined CC_NV_Read && CC_NV_Read == YES
584 #define TPM_CC_NV_Read (TPM_CC)(0x0000014E)
585 #endif
586 #if defined CC_NV_ReadLock && CC_NV_ReadLock == YES
587 #define TPM_CC_NV_ReadLock (TPM_CC)(0x0000014F)
588 #endif
589 #if defined CC_ObjectChangeAuth && CC_ObjectChangeAuth == YES
590 #define TPM_CC_ObjectChangeAuth (TPM_CC)(0x00000150)
591 #endif
592 #if defined CC_PolicySecret && CC_PolicySecret == YES
593 #define TPM_CC_PolicySecret (TPM_CC)(0x00000151)
594 #endif
595 #if defined CC_Rewrap && CC_Rewrap == YES
596 #define TPM_CC_Rewrap (TPM_CC)(0x00000152)
597 #endif
598 #if defined CC_Create && CC_Create == YES
599 #define TPM_CC_Create (TPM_CC)(0x00000153)
600 #endif
601 #if defined CC_ECDH_ZGen && CC_ECDH_ZGen == YES
602 #define TPM_CC_ECDH_ZGen (TPM_CC)(0x00000154)
603 #endif
604 #if defined CC_HMAC && CC_HMAC == YES
605 #define TPM_CC_HMAC (TPM_CC)(0x00000155)
606 #endif
607 #if defined CC_Import && CC_Import == YES
608 #define TPM_CC_Import (TPM_CC)(0x00000156)
609 #endif
610 #if defined CC_Load && CC_Load == YES
611 #define TPM_CC_Load (TPM_CC)(0x00000157)
612 #endif
613 #if defined CC_Quote && CC_Quote == YES
614 #define TPM_CC_Quote (TPM_CC)(0x00000158)
615 #endif
616 #if defined CC_RSA_Decrypt && CC_RSA_Decrypt == YES
617 #define TPM_CC_RSA_Decrypt (TPM_CC)(0x00000159)
618 #endif
619 #if defined CC_HMAC_Start && CC_HMAC_Start == YES
620 #define TPM_CC_HMAC_Start (TPM_CC)(0x0000015B)
621 #endif
622 #if defined CC_SequenceUpdate && CC_SequenceUpdate == YES
623 #define TPM_CC_SequenceUpdate (TPM_CC)(0x0000015C)
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624 #endif
625 #if defined CC_Sign && CC_Sign == YES
626 #define TPM_CC_Sign (TPM_CC)(0x0000015D)
627 #endif
628 #if defined CC_Unseal && CC_Unseal == YES
629 #define TPM_CC_Unseal (TPM_CC)(0x0000015E)
630 #endif
631 #if defined CC_PolicySigned && CC_PolicySigned == YES
632 #define TPM_CC_PolicySigned (TPM_CC)(0x00000160)
633 #endif
634 #if defined CC_ContextLoad && CC_ContextLoad == YES
635 #define TPM_CC_ContextLoad (TPM_CC)(0x00000161)
636 #endif
637 #if defined CC_ContextSave && CC_ContextSave == YES
638 #define TPM_CC_ContextSave (TPM_CC)(0x00000162)
639 #endif
640 #if defined CC_ECDH_KeyGen && CC_ECDH_KeyGen == YES
641 #define TPM_CC_ECDH_KeyGen (TPM_CC)(0x00000163)
642 #endif
643 #if defined CC_EncryptDecrypt && CC_EncryptDecrypt == YES
644 #define TPM_CC_EncryptDecrypt (TPM_CC)(0x00000164)
645 #endif
646 #if defined CC_FlushContext && CC_FlushContext == YES
647 #define TPM_CC_FlushContext (TPM_CC)(0x00000165)
648 #endif
649 #if defined CC_LoadExternal && CC_LoadExternal == YES
650 #define TPM_CC_LoadExternal (TPM_CC)(0x00000167)
651 #endif
652 #if defined CC_MakeCredential && CC_MakeCredential == YES
653 #define TPM_CC_MakeCredential (TPM_CC)(0x00000168)
654 #endif
655 #if defined CC_NV_ReadPublic && CC_NV_ReadPublic == YES
656 #define TPM_CC_NV_ReadPublic (TPM_CC)(0x00000169)
657 #endif
658 #if defined CC_PolicyAuthorize && CC_PolicyAuthorize == YES
659 #define TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize (TPM_CC)(0x0000016A)
660 #endif
661 #if defined CC_PolicyAuthValue && CC_PolicyAuthValue == YES
662 #define TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue (TPM_CC)(0x0000016B)
663 #endif
664 #if defined CC_PolicyCommandCode && CC_PolicyCommandCode == YES
665 #define TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode (TPM_CC)(0x0000016C)
666 #endif
667 #if defined CC_PolicyCounterTimer && CC_PolicyCounterTimer == YES
668 #define TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer (TPM_CC)(0x0000016D)
669 #endif
670 #if defined CC_PolicyCpHash && CC_PolicyCpHash == YES
671 #define TPM_CC_PolicyCpHash (TPM_CC)(0x0000016E)
672 #endif
673 #if defined CC_PolicyLocality && CC_PolicyLocality == YES
674 #define TPM_CC_PolicyLocality (TPM_CC)(0x0000016F)
675 #endif
676 #if defined CC_PolicyNameHash && CC_PolicyNameHash == YES
677 #define TPM_CC_PolicyNameHash (TPM_CC)(0x00000170)
678 #endif
679 #if defined CC_PolicyOR && CC_PolicyOR == YES
680 #define TPM_CC_PolicyOR (TPM_CC)(0x00000171)
681 #endif
682 #if defined CC_PolicyTicket && CC_PolicyTicket == YES
683 #define TPM_CC_PolicyTicket (TPM_CC)(0x00000172)
684 #endif
685 #if defined CC_ReadPublic && CC_ReadPublic == YES
686 #define TPM_CC_ReadPublic (TPM_CC)(0x00000173)
687 #endif
688 #if defined CC_RSA_Encrypt && CC_RSA_Encrypt == YES
689 #define TPM_CC_RSA_Encrypt (TPM_CC)(0x00000174)
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690 #endif
691 #if defined CC_StartAuthSession && CC_StartAuthSession == YES
692 #define TPM_CC_StartAuthSession (TPM_CC)(0x00000176)
693 #endif
694 #if defined CC_VerifySignature && CC_VerifySignature == YES
695 #define TPM_CC_VerifySignature (TPM_CC)(0x00000177)
696 #endif
697 #if defined CC_ECC_Parameters && CC_ECC_Parameters == YES
698 #define TPM_CC_ECC_Parameters (TPM_CC)(0x00000178)
699 #endif
700 #if defined CC_FirmwareRead && CC_FirmwareRead == YES
701 #define TPM_CC_FirmwareRead (TPM_CC)(0x00000179)
702 #endif
703 #if defined CC_GetCapability && CC_GetCapability == YES
704 #define TPM_CC_GetCapability (TPM_CC)(0x0000017A)
705 #endif
706 #if defined CC_GetRandom && CC_GetRandom == YES
707 #define TPM_CC_GetRandom (TPM_CC)(0x0000017B)
708 #endif
709 #if defined CC_GetTestResult && CC_GetTestResult == YES
710 #define TPM_CC_GetTestResult (TPM_CC)(0x0000017C)
711 #endif
712 #if defined CC_Hash && CC_Hash == YES
713 #define TPM_CC_Hash (TPM_CC)(0x0000017D)
714 #endif
715 #if defined CC_PCR_Read && CC_PCR_Read == YES
716 #define TPM_CC_PCR_Read (TPM_CC)(0x0000017E)
717 #endif
718 #if defined CC_PolicyPCR && CC_PolicyPCR == YES
719 #define TPM_CC_PolicyPCR (TPM_CC)(0x0000017F)
720 #endif
721 #if defined CC_PolicyRestart && CC_PolicyRestart == YES
722 #define TPM_CC_PolicyRestart (TPM_CC)(0x00000180)
723 #endif
724 #if defined CC_ReadClock && CC_ReadClock == YES
725 #define TPM_CC_ReadClock (TPM_CC)(0x00000181)
726 #endif
727 #if defined CC_PCR_Extend && CC_PCR_Extend == YES
728 #define TPM_CC_PCR_Extend (TPM_CC)(0x00000182)
729 #endif
730 #if defined CC_PCR_SetAuthValue && CC_PCR_SetAuthValue == YES
731 #define TPM_CC_PCR_SetAuthValue (TPM_CC)(0x00000183)
732 #endif
733 #if defined CC_NV_Certify && CC_NV_Certify == YES
734 #define TPM_CC_NV_Certify (TPM_CC)(0x00000184)
735 #endif
736 #if defined CC_EventSequenceComplete && CC_EventSequenceComplete == YES
737 #define TPM_CC_EventSequenceComplete (TPM_CC)(0x00000185)
738 #endif
739 #if defined CC_HashSequenceStart && CC_HashSequenceStart == YES
740 #define TPM_CC_HashSequenceStart (TPM_CC)(0x00000186)
741 #endif
742 #if defined CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence && CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence == YES
743 #define TPM_CC_PolicyPhysicalPresence (TPM_CC)(0x00000187)
744 #endif
745 #if defined CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect && CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect == YES
746 #define TPM_CC_PolicyDuplicationSelect (TPM_CC)(0x00000188)
747 #endif
748 #if defined CC_PolicyGetDigest && CC_PolicyGetDigest == YES
749 #define TPM_CC_PolicyGetDigest (TPM_CC)(0x00000189)
750 #endif
751 #if defined CC_TestParms && CC_TestParms == YES
752 #define TPM_CC_TestParms (TPM_CC)(0x0000018A)
753 #endif
754 #if defined CC_Commit && CC_Commit == YES
755 #define TPM_CC_Commit (TPM_CC)(0x0000018B)
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756 #endif
757 #if defined CC_PolicyPassword && CC_PolicyPassword == YES
758 #define TPM_CC_PolicyPassword (TPM_CC)(0x0000018C)
759 #endif
760 #if defined CC_ZGen_2Phase && CC_ZGen_2Phase == YES
761 #define TPM_CC_ZGen_2Phase (TPM_CC)(0x0000018D)
762 #endif
763 #if defined CC_EC_Ephemeral && CC_EC_Ephemeral == YES
764 #define TPM_CC_EC_Ephemeral (TPM_CC)(0x0000018E)
765 #endif
766 #if defined CC_PolicyNvWritten && CC_PolicyNvWritten == YES
767 #define TPM_CC_PolicyNvWritten (TPM_CC)(0x0000018F)
768 #endif
769 #define TPM_CC_LAST (TPM_CC)(0x0000018F)
770 #ifndef MAX
771 #define MAX(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))
772 #endif
773 #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE ( \
774 MAX(ALG_SHA1 * SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE, \
775 MAX(ALG_SHA256 * SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, \
776 MAX(ALG_SHA384 * SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE, \
777 MAX(ALG_SM3_256 * SM3_256_BLOCK_SIZE, \
778 MAX(ALG_SHA512 * SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, \
779 0 ))))))
780 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ( \
781 MAX(ALG_SHA1 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, \
782 MAX(ALG_SHA256 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, \
783 MAX(ALG_SHA384 * SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, \
784 MAX(ALG_SM3_256 * SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE, \
785 MAX(ALG_SHA512 * SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, \
786 0 ))))))
787 #if MAX_DIGEST_SIZE == 0 || MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE == 0
788 #error "Hash data not valid"
789 #endif
790 #define HASH_COUNT (ALG_SHA1+ALG_SHA256+ALG_SHA384+ALG_SM3_256+ALG_SHA512)
Define the 2B structure that would hold any hash block
791 TPM2B_TYPE(MAX_HASH_BLOCK, MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
Folloing typedef is for some old code
792 typedef TPM2B_MAX_HASH_BLOCK TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK;
793 #ifndef MAX
794 #define MAX(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))
795 #endif
796 #ifndef ALG_CAMELLIA
797 # define ALG_CAMELLIA NO
798 #endif
799 #ifndef MAX_CAMELLIA_KEY_BITS
800 # define MAX_CAMELLIA_KEY_BITS 0
801 # define MAX_CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 0
802 #endif
803 #ifndef ALG_SM4
804 # define ALG_SM4 NO
805 #endif
806 #ifndef MAX_SM4_KEY_BITS
807 # define MAX_SM4_KEY_BITS 0
808 # define MAX_SM4_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 0
809 #endif
810 #ifndef ALG_AES
811 # define ALG_AES NO
812 #endif
813 #ifndef MAX_AES_KEY_BITS
814 # define MAX_AES_KEY_BITS 0
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815 # define MAX_AES_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES 0
816 #endif
817 #define MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS ( \
818 MAX(MAX_CAMELLIA_KEY_BITS * ALG_CAMELLIA, \
819 MAX(MAX_SM4_KEY_BITS * ALG_SM4, \
820 MAX(MAX_AES_KEY_BITS * ALG_AES, \
821 0))))
822 #define MAX_SYM_KEY_BYTES ((MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS + 7) / 8)
823 #define MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE ( \
824 MAX(MAX_CAMELLIA_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES * ALG_CAMELLIA, \
825 MAX(MAX_SM4_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES * ALG_SM4, \
826 MAX(MAX_AES_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES * ALG_AES, \
827 0))))
828 #if MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS == 0 || MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE == 0
829 # error Bad size for MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS or MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE
830 #endif
Define the 2B structure for a seed
831 TPM2B_TYPE(SEED, PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE);
832 #endif // _IMPLEMENTATION_H_
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Annex B
(informative)
Cryptographic Library Interface
B.1 Introduction
The files in this annex provide cryptographic support functions for the TPM.
When possible, the functions in these files make calls to functions that are provided by a cryptographic
library (for this annex, it is OpenSSL). In many cases, there is a mismatch between the function
performed by the cryptographic library and the function needed by the TPM. In those cases, a function is
provided in the code in this clause.
There are cases where the cryptographic library could have been used for a specific function but not all
functions of the same group. An example is that the OpenSSL version of CFB was not suitable for the
requirements of the TPM. Rather than have one symmetric mode be provided in this code with the
remaining modes provided by OpenSSL, all the symmetric modes are provided in this code.
The provided cryptographic code is believed to be functionally correct but it might not be conformant with
all applicable standards. For example, the RSA key generation schemes produces serviceable RSA keys
but the method is not compliant with FIPS 186-3. Still, the implementation meets the major objective of
the implementation, which is to demonstrate proper TPM behavior. It is not an objective of this
implementation to be submitted for certification.
B.2 Integer Format
The big integers passed to/from the function interfaces in the crypto engine are in BYTE buffers that have
the same format used in the TPM 2.0 specification that states:
"Integer values are considered to be an array of one or more bytes. The byte at offset zero within the
array is the most significant byte of the integer."
B.3 CryptoEngine.h
B.3.1. Introduction
This file contains constant definition shared by CryptUtil() and the parts of the Crypto Engine.
1 #ifndef _CRYPT_PRI_H
2 #define _CRYPT_PRI_H
3 #include <stddef.h>
4 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
5 #include "BaseTypes.h"
6 #include "TpmError.h"
7 #include "swap.h"
8 #include "Implementation.h"
9 #include "TPM_types.h"
10 //#include "TPMB.h"
11 #include "bool.h"
12 #include "Platform.h"
13 #ifndef NULL
14 #define NULL 0
15 #endif
16 typedef UINT16 NUMBYTES; // When a size is a number of bytes
17 typedef UINT32 NUMDIGITS; // When a size is a number of "digits"
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B.3.2. General Purpose Macros
18 #ifndef MAX
19 # define MAX(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : b)
20 #endif
This is the definition of a bit array with one bit per algorithm
21 typedef BYTE ALGORITHM_VECTOR[(ALG_LAST_VALUE + 7) / 8];
B.3.3. Self-test
This structure is used to contain self-test tracking information for the crypto engine. Each of the major
modules is given a 32-bit value in which it may maintain its own self test information. The convention for
this state is that when all of the bits in this structure are 0, all functions need to be tested.
22 typedef struct {
23 UINT32 rng;
24 UINT32 hash;
25 UINT32 sym;
26 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
27 UINT32 rsa;
28 #endif
29 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
30 UINT32 ecc;
31 #endif
32 } CRYPTO_SELF_TEST_STATE;
B.3.4. Hash-related Structures
33 typedef struct {
34 const TPM_ALG_ID alg;
35 const NUMBYTES digestSize;
36 const NUMBYTES blockSize;
37 const NUMBYTES derSize;
38 const BYTE der[20];
39 } HASH_INFO;
This value will change with each implementation. The value of 16 is used to account for any slop in the
context values. The overall size needs to be as large as any of the hash contexts. The structure needs to
start on an alignment boundary and be an even multiple of the alignment
40 #define ALIGNED_SIZE(x, b) ((((x) + (b) - 1) / (b)) * (b))
41 #define MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE ((2 * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE) + 16)
42 #define MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE_ALIGNED \
43 ALIGNED_SIZE(MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE, CRYPTO_ALIGNMENT)
This is an byte array that will hold any of the hash contexts.
44 typedef CRYPTO_ALIGNED BYTE ALIGNED_HASH_STATE[MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE_ALIGNED];
Macro to align an address to the next higher size
45 #define AlignPointer(address, align) \
46 ((((intptr_t)&(address)) + (align - 1)) & ~(align - 1))
Macro to test alignment
47 #define IsAddressAligned(address, align) \
48 (((intptr_t)(address) & (align - 1)) == 0)
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This is the structure that is used for passing a context into the hashing functions. It should be the same
size as the function context used within the hashing functions. This is checked when the hash function is
initialized. This version uses a new layout for the contexts and a different definition. The state buffer is an
array of HASH_UNIT values so that a decent compiler will put the structure on a HASH_UNIT boundary.
If the structure is not properly aligned, the code that manipulates the structure will copy to a properly
aligned structure before it is used and copy the result back. This just makes things slower.
49 typedef struct _HASH_STATE
50 {
51 ALIGNED_HASH_STATE state;
52 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg;
53 } CPRI_HASH_STATE, *PCPRI_HASH_STATE;
54 extern const HASH_INFO g_hashData[HASH_COUNT + 1];
This is for the external hash state. This implementation assumes that the size of the exported hash state
is no larger than the internal hash state. There is a compile-time check to make sure that this is true.
55 typedef struct {
56 ALIGNED_HASH_STATE buffer;
57 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg;
58 } EXPORT_HASH_STATE;
59 typedef enum {
60 IMPORT_STATE, // Converts externally formatted state to internal
61 EXPORT_STATE // Converts internal formatted state to external
62 } IMPORT_EXPORT;
Values and structures for the random number generator. These values are defined in this header file so
that the size of the RNG state can be known to TPM.lib. This allows the allocation of some space in NV
memory for the state to be stored on an orderly shutdown. The GET_PUT enum is used by
_cpri__DrbgGetPutState() to indicate the direction of data flow.
63 typedef enum {
64 GET_STATE, // Get the state to save to NV
65 PUT_STATE // Restore the state from NV
66 } GET_PUT;
The DRBG based on a symmetric block cipher is defined by three values,
a) the key size
b) the block size (the IV size)
c) the symmetric algorithm
67 #define DRBG_KEY_SIZE_BITS MAX_AES_KEY_BITS
68 #define DRBG_IV_SIZE_BITS (MAX_AES_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES * 8)
69 #define DRBG_ALGORITHM TPM_ALG_AES
70 #if ((DRBG_KEY_SIZE_BITS % 8) != 0) || ((DRBG_IV_SIZE_BITS % 8) != 0)
71 #error "Key size and IV for DRBG must be even multiples of 8"
72 #endif
73 #if (DRBG_KEY_SIZE_BITS % DRBG_IV_SIZE_BITS) != 0
74 #error "Key size for DRBG must be even multiple of the cypher block size"
75 #endif
76 typedef UINT32 DRBG_SEED[(DRBG_KEY_SIZE_BITS + DRBG_IV_SIZE_BITS) / 32];
77 typedef struct {
78 UINT64 reseedCounter;
79 UINT32 magic;
80 DRBG_SEED seed; // contains the key and IV for the counter mode DRBG
81 UINT32 lastValue[4]; // used when the TPM does continuous self-test
82 // for FIPS compliance of DRBG
83 } DRBG_STATE, *pDRBG_STATE;
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B.3.5. Asymmetric Structures and Values
84 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
B.3.5.1. ECC-related Structures
This structure replicates the structure definition in TPM_Types.h. It is duplicated to avoid inclusion of all of
TPM_Types.h This structure is similar to the RSA_KEY structure below. The purpose of these structures
is to reduce the overhead of a function call and to make the code less dependent on key types as much
as possible.
85 typedef struct {
86 UINT32 curveID; // The curve identifier
87 TPMS_ECC_POINT *publicPoint; // Pointer to the public point
88 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *privateKey; // Pointer to the private key
89 } ECC_KEY;
90 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
91 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
B.3.5.2. RSA-related Structures
This structure is a succinct representation of the cryptographic components of an RSA key.
92 typedef struct {
93 UINT32 exponent; // The public exponent pointer
94 TPM2B *publicKey; // Pointer to the public modulus
95 TPM2B *privateKey; // The private exponent (not a prime)
96 } RSA_KEY;
97 #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA
B.3.6. Miscelaneous
98 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
99 # ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
100 # if MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES > MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
101 # define MAX_NUMBER_SIZE MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES
102 # else
103 # define MAX_NUMBER_SIZE MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
104 # endif
105 # else // RSA but no ECC
106 # define MAX_NUMBER_SIZE MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES
107 # endif
108 #elif defined TPM_ALG_ECC
109 # define MAX_NUMBER_SIZE MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
110 #else
111 # error No assymmetric algorithm implemented.
112 #endif
113 typedef INT16 CRYPT_RESULT;
114 #define CRYPT_RESULT_MIN INT16_MIN
115 #define CRYPT_RESULT_MAX INT16_MAX
<0 recoverable error
0 success
>0 command specific return value (generally a digest size)
116 #define CRYPT_FAIL ((CRYPT_RESULT) 1)
117 #define CRYPT_SUCCESS ((CRYPT_RESULT) 0)
118 #define CRYPT_NO_RESULT ((CRYPT_RESULT) -1)
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119 #define CRYPT_SCHEME ((CRYPT_RESULT) -2)
120 #define CRYPT_PARAMETER ((CRYPT_RESULT) -3)
121 #define CRYPT_UNDERFLOW ((CRYPT_RESULT) -4)
122 #define CRYPT_POINT ((CRYPT_RESULT) -5)
123 #define CRYPT_CANCEL ((CRYPT_RESULT) -6)
124 typedef UINT64 HASH_CONTEXT[MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE/sizeof(UINT64)];
125 #include "CpriCryptPri_fp.h"
126 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
127 # include "CpriDataEcc.h"
128 # include "CpriECC_fp.h"
129 #endif
130 #include "MathFunctions_fp.h"
131 #include "CpriRNG_fp.h"
132 #include "CpriHash_fp.h"
133 #include "CpriSym_fp.h"
134 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
135 # include "CpriRSA_fp.h"
136 #endif
137 #endif // !_CRYPT_PRI_H
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B.4 OsslCryptoEngine.h
B.4.1. Introduction
This is the header file used by the components of the CryptoEngine(). This file should not be included in
any file other than the files in the crypto engine.
Vendors may replace the implementation in this file by a local crypto engine. The implementation in this
file is based on OpenSSL() library. Integer format: the big integers passed in/out the function interfaces in
this library by a byte buffer (BYTE *) adopt the same format used in TPM 2.0 specification: Integer values
are considered to be an array of one or more bytes. The byte at offset zero within the array is the most
significant byte of the integer.
B.4.2. Defines
1 #ifndef _OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_H
2 #define _OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_H
3 #include <openssl/aes.h>
4 #include <openssl/evp.h>
5 #include <openssl/sha.h>
6 #include <openssl/ec.h>
7 #include <openssl/rand.h>
8 #include <openssl/bn.h>
9 #include <openSSL/ec_lcl.h>
10 #define CRYPTO_ENGINE
11 #include "CryptoEngine.h"
12 #include "CpriMisc_fp.h"
13 #define MAX_ECC_PARAMETER_BYTES 32
14 #define MAX_2B_BYTES MAX((MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES * ALG_RSA), \
15 MAX((MAX_ECC_PARAMETER_BYTES * ALG_ECC), \
16 MAX_DIGEST_SIZE))
17 #define assert2Bsize(a) pAssert((a).size <= sizeof((a).buffer))
18 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
19 # ifdef RSA_KEY_SIEVE
20 # include "RsaKeySieve.h"
21 # include "RsaKeySieve_fp.h"
22 # endif
23 # include "CpriRSA_fp.h"
24 #endif
This is a structure to hold the parameters for the version of KDFa() used by the CryptoEngine(). This
structure allows the state to be passed between multiple functions that use the same pseudo-random
sequence.
25 typedef struct {
26 CPRI_HASH_STATE iPadCtx;
27 CPRI_HASH_STATE oPadCtx;
28 TPM2B *extra;
29 UINT32 *outer;
30 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg;
31 UINT16 keySizeInBits;
32 } KDFa_CONTEXT;
33 #endif // _OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_H
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B.5 MathFunctions.c
B.5.1. Introduction
This file contains implementation of some of the big number primitives. This is used in order to reduce the
overhead in dealing with data conversions to standard big number format.
The simulator code uses the canonical form whenever possible in order to make the code in Part 3 more
accessible. The canonical data formats are simple and not well suited for complex big number
computations. This library provides functions that are found in typical big number libraries but they are
written to handle the canonical data format of the reference TPM.
In some cases, data is converted to a big number format used by a standard library, such as OpenSSL().
This is done when the computations are complex enough warrant conversion. Vendors may replace the
implementation in this file with a library that provides equivalent functions. A vendor may also rewrite the
TPM code so that it uses a standard big number format instead of the canonical form and use the
standard libraries instead of the code in this file.
The implementation in this file makes use of the OpenSSL() library.
Integer format: integers passed through the function interfaces in this library adopt the same format used
in TPM 2.0 specification. It defines an integer as "an array of one or more octets with the most significant
octet at the lowest index of the array." An additional value is needed to indicate the number of significant
bytes.
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
B.5.2. Externally Accessible Functions
B.5.2.1. _math__Normalize2B()
This function will normalize the value in a TPM2B. If there are leading bytes of zero, the first non-zero
byte is shifted up.
Return Value Meaning
0 no significant bytes, value is zero
>0 number of significant bytes
2 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
3 _math__Normalize2B(
4 TPM2B *b // IN/OUT: number to normalize
5 )
6 {
7 UINT16 from;
8 UINT16 to;
9 UINT16 size = b->size;
10
11 for(from = 0; b->buffer[from] == 0 && from < size; from++);
12 b->size -= from;
13 for(to = 0; from < size; to++, from++ )
14 b->buffer[to] = b->buffer[from];
15 return b->size;
16 }
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B.5.2.2. _math__Denormalize2B()
This function is used to adjust a TPM2B so that the number has the desired number of bytes. This is
accomplished by adding bytes of zero at the start of the number.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE number de-normalized
FALSE number already larger than the desired size
17 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
18 _math__Denormalize2B(
19 TPM2B *in, // IN:OUT TPM2B number to de-normalize
20 UINT32 size // IN: the desired size
21 )
22 {
23 UINT32 to;
24 UINT32 from;
25 // If the current size is greater than the requested size, see if this can be
26 // normalized to a value smaller than the requested size and then de-normalize
27 if(in->size > size)
28 {
29 _math__Normalize2B(in);
30 if(in->size > size)
31 return FALSE;
32 }
33 // If the size is already what is requested, leave
34 if(in->size == size)
35 return TRUE;
36
37 // move the bytes to the 'right'
38 for(from = in->size, to = size; from > 0;)
39 in->buffer[--to] = in->buffer[--from];
40
41 // 'to' will always be greater than 0 because we checked for equal above.
42 for(; to > 0;)
43 in->buffer[--to] = 0;
44
45 in->size = (UINT16)size;
46 return TRUE;
47 }
B.5.2.3. _math__sub()
This function to subtract one unsigned value from another c = a - b. c may be the same as a or b.
Return Value Meaning
1 if (a > b) so no borrow
0 if (a = b) so no borrow and b == a
-1 if (a < b) so there was a borrow
48 LIB_EXPORT int
49 _math__sub(
50 const UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
51 const BYTE *a, // IN: a
52 const UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
53 const BYTE *b, // IN: b
54 UINT16 *cSize, // OUT: set to MAX(aSize, bSize)
55 BYTE *c // OUT: the difference
56 )
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57 {
58 int borrow = 0;
59 int notZero = 0;
60 int i;
61 int i2;
62
63 // set c to the longer of a or b
64 *cSize = (UINT16)((aSize > bSize) ? aSize : bSize);
65 // pick the shorter of a and b
66 i = (aSize > bSize) ? bSize : aSize;
67 i2 = *cSize - i;
68 a = &a[aSize - 1];
69 b = &b[bSize - 1];
70 c = &c[*cSize - 1];
71 for(; i > 0; i--)
72 {
73 borrow = *a-- - *b-- + borrow;
74 *c-- = (BYTE)borrow;
75 notZero = notZero || borrow;
76 borrow >>= 8;
77 }
78 if(aSize > bSize)
79 {
80 for(;i2 > 0; i2--)
81 {
82 borrow = *a-- + borrow;
83 *c-- = (BYTE)borrow;
84 notZero = notZero || borrow;
85 borrow >>= 8;
86 }
87 }
88 else if(aSize < bSize)
89 {
90 for(;i2 > 0; i2--)
91 {
92 borrow = 0 - *b-- + borrow;
93 *c-- = (BYTE)borrow;
94 notZero = notZero || borrow;
95 borrow >>= 8;
96 }
97 }
98 // if there is a borrow, then b > a
99 if(borrow)
100 return -1;
101 // either a > b or they are the same
102 return notZero;
103 }
B.5.2.4. _math__Inc()
This function increments a large, big-endian number value by one.
Return Value Meaning
0 result is zero
!0 result is not zero
104 LIB_EXPORT int
105 _math__Inc(
106 UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
107 BYTE *a // IN: a
108 )
109 {
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110
111 for(a = &a[aSize-1];aSize > 0; aSize--)
112 {
113 if((*a-- += 1) != 0)
114 return 1;
115 }
116 return 0;
117 }
B.5.2.5. _math__Dec()
This function decrements a large, ENDIAN value by one.
118 LIB_EXPORT void
119 _math__Dec(
120 UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
121 BYTE *a // IN: a
122 )
123 {
124 for(a = &a[aSize-1]; aSize > 0; aSize--)
125 {
126 if((*a-- -= 1) != 0xff)
127 return;
128 }
129 return;
130 }
B.5.2.6. _math__Mul()
This function is used to multiply two large integers: p = a* b. If the size of p is not specified (pSize ==
NULL), the size of the results p is assumed to be aSize + bSize and the results are de-normalized so that
the resulting size is exactly aSize + bSize. If pSize is provided, then the actual size of the result is
returned. The initial value for pSize must be at least aSize + pSize.
Return Value Meaning
<0 indicates an error
>= 0 the size of the product
131 LIB_EXPORT int
132 _math__Mul(
133 const UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
134 const BYTE *a, // IN: a
135 const UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
136 const BYTE *b, // IN: b
137 UINT32 *pSize, // IN/OUT: size of the product
138 BYTE *p // OUT: product. length of product = aSize +
139 // bSize
140 )
141 {
142 BIGNUM *bnA;
143 BIGNUM *bnB;
144 BIGNUM *bnP;
145 BN_CTX *context;
146 int retVal = 0;
147
148 // First check that pSize is large enough if present
149 if((pSize != NULL) && (*pSize < (aSize + bSize)))
150 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
151 pAssert(pSize == NULL || *pSize <= MAX_2B_BYTES);
152 //
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153 // Allocate space for BIGNUM context
154 //
155 context = BN_CTX_new();
156 if(context == NULL)
157 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
158 bnA = BN_CTX_get(context);
159 bnB = BN_CTX_get(context);
160 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
161 if (bnP == NULL)
162 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
163
164 // Convert the inputs to BIGNUMs
165 //
166 if (BN_bin2bn(a, aSize, bnA) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(b, bSize, bnB) == NULL)
167 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
168
169 // Perform the multiplication
170 //
171 if (BN_mul(bnP, bnA, bnB, context) != 1)
172 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
173
174 // If the size of the results is allowed to float, then set the return
175 // size. Otherwise, it might be necessary to de-normalize the results
176 retVal = BN_num_bytes(bnP);
177 if(pSize == NULL)
178 {
179 BN_bn2bin(bnP, &p[aSize + bSize - retVal]);
180 memset(p, 0, aSize + bSize - retVal);
181 retVal = aSize + bSize;
182 }
183 else
184 {
185 BN_bn2bin(bnP, p);
186 *pSize = retVal;
187 }
188
189 BN_CTX_end(context);
190 BN_CTX_free(context);
191 return retVal;
192 }
B.5.2.7. _math__Div()
Divide an integer (n) by an integer (d) producing a quotient (q) and a remainder (r). If q or r is not needed,
then the pointer to them may be set to NULL.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS operation complete
CRYPT_UNDERFLOW q or r is too small to receive the result
193 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
194 _math__Div(
195 const TPM2B *n, // IN: numerator
196 const TPM2B *d, // IN: denominator
197 TPM2B *q, // OUT: quotient
198 TPM2B *r // OUT: remainder
199 )
200 {
201 BIGNUM *bnN;
202 BIGNUM *bnD;
203 BIGNUM *bnQ;
204 BIGNUM *bnR;
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205 BN_CTX *context;
206 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
207
208 // Get structures for the big number representations
209 context = BN_CTX_new();
210 if(context == NULL)
211 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
212 BN_CTX_start(context);
213 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
214 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
215 bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
216 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
217
218 // Errors in BN_CTX_get() are sticky so only need to check the last allocation
219 if ( bnR == NULL
220 || BN_bin2bn(n->buffer, n->size, bnN) == NULL
221 || BN_bin2bn(d->buffer, d->size, bnD) == NULL)
222 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
223
224 // Check for divide by zero.
225 if(BN_num_bits(bnD) == 0)
226 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_DIVIDE_ZERO);
227
228 // Perform the division
229 if (BN_div(bnQ, bnR, bnN, bnD, context) != 1)
230 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
231
232 // Convert the BIGNUM result back to our format
233 if(q != NULL) // If the quotient is being returned
234 {
235 if(!BnTo2B(q, bnQ, q->size))
236 {
237 retVal = CRYPT_UNDERFLOW;
238 goto Done;
239 }
240 }
241 if(r != NULL) // If the remainder is being returned
242 {
243 if(!BnTo2B(r, bnR, r->size))
244 retVal = CRYPT_UNDERFLOW;
245 }
246
247 Done:
248 BN_CTX_end(context);
249 BN_CTX_free(context);
250
251 return retVal;
252 }
B.5.2.8. _math__uComp()
This function compare two unsigned values.
Return Value Meaning
1 if (a > b)
0 if (a = b)
-1 if (a < b)
253 LIB_EXPORT int
254 _math__uComp(
255 const UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
256 const BYTE *a, // IN: a
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257 const UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
258 const BYTE *b // IN: b
259 )
260 {
261 int borrow = 0;
262 int notZero = 0;
263 int i;
264 // If a has more digits than b, then a is greater than b if
265 // any of the more significant bytes is non zero
266 if((i = (int)aSize - (int)bSize) > 0)
267 for(; i > 0; i--)
268 if(*a++) // means a > b
269 return 1;
270 // If b has more digits than a, then b is greater if any of the
271 // more significant bytes is non zero
272 if(i < 0) // Means that b is longer than a
273 for(; i < 0; i++)
274 if(*b++) // means that b > a
275 return -1;
276 // Either the vales are the same size or the upper bytes of a or b are
277 // all zero, so compare the rest
278 i = (aSize > bSize) ? bSize : aSize;
279 a = &a[i-1];
280 b = &b[i-1];
281 for(; i > 0; i--)
282 {
283 borrow = *a-- - *b-- + borrow;
284 notZero = notZero || borrow;
285 borrow >>= 8;
286 }
287 // if there is a borrow, then b > a
288 if(borrow)
289 return -1;
290 // either a > b or they are the same
291 return notZero;
292 }
B.5.2.9. _math__Comp()
Compare two signed integers:
Return Value Meaning
1 if a > b
0 if a = b
-1 if a < b
293 LIB_EXPORT int
294 _math__Comp(
295 const UINT32 aSize, // IN: size of a
296 const BYTE *a, // IN: a buffer
297 const UINT32 bSize, // IN: size of b
298 const BYTE *b // IN: b buffer
299 )
300 {
301 int signA, signB; // sign of a and b
302
303 // For positive or 0, sign_a is 1
304 // for negative, sign_a is 0
305 signA = ((a[0] & 0x80) == 0) ? 1 : 0;
306
307 // For positive or 0, sign_b is 1
308 // for negative, sign_b is 0
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309 signB = ((b[0] & 0x80) == 0) ? 1 : 0;
310
311 if(signA != signB)
312 {
313 return signA - signB;
314 }
315
316 if(signA == 1)
317 // do unsigned compare function
318 return _math__uComp(aSize, a, bSize, b);
319 else
320 // do unsigned compare the other way
321 return 0 - _math__uComp(aSize, a, bSize, b);
322 }
B.5.2.10. _math__ModExp
This function is used to do modular exponentiation in support of RSA. The most typical uses are: c = m^e
mod n (RSA encrypt) and m = c^d mod n (RSA decrypt). When doing decryption, the e parameter of the
function will contain the private exponent d instead of the public exponent e.
If the results will not fit in the provided buffer, an error is returned (CRYPT_ERROR_UNDERFLOW). If
the results is smaller than the buffer, the results is de-normalized.
This version is intended for use with RSA and requires that m be less than n.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS exponentiation succeeded
CRYPT_PARAMETER number to exponentiate is larger than the modulus
CRYPT_UNDERFLOW result will not fit into the provided buffer
323 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
324 _math__ModExp(
325 UINT32 cSize, // IN: size of the result
326 BYTE *c, // OUT: results buffer
327 const UINT32 mSize, // IN: size of number to be exponentiated
328 const BYTE *m, // IN: number to be exponentiated
329 const UINT32 eSize, // IN: size of power
330 const BYTE *e, // IN: power
331 const UINT32 nSize, // IN: modulus size
332 const BYTE *n // IN: modulu
333 )
334 {
335 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
336 BN_CTX *context;
337 BIGNUM *bnC;
338 BIGNUM *bnM;
339 BIGNUM *bnE;
340 BIGNUM *bnN;
341 INT32 i;
342
343 context = BN_CTX_new();
344 if(context == NULL)
345 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
346 BN_CTX_start(context);
347 bnC = BN_CTX_get(context);
348 bnM = BN_CTX_get(context);
349 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
350 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
351
352 // Errors for BN_CTX_get are sticky so only need to check last allocation
353 if(bnN == NULL)
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354 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
355
356 //convert arguments
357 if ( BN_bin2bn(m, mSize, bnM) == NULL
358 || BN_bin2bn(e, eSize, bnE) == NULL
359 || BN_bin2bn(n, nSize, bnN) == NULL)
360 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
361
362 // Don't do exponentiation if the number being exponentiated is
363 // larger than the modulus.
364 if(BN_ucmp(bnM, bnN) >= 0)
365 {
366 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
367 goto Cleanup;
368 }
369 // Perform the exponentiation
370 if(!(BN_mod_exp(bnC, bnM, bnE, bnN, context)))
371 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
372
373 // Convert the results
374 // Make sure that the results will fit in the provided buffer.
375 if((unsigned)BN_num_bytes(bnC) > cSize)
376 {
377 retVal = CRYPT_UNDERFLOW;
378 goto Cleanup;
379 }
380 i = cSize - BN_num_bytes(bnC);
381 BN_bn2bin(bnC, &c[i]);
382 memset(c, 0, i);
383
384 Cleanup:
385 // Free up allocated BN values
386 BN_CTX_end(context);
387 BN_CTX_free(context);
388 return retVal;
389 }
B.5.2.11. _math__IsPrime()
Check if an 32-bit integer is a prime.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if the integer is probably a prime
FALSE if the integer is definitely not a prime
390 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
391 _math__IsPrime(
392 const UINT32 prime
393 )
394 {
395 int isPrime;
396 BIGNUM *p;
397
398 // Assume the size variables are not overflow, which should not happen in
399 // the contexts that this function will be called.
400 if((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
401 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
402 if(!BN_set_word(p, prime))
403 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
404
405 //
406 // BN_is_prime returning -1 means that it ran into an error.
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407 // It should only return 0 or 1
408 //
409 if((isPrime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL)) < 0)
410 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
411
412 if(p != NULL)
413 BN_clear_free(p);
414 return (isPrime == 1);
415 }
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B.6 CpriCryptPri.c
B.6.1. Introduction
This file contains the interface to the initialization, startup and shutdown functions of the crypto library.
B.6.2. Includes and Locals
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 static void Trap(const char *function, int line, int code);
3 FAIL_FUNCTION TpmFailFunction = (FAIL_FUNCTION)&Trap;
B.6.3. Functions
B.6.3.1. TpmFail()
This is a shim function that is called when a failure occurs. It simply relays the call to the callback pointed
to by TpmFailFunction(). It is only defined for the sake of NO_RETURN specifier that cannot be added to
a function pointer with some compilers.
4 void
5 TpmFail(
6 const char *function,
7 int line,
8 int code)
9 {
10 TpmFailFunction(function, line, code);
11 }
B.6.3.2. FAILURE_TRAP()
This function is called if the caller to _cpri__InitCryptoUnits() doesn't provide a call back address.
12 static void
13 Trap(
14 const char *function,
15 int line,
16 int code
17 )
18 {
19 UNREFERENCED(function);
20 UNREFERENCED(line);
21 UNREFERENCED(code);
22 abort();
23 }
B.6.3.3. _cpri__InitCryptoUnits()
This function calls the initialization functions of the other crypto modules that are part of the crypto engine
for this implementation. This function should be called as a result of _TPM_Init(). The parameter to this
function is a call back function it TPM.lib that is called when the crypto engine has a failure.
24 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
25 _cpri__InitCryptoUnits(
26 FAIL_FUNCTION failFunction
27 )
28 {
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29 TpmFailFunction = failFunction;
30
31 _cpri__RngStartup();
32 _cpri__HashStartup();
33 _cpri__SymStartup();
34
35 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
36 _cpri__RsaStartup();
37 #endif
38
39 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
40 _cpri__EccStartup();
41 #endif
42
43 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
44 }
B.6.3.4. _cpri__StopCryptoUnits()
This function calls the shutdown functions of the other crypto modules that are part of the crypto engine
for this implementation.
45 LIB_EXPORT void
46 _cpri__StopCryptoUnits(
47 void
48 )
49 {
50 return;
51 }
B.6.3.5. _cpri__Startup()
This function calls the startup functions of the other crypto modules that are part of the crypto engine for
this implementation. This function should be called during processing of TPM2_Startup().
52 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
53 _cpri__Startup(
54 void
55 )
56 {
57
58 return( _cpri__HashStartup()
59 && _cpri__RngStartup()
60 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
61 && _cpri__RsaStartup()
62 #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA
63 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
64 && _cpri__EccStartup()
65 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
66 && _cpri__SymStartup());
67 }
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B.7 CpriRNG.c
1 //#define __TPM_RNG_FOR_DEBUG__
B.7.1. Introduction
This file contains the interface to the OpenSSL() random number functions.
B.7.2. Includes
2 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
3 int s_entropyFailure;
B.7.3. Functions
B.7.3.1. _cpri__RngStartup()
This function is called to initialize the random number generator. It collects entropy from the platform to
seed the OpenSSL() random number generator.
4 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
5 _cpri__RngStartup(void)
6 {
7 UINT32 entropySize;
8 BYTE entropy[MAX_RNG_ENTROPY_SIZE];
9 INT32 returnedSize = 0;
10
11 // Initialize the entropy source
12 s_entropyFailure = FALSE;
13 _plat__GetEntropy(NULL, 0);
14
15 // Collect entropy until we have enough
16 for(entropySize = 0;
17 entropySize < MAX_RNG_ENTROPY_SIZE && returnedSize >= 0;
18 entropySize += returnedSize)
19 {
20 returnedSize = _plat__GetEntropy(&entropy[entropySize],
21 MAX_RNG_ENTROPY_SIZE - entropySize);
22 }
23 // Got some entropy on the last call and did not get an error
24 if(returnedSize > 0)
25 {
26 // Seed OpenSSL with entropy
27 RAND_seed(entropy, entropySize);
28 }
29 else
30 {
31 s_entropyFailure = TRUE;
32 }
33 return s_entropyFailure == FALSE;
34 }
B.7.3.2. _cpri__DrbgGetPutState()
This function is used to set the state of the RNG (direction == PUT_STATE) or to recover the state of the
RNG (direction == GET_STATE).
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NOTE: This not currently supported on OpenSSL() version.
35 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
36 _cpri__DrbgGetPutState(
37 GET_PUT direction,
38 int bufferSize,
39 BYTE *buffer
40 )
41 {
42 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(direction);
43 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(bufferSize);
44 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(buffer);
45
46 return CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Function is not implemented
47 }
B.7.3.3. _cpri__StirRandom()
This function is called to add external entropy to the OpenSSL() random number generator.
48 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
49 _cpri__StirRandom(
50 INT32 entropySize,
51 BYTE *entropy
52 )
53 {
54 if (entropySize >= 0)
55 {
56 RAND_add((const void *)entropy, (int) entropySize, 0.0);
57
58 }
59 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
60 }
B.7.3.4. _cpri__GenerateRandom()
This function is called to get a string of random bytes from the OpenSSL() random number generator. The
return value is the number of bytes placed in the buffer. If the number of bytes returned is not equal to the
number of bytes requested (randomSize) it is indicative of a failure of the OpenSSL() random number
generator and is probably fatal.
61 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
62 _cpri__GenerateRandom(
63 INT32 randomSize,
64 BYTE *buffer
65 )
66 {
67 //
68 // We don't do negative sizes or ones that are too large
69 if (randomSize < 0 || randomSize > UINT16_MAX)
70 return 0;
71 // RAND_bytes uses 1 for success and we use 0
72 if(RAND_bytes(buffer, randomSize) == 1)
73 return (UINT16)randomSize;
74 else
75 return 0;
76 }
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B.7.3.4.1. _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom()
This funciton is used to generate a pseudo-random number from some seed values This funciton returns
the same result each time it is called with the same parameters
77 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
78 _cpri__GenerateSeededRandom(
79 INT32 randomSize, // IN: the size of the request
80 BYTE *random, // OUT: receives the data
81 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: used by KDF version but not here
82 TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed value
83 const char *label, // IN: a label string (optional)
84 TPM2B *partyU, // IN: other data (oprtional)
85 TPM2B *partyV // IN: still more (optional)
86 )
87 {
88
89 return (_cpri__KDFa(hashAlg, seed, label, partyU, partyV,
90 randomSize * 8, random, NULL, FALSE));
91 }
92 #endif //%
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B.8 CpriHash.c
B.8.1. Description
This file contains implementation of cryptographic functions for hashing.
B.8.2. Includes, Defines, and Types
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 #include "CpriHashData.c"
3 #define OSSL_HASH_STATE_DATA_SIZE (MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE - 8)
4 typedef struct {
5 union {
6 EVP_MD_CTX context;
7 BYTE data[OSSL_HASH_STATE_DATA_SIZE];
8 } u;
9 INT16 copySize;
10 } OSSL_HASH_STATE;
Temporary aliasing of SM3 to SHA256 until SM3 is available
11 #define EVP_sm3_256 EVP_sha256
B.8.3. Static Functions
B.8.3.1. GetHashServer()
This function returns the address of the hash server function
12 static EVP_MD *
13 GetHashServer(
14 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg
15 )
16 {
17 switch (hashAlg)
18 {
19 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
20 case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
21 return (EVP_MD *)EVP_sha1();
22 break;
23 #endif
24 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
25 case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
26 return (EVP_MD *)EVP_sha256();
27 break;
28 #endif
29 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
30 case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
31 return (EVP_MD *)EVP_sha384();
32 break;
33 #endif
34 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
35 case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
36 return (EVP_MD *)EVP_sha512();
37 break;
38 #endif
39 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
40 case TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
41 return (EVP_MD *)EVP_sm3_256();
42 break;
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43 #endif
44 case TPM_ALG_NULL:
45 return NULL;
46 default:
47 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
48 }
49 }
B.8.3.2. MarshalHashState()
This function copies an OpenSSL() hash context into a caller provided buffer.
Return Value Meaning
>0 the number of bytes of buf used.
50 static UINT16
51 MarshalHashState(
52 EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, // IN: Context to marshal
53 BYTE *buf // OUT: The buffer that will receive the
54 // context. This buffer is at least
55 // MAX_HASH_STATE_SIZE byte
56 )
57 {
58 // make sure everything will fit
59 pAssert(ctxt->digest->ctx_size <= OSSL_HASH_STATE_DATA_SIZE);
60
61 // Copy the context data
62 memcpy(buf, (void*) ctxt->md_data, ctxt->digest->ctx_size);
63
64 return (UINT16)ctxt->digest->ctx_size;
65 }
B.8.3.3. GetHashState()
This function will unmarshal a caller provided buffer into an OpenSSL() hash context. The function returns
the number of bytes copied (which may be zero).
66 static UINT16
67 GetHashState(
68 EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt, // OUT: The context structure to receive the
69 // result of unmarshaling.
70 TPM_ALG_ID algType, // IN: The hash algorithm selector
71 BYTE *buf // IN: Buffer containing marshaled hash data
72 )
73 {
74 EVP_MD *evpmdAlgorithm = NULL;
75
76 pAssert(ctxt != NULL);
77
78 EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctxt);
79
80 evpmdAlgorithm = GetHashServer(algType);
81 if(evpmdAlgorithm == NULL)
82 return 0;
83
84 // This also allocates the ctxt->md_data
85 if((EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, evpmdAlgorithm, NULL)) != 1)
86 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
87
88 pAssert(ctxt->digest->ctx_size < sizeof(ALIGNED_HASH_STATE));
89 memcpy(ctxt->md_data, buf, ctxt->digest->ctx_size);
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90 return (UINT16)ctxt->digest->ctx_size;
91 }
B.8.3.4. GetHashInfoPointer()
This function returns a pointer to the hash info for the algorithm. If the algorithm is not supported, function
returns a pointer to the data block associated with TPM_ALG_NULL.
92 static const HASH_INFO *
93 GetHashInfoPointer(
94 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg
95 )
96 {
97 UINT32 i, tableSize;
98
99 // Get the table size of g_hashData
100 tableSize = sizeof(g_hashData) / sizeof(g_hashData[0]);
101
102 for(i = 0; i < tableSize - 1; i++)
103 {
104 if(g_hashData[i].alg == hashAlg)
105 return &g_hashData[i];
106 }
107 return &g_hashData[tableSize-1];
108 }
B.8.4. Hash Functions
B.8.4.1. _cpri__HashStartup()
Function that is called to initialize the hash service. In this implementation, this function does nothing but
it is called by the CryptUtilStartup() function and must be present.
109 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
110 _cpri__HashStartup(
111 void
112 )
113 {
114 // On startup, make sure that the structure sizes are compatible. It would
115 // be nice if this could be done at compile time but I couldn't figure it out.
116 CPRI_HASH_STATE *cpriState = NULL;
117 // NUMBYTES evpCtxSize = sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX);
118 NUMBYTES cpriStateSize = sizeof(cpriState->state);
119 // OSSL_HASH_STATE *osslState;
120 NUMBYTES osslStateSize = sizeof(OSSL_HASH_STATE);
121 // int dataSize = sizeof(osslState->u.data);
122 pAssert(cpriStateSize >= osslStateSize);
123
124 return TRUE;
125 }
B.8.4.2. _cpri__GetHashAlgByIndex()
This function is used to iterate through the hashes. TPM_ALG_NULL is returned for all indexes that are
not valid hashes. If the TPM implements 3 hashes, then an index value of 0 will return the first
implemented hash and and index of 2 will return the last. All other index values will return
TPM_ALG_NULL.
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Return Value Meaning
TPM_ALG_xxx() a hash algorithm
TPM_ALG_NULL this can be used as a stop value
126 LIB_EXPORT TPM_ALG_ID
127 _cpri__GetHashAlgByIndex(
128 UINT32 index // IN: the index
129 )
130 {
131 if(index >= HASH_COUNT)
132 return TPM_ALG_NULL;
133 return g_hashData[index].alg;
134 }
B.8.4.3. _cpri__GetHashBlockSize()
Returns the size of the block used for the hash
Return Value Meaning
<0 the algorithm is not a supported hash
>= the digest size (0 for TPM_ALG_NULL)
135 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
136 _cpri__GetHashBlockSize(
137 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg // IN: hash algorithm to look up
138 )
139 {
140 return GetHashInfoPointer(hashAlg)->blockSize;
141 }
B.8.4.4. _cpri__GetHashDER
This function returns a pointer to the DER string for the algorithm and indicates its size.
142 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
143 _cpri__GetHashDER(
144 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the algorithm to look up
145 const BYTE **p
146 )
147 {
148 const HASH_INFO *q;
149 q = GetHashInfoPointer(hashAlg);
150 *p = &q->der[0];
151 return q->derSize;
152 }
B.8.4.5. _cpri__GetDigestSize()
Gets the digest size of the algorithm. The algorithm is required to be supported.
Return Value Meaning
=0 the digest size for TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 the digest size of a hash algorithm
153 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
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154 _cpri__GetDigestSize(
155 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg // IN: hash algorithm to look up
156 )
157 {
158 return GetHashInfoPointer(hashAlg)->digestSize;
159 }
B.8.4.6. _cpri__GetContextAlg()
This function returns the algorithm associated with a hash context
160 LIB_EXPORT TPM_ALG_ID
161 _cpri__GetContextAlg(
162 CPRI_HASH_STATE *hashState // IN: the hash context
163 )
164 {
165 return hashState->hashAlg;
166 }
B.8.4.7. _cpri__CopyHashState
This function is used to clone a CPRI_HASH_STATE. The return value is the size of the state.
167 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
168 _cpri__CopyHashState (
169 CPRI_HASH_STATE *out, // OUT: destination of the state
170 CPRI_HASH_STATE *in // IN: source of the state
171 )
172 {
173 OSSL_HASH_STATE *i = (OSSL_HASH_STATE *)&in->state;
174 OSSL_HASH_STATE *o = (OSSL_HASH_STATE *)&out->state;
175 pAssert(sizeof(i) <= sizeof(in->state));
176
177 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&o->u.context);
178 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&o->u.context, &i->u.context);
179 o->copySize = i->copySize;
180 out->hashAlg = in->hashAlg;
181 return sizeof(CPRI_HASH_STATE);
182 }
B.8.4.8. _cpri__StartHash()
Functions starts a hash stack Start a hash stack and returns the digest size. As a side effect, the value of
stateSize in hashState is updated to indicate the number of bytes of state that were saved. This function
calls GetHashServer() and that function will put the TPM into failure mode if the hash algorithm is not
supported.
Return Value Meaning
0 hash is TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 digest size
183 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
184 _cpri__StartHash(
185 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
186 BOOL sequence, // IN: TRUE if the state should be saved
187 CPRI_HASH_STATE *hashState // OUT: the state of hash stack.
188 )
189 {
190 EVP_MD_CTX localState;
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191 OSSL_HASH_STATE *state = (OSSL_HASH_STATE *)&hashState->state;
192 BYTE *stateData = state->u.data;
193 EVP_MD_CTX *context;
194 EVP_MD *evpmdAlgorithm = NULL;
195 UINT16 retVal = 0;
196
197 if(sequence)
198 context = &localState;
199 else
200 context = &state->u.context;
201
202 hashState->hashAlg = hashAlg;
203
204 EVP_MD_CTX_init(context);
205 evpmdAlgorithm = GetHashServer(hashAlg);
206 if(evpmdAlgorithm == NULL)
207 goto Cleanup;
208
209 if(EVP_DigestInit_ex(context, evpmdAlgorithm, NULL) != 1)
210 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
211 retVal = (CRYPT_RESULT)EVP_MD_CTX_size(context);
212
213 Cleanup:
214 if(retVal > 0)
215 {
216 if (sequence)
217 {
218 if((state->copySize = MarshalHashState(context, stateData)) == 0)
219 {
220 // If MarshalHashState returns a negative number, it is an error
221 // code and not a hash size so copy the error code to be the return
222 // from this function and set the actual stateSize to zero.
223 retVal = state->copySize;
224 state->copySize = 0;
225 }
226 // Do the cleanup
227 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(context);
228 }
229 else
230 state->copySize = -1;
231 }
232 else
233 state->copySize = 0;
234 return retVal;
235 }
B.8.4.9. _cpri__UpdateHash()
Add data to a hash or HMAC stack.
236 LIB_EXPORT void
237 _cpri__UpdateHash(
238 CPRI_HASH_STATE *hashState, // IN: the hash context information
239 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: the size of data to be added to the
240 // digest
241 BYTE *data // IN: data to be hashed
242 )
243 {
244 EVP_MD_CTX localContext;
245 OSSL_HASH_STATE *state = (OSSL_HASH_STATE *)&hashState->state;
246 BYTE *stateData = state->u.data;
247 EVP_MD_CTX *context;
248 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
249
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250 // If there is no context, return
251 if(state->copySize == 0)
252 return;
253 if(state->copySize > 0)
254 {
255 context = &localContext;
256 if((retVal = GetHashState(context, hashState->hashAlg, stateData)) <= 0)
257 return;
258 }
259 else
260 context = &state->u.context;
261
262 if(EVP_DigestUpdate(context, data, dataSize) != 1)
263 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
264 else if( state->copySize > 0
265 && (retVal= MarshalHashState(context, stateData)) >= 0)
266 {
267 // retVal is the size of the marshaled data. Make sure that it is consistent
268 // by ensuring that we didn't get more than allowed
269 if(retVal < state->copySize)
270 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
271 else
272 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(context);
273 }
274 return;
275 }
B.8.4.10. _cpri__CompleteHash()
Complete a hash or HMAC computation. This function will place the smaller of digestSize or the size of
the digest in dOut. The number of bytes in the placed in the buffer is returned. If there is a failure, the
returned value is <= 0.
Return Value Meaning
0 no data returned
>0 the number of bytes in the digest
276 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
277 _cpri__CompleteHash(
278 CPRI_HASH_STATE *hashState, // IN: the state of hash stack
279 UINT32 dOutSize, // IN: size of digest buffer
280 BYTE *dOut // OUT: hash digest
281 )
282 {
283 EVP_MD_CTX localState;
284 OSSL_HASH_STATE *state = (OSSL_HASH_STATE *)&hashState->state;
285 BYTE *stateData = state->u.data;
286 EVP_MD_CTX *context;
287 UINT16 retVal;
288 int hLen;
289 BYTE temp[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
290 BYTE *rBuffer = dOut;
291
292 if(state->copySize == 0)
293 return 0;
294 if(state->copySize > 0)
295 {
296 context = &localState;
297 if((retVal = GetHashState(context, hashState->hashAlg, stateData)) <= 0)
298 goto Cleanup;
299 }
300 else
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301 context = &state->u.context;
302
303 hLen = EVP_MD_CTX_size(context);
304 if((unsigned)hLen > dOutSize)
305 rBuffer = temp;
306 if(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(context, rBuffer, NULL) == 1)
307 {
308 if(rBuffer != dOut)
309 {
310 if(dOut != NULL)
311 {
312 memcpy(dOut, temp, dOutSize);
313 }
314 retVal = (UINT16)dOutSize;
315 }
316 else
317 {
318 retVal = (UINT16)hLen;
319 }
320 state->copySize = 0;
321 }
322 else
323 {
324 retVal = 0; // Indicate that no data is returned
325 }
326 Cleanup:
327 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(context);
328 return retVal;
329 }
B.8.4.11. _cpri__ImportExportHashState()
This function is used to import or export the hash state. This function would be called to export state when
a sequence object was being prepared for export
330 LIB_EXPORT void
331 _cpri__ImportExportHashState(
332 CPRI_HASH_STATE *osslFmt, // IN/OUT: the hash state formated for use
333 // by openSSL
334 EXPORT_HASH_STATE *externalFmt, // IN/OUT: the exported hash state
335 IMPORT_EXPORT direction //
336 )
337 {
338 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(direction);
339 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(externalFmt);
340 UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(osslFmt);
341 return;
342
343 #if 0
344 if(direction == IMPORT_STATE)
345 {
346 // don't have the import export functions yet so just copy
347 _cpri__CopyHashState(osslFmt, (CPRI_HASH_STATE *)externalFmt);
348 }
349 else
350 {
351 _cpri__CopyHashState((CPRI_HASH_STATE *)externalFmt, osslFmt);
352 }
353 #endif
354 }
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B.8.4.12. _cpri__HashBlock()
Start a hash, hash a single block, update digest and return the size of the results.
The digestSize parameter can be smaller than the digest. If so, only the more significant bytes are
returned.
Return Value Meaning
>= 0 number of bytes in digest (may be zero)
355 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
356 _cpri__HashBlock(
357 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: The hash algorithm
358 UINT32 dataSize, // IN: size of buffer to hash
359 BYTE *data, // IN: the buffer to hash
360 UINT32 digestSize, // IN: size of the digest buffer
361 BYTE *digest // OUT: hash digest
362 )
363 {
364 EVP_MD_CTX hashContext;
365 EVP_MD *hashServer = NULL;
366 UINT16 retVal = 0;
367 BYTE b[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; // temp buffer in case digestSize not
368 // a full digest
369 unsigned int dSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
370
371 // If there is no digest to compute return
372 if(dSize == 0)
373 return 0;
374
375 // After the call to EVP_MD_CTX_init(), will need to call EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup()
376 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&hashContext); // Initialize the local hash context
377 hashServer = GetHashServer(hashAlg); // Find the hash server
378
379 // It is an error if the digest size is non-zero but there is no server
380 if( (hashServer == NULL)
381 || (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&hashContext, hashServer, NULL) != 1)
382 || (EVP_DigestUpdate(&hashContext, data, dataSize) != 1))
383 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
384 else
385 {
386 // If the size of the digest produced (dSize) is larger than the available
387 // buffer (digestSize), then put the digest in a temp buffer and only copy
388 // the most significant part into the available buffer.
389 if(dSize > digestSize)
390 {
391 if(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&hashContext, b, &dSize) != 1)
392 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
393 memcpy(digest, b, digestSize);
394 retVal = (UINT16)digestSize;
395 }
396 else
397 {
398 if((EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&hashContext, digest, &dSize)) != 1)
399 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
400 retVal = (UINT16) dSize;
401 }
402 }
403 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hashContext);
404 return retVal;
405 }
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B.8.5. HMAC Functions
B.8.5.1. _cpri__StartHMAC
This function is used to start an HMAC using a temp hash context. The function does the initialization of
the hash with the HMAC key XOR iPad and updates the HMAC key XOR oPad.
The function returns the number of bytes in a digest produced by hashAlg.
Return Value Meaning
>= 0 number of bytes in digest produced by hashAlg (may be zero)
406 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
407 _cpri__StartHMAC(
408 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the algorithm to use
409 BOOL sequence, // IN: indicates if the state should be
410 // saved
411 CPRI_HASH_STATE *state, // IN/OUT: the state buffer
412 UINT16 keySize, // IN: the size of the HMAC key
413 BYTE *key, // IN: the HMAC key
414 TPM2B *oPadKey // OUT: the key prepared for the oPad round
415 )
416 {
417 CPRI_HASH_STATE localState;
418 UINT16 blockSize = _cpri__GetHashBlockSize(hashAlg);
419 UINT16 digestSize;
420 BYTE *pb; // temp pointer
421 UINT32 i;
422
423 // If the key size is larger than the block size, then the hash of the key
424 // is used as the key
425 if(keySize > blockSize)
426 {
427 // large key so digest
428 if((digestSize = _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &localState)) == 0)
429 return 0;
430 _cpri__UpdateHash(&localState, keySize, key);
431 _cpri__CompleteHash(&localState, digestSize, oPadKey->buffer);
432 oPadKey->size = digestSize;
433 }
434 else
435 {
436 // key size is ok
437 memcpy(oPadKey->buffer, key, keySize);
438 oPadKey->size = keySize;
439 }
440 // XOR the key with iPad (0x36)
441 pb = oPadKey->buffer;
442 for(i = oPadKey->size; i > 0; i--)
443 *pb++ ^= 0x36;
444
445 // if the keySize is smaller than a block, fill the rest with 0x36
446 for(i = blockSize - oPadKey->size; i > 0; i--)
447 *pb++ = 0x36;
448
449 // Increase the oPadSize to a full block
450 oPadKey->size = blockSize;
451
452 // Start a new hash with the HMAC key
453 // This will go in the caller's state structure and may be a sequence or not
454
455 if((digestSize = _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, sequence, state)) > 0)
456 {
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457
458 _cpri__UpdateHash(state, oPadKey->size, oPadKey->buffer);
459
460 // XOR the key block with 0x5c ^ 0x36
461 for(pb = oPadKey->buffer, i = blockSize; i > 0; i--)
462 *pb++ ^= (0x5c ^ 0x36);
463 }
464
465 return digestSize;
466 }
B.8.5.2. _cpri_CompleteHMAC()
This function is called to complete an HMAC. It will finish the current digest, and start a new digest. It will
then add the oPadKey and the completed digest and return the results in dOut. It will not return more than
dOutSize bytes.
Return Value Meaning
>= 0 number of bytes in dOut (may be zero)
467 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
468 _cpri__CompleteHMAC(
469 CPRI_HASH_STATE *hashState, // IN: the state of hash stack
470 TPM2B *oPadKey, // IN: the HMAC key in oPad format
471 UINT32 dOutSize, // IN: size of digest buffer
472 BYTE *dOut // OUT: hash digest
473 )
474 {
475 BYTE digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
476 CPRI_HASH_STATE *state = (CPRI_HASH_STATE *)hashState;
477 CPRI_HASH_STATE localState;
478 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(state->hashAlg);
479
480 _cpri__CompleteHash(hashState, digestSize, digest);
481
482 // Using the local hash state, do a hash with the oPad
483 if(_cpri__StartHash(state->hashAlg, FALSE, &localState) != digestSize)
484 return 0;
485
486 _cpri__UpdateHash(&localState, oPadKey->size, oPadKey->buffer);
487 _cpri__UpdateHash(&localState, digestSize, digest);
488 return _cpri__CompleteHash(&localState, dOutSize, dOut);
489 }
B.8.6. Mask and Key Generation Functions
B.8.6.1. _crypi_MGF1()
This function performs MGF1 using the selected hash. MGF1 is T(n) = T(n-1) || H(seed || counter). This
function returns the length of the mask produced which could be zero if the digest algorithm is not
supported
Return Value Meaning
0 hash algorithm not supported
>0 should be the same as mSize
490 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
491 _cpri__MGF1(
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492 UINT32 mSize, // IN: length of the mask to be produced
493 BYTE *mask, // OUT: buffer to receive the mask
494 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash to use
495 UINT32 sSize, // IN: size of the seed
496 BYTE *seed // IN: seed size
497 )
498 {
499 EVP_MD_CTX hashContext;
500 EVP_MD *hashServer = NULL;
501 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = 0;
502 BYTE b[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; // temp buffer in case mask is not an
503 // even multiple of a full digest
504 CRYPT_RESULT dSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
505 unsigned int digestSize = (UINT32)dSize;
506 UINT32 remaining;
507 UINT32 counter;
508 BYTE swappedCounter[4];
509
510 // Parameter check
511 if(mSize > (1024*16)) // Semi-arbitrary maximum
512 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
513
514 // If there is no digest to compute return
515 if(dSize <= 0)
516 return 0;
517
518 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&hashContext); // Initialize the local hash context
519 hashServer = GetHashServer(hashAlg); // Find the hash server
520 if(hashServer == NULL)
521 // If there is no server, then there is no digest
522 return 0;
523
524 for(counter = 0, remaining = mSize; remaining > 0; counter++)
525 {
526 // Because the system may be either Endian...
527 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(counter, swappedCounter);
528
529 // Start the hash and include the seed and counter
530 if( (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&hashContext, hashServer, NULL) != 1)
531 || (EVP_DigestUpdate(&hashContext, seed, sSize) != 1)
532 || (EVP_DigestUpdate(&hashContext, swappedCounter, 4) != 1)
533 )
534 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
535
536 // Handling the completion depends on how much space remains in the mask
537 // buffer. If it can hold the entire digest, put it there. If not
538 // put the digest in a temp buffer and only copy the amount that
539 // will fit into the mask buffer.
540 if(remaining < (unsigned)dSize)
541 {
542 if(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&hashContext, b, &digestSize) != 1)
543 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
544 memcpy(mask, b, remaining);
545 break;
546 }
547 else
548 {
549 if(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&hashContext, mask, &digestSize) != 1)
550 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
551 remaining -= dSize;
552 mask = &mask[dSize];
553 }
554 retVal = (CRYPT_RESULT)mSize;
555 }
556
557 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hashContext);
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558 return retVal;
559 }
B.8.6.2. _cpri_KDFa()
This function performs the key generation according to Part 1 of the TPM specification.
This function returns the number of bytes generated which may be zero.
The key and keyStream pointers are not allowed to be NULL. The other pointer values may be NULL.
The value of sizeInBits must be no larger than (2^18)-1 = 256K bits (32385 bytes).
The once parameter is set to allow incremental generation of a large value. If this flag is TRUE,
sizeInBits will be used in the HMAC computation but only one iteration of the KDF is performed. This
would be used for XOR obfuscation so that the mask value can be generated in digest-sized chunks
rather than having to be generated all at once in an arbitrarily large buffer and then XORed() into the
result. If once is TRUE, then sizeInBits must be a multiple of 8.
Any error in the processing of this command is considered fatal.
Return Value Meaning
0 hash algorithm is not supported or is TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 the number of bytes in the keyStream buffer
560 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
561 _cpri__KDFa(
562 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm used in HMAC
563 TPM2B *key, // IN: HMAC key
564 const char *label, // IN: a 0-byte terminated label used in KDF
565 TPM2B *contextU, // IN: context U
566 TPM2B *contextV, // IN: context V
567 UINT32 sizeInBits, // IN: size of generated key in bit
568 BYTE *keyStream, // OUT: key buffer
569 UINT32 *counterInOut, // IN/OUT: caller may provide the iteration
570 // counter for incremental operations to
571 // avoid large intermediate buffers.
572 BOOL once // IN: TRUE if only one iteration is performed
573 // FALSE if iteration count determined by
574 // "sizeInBits"
575 )
576 {
577 UINT32 counter = 0; // counter value
578 INT32 lLen = 0; // length of the label
579 INT16 hLen; // length of the hash
580 INT16 bytes; // number of bytes to produce
581 BYTE *stream = keyStream;
582 BYTE marshaledUint32[4];
583 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
584 TPM2B_MAX_HASH_BLOCK hmacKey;
585
586 pAssert(key != NULL && keyStream != NULL);
587 pAssert(once == FALSE || (sizeInBits & 7) == 0);
588
589 if(counterInOut != NULL)
590 counter = *counterInOut;
591
592 // Prepare label buffer. Calculate its size and keep the last 0 byte
593 if(label != NULL)
594 for(lLen = 0; label[lLen++] != 0; );
595
596 // Get the hash size. If it is less than or 0, either the
597 // algorithm is not supported or the hash is TPM_ALG_NULL
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598 // In either case the digest size is zero. This is the only return
599 // other than the one at the end. All other exits from this function
600 // are fatal errors. After we check that the algorithm is supported
601 // anything else that goes wrong is an implementation flaw.
602 if((hLen = (INT16) _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg)) == 0)
603 return 0;
604
605 // If the size of the request is larger than the numbers will handle,
606 // it is a fatal error.
607 pAssert(((sizeInBits + 7)/ 8) <= INT16_MAX);
608
609 bytes = once ? hLen : (INT16)((sizeInBits + 7) / 8);
610
611 // Generate required bytes
612 for (; bytes > 0; stream = &stream[hLen], bytes = bytes - hLen)
613 {
614 if(bytes < hLen)
615 hLen = bytes;
616
617 counter++;
618 // Start HMAC
619 if(_cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg,
620 FALSE,
621 &hashState,
622 key->size,
623 &key->buffer[0],
624 &hmacKey.b) <= 0)
625 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
626
627 // Adding counter
628 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(counter, marshaledUint32);
629 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, sizeof(UINT32), marshaledUint32);
630
631 // Adding label
632 if(label != NULL)
633 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, lLen, (BYTE *)label);
634
635 // Adding contextU
636 if(contextU != NULL)
637 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, contextU->size, contextU->buffer);
638
639 // Adding contextV
640 if(contextV != NULL)
641 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, contextV->size, contextV->buffer);
642
643 // Adding size in bits
644 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(sizeInBits, marshaledUint32);
645 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, sizeof(UINT32), marshaledUint32);
646
647 // Compute HMAC. At the start of each iteration, hLen is set
648 // to the smaller of hLen and bytes. This causes bytes to decrement
649 // exactly to zero to complete the loop
650 _cpri__CompleteHMAC(&hashState, &hmacKey.b, hLen, stream);
651 }
652
653 // Mask off bits if the required bits is not a multiple of byte size
654 if((sizeInBits % 8) != 0)
655 keyStream[0] &= ((1 << (sizeInBits % 8)) - 1);
656 if(counterInOut != NULL)
657 *counterInOut = counter;
658 return (CRYPT_RESULT)((sizeInBits + 7)/8);
659 }
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B.8.6.3. _cpri__KDFe()
KDFe() as defined in TPM specification part 1.
This function returns the number of bytes generated which may be zero.
The Z and keyStream pointers are not allowed to be NULL. The other pointer values may be NULL. The
value of sizeInBits must be no larger than (2^18)-1 = 256K bits (32385 bytes). Any error in the processing
of this command is considered fatal.
Return Value Meaning
0 hash algorithm is not supported or is TPM_ALG_NULL
>0 the number of bytes in the keyStream buffer
660 LIB_EXPORT UINT16
661 _cpri__KDFe(
662 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm used in HMAC
663 TPM2B *Z, // IN: Z
664 const char *label, // IN: a 0 terminated label using in KDF
665 TPM2B *partyUInfo, // IN: PartyUInfo
666 TPM2B *partyVInfo, // IN: PartyVInfo
667 UINT32 sizeInBits, // IN: size of generated key in bit
668 BYTE *keyStream // OUT: key buffer
669 )
670 {
671 UINT32 counter = 0; // counter value
672 UINT32 lSize = 0;
673 BYTE *stream = keyStream;
674 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
675 INT16 hLen = (INT16) _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
676 INT16 bytes; // number of bytes to generate
677 BYTE marshaledUint32[4];
678
679 pAssert( keyStream != NULL
680 && Z != NULL
681 && ((sizeInBits + 7) / 8) < INT16_MAX);
682
683 if(hLen == 0)
684 return 0;
685
686 bytes = (INT16)((sizeInBits + 7) / 8);
687
688 // Prepare label buffer. Calculate its size and keep the last 0 byte
689 if(label != NULL)
690 for(lSize = 0; label[lSize++] != 0;);
691
692 // Generate required bytes
693 //The inner loop of that KDF uses:
694 // Hashi := H(counter | Z | OtherInfo) (5)
695 // Where:
696 // Hashi the hash generated on the i-th iteration of the loop.
697 // H() an approved hash function
698 // counter a 32-bit counter that is initialized to 1 and incremented
699 // on each iteration
700 // Z the X coordinate of the product of a public ECC key and a
701 // different private ECC key.
702 // OtherInfo a collection of qualifying data for the KDF defined below.
703 // In this specification, OtherInfo will be constructed by:
704 // OtherInfo := Use | PartyUInfo | PartyVInfo
705 for (; bytes > 0; stream = &stream[hLen], bytes = bytes - hLen)
706 {
707 if(bytes < hLen)
708 hLen = bytes;
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709
710 counter++;
711 // Start hash
712 if(_cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState) == 0)
713 return 0;
714
715 // Add counter
716 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(counter, marshaledUint32);
717 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, sizeof(UINT32), marshaledUint32);
718
719 // Add Z
720 if(Z != NULL)
721 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, Z->size, Z->buffer);
722
723 // Add label
724 if(label != NULL)
725 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, lSize, (BYTE *)label);
726 else
727
728 // The SP800-108 specification requires a zero between the label
729 // and the context.
730 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 1, (BYTE *)"");
731
732 // Add PartyUInfo
733 if(partyUInfo != NULL)
734 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, partyUInfo->size, partyUInfo->buffer);
735
736 // Add PartyVInfo
737 if(partyVInfo != NULL)
738 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, partyVInfo->size, partyVInfo->buffer);
739
740 // Compute Hash. hLen was changed to be the smaller of bytes or hLen
741 // at the start of each iteration.
742 _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, hLen, stream);
743 }
744
745 // Mask off bits if the required bits is not a multiple of byte size
746 if((sizeInBits % 8) != 0)
747 keyStream[0] &= ((1 << (sizeInBits % 8)) - 1);
748
749 return (CRYPT_RESULT)((sizeInBits + 7) / 8);
750
751 }
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B.9 CpriHashData.c
This file should be included by the library hash module.
1 const HASH_INFO g_hashData[HASH_COUNT + 1] = {
2 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA1
3 {TPM_ALG_SHA1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
4 SHA1_DER_SIZE, SHA1_DER},
5 #endif
6 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA256
7 {TPM_ALG_SHA256, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
8 SHA256_DER_SIZE, SHA256_DER},
9 #endif
10 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA384
11 {TPM_ALG_SHA384, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
12 SHA384_DER_SIZE, SHA384_DER},
13 #endif
14 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM3_256
15 {TPM_ALG_SM3_256, SM3_256_DIGEST_SIZE, SM3_256_BLOCK_SIZE,
16 SM3_256_DER_SIZE, SM3_256_DER},
17 #endif
18 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SHA512
19 {TPM_ALG_SHA512, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
20 SHA512_DER_SIZE, SHA512_DER},
21 #endif
22 {TPM_ALG_NULL,0,0,0,{0}}
23 };
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B.10 CpriMisc.c
B.10.1. Includes
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
B.10.2. Functions
B.10.2.1. BnTo2B()
This function is used to convert a BigNum() to a byte array of the specified size. If the number is too large
to fit, then 0 is returned. Otherwise, the number is converted into the low-order bytes of the provided array
and the upper bytes are set to zero.
Return Value Meaning
0 failure (probably fatal)
1 conversion successful
2 BOOL
3 BnTo2B(
4 TPM2B *outVal, // OUT: place for the result
5 BIGNUM *inVal, // IN: number to convert
6 UINT16 size // IN: size of the output.
7 )
8 {
9 BYTE *pb = outVal->buffer;
10
11 outVal->size = size;
12
13 size = size - (((UINT16) BN_num_bits(inVal) + 7) / 8);
14 if(size < 0)
15 return FALSE;
16 for(;size > 0; size--)
17 *pb++ = 0;
18 BN_bn2bin(inVal, pb);
19 return TRUE;
20 }
B.10.2.2. Copy2B()
This function copies a TPM2B structure. The compiler can't generate a copy of a TPM2B generic
structure because the actual size is not known. This function performs the copy on any TPM2B pair. The
size of the destination should have been checked before this call to make sure that it will hold the TPM2B
being copied.
This replicates the functionality in the MemoryLib.c.
21 void
22 Copy2B(
23 TPM2B *out, // OUT: The TPM2B to receive the copy
24 TPM2B *in // IN: the TPM2B to copy
25 )
26 {
27 BYTE *pIn = in->buffer;
28 BYTE *pOut = out->buffer;
29 int count;
30 out->size = in->size;
31 for(count = in->size; count > 0; count--)
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32 *pOut++ = *pIn++;
33 return;
34 }
B.10.2.3. BnFrom2B()
This function creates a BIGNUM from a TPM2B and fails if the conversion fails.
35 BIGNUM *
36 BnFrom2B(
37 BIGNUM *out, // OUT: The BIGNUM
38 const TPM2B *in // IN: the TPM2B to copy
39 )
40 {
41 if(BN_bin2bn(in->buffer, in->size, out) == NULL)
42 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
43 return out;
44 }
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B.11 CpriSym.c
B.11.1. Introduction
This file contains the implementation of the symmetric block cipher modes allowed for a TPM. These
function only use the single block encryption and decryption functions of OpesnSSL().
Currently, this module only supports AES encryption. The SM4 code actually calls an AES routine
B.11.2. Includes, Defines, and Typedefs
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
The following sets of defines are used to allow use of the SM4 algorithm identifier while waiting for the
SM4 implementation code to appear.
2 typedef AES_KEY SM4_KEY;
3 #define SM4_set_encrypt_key AES_set_encrypt_key
4 #define SM4_set_decrypt_key AES_set_decrypt_key
5 #define SM4_decrypt AES_decrypt
6 #define SM4_encrypt AES_encrypt
B.11.3. Utility Functions
B.11.3.1. _cpri_SymStartup()
7 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
8 _cpri__SymStartup(
9 void
10 )
11 {
12 return TRUE;
13 }
B.11.3.2. _cpri__GetSymmetricBlockSize()
This function returns the block size of the algorithm.
Return Value Meaning
<= 0 cipher not supported
>0 the cipher block size in bytes
14 LIB_EXPORT INT16
15 _cpri__GetSymmetricBlockSize(
16 TPM_ALG_ID symmetricAlg, // IN: the symmetric algorithm
17 UINT16 keySizeInBits // IN: the key size
18 )
19 {
20 switch (symmetricAlg)
21 {
22 #ifdef TPM_ALG_AES
23 case TPM_ALG_AES:
24 #endif
25 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4 // Both AES and SM4 use the same block size
26 case TPM_ALG_SM4:
27 #endif
28 if(keySizeInBits != 0) // This is mostly to have a reference to
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29 // keySizeInBits for the compiler
30 return 16;
31 else
32 return 0;
33 break;
34
35 default:
36 return 0;
37 }
38 }
B.11.4. AES Encryption
B.11.4.1. _cpri__AESEncryptCBC()
This function performs AES encryption in CBC chain mode. The input dIn buffer is encrypted into dOut.
The input iv buffer is required to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The dInSize is required to
be a multiple of the block size.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS if success
CRYPT_PARAMETER dInSize is not a multiple of the block size
39 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
40 _cpri__AESEncryptCBC(
41 BYTE *dOut, // OUT:
42 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
43 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
44 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
45 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
46 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size (is required to be a multiple
47 // of 16 bytes)
48 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
49 )
50 {
51 AES_KEY AesKey;
52 BYTE *pIv;
53 INT32 dSize; // Need a signed version
54 int i;
55
56 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
57
58 if(dInSize == 0)
59 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
60
61 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
62 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
63
64 // For CBC, the data size must be an even multiple of the
65 // cipher block size
66 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
67 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
68
69 // Create AES encrypt key schedule
70 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
71 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
72
73 // XOR the data block into the IV, encrypt the IV into the IV
74 // and then copy the IV to the output
75 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
76 {
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77 pIv = iv;
78 for(i = 16; i > 0; i--)
79 *pIv++ ^= *dIn++;
80 AES_encrypt(iv, iv, &AesKey);
81 pIv = iv;
82 for(i = 16; i > 0; i--)
83 *dOut++ = *pIv++;
84 }
85 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
86 }
B.11.4.2. _cpri__AESDecryptCBC()
This function performs AES decryption in CBC chain mode. The input dIn buffer is decrypted into dOut.
The input iv buffer is required to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The dInSize is required to
be a multiple of the block size.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS if success
CRYPT_PARAMETER dInSize is not a multiple of the block size
87 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
88 _cpri__AESDecryptCBC(
89 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
90 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
91 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
92 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
93 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption. The size of this
94 // buffer is 16 byte
95 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
96 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
97 )
98 {
99 AES_KEY AesKey;
100 BYTE *pIv;
101 int i;
102 BYTE tmp[16];
103 BYTE *pT = NULL;
104 INT32 dSize;
105
106 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
107
108 if(dInSize == 0)
109 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
110
111 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
112 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
113
114 // For CBC, the data size must be an even multiple of the
115 // cipher block size
116 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
117 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
118
119 // Create AES key schedule
120 if (AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
121 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
122
123 // Copy the input data to a temp buffer, decrypt the buffer into the output;
124 // XOR in the IV, and copy the temp buffer to the IV and repeat.
125 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
126 {
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127 pT = tmp;
128 for(i = 16; i> 0; i--)
129 *pT++ = *dIn++;
130 AES_decrypt(tmp, dOut, &AesKey);
131 pIv = iv;
132 pT = tmp;
133 for(i = 16; i> 0; i--)
134 {
135 *dOut++ ^= *pIv;
136 *pIv++ = *pT++;
137 }
138 }
139 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
140 }
B.11.4.3. _cpri__AESEncryptCFB()
This function performs AES encryption in CFB chain mode. The dOut buffer receives the values
encrypted dIn. The input iv is assumed to be the size of an encryption block (16 bytes). The iv buffer will
be modified to contain the last encrypted block.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
141 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
142 _cpri__AESEncryptCFB(
143 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted
144 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
145 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
146 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
147 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
148 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
149 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
150 )
151 {
152 BYTE *pIv = NULL;
153 AES_KEY AesKey;
154 INT32 dSize; // Need a signed version of dInSize
155 int i;
156
157 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
158
159 if(dInSize == 0)
160 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
161
162 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
163 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
164
165 // Create AES encryption key schedule
166 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
167 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
168
169 // Encrypt the IV into the IV, XOR in the data, and copy to output
170 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
171 {
172 // Encrypt the current value of the IV
173 AES_encrypt(iv, iv, &AesKey);
174 pIv = iv;
175 for(i = (int)(dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
176 // XOR the data into the IV to create the cipher text
177 // and put into the output
178 *dOut++ = *pIv++ ^= *dIn++;
179 }
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180 // If the inner loop (i loop) was smaller than 16, then dSize would have been
181 // smaller than 16 and it is now negative. If it is negative, then it indicates
182 // how many bytes are needed to pad out the IV for the next round.
183 for(; dSize < 0; dSize++)
184 *pIv++ = 0;
185 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
186 }
B.11.4.4. _cpri__AESDecryptCFB()
This function performs AES decrypt in CFB chain mode. The dOut buffer receives the values decrypted
from dIn.
The input iv is assumed to be the size of an encryption block (16 bytes). The iv buffer will be modified to
contain the last decoded block, padded with zeros
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
187 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
188 _cpri__AESDecryptCFB(
189 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
190 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
191 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
192 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
193 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
194 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
195 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
196 )
197 {
198 BYTE *pIv = NULL;
199 BYTE tmp[16];
200 int i;
201 BYTE *pT;
202 AES_KEY AesKey;
203 INT32 dSize;
204
205 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
206
207 if(dInSize == 0)
208 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
209
210 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
211 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
212
213 // Create AES encryption key schedule
214 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
215 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
216
217 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
218 {
219 // Encrypt the IV into the temp buffer
220 AES_encrypt(iv, tmp, &AesKey);
221 pT = tmp;
222 pIv = iv;
223 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
224 // Copy the current cipher text to IV, XOR
225 // with the temp buffer and put into the output
226 *dOut++ = *pT++ ^ (*pIv++ = *dIn++);
227 }
228 // If the inner loop (i loop) was smaller than 16, then dSize
229 // would have been smaller than 16 and it is now negative
230 // If it is negative, then it indicates how may fill bytes
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231 // are needed to pad out the IV for the next round.
232 for(; dSize < 0; dSize++)
233 *pIv++ = 0;
234
235 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
236 }
B.11.4.5. _cpri__AESEncryptCTR()
This function performs AES encryption/decryption in CTR chain mode. The dIn buffer is encrypted into
dOut. The input iv buffer is assumed to have a size equal to the AES block size (16 bytes). The iv will be
incremented by the number of blocks (full and partial) that were encrypted.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
237 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
238 _cpri__AESEncryptCTR(
239 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
240 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
241 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
242 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
243 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
244 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
245 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
246 )
247 {
248 BYTE tmp[16];
249 BYTE *pT;
250 AES_KEY AesKey;
251 int i;
252 INT32 dSize;
253
254 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
255
256 if(dInSize == 0)
257 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
258
259 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
260 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
261
262 // Create AES encryption schedule
263 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
264 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
265
266 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
267 {
268 // Encrypt the current value of the IV(counter)
269 AES_encrypt(iv, (BYTE *)tmp, &AesKey);
270
271 //increment the counter (counter is big-endian so start at end)
272 for(i = 15; i >= 0; i--)
273 if((iv[i] += 1) != 0)
274 break;
275
276 // XOR the encrypted counter value with input and put into output
277 pT = tmp;
278 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
279 *dOut++ = *dIn++ ^ *pT++;
280 }
281 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
282 }
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B.11.4.6. _cpri__AESDecryptCTR()
Counter mode decryption uses the same algorithm as encryption. The _cpri__AESDecryptCTR() function
is implemented as a macro call to _cpri__AESEncryptCTR(). (skip)
283 //% #define _cpri__AESDecryptCTR(dOut, keySize, key, iv, dInSize, dIn) \
284 //% _cpri__AESEncryptCTR( \
285 //% ((BYTE *)dOut), \
286 //% ((UINT32)keySize), \
287 //% ((BYTE *)key), \
288 //% ((BYTE *)iv), \
289 //% ((UINT32)dInSize), \
290 //% ((BYTE *)dIn) \
291 //% )
292 //%
293 // The //% is used by the prototype extraction program to cause it to include the
294 // line in the prototype file after removing the //%. Need an extra line with
nothing on it so that a blank line will separate this macro from the next definition.
B.11.4.7. _cpri__AESEncryptECB()
AES encryption in ECB mode. The data buffer is modified to contain the cipher text.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
295 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
296 _cpri__AESEncryptECB(
297 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: encrypted data
298 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
299 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
300 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
301 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
302 BYTE *dIn // IN: clear text buffer
303 )
304 {
305 AES_KEY AesKey;
306 INT32 dSize;
307
308 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && dIn != NULL);
309
310 if(dInSize == 0)
311 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
312
313 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
314 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
315
316 // For ECB, the data size must be an even multiple of the
317 // cipher block size
318 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
319 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
320 // Create AES encrypting key schedule
321 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
322 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
323
324 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
325 {
326 AES_encrypt(dIn, dOut, &AesKey);
327 dIn = &dIn[16];
328 dOut = &dOut[16];
329 }
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330 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
331 }
B.11.4.8. _cpri__AESDecryptECB()
This function performs AES decryption using ECB (not recommended). The cipher text dIn is decrypted
into dOut.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
332 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
333 _cpri__AESDecryptECB(
334 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the clear text data
335 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
336 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
337 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
338 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
339 BYTE *dIn // IN: cipher text buffer
340 )
341 {
342 AES_KEY AesKey;
343 INT32 dSize;
344
345 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && dIn != NULL);
346
347 if(dInSize == 0)
348 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
349
350 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
351 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
352
353 // For ECB, the data size must be an even multiple of the
354 // cipher block size
355 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
356 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
357
358 // Create AES decryption key schedule
359 if (AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
360 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
361
362 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
363 {
364 AES_decrypt(dIn, dOut, &AesKey);
365 dIn = &dIn[16];
366 dOut = &dOut[16];
367 }
368 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
369 }
B.11.4.9. _cpri__AESEncryptOFB()
This function performs AES encryption/decryption in OFB chain mode. The dIn buffer is modified to
contain the encrypted/decrypted text.
The input iv buffer is assumed to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The returned value of iv
will be the nth encryption of the IV, where n is the number of blocks (full or partial) in the data stream.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
370 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
371 _cpri__AESEncryptOFB(
372 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted/decrypted data
373 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
374 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
375 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
376 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption. The size of this
377 // buffer is 16 byte
378 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
379 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
380 )
381 {
382 BYTE *pIv;
383 AES_KEY AesKey;
384 INT32 dSize;
385 int i;
386
387 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
388
389 if(dInSize == 0)
390 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
391
392 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
393 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
394
395 // Create AES key schedule
396 if (AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &AesKey) != 0)
397 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
398
399 // This is written so that dIn and dOut may be the same
400
401 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
402 {
403 // Encrypt the current value of the "IV"
404 AES_encrypt(iv, iv, &AesKey);
405
406 // XOR the encrypted IV into dIn to create the cipher text (dOut)
407 pIv = iv;
408 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
409 *dOut++ = (*pIv++ ^ *dIn++);
410 }
411 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
412 }
B.11.4.10. _cpri__AESDecryptOFB()
OFB encryption and decryption use the same algorithms for both. The _cpri__AESDecryptOFB() function
is implemented as a macro call to _cpri__AESEncrytOFB(). (skip)
413 //%#define _cpri__AESDecryptOFB(dOut,keySizeInBits, key, iv, dInSize, dIn) \
414 //% _cpri__AESEncryptOFB ( \
415 //% ((BYTE *)dOut), \
416 //% ((UINT32)keySizeInBits), \
417 //% ((BYTE *)key), \
418 //% ((BYTE *)iv), \
419 //% ((UINT32)dInSize), \
420 //% ((BYTE *)dIn) \
421 //% )
422 //%
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423 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM4 //%
B.11.5. SM4 Encryption
B.11.5.1. _cpri__SM4EncryptCBC()
This function performs SM4 encryption in CBC chain mode. The input dIn buffer is encrypted into dOut.
The input iv buffer is required to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The dInSize is required to
be a multiple of the block size.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS if success
CRYPT_PARAMETER dInSize is not a multiple of the block size
424 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
425 _cpri__SM4EncryptCBC(
426 BYTE *dOut, // OUT:
427 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
428 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
429 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
430 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
431 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size (is required to be a multiple
432 // of 16 bytes)
433 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
434 )
435 {
436 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
437 BYTE *pIv;
438 INT32 dSize; // Need a signed version
439 int i;
440
441 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
442
443 if(dInSize == 0)
444 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
445
446 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
447 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
448
449 // For CBC, the data size must be an even multiple of the
450 // cipher block size
451 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
452 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
453
454 // Create SM4 encrypt key schedule
455 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
456 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
457
458 // XOR the data block into the IV, encrypt the IV into the IV
459 // and then copy the IV to the output
460 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
461 {
462 pIv = iv;
463 for(i = 16; i > 0; i--)
464 *pIv++ ^= *dIn++;
465 SM4_encrypt(iv, iv, &Sm4Key);
466 pIv = iv;
467 for(i = 16; i > 0; i--)
468 *dOut++ = *pIv++;
469 }
470 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
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471 }
B.11.5.2. _cpri__SM4DecryptCBC()
This function performs SM4 decryption in CBC chain mode. The input dIn buffer is decrypted into dOut.
The input iv buffer is required to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The dInSize is required to
be a multiple of the block size.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS if success
CRYPT_PARAMETER dInSize is not a multiple of the block size
472 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
473 _cpri__SM4DecryptCBC(
474 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
475 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
476 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
477 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
478 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption. The size of this
479 // buffer is 16 byte
480 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
481 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
482 )
483 {
484 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
485 BYTE *pIv;
486 int i;
487 BYTE tmp[16];
488 BYTE *pT = NULL;
489 INT32 dSize;
490
491 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
492
493 if(dInSize == 0)
494 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
495
496 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
497 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
498
499 // For CBC, the data size must be an even multiple of the
500 // cipher block size
501 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
502 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
503
504 // Create SM4 key schedule
505 if (SM4_set_decrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
506 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
507
508 // Copy the input data to a temp buffer, decrypt the buffer into the output;
509 // XOR in the IV, and copy the temp buffer to the IV and repeat.
510 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
511 {
512 pT = tmp;
513 for(i = 16; i> 0; i--)
514 *pT++ = *dIn++;
515 SM4_decrypt(tmp, dOut, &Sm4Key);
516 pIv = iv;
517 pT = tmp;
518 for(i = 16; i> 0; i--)
519 {
520 *dOut++ ^= *pIv;
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521 *pIv++ = *pT++;
522 }
523 }
524 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
525 }
B.11.5.3. _cpri__SM4EncryptCFB()
This function performs SM4 encryption in CFB chain mode. The dOut buffer receives the values
encrypted dIn. The input iv is assumed to be the size of an encryption block (16 bytes). The iv buffer will
be modified to contain the last encrypted block.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
526 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
527 _cpri__SM4EncryptCFB(
528 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted
529 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
530 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
531 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
532 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
533 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
534 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
535 )
536 {
537 BYTE *pIv;
538 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
539 INT32 dSize; // Need a signed version of dInSize
540 int i;
541
542 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
543
544 if(dInSize == 0)
545 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
546
547 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
548 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
549
550 // Create SM4 encryption key schedule
551 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
552 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
553
554 // Encrypt the IV into the IV, XOR in the data, and copy to output
555 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
556 {
557 // Encrypt the current value of the IV
558 SM4_encrypt(iv, iv, &Sm4Key);
559 pIv = iv;
560 for(i = (int)(dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
561 // XOR the data into the IV to create the cipher text
562 // and put into the output
563 *dOut++ = *pIv++ ^= *dIn++;
564 }
565 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
566 }
B.11.5.4. _cpri__SM4DecryptCFB()
This function performs SM4 decrypt in CFB chain mode. The dOut buffer receives the values decrypted
from dIn.
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The input iv is assumed to be the size of an encryption block (16 bytes). The iv buffer will be modified to
contain the last decoded block, padded with zeros
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
567 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
568 _cpri__SM4DecryptCFB(
569 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
570 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
571 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
572 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
573 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
574 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
575 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
576 )
577 {
578 BYTE *pIv;
579 BYTE tmp[16];
580 int i;
581 BYTE *pT;
582 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
583 INT32 dSize;
584
585 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
586
587 if(dInSize == 0)
588 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
589
590 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
591 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
592
593 // Create SM4 encryption key schedule
594 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
595 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
596
597 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
598 {
599 // Encrypt the IV into the temp buffer
600 SM4_encrypt(iv, tmp, &Sm4Key);
601 pT = tmp;
602 pIv = iv;
603 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
604 // Copy the current cipher text to IV, XOR
605 // with the temp buffer and put into the output
606 *dOut++ = *pT++ ^ (*pIv++ = *dIn++);
607 }
608 // If the inner loop (i loop) was smaller than 16, then dSize
609 // would have been smaller than 16 and it is now negative
610 // If it is negative, then it indicates how may fill bytes
611 // are needed to pad out the IV for the next round.
612 for(; dSize < 0; dSize++)
613 *iv++ = 0;
614
615 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
616 }
B.11.5.5. _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR()
This function performs SM4 encryption/decryption in CTR chain mode. The dIn buffer is encrypted into
dOut. The input iv buffer is assumed to have a size equal to the SM4 block size (16 bytes). The iv will be
incremented by the number of blocks (full and partial) that were encrypted.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
617 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
618 _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR(
619 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
620 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
621 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
622 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
623 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption.
624 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
625 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
626 )
627 {
628 BYTE tmp[16];
629 BYTE *pT;
630 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
631 int i;
632 INT32 dSize;
633
634 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
635
636 if(dInSize == 0)
637 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
638
639 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
640 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
641
642 // Create SM4 encryption schedule
643 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
644 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
645
646 for(; dSize > 0; dSize--)
647 {
648 // Encrypt the current value of the IV(counter)
649 SM4_encrypt(iv, (BYTE *)tmp, &Sm4Key);
650
651 //increment the counter
652 for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
653 if((iv[i] += 1) != 0)
654 break;
655
656 // XOR the encrypted counter value with input and put into output
657 pT = tmp;
658 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
659 *dOut++ = *dIn++ ^ *pT++;
660 }
661 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
662 }
B.11.5.6. _cpri__SM4DecryptCTR()
Counter mode decryption uses the same algorithm as encryption. The _cpri__SM4DecryptCTR() function
is implemented as a macro call to _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR(). (skip)
663 //% #define _cpri__SM4DecryptCTR(dOut, keySize, key, iv, dInSize, dIn) \
664 //% _cpri__SM4EncryptCTR( \
665 //% ((BYTE *)dOut), \
666 //% ((UINT32)keySize), \
667 //% ((BYTE *)key), \
668 //% ((BYTE *)iv), \
669 //% ((UINT32)dInSize), \
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670 //% ((BYTE *)dIn) \
671 //% )
672 //%
673 // The //% is used by the prototype extraction program to cause it to include the
674 // line in the prototype file after removing the //%. Need an extra line with
nothing on it so that a blank line will separate this macro from the next definition.
B.11.5.7. _cpri__SM4EncryptECB()
SM4 encryption in ECB mode. The data buffer is modified to contain the cipher text.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
675 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
676 _cpri__SM4EncryptECB(
677 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: encrypted data
678 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
679 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
680 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
681 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
682 BYTE *dIn // IN: clear text buffer
683 )
684 {
685 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
686 INT32 dSize;
687
688 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && dIn != NULL);
689
690 if(dInSize == 0)
691 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
692
693 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
694 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
695
696 // For ECB, the data size must be an even multiple of the
697 // cipher block size
698 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
699 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
700 // Create SM4 encrypting key schedule
701 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
702 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
703
704 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
705 {
706 SM4_encrypt(dIn, dOut, &Sm4Key);
707 dIn = &dIn[16];
708 dOut = &dOut[16];
709 }
710 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
711 }
B.11.5.8. _cpri__SM4DecryptECB()
This function performs SM4 decryption using ECB (not recommended). The cipher text dIn is decrypted
into dOut.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
712 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
713 _cpri__SM4DecryptECB(
714 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the clear text data
715 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
716 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
717 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
718 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
719 BYTE *dIn // IN: cipher text buffer
720 )
721 {
722 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
723 INT32 dSize;
724
725 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && dIn != NULL);
726
727 if(dInSize == 0)
728 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
729
730 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
731 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
732
733 // For ECB, the data size must be an even multiple of the
734 // cipher block size
735 if((dSize % 16) != 0)
736 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
737
738 // Create SM4 decryption key schedule
739 if (SM4_set_decrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
740 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
741
742 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
743 {
744 SM4_decrypt(dIn, dOut, &Sm4Key);
745 dIn = &dIn[16];
746 dOut = &dOut[16];
747 }
748 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
749 }
B.11.5.9. _cpri__SM4EncryptOFB()
This function performs SM4 encryption/decryption in OFB chain mode. The dIn buffer is modified to
contain the encrypted/decrypted text.
The input iv buffer is assumed to have a size equal to the block size (16 bytes). The returned value of iv
will be the nth encryption of the IV, where n is the number of blocks (full or partial) in the data stream.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS no non-fatal errors
750 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
751 _cpri__SM4EncryptOFB(
752 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the encrypted/decrypted data
753 UINT32 keySizeInBits, // IN: key size in bit
754 BYTE *key, // IN: key buffer. The size of this buffer in
755 // bytes is (keySizeInBits + 7) / 8
756 BYTE *iv, // IN/OUT: IV for decryption. The size of this
757 // buffer is 16 byte
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758 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: data size
759 BYTE *dIn // IN: data buffer
760 )
761 {
762 BYTE *pIv;
763 SM4_KEY Sm4Key;
764 INT32 dSize;
765 int i;
766
767 pAssert(dOut != NULL && key != NULL && iv != NULL && dIn != NULL);
768
769 if(dInSize == 0)
770 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
771
772 pAssert(dInSize <= INT32_MAX);
773 dSize = (INT32)dInSize;
774
775 // Create SM4 key schedule
776 if (SM4_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits, &Sm4Key) != 0)
777 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
778
779 // This is written so that dIn and dOut may be the same
780
781 for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= 16)
782 {
783 // Encrypt the current value of the "IV"
784 SM4_encrypt(iv, iv, &Sm4Key);
785
786 // XOR the encrypted IV into dIn to create the cipher text (dOut)
787 pIv = iv;
788 for(i = (dSize < 16) ? dSize : 16; i > 0; i--)
789 *dOut++ = (*pIv++ ^ *dIn++);
790 }
791 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
792 }
B.11.5.10. _cpri__SM4DecryptOFB()
OFB encryption and decryption use the same algorithms for both. The _cpri__SM4DecryptOFB() function
is implemented as a macro call to _cpri__SM4EncrytOFB(). (skip)
793 //%#define _cpri__SM4DecryptOFB(dOut,keySizeInBits, key, iv, dInSize, dIn) \
794 //% _cpri__SM4EncryptOFB ( \
795 //% ((BYTE *)dOut), \
796 //% ((UINT32)keySizeInBits), \
797 //% ((BYTE *)key), \
798 //% ((BYTE *)iv), \
799 //% ((UINT32)dInSize), \
800 //% ((BYTE *)dIn) \
801 //% )
802 //%
803 #endif //% TPM_ALG_SM4
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B.12 RSA Files
B.12.1. CpriRSA.c
B.12.1.1. Introduction
This file contains implementation of crypto primitives for RSA. This is a simulator of a crypto engine.
Vendors may replace the implementation in this file with their own library functions.
Integer format: the big integers passed in/out to the function interfaces in this library adopt the same
format used in TPM 2.0 specification: Integer values are considered to be an array of one or more bytes.
The byte at offset zero within the array is the most significant byte of the integer. The interface uses
TPM2B as a big number format for numeric values passed to/from CryptUtil().
B.12.1.2. Includes
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
B.12.1.3. Local Functions
B.12.1.3.1. RsaPrivateExponent()
This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus
and one of the primes.
The results are returned in the key->private structure. The size of that structure is expanded to hold the
private exponent. If the computed value is smaller than the public modulus, the private exponent is de-
normalized.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent computed
CRYPT_PARAMETER prime is not half the size of the modulus, or the modulus is not evenly
divisible by the prime, or no private exponent could be computed
from the input parameters
3 static CRYPT_RESULT
4 RsaPrivateExponent(
5 RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to augment with the private
6 // exponent
7 )
8 {
9 BN_CTX *context;
10 BIGNUM *bnD;
11 BIGNUM *bnN;
12 BIGNUM *bnP;
13 BIGNUM *bnE;
14 BIGNUM *bnPhi;
15 BIGNUM *bnQ;
16 BIGNUM *bnQr;
17 UINT32 fill;
18
19 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success
20
21 pAssert(key != NULL && key->privateKey != NULL && key->publicKey != NULL);
22
23 context = BN_CTX_new();
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24 if(context == NULL)
25 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
26 BN_CTX_start(context);
27 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
28 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
29 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
30 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
31 bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context);
32 bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
33 bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context);
34
35 if(bnQr == NULL)
36 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
37
38 // Assume the size of the public key value is within range
39 pAssert(key->publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
40
41 if( BN_bin2bn(key->publicKey->buffer, key->publicKey->size, bnN) == NULL
42 || BN_bin2bn(key->privateKey->buffer, key->privateKey->size, bnP) == NULL)
43
44 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
45
46 // If P size is not 1/2 of n size, then this is not a valid value for this
47 // implementation. This will also catch the case were P is input as zero.
48 // This generates a return rather than an assert because the key being loaded
49 // might be SW generated and wrong.
50 if(BN_num_bits(bnP) < BN_num_bits(bnN)/2)
51 {
52 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
53 goto Cleanup;
54 }
55 // Get q = n/p;
56 if (BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1)
57 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
58
59 // If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n
60 if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
61 {
62 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable
63 goto Cleanup;
64 }
65 // Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1
66 if( BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN) == NULL
67 || !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP)
68 || !BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ)
69 || !BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1))
70 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
71
72 // Compute the multiplicative inverse
73 BN_set_word(bnE, key->exponent);
74 if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL)
75 {
76 // Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad
77 // set of parameters. Specifically, an exponent that is
78 // not compatible with the primes. In an implementation that
79 // has better visibility to the error codes, this might be
80 // refined so that failures in the library would return
81 // a more informative value. Should not assume here that
82 // the error codes will remain unchanged.
83
84 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
85 goto Cleanup;
86 }
87
88 fill = key->publicKey->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD);
89 BN_bn2bin(bnD, &key->privateKey->buffer[fill]);
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90 memset(key->privateKey->buffer, 0, fill);
91
92 // Change the size of the private key so that it is known to contain
93 // a private exponent rather than a prime.
94 key->privateKey->size = key->publicKey->size;
95
96 Cleanup:
97 BN_CTX_end(context);
98 BN_CTX_free(context);
99 return retVal;
100 }
B.12.1.3.2. _cpri__TestKeyRSA()
This function computes the private exponent de = 1 mod (p-1)*(q-1) The inputs are the public modulus
and one of the primes or two primes.
If both primes are provided, the public modulus is computed. If only one prime is provided, the second
prime is computed. In either case, a private exponent is produced and placed in d.
If no modular inverse exists, then CRYPT_PARAMETER is returned.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS private exponent (d) was generated
CRYPT_PARAMETER one or more parameters are invalid
101 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
102 _cpri__TestKeyRSA(
103 TPM2B *d, // OUT: the address to receive the private
104 // exponent
105 UINT32 exponent, // IN: the public modulu
106 TPM2B *publicKey, // IN/OUT: an input if only one prime is
107 // provided. an output if both primes are
108 // provided
109 TPM2B *prime1, // IN: a first prime
110 TPM2B *prime2 // IN: an optional second prime
111 )
112 {
113 BN_CTX *context;
114 BIGNUM *bnD;
115 BIGNUM *bnN;
116 BIGNUM *bnP;
117 BIGNUM *bnE;
118 BIGNUM *bnPhi;
119 BIGNUM *bnQ;
120 BIGNUM *bnQr;
121 UINT32 fill;
122
123 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS; // Assume success
124
125 pAssert(publicKey != NULL && prime1 != NULL);
126 // Make sure that the sizes are within range
127 pAssert( prime1->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2
128 && publicKey->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
129 pAssert( prime2 == NULL || prime2->size < MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2);
130
131 if(publicKey->size/2 != prime1->size)
132 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
133
134 context = BN_CTX_new();
135 if(context == NULL)
136 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
137 BN_CTX_start(context);
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138 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context); // public exponent (e)
139 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context); // private exponent (d)
140 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context); // public modulus (n)
141 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime1 (p)
142 bnPhi = BN_CTX_get(context); // (p-1)(q-1)
143 bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context); // prime2 (q)
144 bnQr = BN_CTX_get(context); // n mod p
145
146 if(bnQr == NULL)
147 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
148
149 if(BN_bin2bn(prime1->buffer, prime1->size, bnP) == NULL)
150 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
151
152 // If prime2 is provided, then compute n
153 if(prime2 != NULL)
154 {
155 // Two primes provided so use them to compute n
156 if(BN_bin2bn(prime2->buffer, prime2->size, bnQ) == NULL)
157 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
158
159 // Make sure that the sizes of the primes are compatible
160 if(BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
161 {
162 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
163 goto Cleanup;
164 }
165 // Multiply the primes to get the public modulus
166
167 if(BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context) != 1)
168 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
169
170 // if the space provided for the public modulus is large enough,
171 // save the created value
172 if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != (publicKey->size * 8))
173 {
174 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
175 goto Cleanup;
176 }
177 BN_bn2bin(bnN, publicKey->buffer);
178 }
179 else
180 {
181 // One prime provided so find the second prime by division
182 BN_bin2bn(publicKey->buffer, publicKey->size, bnN);
183
184 // Get q = n/p;
185 if(BN_div(bnQ, bnQr, bnN, bnP, context) != 1)
186 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
187
188 // If there is a remainder, then this is not a valid n
189 if(BN_num_bytes(bnQr) != 0 || BN_num_bits(bnQ) != BN_num_bits(bnP))
190 {
191 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER; // problem may be recoverable
192 goto Cleanup;
193 }
194 }
195 // Get compute Phi = (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - p - q + 1 = n - p - q + 1
196 BN_copy(bnPhi, bnN);
197 BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnP);
198 BN_sub(bnPhi, bnPhi, bnQ);
199 BN_add_word(bnPhi, 1);
200 // Compute the multiplicative inverse
201 BN_set_word(bnE, exponent);
202 if(BN_mod_inverse(bnD, bnE, bnPhi, context) == NULL)
203 {
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204 // Going to assume that the error is caused by a bad set of parameters.
205 // Specifically, an exponent that is not compatible with the primes.
206 // In an implementation that has better visibility to the error codes,
207 // this might be refined so that failures in the library would return
208 // a more informative value.
209 // Do not assume that the error codes will remain unchanged.
210 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
211 goto Cleanup;
212 }
213 // Return the private exponent.
214 // Make sure it is normalized to have the correct size.
215 d->size = publicKey->size;
216 fill = d->size - BN_num_bytes(bnD);
217 BN_bn2bin(bnD, &d->buffer[fill]);
218 memset(d->buffer, 0, fill);
219 Cleanup:
220 BN_CTX_end(context);
221 BN_CTX_free(context);
222 return retVal;
223 }
B.12.1.3.3. RSAEP()
This function performs the RSAEP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value
(m) with the public exponent (e), modulo the public (n).
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete
CRYPT_PARAMETER number to exponentiate is larger than the modulus
224 static CRYPT_RESULT
225 RSAEP (
226 UINT32 dInOutSize, // OUT size of the encrypted block
227 BYTE *dInOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
228 RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key to use
229 )
230 {
231 UINT32 e;
232 BYTE exponent[4];
233 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
234
235 e = key->exponent;
236 if(e == 0)
237 e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
238 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, exponent);
239
240 //!!! Can put check for test of RSA here
241
242 retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut, 4, exponent,
243 key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer);
244
245 // Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible.
246 pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW);
247
248 return retVal;
249 }
B.12.1.3.4. RSADP()
This function performs the RSADP operation defined in PKCS#1v2.1. It is an exponentiation of a value (c)
with the private exponent (d), modulo the public modulus (n). The decryption is in place.
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This function also checks the size of the private key. If the size indicates that only a prime value is
present, the key is converted to being a private exponent.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS decryption succeeded
CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decrypt is larger than the modulus
250 static CRYPT_RESULT
251 RSADP (
252 UINT32 dInOutSize, // IN/OUT: size of decrypted data
253 BYTE *dInOut, // IN/OUT: the decrypted data
254 RSA_KEY *key // IN: the key
255 )
256 {
257 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
258
259 //!!! Can put check for RSA tested here
260
261 // Make sure that the pointers are provided and that the private key is present
262 // If the private key is present it is assumed to have been created by
263 // so is presumed good _cpri__PrivateExponent
264 pAssert(key != NULL && dInOut != NULL &&
265 key->publicKey->size == key->publicKey->size);
266
267 // make sure that the value to be decrypted is smaller than the modulus
268 // note: this check is redundant as is also performed by _math__ModExp()
269 // which is optimized for use in RSA operations
270 if(_math__uComp(key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer,
271 dInOutSize, dInOut) <= 0)
272 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
273
274 // _math__ModExp can return CRYPT_PARAMTER or CRYPT_UNDERFLOW but actual
275 // underflow is not possible because everything is in the same buffer.
276 retVal = _math__ModExp(dInOutSize, dInOut, dInOutSize, dInOut,
277 key->privateKey->size, key->privateKey->buffer,
278 key->publicKey->size, key->publicKey->buffer);
279
280 // Exponentiation result is stored in-place, thus no space shortage is possible.
281 pAssert(retVal != CRYPT_UNDERFLOW);
282
283 return retVal;
284 }
B.12.1.3.5. OaepEncode()
This function performs OAEP padding. The size of the buffer to receive the OAEP padded data must
equal the size of the modulus
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful
CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not valid
CRYPT_FAIL message size is too large
285 static CRYPT_RESULT
286 OaepEncode(
287 UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size
288 BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data
289 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding
290 const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL)
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291 UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size
292 BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded
293 #ifdef TEST_RSA //
294 , BYTE *testSeed // IN: optional seed used for testing.
295 #endif // TEST_RSA //
296 )
297 {
298 UINT32 padLen;
299 UINT32 dbSize;
300 UINT32 i;
301 BYTE mySeed[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
302 BYTE *seed = mySeed;
303 INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
304 BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
305 BYTE *pp;
306 BYTE *pm;
307 UINT32 lSize = 0;
308 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
309
310 pAssert(padded != NULL && message != NULL);
311
312 // A value of zero is not allowed because the KDF can't produce a result
313 // if the digest size is zero.
314 if(hLen <= 0)
315 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
316
317 // If a label is provided, get the length of the string, including the
318 // terminator
319 if(label != NULL)
320 lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1;
321
322 // Basic size check
323 // messageSize <= k 2hLen 2
324 if(messageSize > paddedSize - 2 * hLen - 2)
325 return CRYPT_FAIL;
326
327 // Hash L even if it is null
328 // Offset into padded leaving room for masked seed and byte of zero
329 pp = &padded[hLen + 1];
330 retVal = _cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize, (BYTE *)label, hLen, pp);
331
332 // concatenate PS of k mLen 2hLen 2
333 padLen = paddedSize - messageSize - (2 * hLen) - 2;
334 memset(&pp[hLen], 0, padLen);
335 pp[hLen+padLen] = 0x01;
336 padLen += 1;
337 memcpy(&pp[hLen+padLen], message, messageSize);
338
339 // The total size of db = hLen + pad + mSize;
340 dbSize = hLen+padLen+messageSize;
341
342 // If testing, then use the provided seed. Otherwise, use values
343 // from the RNG
344 #ifdef TEST_RSA
345 if(testSeed != NULL)
346 seed = testSeed;
347 else
348 #endif // TEST_RSA
349 _cpri__GenerateRandom(hLen, mySeed);
350
351 // mask = MGF1 (seed, nSize hLen 1)
352 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(dbSize, mask, hashAlg, hLen, seed)) < 0)
353 return retVal; // Don't expect an error because hash size is not zero
354 // was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above.
355
356 // Create the masked db
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357 pm = mask;
358 for(i = dbSize; i > 0; i--)
359 *pp++ ^= *pm++;
360 pp = &padded[hLen + 1];
361
362 // Run the masked data through MGF1
363 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, &padded[1], hashAlg, dbSize, pp)) < 0)
364 return retVal; // Don't expect zero here as the only case for zero
365 // was detected in the call to _cpri__HashBlock() above.
366
367 // Now XOR the seed to create masked seed
368 pp = &padded[1];
369 pm = seed;
370 for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--)
371 *pp++ ^= *pm++;
372
373 // Set the first byte to zero
374 *padded = 0x00;
375 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
376 }
B.12.1.3.6. OaepDecode()
This function performs OAEP padding checking. The size of the buffer to receive the recovered data. If
the padding is not valid, the dSize size is set to zero and the function returns CRYPT_NO_RESULTS.
The dSize parameter is used as an input to indicate the size available in the buffer. If insufficient space is
available, the size is not changed and the return code is CRYPT_FAIL.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS decode complete
CRYPT_PARAMETER the value to decode was larger than the modulus
CRYPT_FAIL the padding is wrong or the buffer to receive the results is too small
377 static CRYPT_RESULT
378 OaepDecode(
379 UINT32 *dataOutSize, // IN/OUT: the recovered data size
380 BYTE *dataOut, // OUT: the recovered data
381 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: algorithm to use for padding
382 const char *label, // IN: null-terminated string (may be NULL)
383 UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: the size of the padded data
384 BYTE *padded // IN: the padded data
385 )
386 {
387 UINT32 dSizeSave;
388 UINT32 i;
389 BYTE seedMask[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
390 INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
391
392 BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
393 BYTE *pp;
394 BYTE *pm;
395 UINT32 lSize = 0;
396 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
397
398 // Unknown hash
399 pAssert(hLen > 0 && dataOutSize != NULL && dataOut != NULL && padded != NULL);
400
401 // If there is a label, get its size including the terminating 0x00
402 if(label != NULL)
403 lSize = (UINT32)strlen(label) + 1;
404
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405 // Set the return size to zero so that it doesn't have to be done on each
406 // failure
407 dSizeSave = *dataOutSize;
408 *dataOutSize = 0;
409
410 // Strange size (anything smaller can't be an OAEP padded block)
411 // Also check for no leading 0
412 if(paddedSize < (unsigned)((2 * hLen) + 2) || *padded != 0)
413 return CRYPT_FAIL;
414
415 // Use the hash size to determine what to put through MGF1 in order
416 // to recover the seedMask
417 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(hLen, seedMask, hashAlg,
418 paddedSize-hLen-1, &padded[hLen+1])) < 0)
419 return retVal;
420
421 // Recover the seed into seedMask
422 pp = &padded[1];
423 pm = seedMask;
424 for(i = hLen; i > 0; i--)
425 *pm++ ^= *pp++;
426
427 // Use the seed to generate the data mask
428 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(paddedSize-hLen-1, mask, hashAlg,
429 hLen, seedMask)) < 0)
430 return retVal;
431
432 // Use the mask generated from seed to recover the padded data
433 pp = &padded[hLen+1];
434 pm = mask;
435 for(i = paddedSize-hLen-1; i > 0; i--)
436 *pm++ ^= *pp++;
437
438 // Make sure that the recovered data has the hash of the label
439 // Put trial value in the seed mask
440 if((retVal=_cpri__HashBlock(hashAlg, lSize,(BYTE *)label, hLen, seedMask)) < 0)
441 return retVal;
442
443 if(memcmp(seedMask, mask, hLen) != 0)
444 return CRYPT_FAIL;
445
446 // find the start of the data
447 pm = &mask[hLen];
448 for(i = paddedSize-(2*hLen)-1; i > 0; i--)
449 {
450 if(*pm++ != 0)
451 break;
452 }
453 if(i == 0)
454 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
455
456 // pm should be pointing at the first part of the data
457 // and i is one greater than the number of bytes to move
458 i--;
459 if(i > dSizeSave)
460 {
461 // Restore dSize
462 *dataOutSize = dSizeSave;
463 return CRYPT_FAIL;
464 }
465 memcpy(dataOut, pm, i);
466 *dataOutSize = i;
467 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
468 }
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B.12.1.3.7. PKSC1v1_5Encode()
This function performs the encoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS data encoded
CRYPT_PARAMETER message size is too large
469 static CRYPT_RESULT
470 RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode(
471 UINT32 paddedSize, // IN: pad value size
472 BYTE *padded, // OUT: the pad data
473 UINT32 messageSize, // IN: the message size
474 BYTE *message // IN: the message being padded
475 )
476 {
477 UINT32 ps = paddedSize - messageSize - 3;
478 if(messageSize > paddedSize - 11)
479 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
480
481 // move the message to the end of the buffer
482 memcpy(&padded[paddedSize - messageSize], message, messageSize);
483
484 // Set the first byte to 0x00 and the second to 0x02
485 *padded = 0;
486 padded[1] = 2;
487
488 // Fill with random bytes
489 _cpri__GenerateRandom(ps, &padded[2]);
490
491 // Set the delimiter for the random field to 0
492 padded[2+ps] = 0;
493
494 // Now, the only messy part. Make sure that all the ps bytes are non-zero
495 // In this implementation, use the value of the current index
496 for(ps++; ps > 1; ps--)
497 {
498 if(padded[ps] == 0)
499 padded[ps] = 0x55; // In the < 0.5% of the cases that the random
500 // value is 0, just pick a value to put into
501 // the spot.
502 }
503 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
504 }
B.12.1.3.8. RSAES_Decode()
This function performs the decoding for RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT as defined in PKCS#1V2.1
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
CRYPT_FAIL decoding error or results would no fit into provided buffer
505 static CRYPT_RESULT
506 RSAES_Decode(
507 UINT32 *messageSize, // IN/OUT: recovered message size
508 BYTE *message, // OUT: the recovered message
509 UINT32 codedSize, // IN: the encoded message size
510 BYTE *coded // IN: the encoded message
511 )
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512 {
513 BOOL fail = FALSE;
514 UINT32 ps;
515
516 fail = (codedSize < 11);
517 fail |= (coded[0] != 0x00) || (coded[1] != 0x02);
518 for(ps = 2; ps < codedSize; ps++)
519 {
520 if(coded[ps] == 0)
521 break;
522 }
523 ps++;
524
525 // Make sure that ps has not gone over the end and that there are at least 8
526 // bytes of pad data.
527 fail |= ((ps >= codedSize) || ((ps-2) < 8));
528 if((*messageSize < codedSize - ps) || fail)
529 return CRYPT_FAIL;
530
531 *messageSize = codedSize - ps;
532 memcpy(message, &coded[ps], codedSize - ps);
533 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
534 }
B.12.1.3.9. PssEncode()
This function creates an encoded block of data that is the size of modulus. The function uses the
maximum salt size that will fit in the encoded block.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS encode successful
CRYPT_PARAMETER hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
535 static CRYPT_RESULT
536 PssEncode (
537 UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: size of the encode data buffer
538 BYTE *eOut, // OUT: encoded data buffer
539 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
540 UINT32 hashInSize, // IN: size of digest to encode
541 BYTE *hashIn // IN: the digest
542 #ifdef TEST_RSA //
543 , BYTE *saltIn // IN: optional parameter for testing
544 #endif // TEST_RSA //
545 )
546 {
547 INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
548 BYTE salt[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES - 1];
549 UINT16 saltSize;
550 BYTE *ps = salt;
551 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
552 UINT16 mLen;
553 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
554
555 // These are fatal errors indicating bad TPM firmware
556 pAssert(eOut != NULL && hLen > 0 && hashIn != NULL );
557
558 // Get the size of the mask
559 mLen = (UINT16)(eOutSize - hLen - 1);
560
561 // Maximum possible salt size is mask length - 1
562 saltSize = mLen - 1;
563
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564 // Use the maximum salt size allowed by FIPS 186-4
565 if(saltSize > hLen)
566 saltSize = (UINT16)hLen;
567
568 //using eOut for scratch space
569 // Set the first 8 bytes to zero
570 memset(eOut, 0, 8);
571
572 // Get set the salt
573 #ifdef TEST_RSA
574 if(saltIn != NULL)
575 {
576 saltSize = hLen;
577 memcpy(salt, saltIn, hLen);
578 }
579 else
580 #endif // TEST_RSA
581 _cpri__GenerateRandom(saltSize, salt);
582
583 // Create the hash of the pad || input hash || salt
584 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
585 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, eOut);
586 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, hashInSize, hashIn);
587 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, saltSize, salt);
588 _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, hLen, &eOut[eOutSize - hLen - 1]);
589
590 // Create a mask
591 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, eOut, hashAlg, hLen, &eOut[mLen])) < 0)
592 {
593 // Currently _cpri__MGF1 is not expected to return a CRYPT_RESULT error.
594 pAssert(0);
595 }
596 // Since this implementation uses key sizes that are all even multiples of
597 // 8, just need to make sure that the most significant bit is CLEAR
598 eOut[0] &= 0x7f;
599
600 // Before we mess up the eOut value, set the last byte to 0xbc
601 eOut[eOutSize - 1] = 0xbc;
602
603 // XOR a byte of 0x01 at the position just before where the salt will be XOR'ed
604 eOut = &eOut[mLen - saltSize - 1];
605 *eOut++ ^= 0x01;
606
607 // XOR the salt data into the buffer
608 for(; saltSize > 0; saltSize--)
609 *eOut++ ^= *ps++;
610
611 // and we are done
612 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
613 }
B.12.1.3.10. PssDecode()
This function checks that the PSS encoded block was built from the provided digest. If the check is
successful, CRYPT_SUCCESS is returned. Any other value indicates an error.
This implementation of PSS decoding is intended for the reference TPM implementation and is not at all
generalized. It is used to check signatures over hashes and assumptions are made about the sizes of
values. Those assumptions are enforce by this implementation. This implementation does allow for a
variable size salt value to have been used by the creator of the signature.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
CRYPT_FAIL decode operation failed
614 static CRYPT_RESULT
615 PssDecode(
616 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
617 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare
618 BYTE *dIn, // In: the digest to compare
619 UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data
620 BYTE *eIn, // IN: the encoded data
621 UINT32 saltSize // IN: the expected size of the salt
622 )
623 {
624 INT32 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
625 BYTE mask[MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES];
626 BYTE *pm = mask;
627 BYTE pad[8] = {0};
628 UINT32 i;
629 UINT32 mLen;
630 BOOL fail = FALSE;
631 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
632 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
633
634 // These errors are indicative of failures due to programmer error
635 pAssert(dIn != NULL && eIn != NULL);
636
637 // check the hash scheme
638 if(hLen == 0)
639 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
640
641 // most significant bit must be zero
642 fail = ((eIn[0] & 0x80) != 0);
643
644 // last byte must be 0xbc
645 fail |= (eIn[eInSize - 1] != 0xbc);
646
647 // Use the hLen bytes at the end of the buffer to generate a mask
648 // Doesn't start at the end which is a flag byte
649 mLen = eInSize - hLen - 1;
650 if((retVal = _cpri__MGF1(mLen, mask, hashAlg, hLen, &eIn[mLen])) < 0)
651 return retVal;
652 if(retVal == 0)
653 return CRYPT_FAIL;
654
655 // Clear the MSO of the mask to make it consistent with the encoding.
656 mask[0] &= 0x7F;
657
658 // XOR the data into the mask to recover the salt. This sequence
659 // advances eIn so that it will end up pointing to the seed data
660 // which is the hash of the signature data
661 for(i = mLen; i > 0; i--)
662 *pm++ ^= *eIn++;
663
664 // Find the first byte of 0x01 after a string of all 0x00
665 for(pm = mask, i = mLen; i > 0; i--)
666 {
667 if(*pm == 0x01)
668 break;
669 else
670 fail |= (*pm++ != 0);
671 }
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672 fail |= (i == 0);
673
674 // if we have failed, will continue using the entire mask as the salt value so
675 // that the timing attacks will not disclose anything (I don't think that this
676 // is a problem for TPM applications but, usually, we don't fail so this
677 // doesn't cost anything).
678 if(fail)
679 {
680 i = mLen;
681 pm = mask;
682 }
683 else
684 {
685 pm++;
686 i--;
687 }
688 // If the salt size was provided, then the recovered size must match
689 fail |= (saltSize != 0 && i != saltSize);
690
691 // i contains the salt size and pm points to the salt. Going to use the input
692 // hash and the seed to recreate the hash in the lower portion of eIn.
693 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
694
695 // add the pad of 8 zeros
696 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, 8, pad);
697
698 // add the provided digest value
699 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, dInSize, dIn);
700
701 // and the salt
702 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, i, pm);
703
704 // get the result
705 retVal = _cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, mask);
706
707 // retVal will be the size of the digest or zero. If not equal to the indicated
708 // digest size, then the signature doesn't match
709 fail |= (retVal != hLen);
710 fail |= (memcmp(mask, eIn, hLen) != 0);
711 if(fail)
712 return CRYPT_FAIL;
713 else
714 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
715 }
B.12.1.3.11. PKSC1v1_5SignEncode()
Encode a message using PKCS1v1().5 method.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS encode complete
CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not a supported hash algorithm
CRYPT_PARAMETER eOutSize is not large enough or hInSize does not match the digest
size of hashAlg
716 static CRYPT_RESULT
717 RSASSA_Encode(
718 UINT32 eOutSize, // IN: the size of the resulting block
719 BYTE *eOut, // OUT: the encoded block
720 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5
721 UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of hash to be signed
722 BYTE *hIn // IN: hash buffer
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723 )
724 {
725 BYTE *der;
726 INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der);
727 INT32 fillSize;
728
729 pAssert(eOut != NULL && hIn != NULL);
730
731 // Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string defined.
732 if(derSize == 0 )
733 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
734
735 // If the digest size of 'hashAl' doesn't match the input digest size, then
736 // the DER will misidentify the digest so return an error
737 if((unsigned)_cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg) != hInSize)
738 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
739
740 fillSize = eOutSize - derSize - hInSize - 3;
741
742 // Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space
743 if(fillSize < 8)
744 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
745 // Start filling
746 *eOut++ = 0; // initial byte of zero
747 *eOut++ = 1; // byte of 0x01
748 for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--)
749 *eOut++ = 0xff; // bunch of 0xff
750 *eOut++ = 0; // another 0
751 for(; derSize > 0; derSize--)
752 *eOut++ = *der++; // copy the DER
753 for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--)
754 *eOut++ = *hIn++; // copy the hash
755 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
756 }
B.12.1.3.12. RSASSA_Decode()
This function performs the RSASSA decoding of a signature.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS decode successful
CRYPT_FAIL decode unsuccessful
CRYPT_SCHEME haslAlg is not supported
757 static CRYPT_RESULT
758 RSASSA_Decode(
759 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use for the encoding
760 UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of the digest to compare
761 BYTE *hIn, // In: the digest to compare
762 UINT32 eInSize, // IN: size of the encoded data
763 BYTE *eIn // IN: the encoded data
764 )
765 {
766 BOOL fail = FALSE;
767 BYTE *der;
768 INT32 derSize = _cpri__GetHashDER(hashAlg, &der);
769 INT32 hashSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
770 INT32 fillSize;
771
772 pAssert(hIn != NULL && eIn != NULL);
773
774 // Can't use this scheme if the algorithm doesn't have a DER string
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775 // defined or if the provided hash isn't the right size
776 if(derSize == 0 || (unsigned)hashSize != hInSize)
777 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
778
779 // Make sure that this combination will fit in the provided space
780 // Since no data movement takes place, can just walk though this
781 // and accept nearly random values. This can only be called from
782 // _cpri__ValidateSignature() so eInSize is known to be in range.
783 fillSize = eInSize - derSize - hashSize - 3;
784
785 // Start checking
786 fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // initial byte of zero
787 fail |= (*eIn++ != 1); // byte of 0x01
788 for(; fillSize > 0; fillSize--)
789 fail |= (*eIn++ != 0xff); // bunch of 0xff
790 fail |= (*eIn++ != 0); // another 0
791 for(; derSize > 0; derSize--)
792 fail |= (*eIn++ != *der++); // match the DER
793 for(; hInSize > 0; hInSize--)
794 fail |= (*eIn++ != *hIn++); // match the hash
795 if(fail)
796 return CRYPT_FAIL;
797 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
798 }
B.12.1.4. Externally Accessible Functions
B.12.1.4.1. _cpri__RsaStartup()
Function that is called to initialize the hash service. In this implementation, this function does nothing but
it is called by the CryptUtilStartup() function and must be present.
799 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
800 _cpri__RsaStartup(
801 void
802 )
803 {
804 return TRUE;
805 }
B.12.1.4.2. _cpri__EncryptRSA()
This is the entry point for encryption using RSA. Encryption is use of the public exponent. The padding
parameter determines what padding will be used.
The cOutSize parameter must be at least as large as the size of the key.
If the padding is RSA_PAD_NONE, dIn is treaded as a number. It must be lower in value than the key
modulus.
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NOTE: If dIn has fewer bytes than cOut, then we don't add low-order zeros to dIn to make it the size of the RSA key for
the call to RSAEP. This is because the high order bytes of dIn might have a numeric value that is greater than
the value of the key modulus. If this had low-order zeros added, it would have a numeric value larger than the
modulus even though it started out with a lower numeric value.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS encryption complete
CRYPT_PARAMETER cOutSize is too small (must be the size of the modulus)
CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not a supported scheme
806 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
807 _cpri__EncryptRSA(
808 UINT32 *cOutSize, // OUT: the size of the encrypted data
809 BYTE *cOut, // OUT: the encrypted data
810 RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for encryption
811 TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding
812 UINT32 dInSize, // IN: the amount of data to encrypt
813 BYTE *dIn, // IN: the data to encrypt
814 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed
815 const char *label // IN: in case it is needed
816 )
817 {
818 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
819
820 pAssert(cOutSize != NULL);
821
822 // All encryption schemes return the same size of data
823 if(*cOutSize < key->publicKey->size)
824 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
825 *cOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
826
827 switch (padType)
828 {
829 case TPM_ALG_NULL: // 'raw' encryption
830 {
831 // dIn can have more bytes than cOut as long as the extra bytes
832 // are zero
833 for(; dInSize > *cOutSize; dInSize--)
834 {
835 if(*dIn++ != 0)
836 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
837
838 }
839 // If dIn is smaller than cOut, fill cOut with zeros
840 if(dInSize < *cOutSize)
841 memset(cOut, 0, *cOutSize - dInSize);
842
843 // Copy the rest of the value
844 memcpy(&cOut[*cOutSize-dInSize], dIn, dInSize);
845 // If the size of dIn is the same as cOut dIn could be larger than
846 // the modulus. If it is, then RSAEP() will catch it.
847 }
848 break;
849 case TPM_ALG_RSAES:
850 retVal = RSAES_PKSC1v1_5Encode(*cOutSize, cOut, dInSize, dIn);
851 break;
852 case TPM_ALG_OAEP:
853 retVal = OaepEncode(*cOutSize, cOut, hashAlg, label, dInSize, dIn
854 #ifdef TEST_RSA
855 ,NULL
856 #endif
857 );
858 break;
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859 default:
860 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
861 }
862 // All the schemes that do padding will come here for the encryption step
863 // Check that the Encoding worked
864 if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
865 return retVal;
866
867 // Padding OK so do the encryption
868 return RSAEP(*cOutSize, cOut, key);
869 }
B.12.1.4.3. _cpri__DecryptRSA()
This is the entry point for decryption using RSA. Decryption is use of the private exponent. The padType
parameter determines what padding was used.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS successful completion
CRYPT_PARAMETER cInSize is not the same as the size of the public modulus of key; or
numeric value of the encrypted data is greater than the modulus
CRYPT_FAIL dOutSize is not large enough for the result
CRYPT_SCHEME padType is not supported
870 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
871 _cpri__DecryptRSA(
872 UINT32 *dOutSize, // OUT: the size of the decrypted data
873 BYTE *dOut, // OUT: the decrypted data
874 RSA_KEY *key, // IN: the key to use for decryption
875 TPM_ALG_ID padType, // IN: the type of padding
876 UINT32 cInSize, // IN: the amount of data to decrypt
877 BYTE *cIn, // IN: the data to decrypt
878 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: in case this is needed for the scheme
879 const char *label // IN: in case it is needed for the scheme
880 )
881 {
882 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
883
884 // Make sure that the necessary parameters are provided
885 pAssert(cIn != NULL && dOut != NULL && dOutSize != NULL && key != NULL);
886
887 // Size is checked to make sure that the decryption works properly
888 if(cInSize != key->publicKey->size)
889 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
890
891 // For others that do padding, do the decryption in place and then
892 // go handle the decoding.
893 if((retVal = RSADP(cInSize, cIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
894 return retVal; // Decryption failed
895
896 // Remove padding
897 switch (padType)
898 {
899 case TPM_ALG_NULL:
900 if(*dOutSize < key->publicKey->size)
901 return CRYPT_FAIL;
902 *dOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
903 memcpy(dOut, cIn, *dOutSize);
904 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
905 case TPM_ALG_RSAES:
906 return RSAES_Decode(dOutSize, dOut, cInSize, cIn);
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907 break;
908 case TPM_ALG_OAEP:
909 return OaepDecode(dOutSize, dOut, hashAlg, label, cInSize, cIn);
910 break;
911 default:
912 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
913 break;
914 }
915 }
B.12.1.4.4. _cpri__SignRSA()
This function is used to generate an RSA signature of the type indicated in scheme.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS sign operation completed normally
CRYPT_SCHEME scheme or hashAlg are not supported
CRYPT_PARAMETER hInSize does not match hashAlg (for RSASSA)
916 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
917 _cpri__SignRSA(
918 UINT32 *sigOutSize, // OUT: size of signature
919 BYTE *sigOut, // OUT: signature
920 RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use
921 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use
922 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm for PKSC1v1_5
923 UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be signed
924 BYTE *hIn // IN: digest buffer
925 )
926 {
927 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
928
929 // Parameter checks
930 pAssert(sigOutSize != NULL && sigOut != NULL && key != NULL && hIn != NULL);
931
932 // For all signatures the size is the size of the key modulus
933 *sigOutSize = key->publicKey->size;
934 switch (scheme)
935 {
936 case TPM_ALG_NULL:
937 *sigOutSize = 0;
938 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
939 case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
940 // PssEncode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER
941 retVal = PssEncode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn
942 #ifdef TEST_RSA
943 , NULL
944 #endif
945 );
946 break;
947 case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
948 // RSASSA_Encode can return CRYPT_PARAMETER or CRYPT_SCHEME
949 retVal = RSASSA_Encode(*sigOutSize, sigOut, hashAlg, hInSize, hIn);
950 break;
951 default:
952 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
953 }
954 if(retVal != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
955 return retVal;
956 // Do the encryption using the private key
957 // RSADP can return CRYPT_PARAMETR
958 return RSADP(*sigOutSize,sigOut, key);
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959 }
B.12.1.4.5. _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA()
This function is used to validate an RSA signature. If the signature is valid CRYPT_SUCCESS is
returned. If the signature is not valid, CRYPT_FAIL is returned. Other return codes indicate either
parameter problems or fatal errors.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS the signature checks
CRYPT_FAIL the signature does not check
CRYPT_SCHEME unsupported scheme or hash algorithm
960 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
961 _cpri__ValidateSignatureRSA(
962 RSA_KEY *key, // IN: key to use
963 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme to use
964 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm
965 UINT32 hInSize, // IN: size of digest to be checked
966 BYTE *hIn, // IN: digest buffer
967 UINT32 sigInSize, // IN: size of signature
968 BYTE *sigIn, // IN: signature
969 UINT16 saltSize // IN: salt size for PSS
970 )
971 {
972 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
973
974 // Fatal programming errors
975 pAssert(key != NULL && sigIn != NULL && hIn != NULL);
976
977 // Errors that might be caused by calling parameters
978 if(sigInSize != key->publicKey->size)
979 return CRYPT_FAIL;
980 // Decrypt the block
981 if((retVal = RSAEP(sigInSize, sigIn, key)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
982 return CRYPT_FAIL;
983 switch (scheme)
984 {
985 case TPM_ALG_NULL:
986 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
987 break;
988 case TPM_ALG_RSAPSS:
989 return PssDecode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn, saltSize);
990 break;
991 case TPM_ALG_RSASSA:
992 return RSASSA_Decode(hashAlg, hInSize, hIn, sigInSize, sigIn);
993 break;
994 default:
995 break;
996 }
997 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
998 }
999 #ifndef RSA_KEY_SIEVE
B.12.1.4.6. _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA()
Generate an RSA key from a provided seed
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_FAIL exponent is not prime or is less than 3; or could not find a prime using
the provided parameters
CRYPT_CANCEL operation was canceled
1000 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
1001 _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA(
1002 TPM2B *n, // OUT: The public modulu
1003 TPM2B *p, // OUT: One of the prime factors of n
1004 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: Size of the public modulus in bit
1005 UINT32 e, // IN: The public exponent
1006 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use in the key
1007 // generation proce
1008 TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed to use
1009 const char *label, // IN: A label for the generation process.
1010 TPM2B *extra, // IN: Party 1 data for the KDF
1011 UINT32 *counter // IN/OUT: Counter value to allow KFD iteration
1012 // to be propagated across multiple routine
1013 )
1014 {
1015 UINT32 lLen; // length of the label
1016 // (counting the terminating 0);
1017 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
1018
1019 TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK oPadKey;
1020
1021 UINT32 outer;
1022 UINT32 inner;
1023 BYTE swapped[4];
1024
1025 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1026 int i, fill;
1027 const static char defaultLabel[] = "RSA key";
1028 BYTE *pb;
1029
1030 CPRI_HASH_STATE h1; // contains the hash of the
1031 // HMAC key w/ iPad
1032 CPRI_HASH_STATE h2; // contains the hash of the
1033 // HMAC key w/ oPad
1034 CPRI_HASH_STATE h; // the working hash context
1035
1036 BIGNUM *bnP;
1037 BIGNUM *bnQ;
1038 BIGNUM *bnT;
1039 BIGNUM *bnE;
1040 BIGNUM *bnN;
1041 BN_CTX *context;
1042 UINT32 rem;
1043
1044 // Make sure that hashAlg is valid hash
1045 pAssert(digestSize != 0);
1046
1047 // if present, use externally provided counter
1048 if(counter != NULL)
1049 outer = *counter;
1050 else
1051 outer = 1;
1052
1053 // Validate exponent
1054 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(e, swapped);
1055
1056 // Need to check that the exponent is prime and not less than 3
1057 if( e != 0 && (e < 3 || !_math__IsPrime(e)))
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1058 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1059
1060 // Get structures for the big number representations
1061 context = BN_CTX_new();
1062 if(context == NULL)
1063 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1064 BN_CTX_start(context);
1065 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
1066 bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
1067 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
1068 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
1069 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
1070 if(bnN == NULL)
1071 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1072
1073 // Set Q to zero. This is used as a flag. The prime is computed in P. When a
1074 // new prime is found, Q is checked to see if it is zero. If so, P is copied
1075 // to Q and a new P is found. When both P and Q are non-zero, the modulus and
1076 // private exponent are computed and a trial encryption/decryption is
1077 // performed. If the encrypt/decrypt fails, assume that at least one of the
1078 // primes is composite. Since we don't know which one, set Q to zero and start
1079 // over and find a new pair of primes.
1080 BN_zero(bnQ);
1081
1082 // Need to have some label
1083 if(label == NULL)
1084 label = (const char *)&defaultLabel;
1085 // Get the label size
1086 for(lLen = 0; label[lLen++] != 0;);
1087
1088 // Start the hash using the seed and get the intermediate hash value
1089 _cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, FALSE, &h1, seed->size, seed->buffer, &oPadKey.b);
1090 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &h2);
1091 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h2, oPadKey.b.size, oPadKey.b.buffer);
1092
1093 n->size = (keySizeInBits +7)/8;
1094 pAssert(n->size <= MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
1095 p->size = n->size / 2;
1096 if(e == 0)
1097 e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
1098
1099 BN_set_word(bnE, e);
1100
1101 // The first test will increment the counter from zero.
1102 for(outer += 1; outer != 0; outer++)
1103 {
1104 if(_plat__IsCanceled())
1105 {
1106 retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL;
1107 goto Cleanup;
1108 }
1109
1110 // Need to fill in the candidate with the hash
1111 fill = digestSize;
1112 pb = p->buffer;
1113
1114 // Reset the inner counter
1115 inner = 0;
1116 for(i = p->size; i > 0; i -= digestSize)
1117 {
1118 inner++;
1119 // Initialize the HMAC with saved state
1120 _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h1);
1121
1122 // Hash the inner counter (the one that changes on each HMAC iteration)
1123 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(inner, swapped);
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1124 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
1125 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, lLen, (BYTE *)label);
1126
1127 // Is there any party 1 data
1128 if(extra != NULL)
1129 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, extra->size, extra->buffer);
1130
1131 // Include the outer counter (the one that changes on each prime
1132 // prime candidate generation
1133 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(outer, swapped);
1134 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
1135 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 2, (BYTE *)&keySizeInBits);
1136 if(i < fill)
1137 fill = i;
1138 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
1139
1140 // Restart the oPad hash
1141 _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &h2);
1142
1143 // Add the last hashed data
1144 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, fill, pb);
1145
1146 // gives a completed HMAC
1147 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
1148 pb += fill;
1149 }
1150 // Set the Most significant 2 bits and the low bit of the candidate
1151 p->buffer[0] |= 0xC0;
1152 p->buffer[p->size - 1] |= 1;
1153
1154 // Convert the candidate to a BN
1155 BN_bin2bn(p->buffer, p->size, bnP);
1156
1157 // If this is the second prime, make sure that it differs from the
1158 // first prime by at least 2^100
1159 if(!BN_is_zero(bnQ))
1160 {
1161 // bnQ is non-zero if we already found it
1162 if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) < 0)
1163 BN_sub(bnT, bnQ, bnP);
1164 else
1165 BN_sub(bnT, bnP, bnQ);
1166 if(BN_num_bits(bnT) < 100) // Difference has to be at least 100 bits
1167 continue;
1168 }
1169 // Make sure that the prime candidate (p) is not divisible by the exponent
1170 // and that (p-1) is not divisible by the exponent
1171 // Get the remainder after dividing by the modulus
1172 rem = BN_mod_word(bnP, e);
1173 if(rem == 0) // evenly divisible so add two keeping the number odd and
1174 // making sure that 1 != p mod e
1175 BN_add_word(bnP, 2);
1176 else if(rem == 1) // leaves a remainder of 1 so subtract two keeping the
1177 // number odd and making (e-1) = p mod e
1178 BN_sub_word(bnP, 2);
1179
1180 // Have a candidate, check for primality
1181 if((retVal = (CRYPT_RESULT)BN_is_prime_ex(bnP,
1182 BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL)) < 0)
1183 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1184
1185 if(retVal != 1)
1186 continue;
1187
1188 // Found a prime, is this the first or second.
1189 if(BN_is_zero(bnQ))
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1190 {
1191 // copy p to q and compute another prime in p
1192 BN_copy(bnQ, bnP);
1193 continue;
1194 }
1195 //Form the public modulus
1196 BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context);
1197 if(BN_num_bits(bnN) != keySizeInBits)
1198 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1199
1200 // Save the public modulus
1201 BnTo2B(n, bnN, n->size); // Will pad the buffer to the correct size
1202 pAssert((n->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0);
1203
1204 // And one prime
1205 BnTo2B(p, bnP, p->size);
1206 pAssert((p->buffer[0] & 0x80) != 0);
1207
1208 // Finish by making sure that we can form the modular inverse of PHI
1209 // with respect to the public exponent
1210 // Compute PHI = (p - 1)(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
1211 // Make sure that we can form the modular inverse
1212 BN_sub(bnT, bnN, bnP);
1213 BN_sub(bnT, bnT, bnQ);
1214 BN_add_word(bnT, 1);
1215
1216 // find d such that (Phi * d) mod e ==1
1217 // If there isn't then we are broken because we took the step
1218 // of making sure that the prime != 1 mod e so the modular inverse
1219 // must exist
1220 if(BN_mod_inverse(bnT, bnE, bnT, context) == NULL || BN_is_zero(bnT))
1221 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1222
1223 // And, finally, do a trial encryption decryption
1224 {
1225 TPM2B_TYPE(RSA_KEY, MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
1226 TPM2B_RSA_KEY r;
1227 r.t.size = sizeof(n->size);
1228
1229 // If we are using a seed, then results must be reproducible on each
1230 // call. Otherwise, just get a random number
1231 if(seed == NULL)
1232 _cpri__GenerateRandom(n->size, r.t.buffer);
1233 else
1234 {
1235 // this this version does not have a deterministic RNG, XOR the
1236 // public key and private exponent to get a deterministic value
1237 // for testing.
1238 int i;
1239
1240 // Generate a random-ish number starting with the public modulus
1241 // XORed with the MSO of the seed
1242 for(i = 0; i < n->size; i++)
1243 r.t.buffer[i] = n->buffer[i] ^ seed->buffer[0];
1244 }
1245 // Make sure that the number is smaller than the public modulus
1246 r.t.buffer[0] &= 0x7F;
1247 // Convert
1248 if( BN_bin2bn(r.t.buffer, r.t.size, bnP) == NULL
1249 // Encrypt with the public exponent
1250 || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnP, bnE, bnN, context) != 1
1251 // Decrypt with the private exponent
1252 || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnQ, bnT, bnN, context) != 1)
1253 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1254 // If the starting and ending values are not the same, start over )-;
1255 if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) != 0)
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1256 {
1257 BN_zero(bnQ);
1258 continue;
1259 }
1260 }
1261 retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
1262 goto Cleanup;
1263 }
1264 retVal = CRYPT_FAIL;
1265
1266 Cleanup:
1267 // Close out the hash sessions
1268 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h2, 0, NULL);
1269 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h1, 0, NULL);
1270
1271 // Free up allocated BN values
1272 BN_CTX_end(context);
1273 BN_CTX_free(context);
1274 if(counter != NULL)
1275 *counter = outer;
1276 return retVal;
1277 }
1278 #endif // RSA_KEY_SIEVE
1279 #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA
B.12.2. Alternative RSA Key Generation
B.12.2.1. Introduction
The files in this clause implement an alternative RSA key generation method that is about an order of
magnitude faster than the regular method in B.14.1 and is provided simply to speed testing of the test
functions. The method implemented in this clause uses a sieve rather than choosing prime candidates at
random and testing for primeness. In this alternative, the sieve filed starting address is chosen at random
and a sieve operation is performed on the field using small prime values. After sieving, the bits
representing values that are not divisible by the small primes tested, will be checked in a pseudo-random
order until a prime is found.
The size of the sieve field is tunable as is the value indicating the number of primes that should be
checked. As the size of the prime increases, the density of primes is reduced so the size of the sieve field
should be increased to improve the probability that the field will contain at least one prime. In addition, as
the sieve field increases the number of small primes that should be checked increases. Eliminating a
number from consideration by using division is considerably faster than eliminating the number with a
Miller-Rabin test.
B.12.2.2. RSAKeySieve.h
This header file is used to for parameterization of the Sieve and RNG used by the RSA module
1 #ifndef RSA_H
2 #define RSA_H
This value is used to set the size of the table that is searched by the prime iterator. This is used during
the generation of different primes. The smaller tables are used when generating smaller primes.
3 extern const UINT16 primeTableBytes;
The following define determines how large the prime number difference table will be defined. The value of
13 will allocate the maximum size table which allows generation of the first 6542 primes which is all the
primes less than 2^16.
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4 #define PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES 13
This set of macros used the value above to set the table size.
5 #ifndef PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES
6 # define PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES 4
7 #endif
8 #ifdef PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES
9 # if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES > 12
10 # define PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES 6542
11 # else
12 # if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES <= 0
13 # define PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES 512
14 # else
15 # define PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES (PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_512_BYTE_PAGES * 512)
16 # endif
17 # endif
18 #endif
19 extern const BYTE primeDiffTable [PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES];
This determines the number of bits in the sieve field This must be a power of two.
20 #define FIELD_POWER 14 // This is the only value in this group that should be
21 // changed
22 #define FIELD_BITS (1 << FIELD_POWER)
23 #define MAX_FIELD_SIZE ((FIELD_BITS / 8) + 1)
This is the pre-sieved table. It already has the bits for multiples of 3, 5, and 7 cleared.
24 #define SEED_VALUES_SIZE 105
25 const extern BYTE seedValues[SEED_VALUES_SIZE];
This allows determination of the number of bits that are set in a byte without having to count them
individually.
26 const extern BYTE bitsInByte[256];
This is the iterator structure for accessing the compressed prime number table. The expectation is that
values will need to be accesses sequentially. This tries to save some data access.
27 typedef struct {
28 UINT32 lastPrime;
29 UINT32 index;
30 UINT32 final;
31 } PRIME_ITERATOR;
32 #ifdef RSA_INSTRUMENT
33 # define INSTRUMENT_SET(a, b) ((a) = (b))
34 # define INSTRUMENT_ADD(a, b) (a) = (a) + (b)
35 # define INSTRUMENT_INC(a) (a) = (a) + 1
36 extern UINT32 failedAtIteration[10];
37 extern UINT32 MillerRabinTrials;
38 extern UINT32 totalFieldsSieved;
39 extern UINT32 emptyFieldsSieved;
40 extern UINT32 noPrimeFields;
41 extern UINT32 primesChecked;
42 extern UINT16 lastSievePrime;
43 #else
44 # define INSTRUMENT_SET(a, b)
45 # define INSTRUMENT_ADD(a, b)
46 # define INSTRUMENT_INC(a)
47 #endif
48 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
49 extern UINT16 defaultFieldSize;
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50 #define NUM_PRIMES 2047
51 extern const __int16 primes[NUM_PRIMES];
52 #else
53 #define defaultFieldSize MAX_FIELD_SIZE
54 #endif
55 #endif
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B.12.2.3. RSAKeySieve.c
B.12.2.3.1. Includes and defines
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 #ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
This file produces no code unless the compile switch is set to cause it to generate code.
3 #ifdef RSA_KEY_SIEVE //%
4 #include "RsaKeySieve.h"
This next line will show up in the header file for this code. It will make the local functions public when
debugging.
5 //%#ifdef RSA_DEBUG
B.12.2.3.2. Bit Manipulation Functions
B.12.2.3.2.1. Introduction
These functions operate on a bit array. A bit array is an array of bytes with the 0th byte being the byte
with the lowest memory address. Within the byte, bit 0 is the least significant bit.
B.12.2.3.2.2. ClearBit()
This function will CLEAR a bit in a bit array.
6 void
7 ClearBit(
8 unsigned char *a, // IN: A pointer to an array of byte
9 int i // IN: the number of the bit to CLEAR
10 )
11 {
12 a[i >> 3] &= 0xff ^ (1 << (i & 7));
13 }
B.12.2.3.2.3. SetBit()
Function to SET a bit in a bit array.
14 void
15 SetBit(
16 unsigned char *a, // IN: A pointer to an array of byte
17 int i // IN: the number of the bit to SET
18 )
19 {
20 a[i >> 3] |= (1 << (i & 7));
21 }
B.12.2.3.2.4. IsBitSet()
Function to test if a bit in a bit array is SET.
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Return Value Meaning
0 bit is CLEAR
1 bit is SET
22 UINT32
23 IsBitSet(
24 unsigned char *a, // IN: A pointer to an array of byte
25 int i // IN: the number of the bit to test
26 )
27 {
28 return ((a[i >> 3] & (1 << (i & 7))) != 0);
29 }
B.12.2.3.2.5. BitsInArry()
This function counts the number of bits set in an array of bytes.
30 int
31 BitsInArray(
32 unsigned char *a, // IN: A pointer to an array of byte
33 int i // IN: the number of bytes to sum
34 )
35 {
36 int j = 0;
37 for(; i ; i--)
38 j += bitsInByte[*a++];
39 return j;
40 }
B.12.2.3.2.6. FindNthSetBit()
This function finds the nth SET bit in a bit array. The caller should check that the offset of the returned
value is not out of range. If called when the array does not have n bits set, it will return a fatal error
41 UINT32
42 FindNthSetBit(
43 const UINT16 aSize, // IN: the size of the array to check
44 const BYTE *a, // IN: the array to check
45 const UINT32 n // IN, the number of the SET bit
46 )
47 {
48 UINT32 i;
49 const BYTE *pA = a;
50 UINT32 retValue;
51 BYTE sel;
52
53 (aSize);
54
55 //find the bit
56 for(i = 0; i < n; i += bitsInByte[*pA++]);
57
58 // The chosen bit is in the byte that was just accessed
59 // Compute the offset to the start of that byte
60 pA--;
61 retValue = (UINT32)(pA - a) * 8;
62
63 // Subtract the bits in the last byte added.
64 i -= bitsInByte[*pA];
65
66 // Now process the byte, one bit at a time.
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67 for(sel = *pA; sel != 0 ; sel = sel >> 1)
68 {
69 if(sel & 1)
70 {
71 i += 1;
72 if(i == n)
73 return retValue;
74 }
75 retValue += 1;
76 }
77 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
78 }
B.12.2.3.3. Miscellaneous Functions
B.12.2.3.3.1. RandomForRsa()
This function uses a special form of KDFa() to produces a pseudo random sequence. It's input is a
structure that contains pointers to a pre-computed set of hash contexts that are set up for the HMAC
computations using the seed.
This function will test that ktx.outer will not wrap to zero if incremented. If so, the function returns FALSE.
Otherwise, the ktx.outer is incremented before each number is generated.
79 void
80 RandomForRsa(
81 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktx, // IN: a context for the KDF
82 const char *label, // IN: a use qualifying label
83 TPM2B *p // OUT: the pseudo random result
84 )
85 {
86 INT16 i;
87 UINT32 inner;
88 BYTE swapped[4];
89 UINT16 fill;
90 BYTE *pb;
91 UINT16 lLen = 0;
92 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(ktx->hashAlg);
93 CPRI_HASH_STATE h; // the working hash context
94
95 if(label != NULL)
96 for(lLen = 0; label[lLen++];);
97 fill = digestSize;
98 pb = p->buffer;
99 inner = 0;
100 *(ktx->outer) += 1;
101 for(i = p->size; i > 0; i -= digestSize)
102 {
103 inner++;
104
105 // Initialize the HMAC with saved state
106 _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &(ktx->iPadCtx));
107
108 // Hash the inner counter (the one that changes on each HMAC iteration)
109 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(inner, swapped);
110 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
111 if(lLen != 0)
112 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, lLen, (BYTE *)label);
113
114 // Is there any party 1 data
115 if(ktx->extra != NULL)
116 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, ktx->extra->size, ktx->extra->buffer);
117
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118 // Include the outer counter (the one that changes on each prime
119 // prime candidate generation
120 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(*(ktx->outer), swapped);
121 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 4, swapped);
122 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, 2, (BYTE *)&ktx->keySizeInBits);
123 if(i < fill)
124 fill = i;
125 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
126
127 // Restart the oPad hash
128 _cpri__CopyHashState(&h, &(ktx->oPadCtx));
129
130 // Add the last hashed data
131 _cpri__UpdateHash(&h, fill, pb);
132
133 // gives a completed HMAC
134 _cpri__CompleteHash(&h, fill, pb);
135 pb += fill;
136 }
137 return;
138 }
B.12.2.3.3.2. MillerRabinRounds()
Function returns the number of Miller-Rabin rounds necessary to give an error probability equal to the
security strength of the prime. These values are from FIPS 186-3.
139 UINT32
140 MillerRabinRounds(
141 UINT32 bits // IN: Number of bits in the RSA prime
142 )
143 {
144 if(bits < 511) return 8; // don't really expect this
145 if(bits < 1536) return 5; // for 512 and 1K primes
146 return 4; // for 3K public modulus and greater
147 }
B.12.2.3.3.3. MillerRabin()
This function performs a Miller-Rabin test from FIPS 186-3. It does iterations trials on the number. I all
likelihood, if the number is not prime, the first test fails.
If a KDFa(), PRNG context is provide (ktx), then it is used to provide the random values. Otherwise, the
random numbers are retrieved from the random number generator.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE probably prime
FALSE composite
148 BOOL
149 MillerRabin(
150 BIGNUM *bnW,
151 int iterations,
152 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktx,
153 BN_CTX *context
154 )
155 {
156 BIGNUM *bnWm1;
157 BIGNUM *bnM;
158 BIGNUM *bnB;
159 BIGNUM *bnZ;
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160 BOOL ret = FALSE; // Assumed composite for easy exit
161 TPM2B_TYPE(MAX_PRIME, MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES/2);
162 TPM2B_MAX_PRIME b;
163 int a;
164 int j;
165 int wLen;
166 int i;
167
168 pAssert(BN_is_bit_set(bnW, 0));
169 INSTRUMENT_INC(MillerRabinTrials); // Instrumentation
170
171 BN_CTX_start(context);
172 bnWm1 = BN_CTX_get(context);
173 bnB = BN_CTX_get(context);
174 bnZ = BN_CTX_get(context);
175 bnM = BN_CTX_get(context);
176 if(bnM == NULL)
177 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
178
179 // Let a be the largest integer such that 2^a divides w1.
180 BN_copy(bnWm1, bnW);
181 BN_sub_word(bnWm1, 1);
182 // Since w is odd (w-1) is even so start at bit number 1 rather than 0
183 for(a = 1; !BN_is_bit_set(bnWm1, a); a++);
184
185 // 2. m = (w1) / 2^a
186 BN_rshift(bnM, bnWm1, a);
187
188 // 3. wlen = len (w).
189 wLen = BN_num_bits(bnW);
190 pAssert((wLen & 7) == 0);
191
192 // Set the size for the random number
193 b.b.size = (UINT16)(wLen + 7)/8;
194
195 // 4. For i = 1 to iterations do
196 for(i = 0; i < iterations ; i++)
197 {
198
199 // 4.1 Obtain a string b of wlen bits from an RBG.
200 step4point1:
201 // In the reference implementation, wLen is always a multiple of 8
202 if(ktx != NULL)
203 RandomForRsa(ktx, "Miller-Rabin witness", &b.b);
204 else
205 _cpri__GenerateRandom(b.t.size, b.t.buffer);
206
207 if(BN_bin2bn(b.t.buffer, b.t.size, bnB) == NULL)
208 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
209
210 // 4.2 If ((b 1) or (b w1)), then go to step 4.1.
211 if(BN_is_zero(bnB))
212 goto step4point1;
213 if(BN_is_one(bnB))
214 goto step4point1;
215 if(BN_ucmp(bnB, bnWm1) >= 0)
216 goto step4point1;
217
218 // 4.3 z = b^m mod w.
219 if(BN_mod_exp(bnZ, bnB, bnM, bnW, context) != 1)
220 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
221
222 // 4.4 If ((z = 1) or (z = w 1)), then go to step 4.7.
223 if(BN_is_one(bnZ) || BN_ucmp(bnZ, bnWm1) == 0)
224 goto step4point7;
225
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226 // 4.5 For j = 1 to a 1 do.
227 for(j = 1; j < a; j++)
228 {
229 // 4.5.1 z = z^2 mod w.
230 if(BN_mod_mul(bnZ, bnZ, bnZ, bnW, context) != 1)
231 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
232
233 // 4.5.2 If (z = w1), then go to step 4.7.
234 if(BN_ucmp(bnZ, bnWm1) == 0)
235 goto step4point7;
236
237 // 4.5.3 If (z = 1), then go to step 4.6.
238 if(BN_is_one(bnZ))
239 goto step4point6;
240 }
241 // 4.6 Return COMPOSITE.
242 step4point6:
243 if(i > 9)
244 INSTRUMENT_INC(failedAtIteration[9]);
245 else
246 INSTRUMENT_INC(failedAtIteration[i]);
247 goto end;
248
249 // 4.7 Continue. Comment: Increment i for the do-loop in step 4.
250 step4point7:
251 continue;
252 }
253 // 5. Return PROBABLY PRIME
254 ret = TRUE;
255
256 end:
257 BN_CTX_end(context);
258 return ret;
259 }
B.12.2.3.3.4. NextPrime()
This function is used to access the next prime number in the sequence of primes. It requires a pre-
initialized iterator.
260 UINT32
261 NextPrime(
262 PRIME_ITERATOR *iter
263 )
264 {
265 if(iter->index >= iter->final)
266 return (iter->lastPrime = 0);
267 return (iter->lastPrime += primeDiffTable[iter->index++]);
268 }
B.12.2.3.3.5. AdjustNumberOfPrimes()
Modifies the input parameter to be a valid value for the number of primes. The adjusted value is either the
input value rounded up to the next 512 bytes boundary or the maximum value of the implementation. If
the input is 0, the return is set to the maximum.
269 UINT32
270 AdjustNumberOfPrimes(
271 UINT32 p
272 )
273 {
274 p = ((p + 511) / 512) * 512;
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275 if(p == 0 || p > PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES)
276 p = PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES;
277 return p;
278 }
B.12.2.3.3.6. PrimeInit()
This function is used to initialize the prime sequence generator iterator. The iterator is initialized and
returns the first prime that is equal to the requested starting value. If the starting value is no a prime, then
the iterator is initialized to the next higher prime number.
279 UINT32
280 PrimeInit(
281 UINT32 first, // IN: the initial prime
282 PRIME_ITERATOR *iter, // IN/OUT: the iterator structure
283 UINT32 primes // IN: the table length
284 )
285 {
286
287 iter->lastPrime = 1;
288 iter->index = 0;
289 iter->final = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(primes);
290 while(iter->lastPrime < first)
291 NextPrime(iter);
292 return iter->lastPrime;
293 }
B.12.2.3.3.7. SetDefaultNumberOfPrimes()
This macro sets the default number of primes to the indicated value.
294 //%#define SetDefaultNumberOfPrimes(p) (primeTableBytes = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(p))
B.12.2.3.3.8. IsPrimeWord()
Checks to see if a UINT32 is prime
Return Value Meaning
TRUE number is prime
FAIL number is not prime
295 BOOL
296 IsPrimeWord(
297 UINT32 p // IN: number to test
298 )
299 {
300 #if defined RSA_KEY_SIEVE && (PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES >= 6542)
301
302 UINT32 test;
303 UINT32 index;
304 UINT32 stop;
305
306 if((p & 1) == 0)
307 return FALSE;
308 if(p == 1 || p == 3)
309 return TRUE;
310
311 // Get a high value for the stopping point
312 for(index = p, stop = 0; index; index >>= 2)
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313 stop = (stop << 1) + 1;
314 stop++;
315
316 // If the full prime difference value table is present, can check here
317
318 test = 3;
319 for(index = 1; index < PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES; index += 1)
320 {
321 if((p % test) == 0)
322 return (p == test);
323 if(test > stop)
324 return TRUE;
325 test += primeDiffTable[index];
326 }
327 return TRUE;
328
329 #else
330
331 BYTE b[4];
332 if(p == RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT || p == 1 || p == 3 )
333 return TRUE;
334 if((p & 1) == 0)
335 return FALSE;
336 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(p,b);
337 return _math__IsPrime(p);
338 #endif
339 }
340 typedef struct {
341 UINT16 prime;
342 UINT16 count;
343 } SIEVE_MARKS;
344 const SIEVE_MARKS sieveMarks[5] = {
345 {31, 7}, {73, 5}, {241, 4}, {1621, 3}, {UINT16_MAX, 2}};
B.12.2.3.3.9. PrimeSieve()
This function does a prime sieve over the input field which has as its starting address the value in bnN.
Since this initializes the Sieve using a pre-computed field with the bits associated with 3, 5 and 7 already
turned off, the value of pnN may need to be adjusted by a few counts to allow the pre-computed field to
be used without modification. The fieldSize parameter must be 2^N + 1 and is probably not useful if it is
less than 129 bytes (1024 bits).
346 UINT32
347 PrimeSieve(
348 BIGNUM *bnN, // IN/OUT: number to sieve
349 UINT32 fieldSize, // IN: size of the field area in bytes
350 BYTE *field, // IN: field
351 UINT32 primes // IN: the number of primes to use
352 )
353 {
354 UINT32 i;
355 UINT32 j;
356 UINT32 fieldBits = fieldSize * 8;
357 UINT32 r;
358 const BYTE *p1;
359 BYTE *p2;
360 PRIME_ITERATOR iter;
361 UINT32 adjust;
362 UINT32 mark = 0;
363 UINT32 count = sieveMarks[0].count;
364 UINT32 stop = sieveMarks[0].prime;
365 UINT32 composite;
366
367 // UINT64 test; //DEBUG
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368
369 pAssert(field != NULL && bnN != NULL);
370 // Need to have a field that has a size of 2^n + 1 bytes
371 pAssert(BitsInArray((BYTE *)&fieldSize, 2) == 2);
372
373 primes = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(primes);
374
375 // If the remainder is odd, then subtracting the value
376 // will give an even number, but we want an odd number,
377 // so subtract the 105+rem. Otherwise, just subtract
378 // the even remainder.
379 adjust = BN_mod_word(bnN,105);
380 if(adjust & 1)
381 adjust += 105;
382
383 // seed the field
384 // This starts the pointer at the nearest byte to the input value
385 p1 = &seedValues[adjust/16];
386
387 // Reduce the number of bytes to transfer by the amount skipped
388 j = sizeof(seedValues) - adjust/16;
389 adjust = adjust % 16;
390 BN_sub_word(bnN, adjust);
391 adjust >>= 1;
392
393 // This offsets the field
394 p2 = field;
395 for(i = fieldSize; i > 0; i--)
396 {
397 *p2++ = *p1++;
398 if(--j == 0)
399 {
400 j = sizeof(seedValues);
401 p1 = seedValues;
402 }
403 }
404 // Mask the first bits in the field and the last byte in order to eliminate
405 // bytes not in the field from consideration.
406 field[0] &= 0xff << adjust;
407 field[fieldSize-1] &= 0xff >> (8 - adjust);
408
409 // Cycle through the primes, clearing bits
410 // Have already done 3, 5, and 7
411 PrimeInit(7, &iter, primes);
412
413 // Get the next N primes where N is determined by the mark in the sieveMarks
414 while((composite = NextPrime(&iter)) != 0)
415 {
416 UINT32 pList[8];
417 UINT32 next = 0;
418 i = count;
419 pList[i--] = composite;
420 for(; i > 0; i--)
421 {
422 next = NextPrime(&iter);
423 pList[i] = next;
424 if(next != 0)
425 composite *= next;
426 }
427 composite = BN_mod_word(bnN, composite);
428 for(i = count; i > 0; i--)
429 {
430 next = pList[i];
431 if(next == 0)
432 goto done;
433 r = composite % next;
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434 if(r & 1) j = (next - r)/2;
435 else if(r == 0) j = 0;
436 else j = next - r/2;
437 for(; j < fieldBits; j += next)
438 ClearBit(field, j);
439 }
440 if(next >= stop)
441 {
442 mark++;
443 count = sieveMarks[mark].count;
444 stop = sieveMarks[mark].prime;
445 }
446 }
447 done:
448 INSTRUMENT_INC(totalFieldsSieved);
449 i = BitsInArray(field, fieldSize);
450 if(i == 0) INSTRUMENT_INC(emptyFieldsSieved);
451 return i;
452 }
B.12.2.3.3.10. PrimeSelectWithSieve()
This function will sieve the field around the input prime candidate. If the sieve field is not empty, one of
the one bits in the field is chosen for testing with Miller-Rabin. If the value is prime, pnP is updated with
this value and the function returns success. If this value is not prime, another pseudo-random candidate
is chosen and tested. This process repeats until all values in the field have been checked. If all bits in the
field have been checked and none is prime, the function returns FALSE and a new random value needs
to be chosen.
453 BOOL
454 PrimeSelectWithSieve(
455 BIGNUM *bnP, // IN/OUT: The candidate to filter
456 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktx, // IN: KDFa iterator structure
457 UINT32 e, // IN: the exponent
458 BN_CTX *context // IN: the big number context to play in
459 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG //%
460 ,UINT16 fieldSize, // IN: number of bytes in the field, as
461 // determined by the caller
462 UINT16 primes // IN: number of primes to use.
463 #endif //%
464 )
465 {
466 BYTE field[MAX_FIELD_SIZE];
467 UINT32 first;
468 UINT32 ones;
469 INT32 chosen;
470 UINT32 rounds = MillerRabinRounds(BN_num_bits(bnP));
471 #ifndef RSA_DEBUG
472 UINT32 primes;
473 UINT32 fieldSize;
474 // Adjust the field size and prime table list to fit the size of the prime
475 // being tested.
476 primes = BN_num_bits(bnP);
477 if(primes <= 512)
478 {
479 primes = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(2048);
480 fieldSize = 65;
481 }
482 else if(primes <= 1024)
483 {
484 primes = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(4096);
485 fieldSize = 129;
486 }
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487 else
488 {
489 primes = AdjustNumberOfPrimes(0); // Set to the maximum
490 fieldSize = MAX_FIELD_SIZE;
491 }
492 if(fieldSize > MAX_FIELD_SIZE)
493 fieldSize = MAX_FIELD_SIZE;
494 #endif
495
496 // Save the low-order word to use as a search generator and make sure that
497 // it has some interesting range to it
498 first = bnP->d[0] | 0x80000000;
499
500 // Align to field boundary
501 bnP->d[0] &= ~((UINT32)(fieldSize-3));
502 pAssert(BN_is_bit_set(bnP, 0));
503 bnP->d[0] &= (UINT32_MAX << (FIELD_POWER + 1)) + 1;
504 ones = PrimeSieve(bnP, fieldSize, field, primes);
505 #ifdef RSA_FILTER_DEBUG
506 pAssert(ones == BitsInArray(field, defaultFieldSize));
507 #endif
508 for(; ones > 0; ones--)
509 {
510 #ifdef RSA_FILTER_DEBUG
511 if(ones != BitsInArray(field, defaultFieldSize))
512 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
513 #endif
514 // Decide which bit to look at and find its offset
515 if(ones == 1)
516 ones = ones;
517 chosen = FindNthSetBit(defaultFieldSize, field,((first % ones) + 1));
518 if(chosen >= ((defaultFieldSize) * 8))
519 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
520
521 // Set this as the trial prime
522 BN_add_word(bnP, chosen * 2);
523
524 // Use MR to see if this is prime
525 if(MillerRabin(bnP, rounds, ktx, context))
526 {
527 // Final check is to make sure that 0 != (p-1) mod e
528 // This is the same as -1 != p mod e ; or
529 // (e - 1) != p mod e
530 if((e <= 3) || (BN_mod_word(bnP, e) != (e-1)))
531 return TRUE;
532 }
533 // Back out the bit number
534 BN_sub_word(bnP, chosen * 2);
535
536 // Clear the bit just tested
537 ClearBit(field, chosen);
538 }
539 // Ran out of bits and couldn't find a prime in this field
540 INSTRUMENT_INC(noPrimeFields);
541 return FALSE;
542 }
B.12.2.3.3.11. AdjustPrimeCandiate()
This function adjusts the candidate prime so that it is odd and > root(2)/2. This allows the product of these
two numbers to be .5, which, in fixed point notation means that the most significant bit is 1. For this
routine, the root(2)/2 is approximated with 0xB505 which is, in fixed point is 0.7071075439453125 or an
error of 0.0001%. Just setting the upper two bits would give a value > 0.75 which is an error of > 6%.
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Given the amount of time all the other computations take, reducing the error is not much of a cost, but it
isn't totally required either.
The function also puts the number on a field boundary.
543 void
544 AdjustPrimeCandidate(
545 BYTE *a,
546 UINT16 len
547 )
548 {
549 UINT16 highBytes;
550
551 highBytes = BYTE_ARRAY_TO_UINT16(a);
552 // This is fixed point arithmetic on 16-bit values
553 highBytes = ((UINT32)highBytes * (UINT32)0x4AFB) >> 16;
554 highBytes += 0xB505;
555 UINT16_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(highBytes, a);
556 a[len-1] |= 1;
557 }
B.12.2.3.3.12. GeneratateRamdomPrime()
558 void
559 GenerateRandomPrime(
560 TPM2B *p,
561 BN_CTX *ctx
562 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG //%
563 ,UINT16 field,
564 UINT16 primes
565 #endif //%
566 )
567 {
568 BIGNUM *bnP;
569 BN_CTX *context;
570
571 if(ctx == NULL) context = BN_CTX_new();
572 else context = ctx;
573 if(context == NULL)
574 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
575 BN_CTX_start(context);
576 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
577
578 while(TRUE)
579 {
580 _cpri__GenerateRandom(p->size, p->buffer);
581 p->buffer[p->size-1] |= 1;
582 p->buffer[0] |= 0x80;
583 BN_bin2bn(p->buffer, p->size, bnP);
584 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
585 if(PrimeSelectWithSieve(bnP, NULL, 0, context, field, primes))
586 #else
587 if(PrimeSelectWithSieve(bnP, NULL, 0, context))
588 #endif
589 break;
590 }
591 BnTo2B(p, bnP, (UINT16)BN_num_bytes(bnP));
592 BN_CTX_end(context);
593 if(ctx == NULL)
594 BN_CTX_free(context);
595 return;
596 }
597 KDFa_CONTEXT *
598 KDFaContextStart(
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599 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktx, // IN/OUT: the context structure to initialize
600 TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed for the digest proce
601 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the hash algorithm
602 TPM2B *extra, // IN: the extra data
603 UINT32 *outer, // IN: the outer iteration counter
604 UINT16 keySizeInBit
605 )
606 {
607 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
608 TPM2B_HASH_BLOCK oPadKey;
609
610 if(seed == NULL)
611 return NULL;
612
613 pAssert(ktx != NULL && outer != NULL && digestSize != 0);
614
615 // Start the hash using the seed and get the intermediate hash value
616 _cpri__StartHMAC(hashAlg, FALSE, &(ktx->iPadCtx), seed->size, seed->buffer,
617 &oPadKey.b);
618 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &(ktx->oPadCtx));
619 _cpri__UpdateHash(&(ktx->oPadCtx), oPadKey.b.size, oPadKey.b.buffer);
620 ktx->extra = extra;
621 ktx->hashAlg = hashAlg;
622 ktx->outer = outer;
623 ktx->keySizeInBits = keySizeInBits;
624 return ktx;
625 }
626 void
627 KDFaContextEnd(
628 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktx // IN/OUT: the context structure to close
629 )
630 {
631 if(ktx != NULL)
632 {
633 // Close out the hash sessions
634 _cpri__CompleteHash(&(ktx->iPadCtx), 0, NULL);
635 _cpri__CompleteHash(&(ktx->oPadCtx), 0, NULL);
636 }
637 }
638 //%#endif
B.12.2.3.4. Public Function
B.12.2.3.4.1. Introduction
This is the external entry for this replacement function. All this file provides is the substitute function to
generate an RSA key. If the compiler settings are set appropriately, this this function will be used instead
of the similarly named function in CpriRSA.c.
B.12.2.3.4.2. _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA()
Generate an RSA key from a provided seed
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_FAIL exponent is not prime or is less than 3; or could not find a prime using
the provided parameters
CRYPT_CANCEL operation was canceled
639 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
640 _cpri__GenerateKeyRSA(
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641 TPM2B *n, // OUT: The public modulus
642 TPM2B *p, // OUT: One of the prime factors of n
643 UINT16 keySizeInBits, // IN: Size of the public modulus in bits
644 UINT32 e, // IN: The public exponent
645 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use in the key
646 // generation process
647 TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed to use
648 const char *label, // IN: A label for the generation process.
649 TPM2B *extra, // IN: Party 1 data for the KDF
650 UINT32 *counter // IN/OUT: Counter value to allow KDF
651 // iteration to be propagated across
652 // multiple routines
653 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG //%
654 ,UINT16 primes, // IN: number of primes to test
655 UINT16 fieldSize // IN: the field size to use
656 #endif //%
657 )
658 {
659 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
660 UINT32 myCounter = 0;
661 UINT32 *pCtr = (counter == NULL) ? &myCounter : counter;
662
663 KDFa_CONTEXT ktx;
664 KDFa_CONTEXT *ktxPtr;
665 UINT32 i;
666 BIGNUM *bnP;
667 BIGNUM *bnQ;
668 BIGNUM *bnT;
669 BIGNUM *bnE;
670 BIGNUM *bnN;
671 BN_CTX *context;
672
673 // Make sure that the required pointers are provided
674 pAssert(n != NULL && p != NULL);
675
676 // If the seed is provided, then use KDFa for generation of the 'random'
677 // values
678 ktxPtr = KDFaContextStart(&ktx, seed, hashAlg, extra, pCtr, keySizeInBits);
679
680 n->size = keySizeInBits/8;
681 p->size = n->size / 2;
682
683 // Validate exponent
684 if(e == 0 || e == RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)
685 e = RSA_DEFAULT_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
686 else
687 if(!IsPrimeWord(e))
688 return CRYPT_FAIL;
689
690 // Get structures for the big number representations
691 context = BN_CTX_new();
692 BN_CTX_start(context);
693 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
694 bnQ = BN_CTX_get(context);
695 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
696 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
697 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
698 if(bnN == NULL)
699 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
700
701 // Set Q to zero. This is used as a flag. The prime is computed in P. When a
702 // new prime is found, Q is checked to see if it is zero. If so, P is copied
703 // to Q and a new P is found. When both P and Q are non-zero, the modulus and
704 // private exponent are computed and a trial encryption/decryption is
705 // performed. If the encrypt/decrypt fails, assume that at least one of the
706 // primes is composite. Since we don't know which one, set Q to zero and start
Page 456 TCG Published Family "2.0"
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Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
707 // over and find a new pair of primes.
708 BN_zero(bnQ);
709 BN_set_word(bnE, e);
710
711 // Each call to generate a random value will increment ktx.outer
712 // it doesn't matter if ktx.outer wraps. This lets the caller
713 // use the initial value of the counter for additional entropy.
714 for(i = 0; i < UINT32_MAX; i++)
715 {
716 if(_plat__IsCanceled())
717 {
718 retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL;
719 goto end;
720 }
721 // Get a random prime candidate.
722 if(seed == NULL)
723 _cpri__GenerateRandom(p->size, p->buffer);
724 else
725 RandomForRsa(&ktx, label, p);
726 AdjustPrimeCandidate(p->buffer, p->size);
727
728 // Convert the candidate to a BN
729 if(BN_bin2bn(p->buffer, p->size, bnP) == NULL)
730 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
731 // If this is the second prime, make sure that it differs from the
732 // first prime by at least 2^100. Since BIGNUMS use words, the check
733 // below will make sure they are different by at least 128 bits
734 if(!BN_is_zero(bnQ))
735 { // bnQ is non-zero, we have a first value
736 UINT32 *pP = (UINT32 *)(&bnP->d[4]);
737 UINT32 *pQ = (UINT32 *)(&bnQ->d[4]);
738 INT32 k = ((INT32)bnP->top) - 4;
739 for(;k > 0; k--)
740 if(*pP++ != *pQ++)
741 break;
742 // Didn't find any difference so go get a new value
743 if(k == 0)
744 continue;
745 }
746 // If PrimeSelectWithSieve returns success, bnP is a prime,
747 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
748 if(!PrimeSelectWithSieve(bnP, ktxPtr, e, context, fieldSize, primes))
749 #else
750 if(!PrimeSelectWithSieve(bnP, ktxPtr, e, context))
751 #endif
752 continue; // If not, get another
753
754 // Found a prime, is this the first or second.
755 if(BN_is_zero(bnQ))
756 { // copy p to q and compute another prime in p
757 BN_copy(bnQ, bnP);
758 continue;
759 }
760 //Form the public modulus
761 if( BN_mul(bnN, bnP, bnQ, context) != 1
762 || BN_num_bits(bnN) != keySizeInBits)
763 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
764 // Save the public modulus
765 BnTo2B(n, bnN, n->size);
766 // And one prime
767 BnTo2B(p, bnP, p->size);
768
769 #ifdef EXTENDED_CHECKS
770 // Finish by making sure that we can form the modular inverse of PHI
771 // with respect to the public exponent
772 // Compute PHI = (p - 1)(q - 1) = n - p - q + 1
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 457
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Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
773 // Make sure that we can form the modular inverse
774 if( BN_sub(bnT, bnN, bnP) != 1
775 || BN_sub(bnT, bnT, bnQ) != 1
776 || BN_add_word(bnT, 1) != 1)
777 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
778
779 // find d such that (Phi * d) mod e ==1
780 // If there isn't then we are broken because we took the step
781 // of making sure that the prime != 1 mod e so the modular inverse
782 // must exist
783 if( BN_mod_inverse(bnT, bnE, bnT, context) == NULL
784 || BN_is_zero(bnT))
785 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
786
787 // And, finally, do a trial encryption decryption
788 {
789 TPM2B_TYPE(RSA_KEY, MAX_RSA_KEY_BYTES);
790 TPM2B_RSA_KEY r;
791 r.t.size = sizeof(r.t.buffer);
792 // If we are using a seed, then results must be reproducible on each
793 // call. Otherwise, just get a random number
794 if(seed == NULL)
795 _cpri__GenerateRandom(keySizeInBits/8, r.t.buffer);
796 else
797 RandomForRsa(&ktx, label, &r.b);
798
799 // Make sure that the number is smaller than the public modulus
800 r.t.buffer[0] &= 0x7F;
801 // Convert
802 if( BN_bin2bn(r.t.buffer, r.t.size, bnP) == NULL
803 // Encrypt with the public exponent
804 || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnP, bnE, bnN, context) != 1
805 // Decrypt with the private exponent
806 || BN_mod_exp(bnQ, bnQ, bnT, bnN, context) != 1)
807 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
808 // If the starting and ending values are not the same, start over )-;
809 if(BN_ucmp(bnP, bnQ) != 0)
810 {
811 BN_zero(bnQ);
812 continue;
813 }
814 }
815 #endif // EXTENDED_CHECKS
816 retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
817 goto end;
818 }
819 retVal = CRYPT_FAIL;
820
821 end:
822 KDFaContextEnd(&ktx);
823
824 // Free up allocated BN values
825 BN_CTX_end(context);
826 BN_CTX_free(context);
827 return retVal;
828 }
829 #else
830 static void noFuntion(
831 void
832 )
833 {
834 pAssert(1);
835 }
836 #endif //%
837 #endif // TPM_ALG_RSA
Page 458 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
B.12.2.4. RSAData.c
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 #ifdef RSA_KEY_SIEVE
3 #include "RsaKeySieve.h"
4 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
5 UINT16 defaultFieldSize = MAX_FIELD_SIZE;
6 #endif
This table contains a pre-sieved table. It has the bits for 3, 5, and 7 removed. Because of the factors, it
needs to be aligned to 105 and has a repeat of 105.
7 const BYTE seedValues[SEED_VALUES_SIZE] = {
8 0x16, 0x29, 0xcb, 0xa4, 0x65, 0xda, 0x30, 0x6c,
9 0x99, 0x96, 0x4c, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2d, 0x52, 0x96,
10 0x49, 0xcb, 0xb4, 0x61, 0xd8, 0x32, 0x2d, 0x99,
11 0xa6, 0x44, 0x5b, 0xa4, 0x2c, 0x93, 0x96, 0x69,
12 0xc3, 0xb0, 0x65, 0x5a, 0x32, 0x4d, 0x89, 0xb6,
13 0x48, 0x59, 0x26, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0x86, 0x61, 0xcb,
14 0xb4, 0x64, 0x9a, 0x12, 0x6d, 0x91, 0xb2, 0x4c,
15 0x5a, 0xa6, 0x0d, 0xc3, 0x96, 0x69, 0xc9, 0x34,
16 0x25, 0xda, 0x22, 0x65, 0x99, 0xb4, 0x4c, 0x1b,
17 0x86, 0x2d, 0xd3, 0x92, 0x69, 0x4a, 0xb4, 0x45,
18 0xca, 0x32, 0x69, 0x99, 0x36, 0x0c, 0x5b, 0xa6,
19 0x25, 0xd3, 0x94, 0x68, 0x8b, 0x94, 0x65, 0xd2,
20 0x32, 0x6d, 0x18, 0xb6, 0x4c, 0x4b, 0xa6, 0x29,
21 0xd1};
22 const BYTE bitsInByte[256] = {
23 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03,
24 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
25 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
26 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
27 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
28 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
29 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
30 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
31 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
32 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
33 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
34 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
35 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
36 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
37 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
38 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07,
39 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
40 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
41 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
42 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
43 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
44 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
45 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
46 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07,
47 0x02, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05,
48 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
49 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
50 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07,
51 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x05, 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06,
52 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07,
53 0x04, 0x05, 0x05, 0x06, 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07,
54 0x05, 0x06, 0x06, 0x07, 0x06, 0x07, 0x07, 0x08
55 };
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 459
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
Following table contains a byte that is the difference between two successive primes. This reduces the
table size by a factor of two. It is optimized for sequential access to the prime table which is the most
common case.
When the table size is at its max, the table will have all primes less than 2^16. This is 6542 primes in
6542 bytes.
56 const UINT16 primeTableBytes = PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES;
57 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 0
58 const BYTE primeDiffTable [PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES] = {
59 0x02,0x02,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,
60 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x06,
61 0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,
62 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,
63 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0A,
64 0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x06,
65 0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x04,
66 0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x08,
67 0x06,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x02,
68 0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,
69 0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,
70 0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x08,
71 0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x06,
72 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x22,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,
73 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,
74 0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02
75 #endif
76 // 256
77 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 256
78 ,0x06,0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x06,
79 0x06,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,
80 0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,
81 0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,
82 0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x18,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x02,
83 0x04,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x04,
84 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x12,
85 0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,
86 0x04,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x08,
87 0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x12,
88 0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x02,0x0A,0x08,
89 0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x1A,0x04,0x02,
90 0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x02,0x06,
91 0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,
92 0x10,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x16,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,
93 0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x0C,0x02
94 #endif
95 // 512
96 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 512
97 ,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x06,
98 0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x06,
99 0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x14,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x06,0x10,
100 0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x18,0x0A,0x06,
101 0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x1E,0x0A,0x02,
102 0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x02,
103 0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x10,
104 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x08,
105 0x18,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x1E,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,
106 0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,
107 0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x1C,0x06,0x0E,0x04,
108 0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x0E,
109 0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x1E,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,
110 0x16,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x08,
111 0x0A,0x20,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x06,
112 0x14,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x1E,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x02
113 #endif
Page 460 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
114 // 768
115 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 768
116 ,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x1C,0x06,0x14,0x04,
117 0x12,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,
118 0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x18,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,
119 0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0A,
120 0x08,0x18,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x1E,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x06,
121 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,
122 0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,
123 0x10,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,
124 0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x0A,0x18,0x06,0x0C,0x06,
125 0x02,0x16,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x1E,
126 0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x12,0x18,0x12,0x06,0x10,0x12,0x06,0x02,
127 0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,
128 0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x08,
129 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x1E,0x04,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x0E,
130 0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x1E,0x10,0x02,
131 0x06,0x16,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x18,0x0E,0x06
132 #endif
133 // 1024
134 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 1024
135 ,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x02,
136 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x0C,0x18,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x1E,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,
137 0x0E,0x06,0x22,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,
138 0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x06,
139 0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,
140 0x04,0x14,0x06,0x1E,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,
141 0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x18,0x0C,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x0C,
142 0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x08,
143 0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,
144 0x02,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x24,0x0E,
145 0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x0C,0x06,
146 0x04,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x02,
147 0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x06,0x22,0x02,0x1C,0x02,
148 0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,
149 0x08,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x0C,0x14,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,
150 0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x0C,0x16,0x08,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x04
151 #endif
152 // 1280
153 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 1280
154 ,0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x1C,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x04,
155 0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x12,0x0A,
156 0x08,0x0A,0x20,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x1C,0x02,
157 0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x18,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,
158 0x14,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x10,0x1A,0x04,0x08,0x06,
159 0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x10,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,
160 0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x1C,
161 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x18,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,
162 0x22,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x18,0x04,0x14,0x0A,
163 0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x1A,
164 0x04,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x18,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,
165 0x22,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x16,0x06,
166 0x0E,0x04,0x1A,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x10,0x06,
167 0x08,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0C,
168 0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x04,
169 0x0E,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x24,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04
170 #endif
171 // 1536
172 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 1536
173 ,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x04,
174 0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x1E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x06,
175 0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x18,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,
176 0x1C,0x0E,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,
177 0x0A,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x06,
178 0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x08,
179 0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x1E,
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 461
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
180 0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x12,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x24,0x06,
181 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x0E,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x1E,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x04,
182 0x0E,0x06,0x16,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x12,
183 0x0A,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x1C,0x02,0x1C,0x06,0x02,
184 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x06,
185 0x08,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,
186 0x06,0x1A,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x0E,0x1E,0x04,0x0E,0x16,0x08,0x0C,0x04,
187 0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x0A,
188 0x06,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x12
189 #endif
190 // 1792
191 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 1792
192 ,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x14,
193 0x04,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x04,
194 0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x2C,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x0E,
195 0x04,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x24,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x04,
196 0x0E,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x1A,0x18,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x04,
197 0x06,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x2A,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x04,
198 0x0E,0x06,0x1C,0x12,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x1E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,
199 0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x1A,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x1E,0x04,
200 0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,
201 0x04,0x18,0x18,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x04,
202 0x06,0x06,0x14,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x18,
203 0x10,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x16,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x16,0x08,
204 0x12,0x22,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,
205 0x08,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x14,
206 0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x18,
207 0x06,0x10,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x00
208 #endif
209 // 2048
210 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 2048
211 ,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,
212 0x18,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,
213 0x06,0x14,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x02,
214 0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x06,
215 0x04,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x0C,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x1E,0x04,0x06,
216 0x18,0x14,0x18,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x06,
217 0x04,0x06,0x24,0x14,0x0A,0x1E,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x1C,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x16,0x08,
218 0x04,0x12,0x06,0x0E,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x22,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x12,0x02,
219 0x18,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x0E,0x28,
220 0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x06,
221 0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x18,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x06,
222 0x06,0x34,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x10,
223 0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0C,
224 0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x12,0x0C,
225 0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x12,0x12,0x0C,0x02,
226 0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x1A,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x14,0x04
227 #endif
228 // 2304
229 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 2304
230 ,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x22,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x02,
231 0x0C,0x1E,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x16,0x12,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,
232 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x12,0x02,0x28,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x04,
233 0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x1C,
234 0x02,0x06,0x16,0x0C,0x06,0x0E,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x02,
235 0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x14,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x1E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x12,0x06,0x1E,0x02,0x04,
236 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x0E,0x22,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x02,
237 0x06,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x0C,
238 0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x04,
239 0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x12,0x12,0x08,0x06,0x12,0x10,0x0E,0x06,
240 0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0C,
241 0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x24,0x12,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x02,
242 0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x24,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x18,0x08,0x06,0x06,
243 0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x28,0x06,0x02,0x10,
244 0x02,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x12,
245 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x06,0x24,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x0E,0x10,0x06
Page 462 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
246 #endif
247 // 2560
248 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 2560
249 ,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x04,
250 0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x0E,0x0C,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x12,
251 0x18,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x0C,0x02,0x1C,0x12,
252 0x0E,0x10,0x0C,0x0E,0x18,0x0C,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,
253 0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x1E,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x1E,0x16,0x02,
254 0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x0C,0x04,0x06,
255 0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x1C,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,
256 0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,
257 0x0E,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x1E,0x24,0x0C,0x08,0x16,
258 0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x1A,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x08,
259 0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x14,0x16,0x12,0x0C,0x08,0x1C,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0C,
260 0x18,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0C,0x12,
261 0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x18,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x10,
262 0x0E,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x1E,0x0A,0x08,
263 0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x28,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x12,
264 0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x34,0x0E,0x04,0x14,0x10,0x02
265 #endif
266 // 2816
267 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 2816
268 ,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x0E,
269 0x10,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x10,
270 0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x08,
271 0x0C,0x0C,0x1E,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0E,
272 0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x1A,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0A,
273 0x0E,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x0C,
274 0x1A,0x12,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x06,0x1E,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,
275 0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x12,0x06,0x12,0x0C,0x08,0x0C,0x06,
276 0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x06,
277 0x06,0x12,0x06,0x0E,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x10,
278 0x24,0x0C,0x06,0x0E,0x1C,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x1E,0x08,0x18,
279 0x06,0x1E,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x12,0x02,0x0A,
280 0x02,0x0A,0x1E,0x02,0x1C,0x06,0x0E,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x20,0x04,
281 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,
282 0x14,0x04,0x20,0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x0E,0x04,
283 0x12,0x08,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x0C,0x12
284 #endif
285 // 3072
286 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 3072
287 ,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x30,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x1E,0x02,0x24,
288 0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x10,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x14,0x04,
289 0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x06,
290 0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x04,
291 0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x0C,
292 0x12,0x1E,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x1A,0x04,0x0E,0x18,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x0A,
293 0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x12,0x12,0x0A,0x06,
294 0x08,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x06,
295 0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x12,0x1A,0x04,0x06,0x1E,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x12,0x04,
296 0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x22,0x06,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x04,
297 0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x24,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x0C,0x18,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x10,
298 0x12,0x0C,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x16,0x08,0x0C,
299 0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x16,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x12,
300 0x06,0x14,0x16,0x02,0x0C,0x18,0x04,0x12,0x12,0x02,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x0C,
301 0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x10,0x26,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x06,
302 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x1E,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06
303 #endif
304 // 3328
305 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 3328
306 ,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x12,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x06,0x1E,0x06,0x0E,0x06,
307 0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x1E,0x02,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x02,
308 0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x04,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x1E,0x0C,0x02,
309 0x06,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x16,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x48,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x04,
310 0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x14,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,
311 0x0C,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x12,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 463
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
312 0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x32,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x04,
313 0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x16,0x02,0x10,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,
314 0x14,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x24,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x06,0x04,
315 0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x18,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x06,
316 0x04,0x18,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,
317 0x06,0x22,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x1E,0x16,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x1C,
318 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x12,0x16,0x02,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x04,
319 0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x1E,
320 0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x18,0x28,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,
321 0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x12,0x0E,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x1E,0x04,0x08,0x0A
322 #endif
323 // 3584
324 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 3584
325 ,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,
326 0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x20,0x18,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0A,
327 0x02,0x04,0x12,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x12,0x0C,
328 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x1E,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x3E,0x04,0x02,0x0C,
329 0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,
330 0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x16,0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x12,
331 0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x06,0x22,0x06,0x02,0x0C,
332 0x04,0x06,0x12,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,
333 0x02,0x04,0x12,0x1A,0x0C,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x10,0x06,0x14,
334 0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x2A,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,
335 0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x1E,0x14,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,
336 0x14,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,
337 0x0C,0x1E,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x1A,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x06,
338 0x0E,0x36,0x06,0x34,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x1A,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x02,
339 0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x06,
340 0x08,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x0E,0x0A
341 #endif
342 // 3840
343 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 3840
344 ,0x1A,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0C,0x0C,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x16,
345 0x02,0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x06,0x2C,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x1A,0x04,
346 0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x06,
347 0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x10,
348 0x0C,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,
349 0x1A,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x1A,0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x10,
350 0x14,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x0A,0x14,0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x04,0x08,
351 0x10,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x0E,0x12,0x06,0x10,0x14,0x06,0x04,
352 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x10,
353 0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x1C,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x1E,0x22,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x02,
354 0x12,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x2C,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x02,
355 0x04,0x0E,0x1C,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x0E,0x1E,0x06,0x1E,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,
356 0x04,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x16,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x04,
357 0x12,0x14,0x06,0x10,0x26,0x10,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x28,0x2A,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x02,
358 0x18,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,
359 0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x10,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,0x06
360 #endif
361 // 4096
362 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 4096
363 ,0x12,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x10,0x1A,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x04,
364 0x20,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,
365 0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x2A,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x08,
366 0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x0C,0x0A,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x26,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x14,
367 0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x1A,0x0C,0x04,0x08,0x1C,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x18,0x06,0x0A,0x08,
368 0x06,0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x06,
369 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x1C,0x08,0x10,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x12,0x06,0x02,
370 0x18,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x14,
371 0x12,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x36,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x1A,0x24,0x04,0x02,0x04,
372 0x1A,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x12,0x06,0x08,0x06,
373 0x0C,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x36,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x1E,0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x0C,
374 0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x0A,
375 0x0C,0x0C,0x14,0x12,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x20,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,
376 0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,
377 0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x22,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x1E,0x0A,
Page 464 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
378 0x0E,0x0C,0x0C,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x1E,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x02
379 #endif
380 // 4352
381 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 4352
382 ,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x20,0x0A,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x0A,
383 0x06,0x18,0x08,0x04,0x1E,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0E,
384 0x06,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x12,0x0A,0x02,
385 0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x1E,0x08,0x12,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x04,
386 0x0C,0x12,0x18,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0C,0x06,
387 0x06,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x08,0x0A,
388 0x18,0x18,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x16,0x1E,0x02,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x04,
389 0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x18,0x08,0x0A,0x02,
390 0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x24,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x0E,0x0A,
391 0x06,0x12,0x0C,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x1A,0x0A,0x0E,0x10,0x12,0x08,0x12,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,
392 0x10,0x0E,0x18,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x3C,0x06,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x10,
393 0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x18,0x02,0x1E,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x02,
394 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x10,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x16,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x20,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x02,
395 0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x34,0x0E,0x16,0x02,0x16,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x04,
396 0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,
397 0x04,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x1C,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02
398 #endif
399 // 4608
400 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 4608
401 ,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x3A,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x1C,0x20,0x04,0x1E,0x08,0x06,
402 0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x10,0x08,0x1E,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x08,
403 0x06,0x04,0x06,0x1A,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x08,
404 0x0C,0x0A,0x14,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x04,
405 0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x28,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x24,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x16,
406 0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x24,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x08,
407 0x04,0x02,0x12,0x10,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x2A,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x14,0x0A,
408 0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x12,0x0A,0x12,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x06,
409 0x0A,0x1E,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x26,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x06,
410 0x12,0x06,0x32,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x20,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x12,
411 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x1E,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x18,
412 0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x1E,0x12,0x0C,0x1C,0x02,0x06,
413 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x0C,0x1A,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x02,0x0A,
414 0x12,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x14,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x06,
415 0x0C,0x02,0x24,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x0C,0x12,0x0E,
416 0x18,0x24,0x04,0x14,0x18,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x06,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06
417 #endif
418 // 4864
419 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 4864
420 ,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x12,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,
421 0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x20,0x06,0x04,
422 0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,
423 0x04,0x02,0x16,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x22,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,
424 0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x0E,0x0C,0x0C,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x0C,0x06,
425 0x08,0x04,0x24,0x06,0x06,0x14,0x18,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x1A,0x06,0x10,
426 0x08,0x06,0x04,0x18,0x12,0x08,0x0C,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x02,0x18,0x04,0x0C,0x12,
427 0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x18,0x0C,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x1A,0x04,
428 0x06,0x06,0x02,0x16,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x18,0x02,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x02,
429 0x34,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x18,0x0A,
430 0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x12,0x28,0x06,0x14,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,
431 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x0C,0x0C,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x12,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x10,
432 0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x1E,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x18,0x02,0x06,0x18,0x04,
433 0x02,0x16,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x12,0x18,0x06,
434 0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x26,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x18,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x10,
435 0x0E,0x10,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x1A,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x0C,0x0A
436 #endif
437 // 5120
438 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 5120
439 ,0x12,0x06,0x0E,0x1C,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x22,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x0A,
440 0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x10,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x06,
441 0x12,0x1E,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x12,
442 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x12,0x02,0x24,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,
443 0x06,0x02,0x1E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x1C,0x14,0x04,0x14,0x0C,0x18,0x10,0x12,0x0C,
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 465
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
444 0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x20,0x0C,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x0E,0x06,
445 0x16,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x08,0x1E,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x26,0x16,0x02,
446 0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x0C,0x18,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x04,
447 0x14,0x16,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x0C,0x16,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,
448 0x0A,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x06,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x0C,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x0C,
449 0x06,0x08,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x1C,0x12,
450 0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x06,
451 0x10,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x18,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x16,
452 0x12,0x06,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x16,0x0E,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x08,
453 0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x08,0x28,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x2A,0x14,0x04,0x20,0x0C,
454 0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x04,0x1A,0x12,0x04,0x08,0x1C
455 #endif
456 // 5376
457 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 5376
458 ,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x18,0x06,0x04,0x14,
459 0x16,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x10,0x12,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x12,
460 0x04,0x0E,0x1E,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x0C,
461 0x0A,0x02,0x10,0x08,0x04,0x1E,0x02,0x06,0x1C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,
462 0x1A,0x06,0x12,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x0C,0x1A,0x18,0x04,0x14,0x16,
463 0x02,0x12,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x18,0x0C,
464 0x06,0x12,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x14,
465 0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x0C,0x08,0x1C,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x18,
466 0x0C,0x0A,0x18,0x08,0x0A,0x14,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x0C,0x18,0x22,0x12,
467 0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x18,0x02,0x06,0x04,
468 0x06,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x14,0x18,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x06,0x0C,
469 0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x10,0x14,0x06,0x06,0x1E,0x04,0x08,
470 0x06,0x18,0x10,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0C,0x1E,0x04,0x12,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x1A,0x0A,0x02,
471 0x16,0x08,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0C,0x1C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x18,
472 0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x14,0x10,0x08,0x1E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x20,
473 0x16,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x12,0x0C,0x1C,0x02,0x10,0x0C,0x12
474 #endif
475 // 5632
476 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 5632
477 ,0x0E,0x0A,0x12,0x0C,0x06,0x20,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x16,0x02,
478 0x04,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x1E,0x18,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x04,
479 0x02,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x12,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x10,
480 0x12,0x14,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x1E,0x02,0x0C,0x1C,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,
481 0x12,0x12,0x04,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x1C,0x02,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x1E,0x0C,0x16,
482 0x1A,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x0A,
483 0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x1A,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x1A,
484 0x04,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x18,0x02,
485 0x04,0x08,0x06,0x10,0x0E,0x10,0x12,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,
486 0x06,0x06,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x26,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x0E,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x0A,0x0C,
487 0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,
488 0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x0E,0x1C,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x0E,0x1E,
489 0x0A,0x14,0x06,0x0A,0x18,0x02,0x1C,0x02,0x0C,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x24,0x04,0x08,0x04,
490 0x0E,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x02,
491 0x0A,0x06,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x1A,0x04,
492 0x0E,0x16,0x0E,0x04,0x0C,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x1A,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x12,0x04
493 #endif
494 // 5888
495 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 5888
496 ,0x02,0x10,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x1C,0x26,0x04,
497 0x08,0x10,0x1A,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,
498 0x18,0x04,0x1E,0x1A,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x1A,0x04,0x12,
499 0x08,0x06,0x06,0x0C,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x02,0x2A,0x3A,0x08,0x04,
500 0x06,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,
501 0x16,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x12,0x08,0x0A,0x08,0x10,
502 0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x34,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x02,
503 0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x0A,0x02,0x16,0x02,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x02,0x18,
504 0x0C,0x04,0x1A,0x12,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x1E,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x02,0x16,0x08,0x04,0x06,
505 0x02,0x16,0x06,0x08,0x10,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x12,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x18,0x1E,
506 0x10,0x08,0x22,0x08,0x16,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x12,0x0E,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x04,0x24,0x06,
507 0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x14,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,0x06,0x02,0x28,0x08,0x06,0x1C,
508 0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x12,0x04,0x18,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x14,0x0A,0x0E,0x10,0x0E,0x10,
509 0x06,0x08,0x24,0x04,0x0C,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x32,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,
Page 466 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
510 0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x0A,0x0E,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x02,0x0A,0x06,
511 0x0E,0x12,0x0A,0x26,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x0A
512 #endif
513 // 6144
514 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 6144
515 ,0x08,0x28,0x06,0x14,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x22,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x10,
516 0x2A,0x0C,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x22,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x10,0x02,
517 0x16,0x06,0x08,0x18,0x16,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x08,0x18,0x04,0x06,
518 0x06,0x02,0x16,0x14,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x06,
519 0x10,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x18,0x20,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x12,0x0A,0x08,0x1E,0x12,
520 0x06,0x10,0x0C,0x06,0x0C,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x0C,0x08,0x06,0x16,0x08,0x06,0x04,0x0E,
521 0x0A,0x12,0x14,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x02,0x1C,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0E,
522 0x28,0x18,0x02,0x04,0x08,0x0C,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x20,0x12,0x10,0x06,0x24,0x08,0x06,
523 0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x04,0x06,0x1A,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x12,0x0A,0x06,0x06,0x0E,0x0A,0x06,
524 0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x18,0x04,0x0E,0x16,0x08,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x0C,0x12,0x0A,0x12,0x08,
525 0x18,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x18,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x02,0x0A,0x1E,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x04,0x02,
526 0x28,0x02,0x1C,0x08,0x06,0x06,0x12,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x04,0x12,0x1E,0x12,0x02,0x0C,
527 0x1E,0x06,0x1E,0x04,0x12,0x0C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x06,0x0A,0x06,0x08,0x06,0x0A,0x0C,
528 0x02,0x06,0x0C,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x04,0x14,0x04,0x06,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x16,0x06,0x06,
529 0x08,0x12,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x02,0x06,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,
530 0x12,0x02,0x06,0x06,0x06,0x0A,0x08,0x0A,0x06,0x12,0x0C,0x08,0x0C,0x06,0x04,0x06
531 #endif
532 // 6400
533 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 6400
534 ,0x0E,0x10,0x02,0x0C,0x04,0x06,0x26,0x06,0x06,0x10,0x14,0x1C,0x14,0x0A,0x06,0x06,
535 0x0E,0x04,0x1A,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x12,0x0E,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x0E,0x10,0x02,0x1C,0x06,
536 0x08,0x06,0x22,0x08,0x04,0x12,0x02,0x10,0x08,0x06,0x28,0x08,0x12,0x04,0x1E,0x06,
537 0x0C,0x02,0x1E,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x28,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x08,0x06,
538 0x06,0x1C,0x02,0x04,0x0C,0x0E,0x10,0x08,0x1E,0x10,0x12,0x02,0x0A,0x12,0x06,0x20,
539 0x04,0x12,0x06,0x02,0x0C,0x0A,0x12,0x02,0x06,0x0A,0x0E,0x12,0x1C,0x06,0x08,0x10,
540 0x02,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x08,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x0A,0x08,0x04,0x06,0x0C,0x06,0x14,0x04,
541 0x02,0x06,0x04,0x14,0x0A,0x1A,0x12,0x0A,0x02,0x12,0x06,0x10,0x0E,0x04,0x1A,0x04,
542 0x0E,0x0A,0x0C,0x0E,0x06,0x06,0x04,0x0E,0x0A,0x02,0x1E,0x12,0x16,0x02
543 #endif
544 // 6542
545 #if PRIME_DIFF_TABLE_BYTES > 0
546 };
547 #endif
548 #if defined RSA_INSTRUMENT || defined RSA_DEBUG
549 UINT32 failedAtIteration[10];
550 UINT32 MillerRabinTrials;
551 UINT32 totalFields;
552 UINT32 emptyFields;
553 UINT32 noPrimeFields;
554 UINT16 lastSievePrime;
555 UINT32 primesChecked;
556 #endif
Only want this table when doing debug of the prime number stuff This is a table of the first 2048 primes
and takes 4096 bytes
557 #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
558 const __int16 primes[NUM_PRIMES]=
559 {
560 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53,
561 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131,
562 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223,
563 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311,
564 313, 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409,
565 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503,
566 509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613,
567 617, 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719,
568 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827,
569 829, 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941,
570 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997,1009,1013,1019,1021,1031,1033,1039,1049,
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 467
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
571 1051,1061,1063,1069,1087,1091,1093,1097,1103,1109,1117,1123,1129,1151,1153,1163,
572 1171,1181,1187,1193,1201,1213,1217,1223,1229,1231,1237,1249,1259,1277,1279,1283,
573 1289,1291,1297,1301,1303,1307,1319,1321,1327,1361,1367,1373,1381,1399,1409,1423,
574 1427,1429,1433,1439,1447,1451,1453,1459,1471,1481,1483,1487,1489,1493,1499,1511,
575 1523,1531,1543,1549,1553,1559,1567,1571,1579,1583,1597,1601,1607,1609,1613,1619,
576 1621,1627,1637,1657,1663,1667,1669,1693,1697,1699,1709,1721,1723,1733,1741,1747,
577 1753,1759,1777,1783,1787,1789,1801,1811,1823,1831,1847,1861,1867,1871,1873,1877,
578 1879,1889,1901,1907,1913,1931,1933,1949,1951,1973,1979,1987,1993,1997,1999,2003,
579 2011,2017,2027,2029,2039,2053,2063,2069,2081,2083,2087,2089,2099,2111,2113,2129,
580 2131,2137,2141,2143,2153,2161,2179,2203,2207,2213,2221,2237,2239,2243,2251,2267,
581 2269,2273,2281,2287,2293,2297,2309,2311,2333,2339,2341,2347,2351,2357,2371,2377,
582 2381,2383,2389,2393,2399,2411,2417,2423,2437,2441,2447,2459,2467,2473,2477,2503,
583 2521,2531,2539,2543,2549,2551,2557,2579,2591,2593,2609,2617,2621,2633,2647,2657,
584 2659,2663,2671,2677,2683,2687,2689,2693,2699,2707,2711,2713,2719,2729,2731,2741,
585 2749,2753,2767,2777,2789,2791,2797,2801,2803,2819,2833,2837,2843,2851,2857,2861,
586 2879,2887,2897,2903,2909,2917,2927,2939,2953,2957,2963,2969,2971,2999,3001,3011,
587 3019,3023,3037,3041,3049,3061,3067,3079,3083,3089,3109,3119,3121,3137,3163,3167,
588 3169,3181,3187,3191,3203,3209,3217,3221,3229,3251,3253,3257,3259,3271,3299,3301,
589 3307,3313,3319,3323,3329,3331,3343,3347,3359,3361,3371,3373,3389,3391,3407,3413,
590 3433,3449,3457,3461,3463,3467,3469,3491,3499,3511,3517,3527,3529,3533,3539,3541,
591 3547,3557,3559,3571,3581,3583,3593,3607,3613,3617,3623,3631,3637,3643,3659,3671,
592 3673,3677,3691,3697,3701,3709,3719,3727,3733,3739,3761,3767,3769,3779,3793,3797,
593 3803,3821,3823,3833,3847,3851,3853,3863,3877,3881,3889,3907,3911,3917,3919,3923,
594 3929,3931,3943,3947,3967,3989,4001,4003,4007,4013,4019,4021,4027,4049,4051,4057,
595 4073,4079,4091,4093,4099,4111,4127,4129,4133,4139,4153,4157,4159,4177,4201,4211,
596 4217,4219,4229,4231,4241,4243,4253,4259,4261,4271,4273,4283,4289,4297,4327,4337,
597 4339,4349,4357,4363,4373,4391,4397,4409,4421,4423,4441,4447,4451,4457,4463,4481,
598 4483,4493,4507,4513,4517,4519,4523,4547,4549,4561,4567,4583,4591,4597,4603,4621,
599 4637,4639,4643,4649,4651,4657,4663,4673,4679,4691,4703,4721,4723,4729,4733,4751,
600 4759,4783,4787,4789,4793,4799,4801,4813,4817,4831,4861,4871,4877,4889,4903,4909,
601 4919,4931,4933,4937,4943,4951,4957,4967,4969,4973,4987,4993,4999,5003,5009,5011,
602 5021,5023,5039,5051,5059,5077,5081,5087,5099,5101,5107,5113,5119,5147,5153,5167,
603 5171,5179,5189,5197,5209,5227,5231,5233,5237,5261,5273,5279,5281,5297,5303,5309,
604 5323,5333,5347,5351,5381,5387,5393,5399,5407,5413,5417,5419,5431,5437,5441,5443,
605 5449,5471,5477,5479,5483,5501,5503,5507,5519,5521,5527,5531,5557,5563,5569,5573,
606 5581,5591,5623,5639,5641,5647,5651,5653,5657,5659,5669,5683,5689,5693,5701,5711,
607 5717,5737,5741,5743,5749,5779,5783,5791,5801,5807,5813,5821,5827,5839,5843,5849,
608 5851,5857,5861,5867,5869,5879,5881,5897,5903,5923,5927,5939,5953,5981,5987,6007,
609 6011,6029,6037,6043,6047,6053,6067,6073,6079,6089,6091,6101,6113,6121,6131,6133,
610 6143,6151,6163,6173,6197,6199,6203,6211,6217,6221,6229,6247,6257,6263,6269,6271,
611 6277,6287,6299,6301,6311,6317,6323,6329,6337,6343,6353,6359,6361,6367,6373,6379,
612 6389,6397,6421,6427,6449,6451,6469,6473,6481,6491,6521,6529,6547,6551,6553,6563,
613 6569,6571,6577,6581,6599,6607,6619,6637,6653,6659,6661,6673,6679,6689,6691,6701,
614 6703,6709,6719,6733,6737,6761,6763,6779,6781,6791,6793,6803,6823,6827,6829,6833,
615 6841,6857,6863,6869,6871,6883,6899,6907,6911,6917,6947,6949,6959,6961,6967,6971,
616 6977,6983,6991,6997,7001,7013,7019,7027,7039,7043,7057,7069,7079,7103,7109,7121,
617 7127,7129,7151,7159,7177,7187,7193,7207,7211,7213,7219,7229,7237,7243,7247,7253,
618 7283,7297,7307,7309,7321,7331,7333,7349,7351,7369,7393,7411,7417,7433,7451,7457,
619 7459,7477,7481,7487,7489,7499,7507,7517,7523,7529,7537,7541,7547,7549,7559,7561,
620 7573,7577,7583,7589,7591,7603,7607,7621,7639,7643,7649,7669,7673,7681,7687,7691,
621 7699,7703,7717,7723,7727,7741,7753,7757,7759,7789,7793,7817,7823,7829,7841,7853,
622 7867,7873,7877,7879,7883,7901,7907,7919,7927,7933,7937,7949,7951,7963,7993,8009,
623 8011,8017,8039,8053,8059,8069,8081,8087,8089,8093,8101,8111,8117,8123,8147,8161,
624 8167,8171,8179,8191,8209,8219,8221,8231,8233,8237,8243,8263,8269,8273,8287,8291,
625 8293,8297,8311,8317,8329,8353,8363,8369,8377,8387,8389,8419,8423,8429,8431,8443,
626 8447,8461,8467,8501,8513,8521,8527,8537,8539,8543,8563,8573,8581,8597,8599,8609,
627 8623,8627,8629,8641,8647,8663,8669,8677,8681,8689,8693,8699,8707,8713,8719,8731,
628 8737,8741,8747,8753,8761,8779,8783,8803,8807,8819,8821,8831,8837,8839,8849,8861,
629 8863,8867,8887,8893,8923,8929,8933,8941,8951,8963,8969,8971,8999,9001,9007,9011,
630 9013,9029,9041,9043,9049,9059,9067,9091,9103,9109,9127,9133,9137,9151,9157,9161,
631 9173,9181,9187,9199,9203,9209,9221,9227,9239,9241,9257,9277,9281,9283,9293,9311,
632 9319,9323,9337,9341,9343,9349,9371,9377,9391,9397,9403,9413,9419,9421,9431,9433,
633 9437,9439,9461,9463,9467,9473,9479,9491,9497,9511,9521,9533,9539,9547,9551,9587,
634 9601,9613,9619,9623,9629,9631,9643,9649,9661,9677,9679,9689,9697,9719,9721,9733,
635 9739,9743,9749,9767,9769,9781,9787,9791,9803,9811,9817,9829,9833,9839,9851,9857,
636 9859, 9871, 9883, 9887, 9901, 9907, 9923, 9929,
Page 468 TCG Published Family "2.0"
October 30, 2014 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 Level 00 Revision 01.16
Part 4: Supporting Routines Trusted Platform Module Library
637 9931, 9941, 9949, 9967, 9973,10007,10009,10037,
638 10039,10061,10067,10069,10079,10091,10093,10099,
639 10103,10111,10133,10139,10141,10151,10159,10163,
640 10169,10177,10181,10193,10211,10223,10243,10247,
641 10253,10259,10267,10271,10273,10289,10301,10303,
642 10313,10321,10331,10333,10337,10343,10357,10369,
643 10391,10399,10427,10429,10433,10453,10457,10459,
644 10463,10477,10487,10499,10501,10513,10529,10531,
645 10559,10567,10589,10597,10601,10607,10613,10627,
646 10631,10639,10651,10657,10663,10667,10687,10691,
647 10709,10711,10723,10729,10733,10739,10753,10771,
648 10781,10789,10799,10831,10837,10847,10853,10859,
649 10861,10867,10883,10889,10891,10903,10909,10937,
650 10939,10949,10957,10973,10979,10987,10993,11003,
651 11027,11047,11057,11059,11069,11071,11083,11087,
652 11093,11113,11117,11119,11131,11149,11159,11161,
653 11171,11173,11177,11197,11213,11239,11243,11251,
654 11257,11261,11273,11279,11287,11299,11311,11317,
655 11321,11329,11351,11353,11369,11383,11393,11399,
656 11411,11423,11437,11443,11447,11467,11471,11483,
657 11489,11491,11497,11503,11519,11527,11549,11551,
658 11579,11587,11593,11597,11617,11621,11633,11657,
659 11677,11681,11689,11699,11701,11717,11719,11731,
660 11743,11777,11779,11783,11789,11801,11807,11813,
661 11821,11827,11831,11833,11839,11863,11867,11887,
662 11897,11903,11909,11923,11927,11933,11939,11941,
663 11953,11959,11969,11971,11981,11987,12007,12011,
664 12037,12041,12043,12049,12071,12073,12097,12101,
665 12107,12109,12113,12119,12143,12149,12157,12161,
666 12163,12197,12203,12211,12227,12239,12241,12251,
667 12253,12263,12269,12277,12281,12289,12301,12323,
668 12329,12343,12347,12373,12377,12379,12391,12401,
669 12409,12413,12421,12433,12437,12451,12457,12473,
670 12479,12487,12491,12497,12503,12511,12517,12527,
671 12539,12541,12547,12553,12569,12577,12583,12589,
672 12601,12611,12613,12619,12637,12641,12647,12653,
673 12659,12671,12689,12697,12703,12713,12721,12739,
674 12743,12757,12763,12781,12791,12799,12809,12821,
675 12823,12829,12841,12853,12889,12893,12899,12907,
676 12911,12917,12919,12923,12941,12953,12959,12967,
677 12973,12979,12983,13001,13003,13007,13009,13033,
678 13037,13043,13049,13063,13093,13099,13103,13109,
679 13121,13127,13147,13151,13159,13163,13171,13177,
680 13183,13187,13217,13219,13229,13241,13249,13259,
681 13267,13291,13297,13309,13313,13327,13331,13337,
682 13339,13367,13381,13397,13399,13411,13417,13421,
683 13441,13451,13457,13463,13469,13477,13487,13499,
684 13513,13523,13537,13553,13567,13577,13591,13597,
685 13613,13619,13627,13633,13649,13669,13679,13681,
686 13687,13691,13693,13697,13709,13711,13721,13723,
687 13729,13751,13757,13759,13763,13781,13789,13799,
688 13807,13829,13831,13841,13859,13873,13877,13879,
689 13883,13901,13903,13907,13913,13921,13931,13933,
690 13963,13967,13997,13999,14009,14011,14029,14033,
691 14051,14057,14071,14081,14083,14087,14107,14143,
692 14149,14153,14159,14173,14177,14197,14207,14221,
693 14243,14249,14251,14281,14293,14303,14321,14323,
694 14327,14341,14347,14369,14387,14389,14401,14407,
695 14411,14419,14423,14431,14437,14447,14449,14461,
696 14479,14489,14503,14519,14533,14537,14543,14549,
697 14551,14557,14561,14563,14591,14593,14621,14627,
698 14629,14633,14639,14653,14657,14669,14683,14699,
699 14713,14717,14723,14731,14737,14741,14747,14753,
700 14759,14767,14771,14779,14783,14797,14813,14821,
701 14827,14831,14843,14851,14867,14869,14879,14887,
702 14891,14897,14923,14929,14939,14947,14951,14957,
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 469
Level 00 Revision 01.16 Copyright © TCG 2006-2014 October 30, 2014
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
703 14969,14983,15013,15017,15031,15053,15061,15073,
704 15077,15083,15091,15101,15107,15121,15131,15137,
705 15139,15149,15161,15173,15187,15193,15199,15217,
706 15227,15233,15241,15259,15263,15269,15271,15277,
707 15287,15289,15299,15307,15313,15319,15329,15331,
708 15349,15359,15361,15373,15377,15383,15391,15401,
709 15413,15427,15439,15443,15451,15461,15467,15473,
710 15493,15497,15511,15527,15541,15551,15559,15569,
711 15581,15583,15601,15607,15619,15629,15641,15643,
712 15647,15649,15661,15667,15671,15679,15683,15727,
713 15731,15733,15737,15739,15749,15761,15767,15773,
714 15787,15791,15797,15803,15809,15817,15823,15859,
715 15877,15881,15887,15889,15901,15907,15913,15919,
716 15923,15937,15959,15971,15973,15991,16001,16007,
717 16033,16057,16061,16063,16067,16069,16073,16087,
718 16091,16097,16103,16111,16127,16139,16141,16183,
719 16187,16189,16193,16217,16223,16229,16231,16249,
720 16253,16267,16273,16301,16319,16333,16339,16349,
721 16361,16363,16369,16381,16411,16417,16421,16427,
722 16433,16447,16451,16453,16477,16481,16487,16493,
723 16519,16529,16547,16553,16561,16567,16573,16603,
724 16607,16619,16631,16633,16649,16651,16657,16661,
725 16673,16691,16693,16699,16703,16729,16741,16747,
726 16759,16763,16787,16811,16823,16829,16831,16843,
727 16871,16879,16883,16889,16901,16903,16921,16927,
728 16931,16937,16943,16963,16979,16981,16987,16993,
729 17011,17021,17027,17029,17033,17041,17047,17053,
730 17077,17093,17099,17107,17117,17123,17137,17159,
731 17167,17183,17189,17191,17203,17207,17209,17231,
732 17239,17257,17291,17293,17299,17317,17321,17327,
733 17333,17341,17351,17359,17377,17383,17387,17389,
734 17393,17401,17417,17419,17431,17443,17449,17467,
735 17471,17477,17483,17489,17491,17497,17509,17519,
736 17539,17551,17569,17573,17579,17581,17597,17599,
737 17609,17623,17627,17657,17659,17669,17681,17683,
738 17707,17713,17729,17737,17747,17749,17761,17783,
739 17789,17791,17807,17827,17837,17839,17851,17863
740 };
741 #endif
742 #endif
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B.13 Elliptic Curve Files
B.13.1. CpriDataEcc.h
1 #ifndef _CRYPTDATAECC_H_
2 #define _CRYPTDATAECC_H_
Structure for the curve parameters. This is an analog to the TPMS_ALGORITHM_DETAIL_ECC
3 typedef struct {
4 const TPM2B *p; // a prime number
5 const TPM2B *a; // linear coefficient
6 const TPM2B *b; // constant term
7 const TPM2B *x; // generator x coordinate
8 const TPM2B *y; // generator y coordinate
9 const TPM2B *n; // the order of the curve
10 const TPM2B *h; // cofactor
11 } ECC_CURVE_DATA;
12 typedef struct
13 {
14 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId;
15 UINT16 keySizeBits;
16 TPMT_KDF_SCHEME kdf;
17 TPMT_ECC_SCHEME sign;
18 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData; // the address of the curve data
19 } ECC_CURVE;
20 extern const ECC_CURVE_DATA SM2_P256;
21 extern const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P256;
22 extern const ECC_CURVE_DATA BN_P256;
23 extern const ECC_CURVE eccCurves[];
24 extern const UINT16 ECC_CURVE_COUNT;
25 #endif
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Trusted Platform Module Library Part 4: Supporting Routines
B.13.2. CpriDataEcc.c
Defines for the sizes of ECC parameters
1 #include "TPMB.h"
2 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(1);
3 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(16);
4 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(2);
5 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(24);
6 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(28);
7 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(32);
8 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(4);
9 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(48);
10 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(64);
11 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(66);
12 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(8);
13 TPM2B_BYTE_VALUE(80);
14 #if defined ECC_NIST_P192 && ECC_NIST_P192 == YES
15 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_p = {24,
16 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
17 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
18 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}};
19 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_a = {24,
20 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
21 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
22 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC}};
23 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_b = {24,
24 {0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE7,
25 0x0F, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xAB, 0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49,
26 0xFE, 0xB8, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0xB9, 0xB1}};
27 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_gX = {24,
28 {0x18, 0x8D, 0xA8, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x90, 0xF6,
29 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x20, 0xEB, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x88, 0x00,
30 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x0A, 0xFD, 0x82, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x12}};
31 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_gY = {24,
32 {0x07, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x95, 0xFFC, 0x8D, 0xA7, 0x86,
33 0x31, 0x01, 0x1ED, 0x6B, 0x24, 0xCD, 0xD5, 0x73,
34 0xF9, 0x77, 0xA1, 0x1E, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11}};
35 const TPM2B_24_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_n = {24,
36 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
37 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xF8, 0x36,
38 0x14, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x28, 0x31}};
39 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P192_h = {1,{1}};
40 const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P192 = {&NIST_P192_p.b, &NIST_P192_a.b, &NIST_P192_b.b,
41 &NIST_P192_gX.b, &NIST_P192_gY.b, &NIST_P192_n.b,
42 &NIST_P192_h.b};
43 #endif // ECC_NIST_P192
44 #if defined ECC_NIST_P224 && ECC_NIST_P224 == YES
45 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_p = {28,
46 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
47 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
48 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
49 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01}};
50 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_a = {28,
51 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
52 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
53 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
54 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE}};
55 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_b = {28,
56 {0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB,
57 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7,
58 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43,
59 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4}};
60 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_gX = {28,
61 {0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F,
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62 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3,
63 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6,
64 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21}};
65 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_gY = {28,
66 {0xBD, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xB5, 0xF7, 0x23, 0xFB,
67 0x4C, 0x22, 0xDF, 0xE6, 0xCD, 0x43, 0x75, 0xA0,
68 0x5A, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x99,
69 0x85, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x34}};
70 const TPM2B_28_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_n = {28,
71 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
72 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2,
73 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45,
74 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D}};
75 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P224_h = {1,{1}};
76 const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P224 = {&NIST_P224_p.b, &NIST_P224_a.b, &NIST_P224_b.b,
77 &NIST_P224_gX.b, &NIST_P224_gY.b, &NIST_P224_n.b,
78 &NIST_P224_h.b};
79 #endif // ECC_NIST_P224
80 #if defined ECC_NIST_P256 && ECC_NIST_P256 == YES
81 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_p = {32,
82 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
83 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
84 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
85 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}};
86 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_a = {32,
87 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
88 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
89 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
90 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC}};
91 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_b = {32,
92 {0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7,
93 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC,
94 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
95 0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B}};
96 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_gX = {32,
97 {0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47,
98 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2,
99 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0,
100 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96}};
101 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_gY = {32,
102 {0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x9B,
103 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16,
104 0x2B, 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE,
105 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5}};
106 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_n = {32,
107 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
108 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
109 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
110 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51}};
111 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P256_h = {1,{1}};
112 const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P256 = {&NIST_P256_p.b, &NIST_P256_a.b, &NIST_P256_b.b,
113 &NIST_P256_gX.b, &NIST_P256_gY.b, &NIST_P256_n.b,
114 &NIST_P256_h.b};
115 #endif // ECC_NIST_P256
116 #if defined ECC_NIST_P384 && ECC_NIST_P384 == YES
117 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_p = {48,
118 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
119 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
120 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
121 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
122 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
123 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}};
124 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_a = {48,
125 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
126 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
127 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
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128 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE,
129 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
130 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC}};
131 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_b = {48,
132 {0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4,
133 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B, 0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19,
134 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12,
135 0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A,
136 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D,
137 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF}};
138 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_gX = {48,
139 {0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37,
140 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E, 0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74,
141 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98,
142 0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38,
143 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D, 0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C,
144 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7}};
145 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_gY = {48,
146 {0x36, 0x17, 0xDE, 0x4A, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x6F,
147 0x5D, 0x9E, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x92, 0x92, 0xDC, 0x29,
148 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0xBD, 0x28, 0x9A, 0x14, 0x7C,
149 0xE9, 0xDA, 0x31, 0x13, 0xB5, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xC0,
150 0x0A, 0x60, 0xB1, 0xCE, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x81, 0x9D,
151 0x7A, 0x43, 0x1D, 0x7C, 0x90, 0xEA, 0x0E, 0x5F}};
152 const TPM2B_48_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_n = {48,
153 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
154 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
155 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
156 0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF,
157 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A,
158 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73}};
159 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P384_h = {1,{1}};
160 const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P384 = {&NIST_P384_p.b, &NIST_P384_a.b, &NIST_P384_b.b,
161 &NIST_P384_gX.b, &NIST_P384_gY.b, &NIST_P384_n.b,
162 &NIST_P384_h.b};
163 #endif // ECC_NIST_P384
164 #if defined ECC_NIST_P521 && ECC_NIST_P521 == YES
165 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_p = {66,
166 {0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
167 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
168 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
169 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
170 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
171 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
172 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
173 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
174 0xFF, 0xFF}};
175 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_a = {66,
176 {0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
177 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
178 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
179 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
180 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
181 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
182 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
183 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
184 0xFF, 0xFC}};
185 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_b = {66,
186 {0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C,
187 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85,
188 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3,
189 0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1,
190 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19, 0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E,
191 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1,
192 0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C,
193 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50,
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194 0x3F, 0x00}};
195 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_gX = {66,
196 {0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04,
197 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E, 0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95,
198 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F,
199 0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D,
200 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7,
201 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF,
202 0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A,
203 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5,
204 0xBD, 0x66}};
205 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_gY = {66,
206 {0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6A, 0x78, 0x9A, 0x3B,
207 0xC0, 0x04, 0x5C, 0x8A, 0x5F, 0xB4, 0x2C, 0x7D,
208 0x1B, 0xD9, 0x98, 0xF5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9B,
209 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3E,
210 0x66, 0x2C, 0x97, 0xEE, 0x72, 0x99, 0x5E, 0xF4,
211 0x26, 0x40, 0xC5, 0x50, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x3F, 0xAD,
212 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x70, 0x86, 0xA2, 0x72,
213 0xC2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xBE, 0x94, 0x76, 0x9F, 0xD1,
214 0x66, 0x50}};
215 const TPM2B_66_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_n = {66,
216 {0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
217 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
218 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
219 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
220 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86, 0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F,
221 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
222 0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C,
223 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38,
224 0x64, 0x09}};
225 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE NIST_P521_h = {1,{1}};
226 const ECC_CURVE_DATA NIST_P521 = {&NIST_P521_p.b, &NIST_P521_a.b, &NIST_P521_b.b,
227 &NIST_P521_gX.b, &NIST_P521_gY.b, &NIST_P521_n.b,
228 &NIST_P521_h.b};
229 #endif // ECC_NIST_P521
230 #if defined ECC_BN_P256 && ECC_BN_P256 == YES
231 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_p = {32,
232 {0xFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFC, 0XF0, 0XCD,
233 0X46, 0XE5, 0XF2, 0X5E, 0XEE, 0X71, 0XA4, 0X9F,
234 0X0C, 0XDC, 0X65, 0XFB, 0X12, 0X98, 0X0A, 0X82,
235 0XD3, 0X29, 0X2D, 0XDB, 0XAE, 0XD3, 0X30, 0X13}};
236 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_a = {1,{0}};
237 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_b = {1,{3}};
238 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_gX = {1,{1}};
239 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_gY = {1,{2}};;
240 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_n = {32,
241 {0xFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFC, 0XF0, 0XCD,
242 0X46, 0XE5, 0XF2, 0X5E, 0XEE, 0X71, 0XA4, 0X9E,
243 0X0C, 0XDC, 0X65, 0XFB, 0X12, 0X99, 0X92, 0X1A,
244 0XF6, 0X2D, 0X53, 0X6C, 0XD1, 0X0B, 0X50, 0X0D}};
245 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P256_h = {1,{1}};
246 const ECC_CURVE_DATA BN_P256 = {&BN_P256_p.b, &BN_P256_a.b, &BN_P256_b.b,
247 &BN_P256_gX.b, &BN_P256_gY.b, &BN_P256_n.b,
248 &BN_P256_h.b};
249 #endif // ECC_BN_P256
250 #if defined ECC_BN_P638 && ECC_BN_P638 == YES
251 const TPM2B_80_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_p = {80,
252 {0x23, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D,
253 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xD3,
254 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0x42, 0xD0, 0x00, 0x16, 0x5E,
255 0x3F, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x87, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD5, 0x2F,
256 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x08, 0xDE, 0x55,
257 0xC0, 0x00, 0x86, 0x52, 0x00, 0x21, 0xE5, 0x5B,
258 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0xEB, 0x80,
259 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4C, 0x80, 0x01, 0x5A, 0xCD,
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260 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEC, 0xE0,
261 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x67}};
262 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_a = {1,{0}};
263 const TPM2B_2_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_b = {2,{0x01,0x01}};
264 const TPM2B_80_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_gX = {80,
265 {0x23, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D,
266 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xD3,
267 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0x42, 0xD0, 0x00, 0x16, 0x5E,
268 0x3F, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x87, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD5, 0x2F,
269 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x08, 0xDE, 0x55,
270 0xC0, 0x00, 0x86, 0x52, 0x00, 0x21, 0xE5, 0x5B,
271 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0xEB, 0x80,
272 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4C, 0x80, 0x01, 0x5A, 0xCD,
273 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEC, 0xE0,
274 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x66}};
275 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_gY = {1,{0x10}};
276 const TPM2B_80_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_n = {80,
277 {0x23, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D,
278 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xD3,
279 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0x42, 0xD0, 0x00, 0x16, 0x5E,
280 0x3F, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x87, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD5, 0x2F,
281 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x08, 0xDE, 0x55,
282 0x60, 0x00, 0x86, 0x55, 0x00, 0x21, 0xE5, 0x55,
283 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xF5, 0x4F, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xC0,
284 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x49, 0x80, 0x01, 0x54, 0xD9,
285 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xED, 0xA0,
286 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x61}};
287 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE BN_P638_h = {1,{1}};
288 const ECC_CURVE_DATA BN_P638 = {&BN_P638_p.b, &BN_P638_a.b, &BN_P638_b.b,
289 &BN_P638_gX.b, &BN_P638_gY.b, &BN_P638_n.b,
290 &BN_P638_h.b};
291 #endif // ECC_BN_P638
292 #if defined ECC_SM2_P256 && ECC_SM2_P256 == YES
293 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_p = {32,
294 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
295 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
296 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
297 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF}};
298 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_a = {32,
299 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
300 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
301 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
302 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC}};
303 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_b = {32,
304 {0x28, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x34,
305 0x4D, 0x5A, 0x9E, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x65, 0x09, 0xA7,
306 0xF3, 0x97, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x92,
307 0xDD, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x93}};
308 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_gX = {32,
309 {0x32, 0xC4, 0xAE, 0x2C, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x81, 0x19,
310 0x5F, 0x99, 0x04, 0x46, 0x6A, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x94,
311 0x8F, 0xE3, 0x0B, 0xBF, 0xF2, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xE1,
312 0x71, 0x5A, 0x45, 0x89, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x74, 0xC7}};
313 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_gY = {32,
314 {0xBC, 0x37, 0x36, 0xA2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x77, 0x9C,
315 0x59, 0xBD, 0xCE, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x69, 0x21, 0x53,
316 0xD0, 0xA9, 0x87, 0x7C, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x47, 0x40,
317 0x02, 0xDF, 0x32, 0xE5, 0x21, 0x39, 0xF0, 0xA0}};
318 const TPM2B_32_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_n = {32,
319 {0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
320 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
321 0x72, 0x03, 0xDF, 0x6B, 0x21, 0xC6, 0x05, 0x2B,
322 0x53, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0x09, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x41, 0x23}};
323 const TPM2B_1_BYTE_VALUE SM2_P256_h = {1,{1}};
324 const ECC_CURVE_DATA SM2_P256 = {&SM2_P256_p.b, &SM2_P256_a.b, &SM2_P256_b.b,
325 &SM2_P256_gX.b, &SM2_P256_gY.b, &SM2_P256_n.b,
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326 &SM2_P256_h.b};
327 #endif // ECC_SM2_P256
328 #define comma
329 const ECC_CURVE eccCurves[] = {
330 #if defined ECC_NIST_P192 && ECC_NIST_P192 == YES
331 comma
332 {TPM_ECC_NIST_P192,
333 192,
334 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SHA256},
335 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
336 &NIST_P192}
337 # undef comma
338 # define comma ,
339 #endif // ECC_NIST_P192
340 #if defined ECC_NIST_P224 && ECC_NIST_P224 == YES
341 comma
342 {TPM_ECC_NIST_P224,
343 224,
344 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SHA256},
345 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
346 &NIST_P224}
347 # undef comma
348 # define comma ,
349 #endif // ECC_NIST_P224
350 #if defined ECC_NIST_P256 && ECC_NIST_P256 == YES
351 comma
352 {TPM_ECC_NIST_P256,
353 256,
354 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SHA256},
355 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
356 &NIST_P256}
357 # undef comma
358 # define comma ,
359 #endif // ECC_NIST_P256
360 #if defined ECC_NIST_P384 && ECC_NIST_P384 == YES
361 comma
362 {TPM_ECC_NIST_P384,
363 384,
364 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SHA384},
365 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
366 &NIST_P384}
367 # undef comma
368 # define comma ,
369 #endif // ECC_NIST_P384
370 #if defined ECC_NIST_P521 && ECC_NIST_P521 == YES
371 comma
372 {TPM_ECC_NIST_P521,
373 521,
374 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SHA512},
375 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
376 &NIST_P521}
377 # undef comma
378 # define comma ,
379 #endif // ECC_NIST_P521
380 #if defined ECC_BN_P256 && ECC_BN_P256 == YES
381 comma
382 {TPM_ECC_BN_P256,
383 256,
384 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
385 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
386 &BN_P256}
387 # undef comma
388 # define comma ,
389 #endif // ECC_BN_P256
390 #if defined ECC_BN_P638 && ECC_BN_P638 == YES
391 comma
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392 {TPM_ECC_BN_P638,
393 638,
394 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
395 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
396 &BN_P638}
397 # undef comma
398 # define comma ,
399 #endif // ECC_BN_P638
400 #if defined ECC_SM2_P256 && ECC_SM2_P256 == YES
401 comma
402 {TPM_ECC_SM2_P256,
403 256,
404 {TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A,TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
405 {TPM_ALG_NULL,TPM_ALG_NULL},
406 &SM2_P256}
407 # undef comma
408 # define comma ,
409 #endif // ECC_SM2_P256
410 };
411 const UINT16 ECC_CURVE_COUNT = sizeof(eccCurves) / sizeof(ECC_CURVE);
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B.13.3. CpriECC.c
B.13.3.1. Includes and Defines
Need to include OsslCryptEngine.h to determine if ECC is defined for this Implementation
1 #include "OsslCryptoEngine.h"
2 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
3 #include "CpriDataEcc.h"
4 #include "CpriDataEcc.c"
B.13.3.2. Functions
B.13.3.2.1. _cpri__EccStartup()
This function is called at TPM Startup to initialize the crypto units.
In this implementation, no initialization is performed at startup but a future version may initialize the self-
test functions here.
5 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
6 _cpri__EccStartup(
7 void
8 )
9 {
10 return TRUE;
11 }
B.13.3.2.2. _cpri__GetCurveIdByIndex()
This function returns the number of the i-th implemented curve. The normal use would be to call this
function with i starting at 0. When the i is greater than or equal to the number of implemented curves,
TPM_ECC_NONE is returned.
12 LIB_EXPORT TPM_ECC_CURVE
13 _cpri__GetCurveIdByIndex(
14 UINT16 i
15 )
16 {
17 if(i >= ECC_CURVE_COUNT)
18 return TPM_ECC_NONE;
19 return eccCurves[i].curveId;
20 }
21 LIB_EXPORT UINT32
22 _cpri__EccGetCurveCount(
23 void
24 )
25 {
26 return ECC_CURVE_COUNT;
27 }
B.13.3.2.3. _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId()
This function returns a pointer to the curve data that is associated with the indicated curveId. If there is no
curve with the indicated ID, the function returns NULL.
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Return Value Meaning
NULL curve with the indicated TPM_ECC_CURVE value is not
implemented
non-NULL pointer to the curve data
28 LIB_EXPORT const ECC_CURVE *
29 _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(
30 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId // IN: the curveID
31 )
32 {
33 int i;
34 for(i = 0; i < ECC_CURVE_COUNT; i++)
35 {
36 if(eccCurves[i].curveId == curveId)
37 return &eccCurves[i];
38 }
39 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
40 }
41 static const ECC_CURVE_DATA *
42 GetCurveData(
43 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId // IN: the curveID
44 )
45 {
46 const ECC_CURVE *curve = _cpri__EccGetParametersByCurveId(curveId);
47 return curve->curveData;
48 }
B.13.3.2.4. Point2B()
This function makes a TPMS_ECC_POINT from a BIGNUM EC_POINT.
49 static BOOL
50 Point2B(
51 EC_GROUP *group, // IN: group for the point
52 TPMS_ECC_POINT *p, // OUT: receives the converted point
53 EC_POINT *ecP, // IN: the point to convert
54 INT16 size, // IN: size of the coordinates
55 BN_CTX *context // IN: working context
56 )
57 {
58 BIGNUM *bnX;
59 BIGNUM *bnY;
60
61 BN_CTX_start(context);
62 bnX = BN_CTX_get(context);
63 bnY = BN_CTX_get(context);
64
65 if( bnY == NULL
66
67 // Get the coordinate values
68 || EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, ecP, bnX, bnY, context) != 1
69
70 // Convert x
71 || (!BnTo2B(&p->x.b, bnX, size))
72
73 // Convert y
74 || (!BnTo2B(&p->y.b, bnY, size))
75 )
76 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
77
78 BN_CTX_end(context);
79 return TRUE;
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80 }
B.13.3.2.5. EccCurveInit()
This function initializes the OpenSSL() group definition structure
This function is only used within this file.
It is a fatal error if groupContext is not provided.
Return Value Meaning
NULL the TPM_ECC_CURVE is not valid
non-NULL points to a structure in groupContext static EC_GROUP *
81 static EC_GROUP *
82 EccCurveInit(
83 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the ID of the curve
84 BN_CTX *groupContext // IN: the context in which the group is to be
85 // created
86 )
87 {
88 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
89 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
90 EC_POINT *P = NULL;
91 BN_CTX *context;
92 BIGNUM *bnP;
93 BIGNUM *bnA;
94 BIGNUM *bnB;
95 BIGNUM *bnX;
96 BIGNUM *bnY;
97 BIGNUM *bnN;
98 BIGNUM *bnH;
99 int ok = FALSE;
100
101 // Context must be provided and curve selector must be valid
102 pAssert(groupContext != NULL && curveData != NULL);
103
104 context = BN_CTX_new();
105 if(context == NULL)
106 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
107
108 BN_CTX_start(context);
109 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
110 bnA = BN_CTX_get(context);
111 bnB = BN_CTX_get(context);
112 bnX = BN_CTX_get(context);
113 bnY = BN_CTX_get(context);
114 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
115 bnH = BN_CTX_get(context);
116
117 if (bnH == NULL)
118 goto Cleanup;
119
120 // Convert the number formats
121
122 BnFrom2B(bnP, curveData->p);
123 BnFrom2B(bnA, curveData->a);
124 BnFrom2B(bnB, curveData->b);
125 BnFrom2B(bnX, curveData->x);
126 BnFrom2B(bnY, curveData->y);
127 BnFrom2B(bnN, curveData->n);
128 BnFrom2B(bnH, curveData->h);
129
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130 // initialize EC group, associate a generator point and initialize the point
131 // from the parameter data
132 ok = ( (group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(bnP, bnA, bnB, groupContext)) != NULL
133 && (P = EC_POINT_new(group)) != NULL
134 && EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, bnX, bnY, groupContext)
135 && EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, bnN, bnH)
136 );
137 Cleanup:
138 if (!ok && group != NULL)
139 {
140 EC_GROUP_free(group);
141 group = NULL;
142 }
143 if(P != NULL)
144 EC_POINT_free(P);
145 BN_CTX_end(context);
146 BN_CTX_free(context);
147 return group;
148 }
B.13.3.2.6. PointFrom2B()
This function sets the coordinates of an existing BN Point from a TPMS_ECC_POINT.
149 static EC_POINT *
150 PointFrom2B(
151 EC_GROUP *group, // IN: the group for the point
152 EC_POINT *ecP, // IN: an existing BN point in the group
153 TPMS_ECC_POINT *p, // IN: the 2B coordinates of the point
154 BN_CTX *context // IN: the BIGNUM context
155 )
156 {
157 BIGNUM *bnX;
158 BIGNUM *bnY;
159
160 // If the point is not allocated then just return a NULL
161 if(ecP == NULL)
162 return NULL;
163
164 BN_CTX_start(context);
165 bnX = BN_CTX_get(context);
166 bnY = BN_CTX_get(context);
167 if( // Set the coordinates of the point
168 bnY == NULL
169 || BN_bin2bn(p->x.t.buffer, p->x.t.size, bnX) == NULL
170 || BN_bin2bn(p->y.t.buffer, p->y.t.size, bnY) == NULL
171 || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, ecP, bnX, bnY, context)
172 )
173 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
174
175 BN_CTX_end(context);
176 return ecP;
177 }
B.13.3.2.7. EccInitPoint2B()
This function allocates a point in the provided group and initializes it with the values in a
TPMS_ECC_POINT.
178 static EC_POINT *
179 EccInitPoint2B(
180 EC_GROUP *group, // IN: group for the point
181 TPMS_ECC_POINT *p, // IN: the coordinates for the point
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182 BN_CTX *context // IN: the BIGNUM context
183 )
184 {
185 EC_POINT *ecP;
186
187 BN_CTX_start(context);
188 ecP = EC_POINT_new(group);
189
190 if(PointFrom2B(group, ecP, p, context) == NULL)
191 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
192
193 BN_CTX_end(context);
194 return ecP;
195 }
B.13.3.2.8. PointMul()
This function does a point multiply and checks for the result being the point at infinity. Q = ([A]G + [B]P)
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_NO_RESULT point is at infinity
CRYPT_SUCCESS point not at infinity
196 static CRYPT_RESULT
197 PointMul(
198 EC_GROUP *group, // IN: group curve
199 EC_POINT *ecpQ, // OUT: result
200 BIGNUM *bnA, // IN: scalar for [A]G
201 EC_POINT *ecpP, // IN: point for [B]P
202 BIGNUM *bnB, // IN: scalar for [B]P
203 BN_CTX *context // IN: working context
204 )
205 {
206 if(EC_POINT_mul(group, ecpQ, bnA, ecpP, bnB, context) != 1)
207 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
208 if(EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, ecpQ))
209 return CRYPT_NO_RESULT;
210 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
211 }
B.13.3.2.9. GetRandomPrivate()
This function gets a random value (d) to use as a private ECC key and then qualifies the key so that it is
between 0 < d < n.
It is a fatal error if dOut or pIn is not provided or if the size of pIn is larger than MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
(the largest buffer size of a TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER)
212 static void
213 GetRandomPrivate(
214 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dOut, // OUT: the qualified random value
215 const TPM2B *pIn // IN: the maximum value for the key
216 )
217 {
218 int i;
219 BYTE *pb;
220
221 pAssert(pIn != NULL && dOut != NULL && pIn->size <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES);
222
223 // Set the size of the output
224 dOut->t.size = pIn->size;
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225 // Get some random bits
226 while(TRUE)
227 {
228 _cpri__GenerateRandom(dOut->t.size, dOut->t.buffer);
229 // See if the d < n
230 if(memcmp(dOut->t.buffer, pIn->buffer, pIn->size) < 0)
231 {
232 // dOut < n so make sure that 0 < dOut
233 for(pb = dOut->t.buffer, i = dOut->t.size; i > 0; i--)
234 {
235 if(*pb++ != 0)
236 return;
237 }
238 }
239 }
240 }
B.13.3.2.10. Mod2B()
Function does modular reduction of TPM2B values.
241 static CRYPT_RESULT
242 Mod2B(
243 TPM2B *x, // IN/OUT: value to reduce
244 const TPM2B *n // IN: mod
245 )
246 {
247 int compare;
248 compare = _math__uComp(x->size, x->buffer, n->size, n->buffer);
249 if(compare < 0)
250 // if x < n, then mod is x
251 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
252 if(compare == 0)
253 {
254 // if x == n then mod is 0
255 x->size = 0;
256 x->buffer[0] = 0;
257 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
258 }
259 return _math__Div(x, n, NULL, x);
260 }
B.13.3.2.11. _cpri__EccPointMultiply
This function computes 'R := [dIn]G + [uIn]QIn. Where dIn and uIn are scalars, G and QIn are points on
the specified curve and G is the default generator of the curve.
The xOut and yOut parameters are optional and may be set to NULL if not used.
It is not necessary to provide uIn if QIn is specified but one of uIn and dIn must be provided. If dIn and
QIn are specified but uIn is not provided, then R = [dIn]QIn.
If the multiply produces the point at infinity, the CRYPT_NO_RESULT is returned.
The sizes of xOut and yOut' will be set to be the size of the degree of the curve
It is a fatal error if dIn and uIn are both unspecified (NULL) or if Qin or Rout is unspecified.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS point multiplication succeeded
CRYPT_POINT the point Qin is not on the curve
CRYPT_NO_RESULT the product point is at infinity
261 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
262 _cpri__EccPointMultiply(
263 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Rout, // OUT: the product point R
264 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve to use
265 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: value to multiply against the
266 // curve generator
267 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qin, // IN: point Q
268 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *uIn // IN: scalar value for the multiplier
269 // of Q
270 )
271 {
272 BN_CTX *context;
273 BIGNUM *bnD;
274 BIGNUM *bnU;
275 EC_GROUP *group;
276 EC_POINT *R = NULL;
277 EC_POINT *Q = NULL;
278 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
279
280 // Validate that the required parameters are provided.
281 pAssert((dIn != NULL || uIn != NULL) && (Qin != NULL || dIn != NULL));
282
283 // If a point is provided for the multiply, make sure that it is on the curve
284 if(Qin != NULL && !_cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve(curveId, Qin))
285 return CRYPT_POINT;
286
287 context = BN_CTX_new();
288 if(context == NULL)
289 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
290
291 BN_CTX_start(context);
292 bnU = BN_CTX_get(context);
293 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
294 group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context);
295
296 // There should be no path for getting a bad curve ID into this function.
297 pAssert(group != NULL);
298
299 // check allocations should have worked and allocate R
300 if( bnD == NULL
301 || (R = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
302 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
303
304 // If Qin is present, create the point
305 if(Qin != NULL)
306 {
307 // Assume the size variables do not overflow. This should not happen in
308 // the contexts in which this function will be called.
309 assert2Bsize(Qin->x.t);
310 assert2Bsize(Qin->x.t);
311 Q = EccInitPoint2B(group, Qin, context);
312
313 }
314 if(dIn != NULL)
315 {
316 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
317 // the contexts that this function will be called.
318 assert2Bsize(dIn->t);
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319 BnFrom2B(bnD, &dIn->b);
320 }
321 else
322 bnD = NULL;
323
324 // If uIn is specified, initialize its BIGNUM
325 if(uIn != NULL)
326 {
327 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
328 // the contexts that this function will be called.
329 assert2Bsize(uIn->t);
330 BnFrom2B(bnU, &uIn->b);
331 }
332 // If uIn is not specified but Q is, then we are going to
333 // do R = [d]Q
334 else if(Qin != NULL)
335 {
336 bnU = bnD;
337 bnD = NULL;
338 }
339 // If neither Q nor u is specified, then null this pointer
340 else
341 bnU = NULL;
342
343 // Use the generator of the curve
344 if((retVal = PointMul(group, R, bnD, Q, bnU, context)) == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
345 Point2B(group, Rout, R, (INT16) BN_num_bytes(&group->field), context);
346
347 if (Q)
348 EC_POINT_free(Q);
349 if(R)
350 EC_POINT_free(R);
351 if(group)
352 EC_GROUP_free(group);
353 BN_CTX_end(context);
354 BN_CTX_free(context);
355 return retVal;
356 }
B.13.3.2.12. ClearPoint2B()
Initialize the size values of a point
357 static void
358 ClearPoint2B(
359 TPMS_ECC_POINT *p // IN: the point
360 )
361 {
362 if(p != NULL) {
363 p->x.t.size = 0;
364 p->y.t.size = 0;
365 }
366 }
367 #if defined TPM_ALG_ECDAA || defined TPM_ALG_SM2 //%
B.13.3.2.13. _cpri__EccCommitCompute()
This function performs the point multiply operations required by TPM2_Commit().
If B or M is provided, they must be on the curve defined by curveId. This routine does not check that they
are on the curve and results are unpredictable if they are not.
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It is a fatal error if r or d is NULL. If B is not NULL, then it is a fatal error if K and L are both NULL. If M is
not NULL, then it is a fatal error if E is NULL.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS computations completed normally
CRYPT_NO_RESULT if K, L or E was computed to be the point at infinity
CRYPT_CANCEL a cancel indication was asserted during this function
368 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
369 _cpri__EccCommitCompute(
370 TPMS_ECC_POINT *K, // OUT: [d]B or [r]Q
371 TPMS_ECC_POINT *L, // OUT: [r]B
372 TPMS_ECC_POINT *E, // OUT: [r]M
373 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computations
374 TPMS_ECC_POINT *M, // IN: M (optional)
375 TPMS_ECC_POINT *B, // IN: B (optional)
376 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *d, // IN: d (required)
377 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *r // IN: the computed r value (required)
378 )
379 {
380 BN_CTX *context;
381 BIGNUM *bnX, *bnY, *bnR, *bnD;
382 EC_GROUP *group;
383 EC_POINT *pK = NULL, *pL = NULL, *pE = NULL, *pM = NULL, *pB = NULL;
384 UINT16 keySizeInBytes;
385 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
386
387 // Validate that the required parameters are provided.
388 // Note: E has to be provided if computing E := [r]Q or E := [r]M. Will do
389 // E := [r]Q if both M and B are NULL.
390 pAssert( r != NULL && (K != NULL || B == NULL) && (L != NULL || B == NULL)
391 || (E != NULL || (M == NULL && B != NULL)));
392
393 context = BN_CTX_new();
394 if(context == NULL)
395 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
396 BN_CTX_start(context);
397 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
398 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
399 bnX = BN_CTX_get(context);
400 bnY = BN_CTX_get(context);
401 if(bnY == NULL)
402 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
403
404 // Initialize the output points in case they are not computed
405 ClearPoint2B(K);
406 ClearPoint2B(L);
407 ClearPoint2B(E);
408
409 if((group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL)
410 {
411 retVal = CRYPT_PARAMETER;
412 goto Cleanup2;
413 }
414 keySizeInBytes = (UINT16) BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
415
416 // Sizes of the r and d parameters may not be zero
417 pAssert(((int) r->t.size > 0) && ((int) d->t.size > 0));
418
419 // Convert scalars to BIGNUM
420 BnFrom2B(bnR, &r->b);
421 BnFrom2B(bnD, &d->b);
422
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423 // If B is provided, compute K=[d]B and L=[r]B
424 if(B != NULL)
425 {
426 // Allocate the points to receive the value
427 if( (pK = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL
428 || (pL = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
429 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
430 // need to compute K = [d]B
431 // Allocate and initialize BIGNUM version of B
432 pB = EccInitPoint2B(group, B, context);
433
434 // do the math for K = [d]B
435 if((retVal = PointMul(group, pK, NULL, pB, bnD, context)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
436 goto Cleanup;
437
438 // Convert BN K to TPM2B K
439 Point2B(group, K, pK, (INT16)keySizeInBytes, context);
440
441 // compute L= [r]B after checking for cancel
442 if(_plat__IsCanceled())
443 {
444 retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL;
445 goto Cleanup;
446 }
447 // compute L = [r]B
448 if((retVal = PointMul(group, pL, NULL, pB, bnR, context)) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
449 goto Cleanup;
450
451 // Convert BN L to TPM2B L
452 Point2B(group, L, pL, (INT16)keySizeInBytes, context);
453 }
454 if(M != NULL || B == NULL)
455 {
456 // if this is the third point multiply, check for cancel first
457 if(B != NULL && _plat__IsCanceled())
458 {
459 retVal = CRYPT_CANCEL;
460 goto Cleanup;
461 }
462
463 // Allocate E
464 if((pE = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
465 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
466
467 // Create BIGNUM version of M unless M is NULL
468 if(M != NULL)
469 {
470 // M provided so initialize a BIGNUM M and compute E = [r]M
471 pM = EccInitPoint2B(group, M, context);
472 retVal = PointMul(group, pE, NULL, pM, bnR, context);
473 }
474 else
475 // compute E = [r]G (this is only done if M and B are both NULL
476 retVal = PointMul(group, pE, bnR, NULL, NULL, context);
477
478 if(retVal == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
479 // Convert E to 2B format
480 Point2B(group, E, pE, (INT16)keySizeInBytes, context);
481 }
482 Cleanup:
483 EC_GROUP_free(group);
484 if(pK != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pK);
485 if(pL != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pL);
486 if(pE != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pE);
487 if(pM != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pM);
488 if(pB != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pB);
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489 Cleanup2:
490 BN_CTX_end(context);
491 BN_CTX_free(context);
492 return retVal;
493 }
494 #endif //%
B.13.3.2.14. _cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve()
This function is used to test if a point is on a defined curve. It does this by checking that y^2 mod p = x^3
+ a*x + b mod p
It is a fatal error if Q is not specified (is NULL).
Return Value Meaning
TRUE point is on curve
FALSE point is not on curve or curve is not supported
495 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
496 _cpri__EccIsPointOnCurve(
497 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve selector
498 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Q // IN: the point.
499 )
500 {
501 BN_CTX *context;
502 BIGNUM *bnX;
503 BIGNUM *bnY;
504 BIGNUM *bnA;
505 BIGNUM *bnB;
506 BIGNUM *bnP;
507 BIGNUM *bn3;
508 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
509 BOOL retVal;
510
511 pAssert(Q != NULL && curveData != NULL);
512
513 if((context = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
514 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
515 BN_CTX_start(context);
516 bnX = BN_CTX_get(context);
517 bnY = BN_CTX_get(context);
518 bnA = BN_CTX_get(context);
519 bnB = BN_CTX_get(context);
520 bn3 = BN_CTX_get(context);
521 bnP = BN_CTX_get(context);
522 if(bnP == NULL)
523 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
524
525 // Convert values
526 if ( !BN_bin2bn(Q->x.t.buffer, Q->x.t.size, bnX)
527 || !BN_bin2bn(Q->y.t.buffer, Q->y.t.size, bnY)
528 || !BN_bin2bn(curveData->p->buffer, curveData->p->size, bnP)
529 || !BN_bin2bn(curveData->a->buffer, curveData->a->size, bnA)
530 || !BN_set_word(bn3, 3)
531 || !BN_bin2bn(curveData->b->buffer, curveData->b->size, bnB)
532 )
533 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
534
535 // The following sequence is probably not optimal but it seems to be correct.
536 // compute x^3 + a*x + b mod p
537 // first, compute a*x mod p
538 if( !BN_mod_mul(bnA, bnA, bnX, bnP, context)
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539 // next, compute a*x + b mod p
540 || !BN_mod_add(bnA, bnA, bnB, bnP, context)
541 // next, compute X^3 mod p
542 || !BN_mod_exp(bnX, bnX, bn3, bnP, context)
543 // finally, compute x^3 + a*x + b mod p
544 || !BN_mod_add(bnX, bnX, bnA, bnP, context)
545 // then compute y^2
546 || !BN_mod_mul(bnY, bnY, bnY, bnP, context)
547 )
548 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
549
550 retVal = BN_cmp(bnX, bnY) == 0;
551 BN_CTX_end(context);
552 BN_CTX_free(context);
553 return retVal;
554 }
B.13.3.2.15. _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc()
This function generates an ECC key pair based on the input parameters. This routine uses KDFa() to
produce candidate numbers. The method is according to FIPS 186-3, section B.4.1 "GKey() Pair
Generation Using Extra Random Bits." According to the method in FIPS 186-3, the resulting private value
d should be 1 <= d < n where n is the order of the base point. In this implementation, the range of the
private value is further restricted to be 2^(nLen/2) <= d < n where nLen is the order of n.
EXAMPLE: If the curve is NIST-P256, then nLen is 256 bits and d will need to be between 2^128 <= d < n
It is a fatal error if Qout, dOut, or seed is not provided (is NULL).
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_PARAMETER the hash algorithm is not supported
555 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
556 _cpri__GenerateKeyEcc(
557 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qout, // OUT: the public point
558 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dOut, // OUT: the private scalar
559 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve identifier
560 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm to use in the key
561 // generation process
562 TPM2B *seed, // IN: the seed to use
563 const char *label, // IN: A label for the generation
564 // process.
565 TPM2B *extra, // IN: Party 1 data for the KDF
566 UINT32 *counter // IN/OUT: Counter value to allow KDF
567 // iteration to be propagated across
568 // multiple functions
569 )
570 {
571 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
572 INT16 keySizeInBytes;
573 UINT32 count = 0;
574 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
575 UINT16 hLen = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
576 BIGNUM *bnNm1; // Order of the curve minus one
577 BIGNUM *bnD; // the private scalar
578 BN_CTX *context; // the context for the BIGNUM values
579 BYTE withExtra[MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES + 8]; // trial key with
580 //extra bits
581 TPM2B_4_BYTE_VALUE marshaledCounter = {4, {0}};
582 UINT32 totalBits;
583
584 // Validate parameters (these are fatal)
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585 pAssert( seed != NULL && dOut != NULL && Qout != NULL && curveData != NULL);
586
587 // Non-fatal parameter checks.
588 if(hLen <= 0)
589 return CRYPT_PARAMETER;
590
591 // allocate the local BN values
592 context = BN_CTX_new();
593 if(context == NULL)
594 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
595 BN_CTX_start(context);
596 bnNm1 = BN_CTX_get(context);
597 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
598
599 // The size of the input scalars is limited by the size of the size of a
600 // TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER. Make sure that it is not irrational.
601 pAssert((int) curveData->n->size <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES);
602
603 if( bnD == NULL
604 || BN_bin2bn(curveData->n->buffer, curveData->n->size, bnNm1) == NULL
605 || (keySizeInBytes = (INT16) BN_num_bytes(bnNm1)) > MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES)
606 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
607
608 // get the total number of bits
609 totalBits = BN_num_bits(bnNm1) + 64;
610
611 // Reduce bnNm1 from 'n' to 'n' - 1
612 BN_sub_word(bnNm1, 1);
613
614 // Initialize the count value
615 if(counter != NULL)
616 count = *counter;
617 if(count == 0)
618 count = 1;
619
620 // Start search for key (should be quick)
621 for(; count != 0; count++)
622 {
623
624 UINT32_TO_BYTE_ARRAY(count, marshaledCounter.t.buffer);
625 _cpri__KDFa(hashAlg, seed, label, extra, &marshaledCounter.b,
626 totalBits, withExtra, NULL, FALSE);
627
628 // Convert the result and modular reduce
629 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
630 // the contexts that this function will be called.
631 pAssert(keySizeInBytes <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES);
632 if ( BN_bin2bn(withExtra, keySizeInBytes+8, bnD) == NULL
633 || BN_mod(bnD, bnD, bnNm1, context) != 1)
634 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
635
636 // Add one to get 0 < d < n
637 BN_add_word(bnD, 1);
638 if(BnTo2B(&dOut->b, bnD, keySizeInBytes) != 1)
639 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
640
641 // Do the point multiply to create the public portion of the key. If
642 // the multiply generates the point at infinity (unlikely), do another
643 // iteration.
644 if( (retVal = _cpri__EccPointMultiply(Qout, curveId, dOut, NULL, NULL))
645 != CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
646 break;
647 }
648
649 if(count == 0) // if counter wrapped, then the TPM should go into failure mode
650 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
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651
652 // Free up allocated BN values
653 BN_CTX_end(context);
654 BN_CTX_free(context);
655 if(counter != NULL)
656 *counter = count;
657 return retVal;
658 }
B.13.3.2.16. _cpri__GetEphemeralEcc()
This function creates an ephemeral ECC. It is ephemeral in that is expected that the private part of the
key will be discarded
659 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
660 _cpri__GetEphemeralEcc(
661 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qout, // OUT: the public point
662 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dOut, // OUT: the private scalar
663 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId // IN: the curve for the key
664 )
665 {
666 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
667 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
668
669 pAssert(curveData != NULL);
670
671 // Keep getting random values until one is found that doesn't create a point
672 // at infinity. This will never, ever, ever, ever, ever, happen but if it does
673 // we have to get a next random value.
674 while(TRUE)
675 {
676 GetRandomPrivate(dOut, curveData->p);
677
678 // _cpri__EccPointMultiply does not return CRYPT_ECC_POINT if no point is
679 // provided. CRYPT_PARAMTER should not be returned because the curve ID
680 // has to be supported. Thus the only possible error is CRYPT_NO_RESULT.
681 retVal = _cpri__EccPointMultiply(Qout, curveId, dOut, NULL, NULL);
682 if(retVal != CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
683 return retVal; // Will return CRYPT_SUCCESS
684 }
685 }
686 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDSA //%
B.13.3.2.17. SignEcdsa()
This function implements the ECDSA signing algorithm. The method is described in the comments below.
It is a fatal error if rOut, sOut, dIn, or digest are not provided.
687 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
688 SignEcdsa(
689 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rOut, // OUT: r component of the signature
690 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sOut, // OUT: s component of the signature
691 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
692 // process
693 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: the private key
694 TPM2B *digest // IN: the value to sign
695 )
696 {
697 BIGNUM *bnK;
698 BIGNUM *bnIk;
699 BIGNUM *bnN;
700 BIGNUM *bnR;
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701 BIGNUM *bnD;
702 BIGNUM *bnZ;
703 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER k;
704 TPMS_ECC_POINT R;
705 BN_CTX *context;
706 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
707 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
708
709 pAssert(rOut != NULL && sOut != NULL && dIn != NULL && digest != NULL);
710
711 context = BN_CTX_new();
712 if(context == NULL)
713 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
714 BN_CTX_start(context);
715 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
716 bnZ = BN_CTX_get(context);
717 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
718 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
719 bnIk = BN_CTX_get(context);
720 bnK = BN_CTX_get(context);
721 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
722 // the contexts that this function will be called.
723 pAssert(curveData->n->size <= MAX_ECC_PARAMETER_BYTES);
724 if( bnK == NULL
725 || BN_bin2bn(curveData->n->buffer, curveData->n->size, bnN) == NULL)
726 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
727
728 // The algorithm as described in "Suite B Implementer's Guide to FIPS 186-3(ECDSA)"
729 // 1. Use one of the routines in Appendix A.2 to generate (k, k^-1), a per-message
730 // secret number and its inverse modulo n. Since n is prime, the
731 // output will be invalid only if there is a failure in the RBG.
732 // 2. Compute the elliptic curve point R = [k]G = (xR, yR) using EC scalar
733 // multiplication (see [Routines]), where G is the base point included in
734 // the set of domain parameters.
735 // 3. Compute r = xR mod n. If r = 0, then return to Step 1. 1.
736 // 4. Use the selected hash function to compute H = Hash(M).
737 // 5. Convert the bit string H to an integer e as described in Appendix B.2.
738 // 6. Compute s = (k^-1 * (e + d * r)) mod n. If s = 0, return to Step 1.2.
739 // 7. Return (r, s).
740
741 // Generate a random value k in the range 1 <= k < n
742 // Want a K value that is the same size as the curve order
743 k.t.size = curveData->n->size;
744
745 while(TRUE) // This implements the loop at step 6. If s is zero, start over.
746 {
747 while(TRUE)
748 {
749 // Step 1 and 2 -- generate an ephemeral key and the modular inverse
750 // of the private key.
751 while(TRUE)
752 {
753 GetRandomPrivate(&k, curveData->n);
754
755 // Do the point multiply to generate a point and check to see if
756 // the point it at infinity
757 if( _cpri__EccPointMultiply(&R, curveId, &k, NULL, NULL)
758 != CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
759 break; // can only be CRYPT_SUCCESS
760 }
761
762 // x coordinate is mod p. Make it mod n
763 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen
764 // in the contexts that this function will be called.
765 assert2Bsize(R.x.t);
766 BN_bin2bn(R.x.t.buffer, R.x.t.size, bnR);
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767 BN_mod(bnR, bnR, bnN, context);
768
769 // Make sure that it is not zero;
770 if(BN_is_zero(bnR))
771 continue;
772
773 // Make sure that a modular inverse exists
774 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen
775 // in the contexts that this function will be called.
776 assert2Bsize(k.t);
777 BN_bin2bn(k.t.buffer, k.t.size, bnK);
778 if( BN_mod_inverse(bnIk, bnK, bnN, context) != NULL)
779 break;
780 }
781
782 // Set z = leftmost bits of the digest
783 // NOTE: This is implemented such that the key size needs to be
784 // an even number of bytes in length.
785 if(digest->size > curveData->n->size)
786 {
787 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen
788 // in the contexts that this function will be called.
789 pAssert(curveData->n->size <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES);
790 // digest is larger than n so truncate
791 BN_bin2bn(digest->buffer, curveData->n->size, bnZ);
792 }
793 else
794 {
795 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen
796 // in the contexts that this function will be called.
797 pAssert(digest->size <= MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
798 // digest is same or smaller than n so use it all
799 BN_bin2bn(digest->buffer, digest->size, bnZ);
800 }
801
802 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
803 // the contexts that this function will be called.
804 assert2Bsize(dIn->t);
805 if( bnZ == NULL
806
807 // need the private scalar of the signing key
808 || BN_bin2bn(dIn->t.buffer, dIn->t.size, bnD) == NULL)
809 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
810
811 // NOTE: When the result of an operation is going to be reduced mod x
812 // any modular multiplication is done so that the intermediate values
813 // don't get too large.
814 //
815 // now have inverse of K (bnIk), z (bnZ), r (bnR), d (bnD) and n (bnN)
816 // Compute s = k^-1 (z + r*d)(mod n)
817 // first do d = r*d mod n
818 if( !BN_mod_mul(bnD, bnR, bnD, bnN, context)
819
820 // d = z + r * d
821 || !BN_add(bnD, bnZ, bnD)
822
823 // d = k^(-1)(z + r * d)(mod n)
824 || !BN_mod_mul(bnD, bnIk, bnD, bnN, context)
825
826 // convert to TPM2B format
827 || !BnTo2B(&sOut->b, bnD, curveData->n->size)
828
829 // and write the modular reduced version of r
830 // NOTE: this was deferred to reduce the number of
831 // error checks.
832 || !BnTo2B(&rOut->b, bnR, curveData->n->size))
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833 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
834
835 if(!BN_is_zero(bnD))
836 break; // signature not zero so done
837
838 // if the signature value was zero, start over
839 }
840
841 // Free up allocated BN values
842 BN_CTX_end(context);
843 BN_CTX_free(context);
844 return retVal;
845 }
846 #endif //%
847 #if defined TPM_ALG_ECDAA || defined TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR //%
B.13.3.2.18. EcDaa()
This function is used to perform a modified Schnorr signature for ECDAA.
This function performs s = k + T * d mod n where
a) 'k is a random, or pseudo-random value used in the commit phase
b) T is the digest to be signed, and
c) d is a private key.
If tIn is NULL then use tOut as T
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature created
848 static CRYPT_RESULT
849 EcDaa(
850 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *tOut, // OUT: T component of the signature
851 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sOut, // OUT: s component of the signature
852 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in signing
853 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: the private key
854 TPM2B *tIn, // IN: the value to sign
855 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *kIn // IN: a random value from commit
856 )
857 {
858 BIGNUM *bnN, *bnK, *bnT, *bnD;
859 BN_CTX *context;
860 const TPM2B *n;
861 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
862 BOOL OK = TRUE;
863
864 // Parameter checks
865 pAssert( sOut != NULL && dIn != NULL && tOut != NULL
866 && kIn != NULL && curveData != NULL);
867
868 // this just saves key strokes
869 n = curveData->n;
870
871 if(tIn != NULL)
872 Copy2B(&tOut->b, tIn);
873
874 // The size of dIn and kIn input scalars is limited by the size of the size
875 // of a TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER and tIn can be no larger than a digest.
876 // Make sure they are within range.
877 pAssert( (int) dIn->t.size <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
878 && (int) kIn->t.size <= MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
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879 && (int) tOut->t.size <= MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
880 );
881
882 context = BN_CTX_new();
883 if(context == NULL)
884 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
885 BN_CTX_start(context);
886 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
887 bnK = BN_CTX_get(context);
888 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
889 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
890
891 // Check for allocation problems
892 if(bnD == NULL)
893 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
894
895 // Convert values
896 if( BN_bin2bn(n->buffer, n->size, bnN) == NULL
897 || BN_bin2bn(kIn->t.buffer, kIn->t.size, bnK) == NULL
898 || BN_bin2bn(dIn->t.buffer, dIn->t.size, bnD) == NULL
899 || BN_bin2bn(tOut->t.buffer, tOut->t.size, bnT) == NULL)
900
901 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
902 // Compute T = T mod n
903 OK = OK && BN_mod(bnT, bnT, bnN, context);
904
905 // compute (s = k + T * d mod n)
906 // d = T * d mod n
907 OK = OK && BN_mod_mul(bnD, bnT, bnD, bnN, context) == 1;
908 // d = k + T * d mod n
909 OK = OK && BN_mod_add(bnD, bnK, bnD, bnN, context) == 1;
910 // s = d
911 OK = OK && BnTo2B(&sOut->b, bnD, n->size);
912 // r = T
913 OK = OK && BnTo2B(&tOut->b, bnT, n->size);
914 if(!OK)
915 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
916
917 // Cleanup
918 BN_CTX_end(context);
919 BN_CTX_free(context);
920
921 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
922 }
923 #endif //%
924 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR //%
B.13.3.2.19. SchnorrEcc()
This function is used to perform a modified Schnorr signature.
This function will generate a random value k and compute
a) (xR, yR) = [k]G
b) r = hash(P || xR)(mod n)
c) s= k + r * ds
d) return the tuple T, s
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature created
CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg can't produce zero-length digest
925 static CRYPT_RESULT
926 SchnorrEcc(
927 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rOut, // OUT: r component of the signature
928 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sOut, // OUT: s component of the signature
929 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm used
930 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in signing
931 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: the private key
932 TPM2B *digest, // IN: the digest to sign
933 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *kIn // IN: for testing
934 )
935 {
936 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER k;
937 BIGNUM *bnR, *bnN, *bnK, *bnT, *bnD;
938 BN_CTX *context;
939 const TPM2B *n;
940 EC_POINT *pR = NULL;
941 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
942 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
943 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
944 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
945 TPM2B_TYPE(T, MAX(MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, MAX_ECC_PARAMETER_BYTES));
946 TPM2B_T T2b;
947 BOOL OK = TRUE;
948
949 // Parameter checks
950
951 // Must have a place for the 'r' and 's' parts of the signature, a private
952 // key ('d')
953 pAssert( rOut != NULL && sOut != NULL && dIn != NULL
954 && digest != NULL && curveData != NULL);
955
956 // to save key strokes
957 n = curveData->n;
958
959 // If the digest does not produce a hash, then null the signature and return
960 // a failure.
961 if(digestSize == 0)
962 {
963 rOut->t.size = 0;
964 sOut->t.size = 0;
965 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
966 }
967
968 // Allocate big number values
969 context = BN_CTX_new();
970 if(context == NULL)
971 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
972 BN_CTX_start(context);
973 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
974 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
975 bnK = BN_CTX_get(context);
976 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
977 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
978 if( bnD == NULL
979 // initialize the group parameters
980 || (group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL
981 // allocate a local point
982 || (pR = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL
983 )
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984 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
985
986 if(BN_bin2bn(curveData->n->buffer, curveData->n->size, bnN) == NULL)
987 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
988
989 while(OK)
990 {
991 // a) set k to a random value such that 1 k n-1
992 if(kIn != NULL)
993 {
994 Copy2B(&k.b, &kIn->b); // copy input k if testing
995 OK = FALSE; // not OK to loop
996 }
997 else
998 // If get a random value in the correct range
999 GetRandomPrivate(&k, n);
1000
1001 // Convert 'k' and generate pR = ['k']G
1002 BnFrom2B(bnK, &k.b);
1003
1004 // b) compute E (xE, yE) [k]G
1005 if(PointMul(group, pR, bnK, NULL, NULL, context) == CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
1006 // c) if E is the point at infinity, go to a)
1007 continue;
1008
1009 // d) compute e xE (mod n)
1010 // Get the x coordinate of the point
1011 EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pR, bnR, NULL, context);
1012
1013 // make (mod n)
1014 BN_mod(bnR, bnR, bnN, context);
1015
1016 // e) if e is zero, go to a)
1017 if(BN_is_zero(bnR))
1018 continue;
1019
1020 // Convert xR to a string (use T as a temp)
1021 BnTo2B(&T2b.b, bnR, (UINT16)(BN_num_bits(bnR)+7)/8);
1022
1023 // f) compute r HschemeHash(P || e) (mod n)
1024 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
1025 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, digest->size, digest->buffer);
1026 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, T2b.t.size, T2b.t.buffer);
1027 if(_cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, digestSize, T2b.b.buffer) != digestSize)
1028 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1029 T2b.t.size = digestSize;
1030 BnFrom2B(bnT, &T2b.b);
1031 BN_div(NULL, bnT, bnT, bnN, context);
1032 BnTo2B(&rOut->b, bnT, (UINT16)BN_num_bytes(bnT));
1033
1034 // We have a value and we are going to exit the loop successfully
1035 OK = TRUE;
1036 break;
1037 }
1038 // Cleanup
1039 EC_POINT_free(pR);
1040 EC_GROUP_free(group);
1041 BN_CTX_end(context);
1042 BN_CTX_free(context);
1043
1044 // If we have a value, finish the signature
1045 if(OK)
1046 return EcDaa(rOut, sOut, curveId, dIn, NULL, &k);
1047 else
1048 return CRYPT_NO_RESULT;
1049 }
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1050 #endif //%
1051 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2 //%
1052 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG //%
1053 static int
1054 cmp_bn2hex(
1055 BIGNUM *bn, // IN: big number value
1056 const char *c // IN: character string number
1057 )
1058 {
1059 int result;
1060 BIGNUM *bnC = BN_new();
1061 pAssert(bnC != NULL);
1062
1063 BN_hex2bn(&bnC, c);
1064 result = BN_ucmp(bn, bnC);
1065 BN_free(bnC);
1066 return result;
1067 }
1068 static int
1069 cmp_2B2hex(
1070 TPM2B *a, // IN: TPM2B number to compare
1071 const char *c // IN: character string
1072 )
1073 {
1074 int result;
1075 int sl = strlen(c);
1076 BIGNUM *bnA;
1077
1078 result = (a->size * 2) - sl;
1079 if(result != 0)
1080 return result;
1081 pAssert((bnA = BN_bin2bn(a->buffer, a->size, NULL)) != NULL);
1082 result = cmp_bn2hex(bnA, c);
1083 BN_free(bnA);
1084 return result;
1085 }
1086 static void
1087 cpy_hexTo2B(
1088 TPM2B *b, // OUT: receives value
1089 const char *c // IN: source string
1090 )
1091 {
1092 BIGNUM *bnB = BN_new();
1093 pAssert((strlen(c) & 1) == 0); // must have an even number of digits
1094 b->size = strlen(c) / 2;
1095 BN_hex2bn(&bnB, c);
1096 pAssert(bnB != NULL);
1097 BnTo2B(b, bnB, b->size);
1098 BN_free(bnB);
1099
1100 }
1101 #endif //% _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
B.13.3.2.20. SignSM2()
This function signs a digest using the method defined in SM2 Part 2. The method in the standard will add
a header to the message to be signed that is a hash of the values that define the key. This then hashed
with the message to produce a digest (e) that is signed. This function signs e.
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 499
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS sign worked
1102 static CRYPT_RESULT
1103 SignSM2(
1104 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rOut, // OUT: r component of the signature
1105 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sOut, // OUT: s component of the signature
1106 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in signing
1107 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: the private key
1108 TPM2B *digest // IN: the digest to sign
1109 )
1110 {
1111 BIGNUM *bnR;
1112 BIGNUM *bnS;
1113 BIGNUM *bnN;
1114 BIGNUM *bnK;
1115 BIGNUM *bnX1;
1116 BIGNUM *bnD;
1117 BIGNUM *bnT; // temp
1118 BIGNUM *bnE;
1119
1120 BN_CTX *context;
1121 TPM2B_TYPE(DIGEST, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
1122 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER k;
1123 TPMS_ECC_POINT p2Br;
1124 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1125
1126 pAssert(curveData != NULL);
1127 context = BN_CTX_new();
1128 BN_CTX_start(context);
1129 bnK = BN_CTX_get(context);
1130 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
1131 bnS = BN_CTX_get(context);
1132 bnX1 = BN_CTX_get(context);
1133 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
1134 bnD = BN_CTX_get(context);
1135 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
1136 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
1137 if(bnE == NULL)
1138 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1139
1140 BnFrom2B(bnE, digest);
1141 BnFrom2B(bnN, curveData->n);
1142 BnFrom2B(bnD, &dIn->b);
1143
1144 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1145 BN_hex2bn(&bnE, "B524F552CD82B8B028476E005C377FB19A87E6FC682D48BB5D42E3D9B9EFFE76");
1146 BN_hex2bn(&bnD, "128B2FA8BD433C6C068C8D803DFF79792A519A55171B1B650C23661D15897263");
1147 #endif
1148 // A3: Use random number generator to generate random number 1 <= k <= n-1;
1149 // NOTE: Ax: numbers are from the SM2 standard
1150 k.t.size = curveData->n->size;
1151 loop:
1152 {
1153 // Get a random number
1154 _cpri__GenerateRandom(k.t.size, k.t.buffer);
1155
1156 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1157 BN_hex2bn(&bnK, "6CB28D99385C175C94F94E934817663FC176D925DD72B727260DBAAE1FB2F96F");
1158 BnTo2B(&k.b,bnK, 32);
1159 k.t.size = 32;
1160 #endif
1161 //make sure that the number is 0 < k < n
1162 BnFrom2B(bnK, &k.b);
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1163 if( BN_ucmp(bnK, bnN) >= 0
1164 || BN_is_zero(bnK))
1165 goto loop;
1166
1167 // A4: Figure out the point of elliptic curve (x1, y1)=[k]G, and according
1168 // to details specified in 4.2.7 in Part 1 of this document, transform the
1169 // data type of x1 into an integer;
1170 if( _cpri__EccPointMultiply(&p2Br, curveId, &k, NULL, NULL)
1171 == CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
1172 goto loop;
1173
1174 BnFrom2B(bnX1, &p2Br.x.b);
1175
1176 // A5: Figure out r = (e + x1) mod n,
1177 if(!BN_mod_add(bnR, bnE, bnX1, bnN, context))
1178 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1179 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1180 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnR,
1181 "40F1EC59F793D9F49E09DCEF49130D4194F79FB1EED2CAA55BACDB49C4E755D1")
1182 == 0);
1183 #endif
1184
1185 // if r=0 or r+k=n, return to A3;
1186 if(!BN_add(bnT, bnK, bnR))
1187 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1188
1189 if(BN_is_zero(bnR) || BN_ucmp(bnT, bnN) == 0)
1190 goto loop;
1191
1192 // A6: Figure out s = ((1 + dA)^-1 (k - r dA)) mod n, if s=0, return to A3;
1193 // compute t = (1+d)-1
1194 BN_copy(bnT, bnD);
1195 if( !BN_add_word(bnT, 1)
1196 || !BN_mod_inverse(bnT, bnT, bnN, context) // (1 + dA)^-1 mod n
1197 )
1198 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1199 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1200 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnT,
1201 "79BFCF3052C80DA7B939E0C6914A18CBB2D96D8555256E83122743A7D4F5F956")
1202 == 0);
1203 #endif
1204 // compute s = t * (k - r * dA) mod n
1205 if( !BN_mod_mul(bnS, bnD, bnR, bnN, context) // (r * dA) mod n
1206 || !BN_mod_sub(bnS, bnK, bnS, bnN, context) // (k - (r * dA) mod n
1207 || !BN_mod_mul(bnS, bnT, bnS, bnN, context))// t * (k - (r * dA) mod n
1208 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1209 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1210 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnS,
1211 "6FC6DAC32C5D5CF10C77DFB20F7C2EB667A457872FB09EC56327A67EC7DEEBE7")
1212 == 0);
1213 #endif
1214
1215 if(BN_is_zero(bnS))
1216 goto loop;
1217 }
1218
1219 // A7: According to details specified in 4.2.1 in Part 1 of this document, transform
1220 // the data type of r, s into bit strings, signature of message M is (r, s).
1221
1222 BnTo2B(&rOut->b, bnR, curveData->n->size);
1223 BnTo2B(&sOut->b, bnS, curveData->n->size);
1224 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1225 pAssert(cmp_2B2hex(&rOut->b,
1226 "40F1EC59F793D9F49E09DCEF49130D4194F79FB1EED2CAA55BACDB49C4E755D1")
1227 == 0);
1228 pAssert(cmp_2B2hex(&sOut->b,
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1229 "6FC6DAC32C5D5CF10C77DFB20F7C2EB667A457872FB09EC56327A67EC7DEEBE7")
1230 == 0);
1231 #endif
1232 BN_CTX_end(context);
1233 BN_CTX_free(context);
1234 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
1235 }
1236 #endif //% TPM_ALG_SM2
B.13.3.2.21. _cpri__SignEcc()
This function is the dispatch function for the various ECC-based signing schemes.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SCHEME scheme is not supported
1237 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
1238 _cpri__SignEcc(
1239 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rOut, // OUT: r component of the signature
1240 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sOut, // OUT: s component of the signature
1241 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme selector
1242 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the hash algorithm if need
1243 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
1244 // process
1245 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dIn, // IN: the private key
1246 TPM2B *digest, // IN: the digest to sign
1247 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *kIn // IN: k for input
1248 )
1249 {
1250 switch (scheme)
1251 {
1252 case TPM_ALG_ECDSA:
1253 // SignEcdsa always works
1254 return SignEcdsa(rOut, sOut, curveId, dIn, digest);
1255 break;
1256 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDAA
1257 case TPM_ALG_ECDAA:
1258 if(rOut != NULL)
1259 rOut->b.size = 0;
1260 return EcDaa(rOut, sOut, curveId, dIn, digest, kIn);
1261 break;
1262 #endif
1263 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR
1264 case TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR:
1265 return SchnorrEcc(rOut, sOut, hashAlg, curveId, dIn, digest, kIn);
1266 break;
1267 #endif
1268 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2
1269 case TPM_ALG_SM2:
1270 return SignSM2(rOut, sOut, curveId, dIn, digest);
1271 break;
1272 #endif
1273 default:
1274 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
1275 }
1276 }
1277 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECDSA //%
B.13.3.2.22. ValidateSignatureEcdsa()
This function validates an ECDSA signature. rIn and sIn shoudl have been checked to make sure that
they are not zero.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature valid
CRYPT_FAIL signature not valid
1278 static CRYPT_RESULT
1279 ValidateSignatureEcdsa(
1280 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rIn, // IN: r component of the signature
1281 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sIn, // IN: s component of the signature
1282 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
1283 // process
1284 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qin, // IN: the public point of the key
1285 TPM2B *digest // IN: the digest that was signed
1286 )
1287 {
1288 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER U1;
1289 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER U2;
1290 TPMS_ECC_POINT R;
1291 const TPM2B *n;
1292 BN_CTX *context;
1293 EC_POINT *pQ = NULL;
1294 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
1295 BIGNUM *bnU1;
1296 BIGNUM *bnU2;
1297 BIGNUM *bnR;
1298 BIGNUM *bnS;
1299 BIGNUM *bnW;
1300 BIGNUM *bnV;
1301 BIGNUM *bnN;
1302 BIGNUM *bnE;
1303 BIGNUM *bnGx;
1304 BIGNUM *bnGy;
1305 BIGNUM *bnQx;
1306 BIGNUM *bnQy;
1307 CRYPT_RESULT retVal = CRYPT_FAIL;
1308 int t;
1309
1310 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1311
1312 // The curve selector should have been filtered by the unmarshaling process
1313 pAssert (curveData != NULL);
1314 n = curveData->n;
1315
1316 // 1. If r and s are not both integers in the interval [1, n - 1], output
1317 // INVALID.
1318 // rIn and sIn are known to be greater than zero (was checked by the caller).
1319 if( _math__uComp(rIn->t.size, rIn->t.buffer, n->size, n->buffer) >= 0
1320 || _math__uComp(sIn->t.size, sIn->t.buffer, n->size, n->buffer) >= 0
1321 )
1322 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1323
1324 context = BN_CTX_new();
1325 if(context == NULL)
1326 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1327 BN_CTX_start(context);
1328 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
1329 bnS = BN_CTX_get(context);
1330 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
1331 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
1332 bnV = BN_CTX_get(context);
1333 bnW = BN_CTX_get(context);
1334 bnGx = BN_CTX_get(context);
1335 bnGy = BN_CTX_get(context);
1336 bnQx = BN_CTX_get(context);
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1337 bnQy = BN_CTX_get(context);
1338 bnU1 = BN_CTX_get(context);
1339 bnU2 = BN_CTX_get(context);
1340
1341 // Assume the size variables do not overflow, which should not happen in
1342 // the contexts that this function will be called.
1343 assert2Bsize(Qin->x.t);
1344 assert2Bsize(rIn->t);
1345 assert2Bsize(sIn->t);
1346
1347 // BN_CTX_get() is sticky so only need to check the last value to know that
1348 // all worked.
1349 if( bnU2 == NULL
1350
1351 // initialize the group parameters
1352 || (group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL
1353
1354 // allocate a local point
1355 || (pQ = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL
1356
1357 // use the public key values (QxIn and QyIn) to initialize Q
1358 || BN_bin2bn(Qin->x.t.buffer, Qin->x.t.size, bnQx) == NULL
1359 || BN_bin2bn(Qin->x.t.buffer, Qin->x.t.size, bnQy) == NULL
1360 || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pQ, bnQx, bnQy, context)
1361
1362 // convert the signature values
1363 || BN_bin2bn(rIn->t.buffer, rIn->t.size, bnR) == NULL
1364 || BN_bin2bn(sIn->t.buffer, sIn->t.size, bnS) == NULL
1365
1366 // convert the curve order
1367 || BN_bin2bn(curveData->n->buffer, curveData->n->size, bnN) == NULL)
1368 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1369
1370 // 2. Use the selected hash function to compute H0 = Hash(M0).
1371 // This is an input parameter
1372
1373 // 3. Convert the bit string H0 to an integer e as described in Appendix B.2.
1374 t = (digest->size > rIn->t.size) ? rIn->t.size : digest->size;
1375 if(BN_bin2bn(digest->buffer, t, bnE) == NULL)
1376 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1377
1378 // 4. Compute w = (s')^-1 mod n, using the routine in Appendix B.1.
1379 if (BN_mod_inverse(bnW, bnS, bnN, context) == NULL)
1380 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1381
1382 // 5. Compute u1 = (e' * w) mod n, and compute u2 = (r' * w) mod n.
1383 if( !BN_mod_mul(bnU1, bnE, bnW, bnN, context)
1384 || !BN_mod_mul(bnU2, bnR, bnW, bnN, context))
1385 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1386
1387 BnTo2B(&U1.b, bnU1, (INT16) BN_num_bytes(bnU1));
1388 BnTo2B(&U2.b, bnU2, (INT16) BN_num_bytes(bnU2));
1389
1390 // 6. Compute the elliptic curve point R = (xR, yR) = u1G+u2Q, using EC
1391 // scalar multiplication and EC addition (see [Routines]). If R is equal to
1392 // the point at infinity O, output INVALID.
1393 if(_cpri__EccPointMultiply(&R, curveId, &U1, Qin, &U2) == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1394 {
1395 // 7. Compute v = Rx mod n.
1396 if( BN_bin2bn(R.x.t.buffer, R.x.t.size, bnV) == NULL
1397 || !BN_mod(bnV, bnV, bnN, context))
1398 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1399
1400 // 8. Compare v and r0. If v = r0, output VALID; otherwise, output INVALID
1401 if(BN_cmp(bnV, bnR) == 0)
1402 retVal = CRYPT_SUCCESS;
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1403 }
1404
1405 if(pQ != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQ);
1406 if(group != NULL) EC_GROUP_free(group);
1407 BN_CTX_end(context);
1408 BN_CTX_free(context);
1409
1410 return retVal;
1411 }
1412 #endif //% TPM_ALG_ECDSA
1413 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR //%
B.13.3.2.23. ValidateSignatureEcSchnorr()
This function is used to validate an EC Schnorr signature. rIn and sIn are required to be greater than
zero. This is checked in _cpri__ValidateSignatureEcc().
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature valid
CRYPT_FAIL signature not valid
CRYPT_SCHEME hashAlg is not supported
1414 static CRYPT_RESULT
1415 ValidateSignatureEcSchnorr(
1416 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rIn, // IN: r component of the signature
1417 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sIn, // IN: s component of the signature
1418 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: hash algorithm of the signature
1419 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
1420 // process
1421 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qin, // IN: the public point of the key
1422 TPM2B *digest // IN: the digest that was signed
1423 )
1424 {
1425 TPMS_ECC_POINT pE;
1426 const TPM2B *n;
1427 CPRI_HASH_STATE hashState;
1428 TPM2B_DIGEST rPrime;
1429 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER minusR;
1430 UINT16 digestSize = _cpri__GetDigestSize(hashAlg);
1431 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1432
1433 // The curve parameter should have been filtered by unmarshaling code
1434 pAssert(curveData != NULL);
1435
1436 if(digestSize == 0)
1437 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
1438
1439 // Input parameter validation
1440 pAssert(rIn != NULL && sIn != NULL && Qin != NULL && digest != NULL);
1441
1442 n = curveData->n;
1443
1444 // if sIn or rIn are not between 1 and N-1, signature check fails
1445 // sIn and rIn were verified to be non-zero by the caller
1446 if( _math__uComp(sIn->b.size, sIn->b.buffer, n->size, n->buffer) >= 0
1447 || _math__uComp(rIn->b.size, rIn->b.buffer, n->size, n->buffer) >= 0
1448 )
1449 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1450
1451 //E = [s]InG - [r]InQ
1452 _math__sub(n->size, n->buffer,
1453 rIn->t.size, rIn->t.buffer,
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1454 &minusR.t.size, minusR.t.buffer);
1455 if(_cpri__EccPointMultiply(&pE, curveId, sIn, Qin, &minusR) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1456 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1457
1458 // Ex = Ex mod N
1459 if(Mod2B(&pE.x.b, n) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1460 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1461
1462 _math__Normalize2B(&pE.x.b);
1463
1464 // rPrime = h(digest || pE.x) mod n;
1465 _cpri__StartHash(hashAlg, FALSE, &hashState);
1466 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, digest->size, digest->buffer);
1467 _cpri__UpdateHash(&hashState, pE.x.t.size, pE.x.t.buffer);
1468 if(_cpri__CompleteHash(&hashState, digestSize, rPrime.t.buffer) != digestSize)
1469 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1470
1471 rPrime.t.size = digestSize;
1472
1473 // rPrime = rPrime (mod n)
1474 if(Mod2B(&rPrime.b, n) != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1475 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1476
1477 // if the values don't match, then the signature is bad
1478 if(_math__uComp(rIn->t.size, rIn->t.buffer,
1479 rPrime.t.size, rPrime.t.buffer) != 0)
1480 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1481 else
1482 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
1483 }
1484 #endif //% TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR
1485 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2 //%
B.13.3.2.24. ValidateSignatueSM2Dsa()
This function is used to validate an SM2 signature.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature valid
CRYPT_FAIL signature not valid
1486 static CRYPT_RESULT
1487 ValidateSignatureSM2Dsa(
1488 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rIn, // IN: r component of the signature
1489 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sIn, // IN: s component of the signature
1490 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
1491 // process
1492 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qin, // IN: the public point of the key
1493 TPM2B *digest // IN: the digest that was signed
1494 )
1495 {
1496 BIGNUM *bnR;
1497 BIGNUM *bnRp;
1498 BIGNUM *bnT;
1499 BIGNUM *bnS;
1500 BIGNUM *bnE;
1501 EC_POINT *pQ;
1502 BN_CTX *context;
1503 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
1504 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1505 BOOL fail = FALSE;
1506
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1507 if((context = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || curveData == NULL)
1508 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1509 bnR = BN_CTX_get(context);
1510 bnRp= BN_CTX_get(context);
1511 bnE = BN_CTX_get(context);
1512 bnT = BN_CTX_get(context);
1513 bnS = BN_CTX_get(context);
1514 if( bnS == NULL
1515 || (group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL)
1516 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1517
1518 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1519 cpy_hexTo2B(&Qin->x.b,
1520 "0AE4C7798AA0F119471BEE11825BE46202BB79E2A5844495E97C04FF4DF2548A");
1521 cpy_hexTo2B(&Qin->y.b,
1522 "7C0240F88F1CD4E16352A73C17B7F16F07353E53A176D684A9FE0C6BB798E857");
1523 cpy_hexTo2B(digest,
1524 "B524F552CD82B8B028476E005C377FB19A87E6FC682D48BB5D42E3D9B9EFFE76");
1525 #endif
1526 pQ = EccInitPoint2B(group, Qin, context);
1527
1528 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1529 pAssert(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pQ, bnT, bnS, context));
1530 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnT,
1531 "0AE4C7798AA0F119471BEE11825BE46202BB79E2A5844495E97C04FF4DF2548A")
1532 == 0);
1533 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnS,
1534 "7C0240F88F1CD4E16352A73C17B7F16F07353E53A176D684A9FE0C6BB798E857")
1535 == 0);
1536 #endif
1537
1538 BnFrom2B(bnR, &rIn->b);
1539 BnFrom2B(bnS, &sIn->b);
1540 BnFrom2B(bnE, digest);
1541
1542 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1543 // Make sure that the input signature is the test signature
1544 pAssert(cmp_2B2hex(&rIn->b,
1545 "40F1EC59F793D9F49E09DCEF49130D4194F79FB1EED2CAA55BACDB49C4E755D1") == 0);
1546 pAssert(cmp_2B2hex(&sIn->b,
1547 "6FC6DAC32C5D5CF10C77DFB20F7C2EB667A457872FB09EC56327A67EC7DEEBE7") == 0);
1548 #endif
1549
1550 // a) verify that r and s are in the inclusive interval 1 to (n 1)
1551 fail = (BN_ucmp(bnR, &group->order) >= 0);
1552
1553 fail = (BN_ucmp(bnS, &group->order) >= 0) || fail;
1554 if(fail)
1555 // There is no reason to continue. Since r and s are inputs from the caller,
1556 // they can know that the values are not in the proper range. So, exiting here
1557 // does not disclose any information.
1558 goto Cleanup;
1559
1560 // b) compute t := (r + s) mod n
1561 if(!BN_mod_add(bnT, bnR, bnS, &group->order, context))
1562 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1563 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1564 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnT,
1565 "2B75F07ED7ECE7CCC1C8986B991F441AD324D6D619FE06DD63ED32E0C997C801")
1566 == 0);
1567 #endif
1568
1569 // c) verify that t > 0
1570 if(BN_is_zero(bnT)) {
1571 fail = TRUE;
1572 // set to a value that should allow rest of the computations to run without
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1573 // trouble
1574 BN_copy(bnT, bnS);
1575 }
1576 // d) compute (x, y) := [s]G + [t]Q
1577 if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, pQ, bnS, pQ, bnT, context))
1578 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1579 // Get the x coordinate of the point
1580 if(!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pQ, bnT, NULL, context))
1581 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1582
1583 #ifdef _SM2_SIGN_DEBUG
1584 pAssert(cmp_bn2hex(bnT,
1585 "110FCDA57615705D5E7B9324AC4B856D23E6D9188B2AE47759514657CE25D112")
1586 == 0);
1587 #endif
1588
1589 // e) compute r' := (e + x) mod n (the x coordinate is in bnT)
1590 if(!BN_mod_add(bnRp, bnE, bnT, &group->order, context))
1591 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1592
1593 // f) verify that r' = r
1594 fail = BN_ucmp(bnR, bnRp) != 0 || fail;
1595
1596 Cleanup:
1597 if(pQ) EC_POINT_free(pQ);
1598 if(group) EC_GROUP_free(group);
1599 BN_CTX_end(context);
1600 BN_CTX_free(context);
1601
1602 if(fail)
1603 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1604 else
1605 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
1606 }
1607 #endif //% TPM_ALG_SM2
B.13.3.2.25. _cpri__ValidateSignatureEcc()
This function validates
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS signature is valid
CRYPT_FAIL not a valid signature
CRYPT_SCHEME unsupported scheme
1608 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
1609 _cpri__ValidateSignatureEcc(
1610 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *rIn, // IN: r component of the signature
1611 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *sIn, // IN: s component of the signature
1612 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the scheme selector
1613 TPM_ALG_ID hashAlg, // IN: the hash algorithm used (not used
1614 // in all schemes)
1615 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve used in the signature
1616 // process
1617 TPMS_ECC_POINT *Qin, // IN: the public point of the key
1618 TPM2B *digest // IN: the digest that was signed
1619 )
1620 {
1621 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1622
1623 // return failure if either part of the signature is zero
1624 if(_math__Normalize2B(&rIn->b) == 0 || _math__Normalize2B(&sIn->b) == 0)
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1625 return CRYPT_FAIL;
1626
1627 switch (scheme)
1628 {
1629 case TPM_ALG_ECDSA:
1630 retVal = ValidateSignatureEcdsa(rIn, sIn, curveId, Qin, digest);
1631 break;
1632
1633 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR
1634 case TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR:
1635 retVal = ValidateSignatureEcSchnorr(rIn, sIn, hashAlg, curveId, Qin,
1636 digest);
1637 break;
1638 #endif
1639
1640 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2
1641 case TPM_ALG_SM2:
1642 retVal = ValidateSignatureSM2Dsa(rIn, sIn, curveId, Qin, digest);
1643 #endif
1644 default:
1645 retVal = CRYPT_SCHEME;
1646 break;
1647 }
1648 return retVal;
1649 }
1650 #if CC_ZGen_2Phase == YES //%
1651 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECMQV
B.13.3.2.26. avf1()
This function does the associated value computation required by MQV key exchange. Process:
a) Convert xQ to an integer xqi using the convention specified in Appendix C.3.
b) Calculate xqm = xqi mod 2^ceil(f/2) (where f = ceil(log2(n)).
c) Calculate the associate value function avf(Q) = xqm + 2ceil(f / 2)
1652 static BOOL
1653 avf1(
1654 BIGNUM *bnX, // IN/OUT: the reduced value
1655 BIGNUM *bnN // IN: the order of the curve
1656 )
1657 {
1658 // compute f = 2^(ceil(ceil(log2(n)) / 2))
1659 int f = (BN_num_bits(bnN) + 1) / 2;
1660 // x' = 2^f + (x mod 2^f)
1661 BN_mask_bits(bnX, f); // This is mod 2*2^f but it doesn't matter because
1662 // the next operation will SET the extra bit anyway
1663 BN_set_bit(bnX, f);
1664 return TRUE;
1665 }
B.13.3.2.27. C_2_2_MQV()
This function performs the key exchange defined in SP800-56A 6.1.1.4 Full MQV, C(2, 2, ECC MQV).
CAUTION: Implementation of this function may require use of essential claims in patents not owned by
TCG members.
Points QsB() and QeB() are required to be on the curve of inQsA. The function will fail, possibly
catastrophically, if this is not the case.
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Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS results is valid
CRYPT_NO_RESULT the value for dsA does not give a valid point on the curve
1666 static CRYPT_RESULT
1667 C_2_2_MQV(
1668 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ, // OUT: the computed point
1669 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computations
1670 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dsA, // IN: static private TPM key
1671 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *deA, // IN: ephemeral private TPM key
1672 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QsB, // IN: static public party B key
1673 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QeB // IN: ephemeral public party B key
1674 )
1675 {
1676 BN_CTX *context;
1677 EC_POINT *pQeA = NULL;
1678 EC_POINT *pQeB = NULL;
1679 EC_POINT *pQsB = NULL;
1680 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
1681 BIGNUM *bnTa;
1682 BIGNUM *bnDeA;
1683 BIGNUM *bnDsA;
1684 BIGNUM *bnXeA; // x coordinate of ephemeral party A key
1685 BIGNUM *bnH;
1686 BIGNUM *bnN;
1687 BIGNUM *bnXeB;
1688 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1689 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1690
1691 pAssert( curveData != NULL && outZ != NULL && dsA != NULL
1692 && deA != NULL && QsB != NULL && QeB != NULL);
1693
1694 context = BN_CTX_new();
1695 if(context == NULL || curveData == NULL)
1696 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1697 BN_CTX_start(context);
1698 bnTa = BN_CTX_get(context);
1699 bnDeA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1700 bnDsA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1701 bnXeA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1702 bnH = BN_CTX_get(context);
1703 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
1704 bnXeB = BN_CTX_get(context);
1705 if(bnXeB == NULL)
1706 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1707
1708 // Process:
1709 // 1. implicitsigA = (de,A + avf(Qe,A)ds,A ) mod n.
1710 // 2. P = h(implicitsigA)(Qe,B + avf(Qe,B)Qs,B).
1711 // 3. If P = O, output an error indicator.
1712 // 4. Z=xP, where xP is the x-coordinate of P.
1713
1714 // Initialize group parameters and local values of input
1715 if((group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL)
1716 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1717
1718 if((pQeA = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
1719 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1720
1721 BnFrom2B(bnDeA, &deA->b);
1722 BnFrom2B(bnDsA, &dsA->b);
1723 BnFrom2B(bnH, curveData->h);
1724 BnFrom2B(bnN, curveData->n);
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1725 BnFrom2B(bnXeB, &QeB->x.b);
1726 pQeB = EccInitPoint2B(group, QeB, context);
1727 pQsB = EccInitPoint2B(group, QsB, context);
1728
1729 // Compute the public ephemeral key pQeA = [de,A]G
1730 if( (retVal = PointMul(group, pQeA, bnDeA, NULL, NULL, context))
1731 != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1732 goto Cleanup;
1733
1734 if(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pQeA, bnXeA, NULL, context) != 1)
1735 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1736
1737 // 1. implicitsigA = (de,A + avf(Qe,A)ds,A ) mod n.
1738 // tA := (ds,A + de,A avf(Xe,A)) mod n (3)
1739 // Compute 'tA' = ('deA' + 'dsA' avf('XeA')) mod n
1740 // Ta = avf(XeA);
1741 BN_copy(bnTa, bnXeA);
1742 avf1(bnTa, bnN);
1743 if(// do Ta = ds,A * Ta mod n = dsA * avf(XeA) mod n
1744 !BN_mod_mul(bnTa, bnDsA, bnTa, bnN, context)
1745
1746 // now Ta = deA + Ta mod n = deA + dsA * avf(XeA) mod n
1747 || !BN_mod_add(bnTa, bnDeA, bnTa, bnN, context)
1748 )
1749 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1750
1751 // 2. P = h(implicitsigA)(Qe,B + avf(Qe,B)Qs,B).
1752 // Put this in because almost every case of h is == 1 so skip the call when
1753 // not necessary.
1754 if(!BN_is_one(bnH))
1755 {
1756 // Cofactor is not 1 so compute Ta := Ta * h mod n
1757 if(!BN_mul(bnTa, bnTa, bnH, context))
1758 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1759 }
1760
1761 // Now that 'tA' is (h * 'tA' mod n)
1762 // 'outZ' = (tA)(Qe,B + avf(Qe,B)Qs,B).
1763
1764 // first, compute XeB = avf(XeB)
1765 avf1(bnXeB, bnN);
1766
1767 // QsB := [XeB]QsB
1768 if( !EC_POINT_mul(group, pQsB, NULL, pQsB, bnXeB, context)
1769
1770 // QeB := QsB + QeB
1771 || !EC_POINT_add(group, pQeB, pQeB, pQsB, context)
1772 )
1773 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1774
1775 // QeB := [tA]QeB = [tA](QsB + [Xe,B]QeB) and check for at infinity
1776 if(PointMul(group, pQeB, NULL, pQeB, bnTa, context) == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1777 // Convert BIGNUM E to TPM2B E
1778 Point2B(group, outZ, pQeB, (INT16)BN_num_bytes(bnN), context);
1779
1780 Cleanup:
1781 if(pQeA != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQeA);
1782 if(pQeB != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQeB);
1783 if(pQsB != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQsB);
1784 if(group != NULL) EC_GROUP_free(group);
1785 BN_CTX_end(context);
1786 BN_CTX_free(context);
1787
1788 return retVal;
1789
1790 }
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1791 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECMQV
1792 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2 //%
B.13.3.2.28. avfSm2()
This function does the associated value computation required by SM2 key exchange. This is different
form the avf() in the international standards because it returns a value that is half the size of the value
returned by the standard avf. For example, if n is 15, Ws (w in the standard) is 2 but the W here is 1. This
means that an input value of 14 (1110b) would return a value of 110b with the standard but 10b with the
scheme in SM2.
1793 static BOOL
1794 avfSm2(
1795 BIGNUM *bnX, // IN/OUT: the reduced value
1796 BIGNUM *bnN // IN: the order of the curve
1797 )
1798 {
1799 // a) set w := ceil(ceil(log2(n)) / 2) - 1
1800 int w = ((BN_num_bits(bnN) + 1) / 2) - 1;
1801
1802 // b) set x' := 2^w + ( x & (2^w - 1))
1803 // This is just like the avf for MQV where x' = 2^w + (x mod 2^w)
1804 BN_mask_bits(bnX, w); // as wiht avf1, this is too big by a factor of 2 but
1805 // it doesn't matter becasue we SET the extra bit anyway
1806 BN_set_bit(bnX, w);
1807 return TRUE;
1808 }
SM2KeyExchange() This function performs the key exchange defined in SM2. The first step is to compute
tA = (dsA + deA avf(Xe,A)) mod n Then, compute the Z value from outZ = (h tA mod n) (QsA +
[avf(QeB().x)](QeB())). The function will compute the ephemeral public key from the ephemeral private
key. All points are required to be on the curve of inQsA. The function will fail catastrophically if this is not
the case
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SUCCESS results is valid
CRYPT_NO_RESULT the value for dsA does not give a valid point on the curve
1809 static CRYPT_RESULT
1810 SM2KeyExchange(
1811 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ, // OUT: the computed point
1812 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computations
1813 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dsA, // IN: static private TPM key
1814 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *deA, // IN: ephemeral private TPM key
1815 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QsB, // IN: static public party B key
1816 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QeB // IN: ephemeral public party B key
1817 )
1818 {
1819 BN_CTX *context;
1820 EC_POINT *pQeA = NULL;
1821 EC_POINT *pQeB = NULL;
1822 EC_POINT *pQsB = NULL;
1823 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
1824 BIGNUM *bnTa;
1825 BIGNUM *bnDeA;
1826 BIGNUM *bnDsA;
1827 BIGNUM *bnXeA; // x coordinate of ephemeral party A key
1828 BIGNUM *bnH;
1829 BIGNUM *bnN;
1830 BIGNUM *bnXeB;
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1831 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1832 CRYPT_RESULT retVal;
1833
1834 pAssert( curveData != NULL && outZ != NULL && dsA != NULL
1835 && deA != NULL && QsB != NULL && QeB != NULL);
1836
1837 context = BN_CTX_new();
1838 if(context == NULL || curveData == NULL)
1839 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1840 BN_CTX_start(context);
1841 bnTa = BN_CTX_get(context);
1842 bnDeA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1843 bnDsA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1844 bnXeA = BN_CTX_get(context);
1845 bnH = BN_CTX_get(context);
1846 bnN = BN_CTX_get(context);
1847 bnXeB = BN_CTX_get(context);
1848 if(bnXeB == NULL)
1849 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1850
1851 // Initialize group parameters and local values of input
1852 if((group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL)
1853 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1854
1855 if((pQeA = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
1856 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1857
1858 BnFrom2B(bnDeA, &deA->b);
1859 BnFrom2B(bnDsA, &dsA->b);
1860 BnFrom2B(bnH, curveData->h);
1861 BnFrom2B(bnN, curveData->n);
1862 BnFrom2B(bnXeB, &QeB->x.b);
1863 pQeB = EccInitPoint2B(group, QeB, context);
1864 pQsB = EccInitPoint2B(group, QsB, context);
1865
1866 // Compute the public ephemeral key pQeA = [de,A]G
1867 if( (retVal = PointMul(group, pQeA, bnDeA, NULL, NULL, context))
1868 != CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1869 goto Cleanup;
1870
1871 if(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, pQeA, bnXeA, NULL, context) != 1)
1872 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1873
1874 // tA := (ds,A + de,A avf(Xe,A)) mod n (3)
1875 // Compute 'tA' = ('dsA' + 'deA' avf('XeA')) mod n
1876 // Ta = avf(XeA);
1877 BN_copy(bnTa, bnXeA);
1878 avfSm2(bnTa, bnN);
1879 if(// do Ta = de,A * Ta mod n = deA * avf(XeA) mod n
1880 !BN_mod_mul(bnTa, bnDeA, bnTa, bnN, context)
1881
1882 // now Ta = dsA + Ta mod n = dsA + deA * avf(XeA) mod n
1883 || !BN_mod_add(bnTa, bnDsA, bnTa, bnN, context)
1884 )
1885 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1886
1887 // outZ ? [h tA mod n] (Qs,B + [avf(Xe,B)](Qe,B)) (4)
1888 // Put this in because almost every case of h is == 1 so skip the call when
1889 // not necessary.
1890 if(!BN_is_one(bnH))
1891 {
1892 // Cofactor is not 1 so compute Ta := Ta * h mod n
1893 if(!BN_mul(bnTa, bnTa, bnH, context))
1894 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1895 }
1896
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1897 // Now that 'tA' is (h * 'tA' mod n)
1898 // 'outZ' = ['tA'](QsB + [avf(QeB.x)](QeB)).
1899
1900 // first, compute XeB = avf(XeB)
1901 avfSm2(bnXeB, bnN);
1902
1903 // QeB := [XeB]QeB
1904 if( !EC_POINT_mul(group, pQeB, NULL, pQeB, bnXeB, context)
1905
1906 // QeB := QsB + QeB
1907 || !EC_POINT_add(group, pQeB, pQeB, pQsB, context)
1908 )
1909 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1910
1911 // QeB := [tA]QeB = [tA](QsB + [Xe,B]QeB) and check for at infinity
1912 if(PointMul(group, pQeB, NULL, pQeB, bnTa, context) == CRYPT_SUCCESS)
1913 // Convert BIGNUM E to TPM2B E
1914 Point2B(group, outZ, pQeB, (INT16)BN_num_bytes(bnN), context);
1915
1916 Cleanup:
1917 if(pQeA != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQeA);
1918 if(pQeB != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQeB);
1919 if(pQsB != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQsB);
1920 if(group != NULL) EC_GROUP_free(group);
1921 BN_CTX_end(context);
1922 BN_CTX_free(context);
1923
1924 return retVal;
1925
1926 }
1927 #endif //% TPM_ALG_SM2
B.13.3.2.29. C_2_2_ECDH()
This function performs the two phase key exchange defined in SP800-56A, 6.1.1.2 Full Unified Model,
C(2, 2, ECC CDH).
1928 static CRYPT_RESULT
1929 C_2_2_ECDH(
1930 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ1, // OUT: Zs
1931 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ2, // OUT: Ze
1932 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computations
1933 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dsA, // IN: static private TPM key
1934 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *deA, // IN: ephemeral private TPM key
1935 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QsB, // IN: static public party B key
1936 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QeB // IN: ephemeral public party B key
1937 )
1938 {
1939 BN_CTX *context;
1940 EC_POINT *pQ = NULL;
1941 EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
1942 BIGNUM *bnD;
1943 INT16 size;
1944 const ECC_CURVE_DATA *curveData = GetCurveData(curveId);
1945
1946 context = BN_CTX_new();
1947 if(context == NULL || curveData == NULL)
1948 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_ALLOCATION);
1949 BN_CTX_start(context);
1950 if((bnD = BN_CTX_get(context)) == NULL)
1951 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1952
1953 // Initialize group parameters and local values of input
1954 if((group = EccCurveInit(curveId, context)) == NULL)
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1955 FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
1956 size = (INT16)BN_num_bytes(&group->order);
1957
1958 // Get the static private key of A
1959 BnFrom2B(bnD, &dsA->b);
1960
1961 // Initialize the static public point from B
1962 pQ = EccInitPoint2B(group, QsB, context);
1963
1964 // Do the point multiply for the Zs value
1965 if(PointMul(group, pQ, NULL, pQ, bnD, context) != CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
1966 // Convert the Zs value
1967 Point2B(group, outZ1, pQ, size, context);
1968
1969 // Get the ephemeral private key of A
1970 BnFrom2B(bnD, &deA->b);
1971
1972 // Initalize the ephemeral public point from B
1973 PointFrom2B(group, pQ, QeB, context);
1974
1975 // Do the point multiply for the Ze value
1976 if(PointMul(group, pQ, NULL, pQ, bnD, context) != CRYPT_NO_RESULT)
1977 // Convert the Ze value.
1978 Point2B(group, outZ2, pQ, size, context);
1979
1980 if(pQ != NULL) EC_POINT_free(pQ);
1981 if(group != NULL) EC_GROUP_free(group);
1982 BN_CTX_end(context);
1983 BN_CTX_free(context);
1984 return CRYPT_SUCCESS;
1985 }
B.13.3.2.30. _cpri__C_2_2_KeyExchange()
This function is the dispatch routine for the EC key exchange function that use two ephemeral and two
static keys.
Return Value Meaning
CRYPT_SCHEME scheme is not defined
1986 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
1987 _cpri__C_2_2_KeyExchange(
1988 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ1, // OUT: a computed point
1989 TPMS_ECC_POINT *outZ2, // OUT: and optional second point
1990 TPM_ECC_CURVE curveId, // IN: the curve for the computations
1991 TPM_ALG_ID scheme, // IN: the key exchange scheme
1992 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *dsA, // IN: static private TPM key
1993 TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER *deA, // IN: ephemeral private TPM key
1994 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QsB, // IN: static public party B key
1995 TPMS_ECC_POINT *QeB // IN: ephemeral public party B key
1996 )
1997 {
1998 pAssert( outZ1 != NULL
1999 && dsA != NULL && deA != NULL
2000 && QsB != NULL && QeB != NULL);
2001
2002 // Initalize the output points so that they are empty until one of the
2003 // functions decides otherwise
2004 outZ1->x.b.size = 0;
2005 outZ1->y.b.size = 0;
2006 if(outZ2 != NULL)
2007 {
2008 outZ2->x.b.size = 0;
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2009 outZ2->y.b.size = 0;
2010 }
2011
2012 switch (scheme)
2013 {
2014 case TPM_ALG_ECDH:
2015 return C_2_2_ECDH(outZ1, outZ2, curveId, dsA, deA, QsB, QeB);
2016 break;
2017 #ifdef TPM_ALG_ECMQV
2018 case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
2019 return C_2_2_MQV(outZ1, curveId, dsA, deA, QsB, QeB);
2020 break;
2021 #endif
2022 #ifdef TPM_ALG_SM2
2023 case TPM_ALG_SM2:
2024 return SM2KeyExchange(outZ1, curveId, dsA, deA, QsB, QeB);
2025 break;
2026 #endif
2027 default:
2028 return CRYPT_SCHEME;
2029 }
2030 }
2031 #else //%
Stub used when the 2-phase key exchange is not defined so that the linker has something to associate
with the value in the .def file.
2032 LIB_EXPORT CRYPT_RESULT
2033 _cpri__C_2_2_KeyExchange(
2034 void
2035 )
2036 {
2037 return CRYPT_FAIL;
2038 }
2039 #endif //% CC_ZGen_2Phase
2040 #endif // TPM_ALG_ECC
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Annex C
(informative)
Simulation Environment
C.1 Introduction
These files are used to simulate some of the implementation-dependent hardware of a TPM. These files
are provided to allow creation of a simulation environment for the TPM. These files are not expected to be
part of a hardware TPM implementation.
C.2 Cancel.c
C.2.1. Introduction
This module simulates the cancel pins on the TPM.
C.2.2. Includes, Typedefs, Structures, and Defines
1 #include "PlatformData.h"
C.2.3. Functions
C.2.3.1. _plat__IsCanceled()
Check if the cancel flag is set
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if cancel flag is set
FALSE if cancel flag is not set
2 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
3 _plat__IsCanceled(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 // return cancel flag
8 return s_isCanceled;
9 }
C.2.3.2. _plat__SetCancel()
Set cancel flag.
10 LIB_EXPORT void
11 _plat__SetCancel(
12 void
13 )
14 {
15 s_isCanceled = TRUE;
16 return;
17 }
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C.2.3.3. _plat__ClearCancel()
Clear cancel flag
18 LIB_EXPORT void
19 _plat__ClearCancel(
20 void
21 )
22 {
23 s_isCanceled = FALSE;
24 return;
25 }
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C.3 Clock.c
C.3.1. Introduction
This file contains the routines that are used by the simulator to mimic a hardware clock on a TPM. In this
implementation, all the time values are measured in millisecond. However, the precision of the clock
functions may be implementation dependent.
C.3.2. Includes and Data Definitions
1 #include <time.h>
2 #include "PlatformData.h"
3 #include "Platform.h"
C.3.3. Functions
C.3.3.1. _plat__ClockReset()
Set the current clock time as initial time. This function is called at a power on event to reset the clock
4 LIB_EXPORT void
5 _plat__ClockReset(
6 void
7 )
8 {
9 // Implementation specific: Microsoft C set CLOCKS_PER_SEC to be 1/1000,
10 // so here the measurement of clock() is in millisecond.
11 s_initClock = clock();
12 s_adjustRate = CLOCK_NOMINAL;
13
14 return;
15 }
C.3.3.2. _plat__ClockTimeFromStart()
Function returns the compensated time from the start of the command when
_plat__ClockTimeFromStart() was called.
16 unsigned long long
17 _plat__ClockTimeFromStart(
18 void
19 )
20 {
21 unsigned long long currentClock = clock();
22 return ((currentClock - s_initClock) * CLOCK_NOMINAL) / s_adjustRate;
23 }
C.3.3.3. _plat__ClockTimeElapsed()
Get the time elapsed from current to the last time the _plat__ClockTimeElapsed() is called. For the first
_plat__ClockTimeElapsed() call after a power on event, this call report the elapsed time from power on to
the current call
24 LIB_EXPORT unsigned long long
25 _plat__ClockTimeElapsed(
26 void
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27 )
28 {
29 unsigned long long elapsed;
30 unsigned long long currentClock = clock();
31 elapsed = ((currentClock - s_initClock) * CLOCK_NOMINAL) / s_adjustRate;
32 s_initClock += (elapsed * s_adjustRate) / CLOCK_NOMINAL;
33
34 #ifdef DEBUGGING_TIME
35 // Put this in so that TPM time will pass much faster than real time when
36 // doing debug.
37 // A value of 1000 for DEBUG_TIME_MULTIPLER will make each ms into a second
38 // A good value might be 100
39 elapsed *= DEBUG_TIME_MULTIPLIER
40 #endif
41 return elapsed;
42 }
C.3.3.4. _plat__ClockAdjustRate()
Adjust the clock rate
43 LIB_EXPORT void
44 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(
45 int adjust // IN: the adjust number. It could be positive
46 // or negative
47 )
48 {
49 // We expect the caller should only use a fixed set of constant values to
50 // adjust the rate
51 switch(adjust)
52 {
53 case CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE:
54 s_adjustRate += CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE;
55 break;
56 case -CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE:
57 s_adjustRate -= CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE;
58 break;
59 case CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM:
60 s_adjustRate += CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM;
61 break;
62 case -CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM:
63 s_adjustRate -= CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM;
64 break;
65 case CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE:
66 s_adjustRate += CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE;
67 break;
68 case -CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE:
69 s_adjustRate -= CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE;
70 break;
71 default:
72 // ignore any other values;
73 break;
74 }
75
76 if(s_adjustRate > (CLOCK_NOMINAL + CLOCK_ADJUST_LIMIT))
77 s_adjustRate = CLOCK_NOMINAL + CLOCK_ADJUST_LIMIT;
78 if(s_adjustRate < (CLOCK_NOMINAL - CLOCK_ADJUST_LIMIT))
79 s_adjustRate = CLOCK_NOMINAL-CLOCK_ADJUST_LIMIT;
80
81 return;
82 }
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C.4 Entropy.c
C.4.1. Includes
1 #define _CRT_RAND_S
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3 #include <stdint.h>
4 #include <memory.h>
5 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
C.4.2. Local values
This is the last 32-bits of hardware entropy produced. We have to check to see that two consecutive 32-
bit values are not the same because (according to FIPS 140-2, annex C
“If each call to a RNG produces blocks of n bits (where n > 15), the first n-bit block generated after
power-up, initialization, or reset shall not be used, but shall be saved for comparison with the next n-
bit block to be generated. Each subsequent generation of an n-bit block shall be compared with the
previously generated block. The test shall fail if any two compared n-bit blocks are equal.”
6 extern uint32_t lastEntropy;
7 extern int firstValue;
C.4.3. _plat__GetEntropy()
This function is used to get available hardware entropy. In a hardware implementation of this function,
there would be no call to the system to get entropy. If the caller does not ask for any entropy, then this is
a startup indication and firstValue should be reset.
Return Value Meaning
<0 hardware failure of the entropy generator, this is sticky
>= 0 the returned amount of entropy (bytes)
8 LIB_EXPORT int32_t
9 _plat__GetEntropy(
10 unsigned char *entropy, // output buffer
11 uint32_t amount // amount requested
12 )
13 {
14 uint32_t rndNum;
15 int OK = 1;
16
17 if(amount == 0)
18 {
19 firstValue = 1;
20 return 0;
21 }
22
23 // Only provide entropy 32 bits at a time to test the ability
24 // of the caller to deal with partial results.
25 OK = rand_s(&rndNum) == 0;
26 if(OK)
27 {
28 if(firstValue)
29 firstValue = 0;
30 else
31 OK = (rndNum != lastEntropy);
32 }
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33 if(OK)
34 {
35 lastEntropy = rndNum;
36 if(amount > sizeof(rndNum))
37 amount = sizeof(rndNum);
38 memcpy(entropy, &rndNum, amount);
39 }
40 return (OK) ? (int32_t)amount : -1;
41 }
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C.5 LocalityPlat.c
C.5.1. Includes
1 #include "PlatformData.h"
2 #include "TpmError.h"
C.5.2. Functions
C.5.2.1. _plat__LocalityGet()
Get the most recent command locality in locality value form. This is an integer value for locality and not a
locality structure The locality can be 0-4 or 32-255. 5-31 is not allowed.
3 LIB_EXPORT unsigned char
4 _plat__LocalityGet(
5 void
6 )
7 {
8 return s_locality;
9 }
C.5.2.2. _plat__LocalitySet()
Set the most recent command locality in locality value form
10 LIB_EXPORT void
11 _plat__LocalitySet(
12 unsigned char locality
13 )
14 {
15 if(locality > 4 && locality < 32)
16 locality = 0;
17 s_locality = locality;
18 return;
19 }
C.5.2.3. _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled()
This function is used to check if the RSA key cache is enabled or not.
20 LIB_EXPORT int
21 _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled(
22 void
23 )
24 {
25 return s_RsaKeyCacheEnabled;
26 }
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C.6 NVMem.c
C.6.1. Introduction
This file contains the NV read and write access methods. This implementation uses RAM/file and does
not manage the RAM/file as NV blocks. The implementation may become more sophisticated over time.
C.6.2. Includes
1 #include <memory.h>
2 #include <string.h>
3 #include "PlatformData.h"
4 #include "TpmError.h"
5 #include "assert.h"
C.6.3. Functions
C.6.3.1. _plat__NvErrors()
This function is used by the simulator to set the error flags in the NV subsystem to simulate an error in the
NV loading process
6 LIB_EXPORT void
7 _plat__NvErrors(
8 BOOL recoverable,
9 BOOL unrecoverable
10 )
11 {
12 s_NV_unrecoverable = unrecoverable;
13 s_NV_recoverable = recoverable;
14 }
C.6.3.2. _plat__NVEnable()
Enable NV memory.
This version just pulls in data from a file. In a real TPM, with NV on chip, this function would verify the
integrity of the saved context. If the NV memory was not on chip but was in something like RPMB, the NV
state would be read in, decrypted and integrity checked.
The recovery from an integrity failure depends on where the error occurred. It it was in the state that is
discarded by TPM Reset, then the error is recoverable if the TPM is reset. Otherwise, the TPM must go
into failure mode.
Return Value Meaning
0 if success
>0 if receive recoverable error
<0 if unrecoverable error
15 LIB_EXPORT int
16 _plat__NVEnable(
17 void *platParameter // IN: platform specific parameter
18 )
19 {
20 (platParameter); // to keep compiler quiet
21 // Start assuming everything is OK
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22 s_NV_unrecoverable = FALSE;
23 s_NV_recoverable = FALSE;
24
25 #ifdef FILE_BACKED_NV
26
27 if(s_NVFile != NULL) return 0;
28
29 // Try to open an exist NVChip file for read/write
30 if(0 != fopen_s(&s_NVFile, "NVChip", "r+b"))
31 s_NVFile = NULL;
32
33 if(NULL != s_NVFile)
34 {
35 // See if the NVChip file is empty
36 fseek(s_NVFile, 0, SEEK_END);
37 if(0 == ftell(s_NVFile))
38 s_NVFile = NULL;
39 }
40
41 if(s_NVFile == NULL)
42 {
43 // Initialize all the byte in the new file to 0
44 memset(s_NV, 0, NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
45
46 // If NVChip file does not exist, try to create it for read/write
47 fopen_s(&s_NVFile, "NVChip", "w+b");
48 // Start initialize at the end of new file
49 fseek(s_NVFile, 0, SEEK_END);
50 // Write 0s to NVChip file
51 fwrite(s_NV, 1, NV_MEMORY_SIZE, s_NVFile);
52 }
53 else
54 {
55 // If NVChip file exist, assume the size is correct
56 fseek(s_NVFile, 0, SEEK_END);
57 assert(ftell(s_NVFile) == NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
58 // read NV file data to memory
59 fseek(s_NVFile, 0, SEEK_SET);
60 fread(s_NV, NV_MEMORY_SIZE, 1, s_NVFile);
61 }
62 #endif
63 // NV contents have been read and the error checks have been performed. For
64 // simulation purposes, use the signaling interface to indicate if an error is
65 // to be simulated and the type of the error.
66 if(s_NV_unrecoverable)
67 return -1;
68 return s_NV_recoverable;
69 }
C.6.3.3. _plat__NVDisable()
Disable NV memory
70 LIB_EXPORT void
71 _plat__NVDisable(
72 void
73 )
74 {
75 #ifdef FILE_BACKED_NV
76
77 assert(s_NVFile != NULL);
78 // Close NV file
79 fclose(s_NVFile);
80 // Set file handle to NULL
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81 s_NVFile = NULL;
82
83 #endif
84
85 return;
86 }
C.6.3.4. _plat__IsNvAvailable()
Check if NV is available
Return Value Meaning
0 NV is available
1 NV is not available due to write failure
2 NV is not available due to rate limit
87 LIB_EXPORT int
88 _plat__IsNvAvailable(
89 void
90 )
91 {
92 // NV is not available if the TPM is in failure mode
93 if(!s_NvIsAvailable)
94 return 1;
95
96 #ifdef FILE_BACKED_NV
97 if(s_NVFile == NULL)
98 return 1;
99 #endif
100
101 return 0;
102
103 }
C.6.3.5. _plat__NvMemoryRead()
Function: Read a chunk of NV memory
104 LIB_EXPORT void
105 _plat__NvMemoryRead(
106 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: read start
107 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to read
108 void *data // OUT: data buffer
109 )
110 {
111 assert(startOffset + size <= NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
112
113 // Copy data from RAM
114 memcpy(data, &s_NV[startOffset], size);
115 return;
116 }
C.6.3.6. _plat__NvIsDifferent()
This function checks to see if the NV is different from the test value. This is so that NV will not be written if
it has not changed.
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE the NV location is different from the test value
FALSE the NV location is the same as the test value
117 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
118 _plat__NvIsDifferent(
119 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: read start
120 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to read
121 void *data // IN: data buffer
122 )
123 {
124 return (memcmp(&s_NV[startOffset], data, size) != 0);
125 }
C.6.3.7. _plat__NvMemoryWrite()
This function is used to update NV memory. The write is to a memory copy of NV. At the end of the
current command, any changes are written to the actual NV memory.
126 LIB_EXPORT void
127 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(
128 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: write start
129 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to write
130 void *data // OUT: data buffer
131 )
132 {
133 assert(startOffset + size <= NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
134
135 // Copy the data to the NV image
136 memcpy(&s_NV[startOffset], data, size);
137 }
C.6.3.8. _plat__NvMemoryMove()
Function: Move a chunk of NV memory from source to destination This function should ensure that if
there overlap, the original data is copied before it is written
138 LIB_EXPORT void
139 _plat__NvMemoryMove(
140 unsigned int sourceOffset, // IN: source offset
141 unsigned int destOffset, // IN: destination offset
142 unsigned int size // IN: size of data being moved
143 )
144 {
145 assert(sourceOffset + size <= NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
146 assert(destOffset + size <= NV_MEMORY_SIZE);
147
148 // Move data in RAM
149 memmove(&s_NV[destOffset], &s_NV[sourceOffset], size);
150
151 return;
152 }
C.6.3.9. _plat__NvCommit()
Update NV chip
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Return Value Meaning
0 NV write success
non-0 NV write fail
153 LIB_EXPORT int
154 _plat__NvCommit(
155 void
156 )
157 {
158 #ifdef FILE_BACKED_NV
159 // If NV file is not available, return failure
160 if(s_NVFile == NULL)
161 return 1;
162
163 // Write RAM data to NV
164 fseek(s_NVFile, 0, SEEK_SET);
165 fwrite(s_NV, 1, NV_MEMORY_SIZE, s_NVFile);
166 return 0;
167 #else
168 return 0;
169 #endif
170
171 }
C.6.3.10. _plat__SetNvAvail()
Set the current NV state to available. This function is for testing purpose only. It is not part of the
platform NV logic
172 LIB_EXPORT void
173 _plat__SetNvAvail(
174 void
175 )
176 {
177 s_NvIsAvailable = TRUE;
178 return;
179 }
C.6.3.11. _plat__ClearNvAvail()
Set the current NV state to unavailable. This function is for testing purpose only. It is not part of the
platform NV logic
180 LIB_EXPORT void
181 _plat__ClearNvAvail(
182 void
183 )
184 {
185 s_NvIsAvailable = FALSE;
186 return;
187 }
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C.7 PowerPlat.c
C.7.1. Includes and Function Prototypes
1 #include "PlatformData.h"
2 #include "Platform.h"
C.7.2. Functions
C.7.2.1. _plat__Signal_PowerOn()
Signal platform power on
3 LIB_EXPORT int
4 _plat__Signal_PowerOn(
5 void
6 )
7 {
8 // Start clock
9 _plat__ClockReset();
10
11 // Initialize locality
12 s_locality = 0;
13
14 // Command cancel
15 s_isCanceled = FALSE;
16
17 // Need to indicate that we lost power
18 s_powerLost = TRUE;
19
20 return 0;
21 }
C.7.2.2. _plat__WasPowerLost()
Test whether power was lost before a _TPM_Init()
22 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
23 _plat__WasPowerLost(
24 BOOL clear
25 )
26 {
27 BOOL retVal = s_powerLost;
28 if(clear)
29 s_powerLost = FALSE;
30 return retVal;
31 }
C.7.2.3. _plat_Signal_Reset()
This a TPM reset without a power loss.
32 LIB_EXPORT int
33 _plat__Signal_Reset(
34 void
35 )
36 {
37 // Need to reset the clock
38 _plat__ClockReset();
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39
40 // if we are doing reset but did not have a power failure, then we should
41 // not need to reload NV ...
42 return 0;
43 }
C.7.2.4. _plat__Signal_PowerOff()
Signal platform power off
44 LIB_EXPORT void
45 _plat__Signal_PowerOff(
46 void
47 )
48 {
49 // Prepare NV memory for power off
50 _plat__NVDisable();
51
52 return;
53 }
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C.8 Platform.h
1 #ifndef PLATFORM_H
2 #define PLATFORM_H
C.8.1. Includes and Defines
3 #include "bool.h"
4 #include "stdint.h"
5 #include "TpmError.h"
6 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
7 #define UNREFERENCED(a) ((void)(a))
C.8.2. Power Functions
C.8.2.1. _plat__Signal_PowerOn
Signal power on This signal is simulate by a RPC call
8 LIB_EXPORT int
9 _plat__Signal_PowerOn(void);
C.8.2.2. _plat__Signal_Reset
Signal reset This signal is simulate by a RPC call
10 LIB_EXPORT int
11 _plat__Signal_Reset(void);
C.8.2.3. _plat__WasPowerLost()
Indicates if the power was lost before a _TPM__Init().
12 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
13 _plat__WasPowerLost(BOOL clear);
C.8.2.4. _plat__Signal_PowerOff()
Signal power off This signal is simulate by a RPC call
14 LIB_EXPORT void
15 _plat__Signal_PowerOff(void);
C.8.3. Physical Presence Functions
C.8.3.1. _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted()
Check if physical presence is signaled
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Return Value Meaning
TRUE if physical presence is signaled
FALSE if physical presence is not signaled
16 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
17 _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted(void);
C.8.3.2. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn
Signal physical presence on This signal is simulate by a RPC call
18 LIB_EXPORT void
19 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn(void);
C.8.3.3. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff()
Signal physical presence off This signal is simulate by a RPC call
20 LIB_EXPORT void
21 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff(void);
C.8.4. Command Canceling Functions
C.8.4.1. _plat__IsCanceled()
Check if the cancel flag is set
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if cancel flag is set
FALSE if cancel flag is not set
22 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
23 _plat__IsCanceled(void);
C.8.4.2. _plat__SetCancel()
Set cancel flag.
24 LIB_EXPORT void
25 _plat__SetCancel(void);
C.8.4.3. _plat__ClearCancel()
Clear cancel flag
26 LIB_EXPORT void
27 _plat__ClearCancel( void);
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C.8.5. NV memory functions
C.8.5.1. _plat__NvErrors()
This function is used by the simulator to set the error flags in the NV subsystem to simulate an error in the
NV loading process
28 LIB_EXPORT void
29 _plat__NvErrors(
30 BOOL recoverable,
31 BOOL unrecoverable
32 );
C.8.5.2. _plat__NVEnable()
Enable platform NV memory NV memory is automatically enabled at power on event. This function is
mostly for TPM_Manufacture() to access NV memory without a power on event
Return Value Meaning
0 if success
non-0 if fail
33 LIB_EXPORT int
34 _plat__NVEnable(
35 void *platParameter // IN: platform specific parameters
36 );
C.8.5.3. _plat__NVDisable()
Disable platform NV memory NV memory is automatically disabled at power off event. This function is
mostly for TPM_Manufacture() to disable NV memory without a power off event
37 LIB_EXPORT void
38 _plat__NVDisable(void);
C.8.5.4. _plat__IsNvAvailable()
Check if NV is available
Return Value Meaning
0 NV is available
1 NV is not available due to write failure
2 NV is not available due to rate limit
39 LIB_EXPORT int
40 _plat__IsNvAvailable(void);
C.8.5.5. _plat__NvCommit()
Update NV chip
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Return Value Meaning
0 NV write success
non-0 NV write fail
41 LIB_EXPORT int
42 _plat__NvCommit(void);
C.8.5.6. _plat__NvMemoryRead()
Read a chunk of NV memory
43 LIB_EXPORT void
44 _plat__NvMemoryRead(
45 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: read start
46 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to read
47 void *data // OUT: data buffer
48 );
C.8.5.7. _plat__NvIsDifferent()
This function checks to see if the NV is different from the test value. This is so that NV will not be written if
it has not changed.
Return Value Meaning
TRUE the NV location is different from the test value
FALSE the NV location is the same as the test value
49 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
50 _plat__NvIsDifferent(
51 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: read start
52 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to compare
53 void *data // IN: data buffer
54 );
C.8.5.8. _plat__NvMemoryWrite()
Write a chunk of NV memory
55 LIB_EXPORT void
56 _plat__NvMemoryWrite(
57 unsigned int startOffset, // IN: read start
58 unsigned int size, // IN: size of bytes to read
59 void *data // OUT: data buffer
60 );
C.8.5.9. _plat__NvMemoryMove()
Move a chunk of NV memory from source to destination This function should ensure that if there overlap,
the original data is copied before it is written
61 LIB_EXPORT void
62 _plat__NvMemoryMove(
63 unsigned int sourceOffset, // IN: source offset
64 unsigned int destOffset, // IN: destination offset
65 unsigned int size // IN: size of data being moved
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66 );
C.8.5.10. _plat__SetNvAvail()
Set the current NV state to available. This function is for testing purposes only. It is not part of the
platform NV logic
67 LIB_EXPORT void
68 _plat__SetNvAvail(void);
C.8.5.11. _plat__ClearNvAvail()
Set the current NV state to unavailable. This function is for testing purposes only. It is not part of the
platform NV logic
69 LIB_EXPORT void
70 _plat__ClearNvAvail(void);
C.8.6. Locality Functions
C.8.6.1. _plat__LocalityGet()
Get the most recent command locality in locality value form
71 LIB_EXPORT unsigned char
72 _plat__LocalityGet(void);
C.8.6.2. _plat__LocalitySet()
Set the most recent command locality in locality value form
73 LIB_EXPORT void
74 _plat__LocalitySet(
75 unsigned char locality
76 );
C.8.6.3. _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled()
This function is used to check if the RSA key cache is enabled or not.
77 LIB_EXPORT int
78 _plat__IsRsaKeyCacheEnabled(
79 void
80 );
C.8.7. Clock Constants and Functions
Assume that the nominal divisor is 30000
81 #define CLOCK_NOMINAL 30000
A 1% change in rate is 300 counts
82 #define CLOCK_ADJUST_COARSE 300
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A .1 change in rate is 30 counts
83 #define CLOCK_ADJUST_MEDIUM 30
A minimum change in rate is 1 count
84 #define CLOCK_ADJUST_FINE 1
The clock tolerance is +/-15% (4500 counts) Allow some guard band (16.7%)
85 #define CLOCK_ADJUST_LIMIT 5000
C.8.7.1. _plat__ClockReset()
This function sets the current clock time as initial time. This function is called at a power on event to reset
the clock
86 LIB_EXPORT void
87 _plat__ClockReset(void);
C.8.7.2. _plat__ClockTimeFromStart()
Function returns the compensated time from the start of the command when
_plat__ClockTimeFromStart() was called.
88 LIB_EXPORT unsigned long long
89 _plat__ClockTimeFromStart(
90 void
91 );
C.8.7.3. _plat__ClockTimeElapsed()
Get the time elapsed from current to the last time the _plat__ClockTimeElapsed() is called. For the first
_plat__ClockTimeElapsed() call after a power on event, this call report the elapsed time from power on to
the current call
92 LIB_EXPORT unsigned long long
93 _plat__ClockTimeElapsed(void);
C.8.7.4. _plat__ClockAdjustRate()
Adjust the clock rate
94 LIB_EXPORT void
95 _plat__ClockAdjustRate(
96 int adjust // IN: the adjust number. It could be
97 // positive or negative
98 );
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C.8.8. Single Function Files
C.8.8.1. _plat__GetEntropy()
This function is used to get available hardware entropy. In a hardware implementation of this function,
there would be no call to the system to get entropy. If the caller does not ask for any entropy, then this is
a startup indication and firstValue should be reset.
Return Value Meaning
<0 hardware failure of the entropy generator, this is sticky
>= 0 the returned amount of entropy (bytes)
99 LIB_EXPORT int32_t
100 _plat__GetEntropy(
101 unsigned char *entropy, // output buffer
102 uint32_t amount // amount requested
103 );
104 #endif
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C.9 PlatformData.h
This file contains the instance data for the Platform module. It is collected in this file so that the state of
the module is easier to manage.
1 #ifndef _PLATFORM_DATA_H_
2 #define _PLATFORM_DATA_H_
3 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
4 #include "Implementation.h"
5 #include "bool.h"
From Cancel.c Cancel flag. It is initialized as FALSE, which indicate the command is not being canceled
6 extern BOOL s_isCanceled;
From Clock.c This variable records the time when _plat__ClockReset() is called. This mechanism allow
us to subtract the time when TPM is power off from the total time reported by clock() function
7 extern unsigned long long s_initClock;
8 extern unsigned int s_adjustRate;
From LocalityPlat.c Locality of current command
9 extern unsigned char s_locality;
From NVMem.c Choose if the NV memory should be backed by RAM or by file. If this macro is defined,
then a file is used as NV. If it is not defined, then RAM is used to back NV memory. Comment out to use
RAM.
10 #define FILE_BACKED_NV
11 #if defined FILE_BACKED_NV
12 #include <stdio.h>
A file to emulate NV storage
13 extern FILE* s_NVFile;
14 #endif
15 extern unsigned char s_NV[NV_MEMORY_SIZE];
16 extern BOOL s_NvIsAvailable;
17 extern BOOL s_NV_unrecoverable;
18 extern BOOL s_NV_recoverable;
From PPPlat.c Physical presence. It is initialized to FALSE
19 extern BOOL s_physicalPresence;
From Power
20 extern BOOL s_powerLost;
From Entropy.c
21 extern uint32_t lastEntropy;
22 extern int firstValue;
23 #endif // _PLATFORM_DATA_H_
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C.10 PlatformData.c
C.10.1. Description
This file will instance the TPM variables that are not stack allocated. The descriptions for these variables
is in Global.h for this project.
C.10.2. Includes
This include is required to set the NV memory size consistently across all parts of the implementation.
1 #include "Implementation.h"
2 #include "Platform.h"
3 #include "PlatformData.h"
From Cancel.c
4 BOOL s_isCanceled;
From Clock.c
5 unsigned long long s_initClock;
6 unsigned int s_adjustRate;
From LocalityPlat.c
7 unsigned char s_locality;
From Power.c
8 BOOL s_powerLost;
From Entropy.c
9 uint32_t lastEntropy;
10 int firstValue;
From NVMem.c
11 #ifdef VTPM
12 # undef FILE_BACKED_NV
13 #endif
14 #ifdef FILE_BACKED_NV
15 FILE *s_NVFile = NULL;
16 #endif
17 unsigned char s_NV[NV_MEMORY_SIZE];
18 BOOL s_NvIsAvailable;
19 BOOL s_NV_unrecoverable;
20 BOOL s_NV_recoverable;
From PPPlat.c
21 BOOL s_physicalPresence;
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C.11 PPPlat.c
C.11.1. Description
This module simulates the physical present interface pins on the TPM.
C.11.2. Includes
1 #include "PlatformData.h"
C.11.3. Functions
C.11.3.1. _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted()
Check if physical presence is signaled
Return Value Meaning
TRUE if physical presence is signaled
FALSE if physical presence is not signaled
2 LIB_EXPORT BOOL
3 _plat__PhysicalPresenceAsserted(
4 void
5 )
6 {
7 // Do not know how to check physical presence without real hardware.
8 // so always return TRUE;
9 return s_physicalPresence;
10 }
C.11.3.2. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn()
Signal physical presence on
11 LIB_EXPORT void
12 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn(
13 void
14 )
15 {
16 s_physicalPresence = TRUE;
17 return;
18 }
C.11.3.3. _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff()
Signal physical presence off
19 LIB_EXPORT void
20 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff(
21 void
22 )
23 {
24 s_physicalPresence = FALSE;
25 return;
26 }
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C.12 Unique.c
C.12.1. Introduction
In some implementations of the TPM, the hardware can provide a secret value to the TPM. This secret
value is statistically unique to the instance of the TPM. Typical uses of this value are to provide
personalization to the random number generation and as a shared secret between the TPM and the
manufacturer.
C.12.2. Includes
1 #include "stdint.h"
2 #include "TpmBuildSwitches.h"
3 const char notReallyUnique[] =
4 "This is not really a unique value. A real unique value should"
5 " be generated by the platform.";
C.12.3. _plat__GetUnique()
This function is used to access the platform-specific unique value. This function places the unique value
in the provided buffer (b) and returns the number of bytes transferred. The function will not copy more
data than bSize.
NOTE: If a platform unique value has unequal distribution of uniqueness and bSize is smaller than the size of the
unique value, the bSize portion with the most uniqueness should be returned.
6 LIB_EXPORT uint32_t
7 _plat__GetUnique(
8 uint32_t which, // authorities (0) or details
9 uint32_t bSize, // size of the buffer
10 unsigned char *b // output buffer
11 )
12 {
13 const char *from = notReallyUnique;
14 uint32_t retVal = 0;
15
16 if(which == 0) // the authorities value
17 {
18 for(retVal = 0;
19 *from != 0 && retVal < bSize;
20 retVal++)
21 {
22 *b++ = *from++;
23 }
24 }
25 else
26 {
27 #define uSize sizeof(notReallyUnique)
28 b = &b[((bSize < uSize) ? bSize : uSize) - 1];
29 for(retVal = 0;
30 *from != 0 && retVal < bSize;
31 retVal++)
32 {
33 *b-- = *from++;
34 }
35 }
36 return retVal;
37 }
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Annex D
(informative)
Remote Procedure Interface
D.1 Introduction
These files provide an RPC interface for a TPM simulation.
The simulation uses two ports: a command port and a hardware simulation port. Only TPM commands
defined in TPM 2.0 Part 3 are sent to the TPM on the command port. The hardware simulation port is
used to simulate hardware events such as power on/off and locality; and indications such as
_TPM_HashStart.
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D.2 TpmTcpProtocol.h
D.2.1. Introduction
TPM commands are communicated as BYTE streams on a TCP connection. The TPM command
protocol is enveloped with the interface protocol described in this file. The command is indicated by a
UINT32 with one of the values below. Most commands take no parameters return no TPM errors. In
these cases the TPM interface protocol acknowledges that command processing is complete by returning
a UINT32=0. The command TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_DATA takes a UINT32-prepended variable length
BYTE array and the interface protocol acknowledges command completion with a UINT32=0. Most TPM
commands are enveloped using the TPM_SEND_COMMAND interface command. The parameters are
as indicated below. The interface layer also appends a UIN32=0 to the TPM response for regularity.
D.2.2. Typedefs and Defines
1 #ifndef TCP_TPM_PROTOCOL_H
2 #define TCP_TPM_PROTOCOL_H
TPM Commands. All commands acknowledge processing by returning a UINT32 == 0 except where
noted
3 #define TPM_SIGNAL_POWER_ON 1
4 #define TPM_SIGNAL_POWER_OFF 2
5 #define TPM_SIGNAL_PHYS_PRES_ON 3
6 #define TPM_SIGNAL_PHYS_PRES_OFF 4
7 #define TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_START 5
8 #define TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_DATA 6
9 // {UINT32 BufferSize, BYTE[BufferSize] Buffer}
10 #define TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_END 7
11 #define TPM_SEND_COMMAND 8
12 // {BYTE Locality, UINT32 InBufferSize, BYTE[InBufferSize] InBuffer} ->
13 // {UINT32 OutBufferSize, BYTE[OutBufferSize] OutBuffer}
14 #define TPM_SIGNAL_CANCEL_ON 9
15 #define TPM_SIGNAL_CANCEL_OFF 10
16 #define TPM_SIGNAL_NV_ON 11
17 #define TPM_SIGNAL_NV_OFF 12
18 #define TPM_SIGNAL_KEY_CACHE_ON 13
19 #define TPM_SIGNAL_KEY_CACHE_OFF 14
20 #define TPM_REMOTE_HANDSHAKE 15
21 #define TPM_SET_ALTERNATIVE_RESULT 16
22 #define TPM_SIGNAL_RESET 17
23 #define TPM_SESSION_END 20
24 #define TPM_STOP 21
25 #define TPM_GET_COMMAND_RESPONSE_SIZES 25
26 #define TPM_TEST_FAILURE_MODE 30
27 enum TpmEndPointInfo
28 {
29 tpmPlatformAvailable = 0x01,
30 tpmUsesTbs = 0x02,
31 tpmInRawMode = 0x04,
32 tpmSupportsPP = 0x08
33 };
34
35 // Existing RPC interface type definitions retained so that the implementation
36 // can be re-used
37 typedef struct
38 {
39 unsigned long BufferSize;
40 unsigned char *Buffer;
41 } _IN_BUFFER;
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42
43 typedef unsigned char *_OUTPUT_BUFFER;
44
45 typedef struct
46 {
47 uint32_t BufferSize;
48 _OUTPUT_BUFFER Buffer;
49 } _OUT_BUFFER;
50
51 //** TPM Command Function Prototypes
52 void _rpc__Signal_PowerOn(BOOL isReset);
53 void _rpc__Signal_PowerOff();
54 void _rpc__ForceFailureMode();
55 void _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn();
56 void _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff();
57 void _rpc__Signal_Hash_Start();
58 void _rpc__Signal_Hash_Data(
59 _IN_BUFFER input
60 );
61 void _rpc__Signal_HashEnd();
62 void _rpc__Send_Command(
63 unsigned char locality,
64 _IN_BUFFER request,
65 _OUT_BUFFER *response
66 );
67 void _rpc__Signal_CancelOn();
68 void _rpc__Signal_CancelOff();
69 void _rpc__Signal_NvOn();
70 void _rpc__Signal_NvOff();
71 BOOL _rpc__InjectEPS(
72 const char* seed,
73 int seedSize
74 );
start the TPM server on the indicated socket. The TPM is single-threaded and will accept connections
first-come-first-served. Once a connection is dropped another client can connect.
75 BOOL TpmServer(SOCKET ServerSocket);
76 #endif
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D.3 TcpServer.c
D.3.1. Description
This file contains the socket interface to a TPM simulator.
D.3.2. Includes, Locals, Defines and Function Prototypes
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include <windows.h>
3 #include <winsock.h>
4 #include "string.h"
5 #include <stdlib.h>
6 #include <stdint.h>
7 #include "TpmTcpProtocol.h"
8 BOOL ReadBytes(SOCKET s, char* buffer, int NumBytes);
9 BOOL ReadVarBytes(SOCKET s, char* buffer, UINT32* BytesReceived, int MaxLen);
10 BOOL WriteVarBytes(SOCKET s, char *buffer, int BytesToSend);
11 BOOL WriteBytes(SOCKET s, char* buffer, int NumBytes);
12 BOOL WriteUINT32(SOCKET s, UINT32 val);
13 #ifndef __IGNORE_STATE__
14 static UINT32 ServerVersion = 1;
15 #define MAX_BUFFER 1048576
16 char InputBuffer[MAX_BUFFER]; //The input data buffer for the simulator.
17 char OutputBuffer[MAX_BUFFER]; //The output data buffer for the simulator.
18 struct {
19 UINT32 largestCommandSize;
20 UINT32 largestCommand;
21 UINT32 largestResponseSize;
22 UINT32 largestResponse;
23 } CommandResponseSizes = {0};
24 #endif // __IGNORE_STATE___
D.3.3. Functions
D.3.3.1. CreateSocket()
This function creates a socket listening on PortNumber.
25 static int
26 CreateSocket(
27 int PortNumber,
28 SOCKET *listenSocket
29 )
30 {
31 WSADATA wsaData;
32 struct sockaddr_in MyAddress;
33
34 int res;
35
36 // Initialize Winsock
37 res = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsaData);
38 if (res != 0)
39 {
40 printf("WSAStartup failed with error: %d\n", res);
41 return -1;
42 }
43
44 // create listening socket
45 *listenSocket = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
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46 if(INVALID_SOCKET == *listenSocket)
47 {
48 printf("Cannot create server listen socket. Error is 0x%x\n",
49 WSAGetLastError());
50 return -1;
51 }
52
53 // bind the listening socket to the specified port
54 ZeroMemory(&MyAddress, sizeof(MyAddress));
55 MyAddress.sin_port=htons((short) PortNumber);
56 MyAddress.sin_family=AF_INET;
57
58 res= bind(*listenSocket,(struct sockaddr*) &MyAddress,sizeof(MyAddress));
59 if(res==SOCKET_ERROR)
60 {
61 printf("Bind error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
62 return -1;
63 };
64
65 // listen/wait for server connections
66 res= listen(*listenSocket,3);
67 if(res==SOCKET_ERROR)
68 {
69 printf("Listen error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
70 return -1;
71 };
72
73 return 0;
74 }
D.3.3.2. PlatformServer()
This function processes incoming platform requests.
75 BOOL
76 PlatformServer(
77 SOCKET s
78 )
79 {
80 BOOL ok = TRUE;
81 UINT32 length = 0;
82 UINT32 Command;
83
84 for(;;)
85 {
86 ok = ReadBytes(s, (char*) &Command, 4);
87 // client disconnected (or other error). We stop processing this client
88 // and return to our caller who can stop the server or listen for another
89 // connection.
90 if(!ok) return TRUE;
91 Command = ntohl(Command);
92 switch(Command)
93 {
94 case TPM_SIGNAL_POWER_ON:
95 _rpc__Signal_PowerOn(FALSE);
96 break;
97
98 case TPM_SIGNAL_POWER_OFF:
99 _rpc__Signal_PowerOff();
100 break;
101
102 case TPM_SIGNAL_RESET:
103 _rpc__Signal_PowerOn(TRUE);
104 break;
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105
106 case TPM_SIGNAL_PHYS_PRES_ON:
107 _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn();
108 break;
109
110 case TPM_SIGNAL_PHYS_PRES_OFF:
111 _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff();
112 break;
113
114 case TPM_SIGNAL_CANCEL_ON:
115 _rpc__Signal_CancelOn();
116 break;
117
118 case TPM_SIGNAL_CANCEL_OFF:
119 _rpc__Signal_CancelOff();
120 break;
121
122 case TPM_SIGNAL_NV_ON:
123 _rpc__Signal_NvOn();
124 break;
125
126 case TPM_SIGNAL_NV_OFF:
127 _rpc__Signal_NvOff();
128 break;
129
130 case TPM_SESSION_END:
131 // Client signaled end-of-session
132 return TRUE;
133
134 case TPM_STOP:
135 // Client requested the simulator to exit
136 return FALSE;
137
138 case TPM_TEST_FAILURE_MODE:
139 _rpc__ForceFailureMode();
140 break;
141
142 case TPM_GET_COMMAND_RESPONSE_SIZES:
143 ok = WriteVarBytes(s, (char *)&CommandResponseSizes,
144 sizeof(CommandResponseSizes));
145 memset(&CommandResponseSizes, 0, sizeof(CommandResponseSizes));
146 if(!ok)
147 return TRUE;
148 break;
149
150 default:
151 printf("Unrecognized platform interface command %d\n", Command);
152 WriteUINT32(s, 1);
153 return TRUE;
154 }
155 WriteUINT32(s,0);
156 }
157 return FALSE;
158 }
D.3.3.3. PlatformSvcRoutine()
This function is called to set up the socket interfaces to listen for commands.
159 DWORD WINAPI
160 PlatformSvcRoutine(
161 LPVOID port
162 )
163 {
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164 int PortNumber = (int)(INT_PTR) port;
165 SOCKET listenSocket, serverSocket;
166 struct sockaddr_in HerAddress;
167 int res;
168 int length;
169 BOOL continueServing;
170
171 res = CreateSocket(PortNumber, &listenSocket);
172 if(res != 0)
173 {
174 printf("Create platform service socket fail\n");
175 return res;
176 }
177
178 // Loop accepting connections one-by-one until we are killed or asked to stop
179 // Note the platform service is single-threaded so we don't listen for a new
180 // connection until the prior connection drops.
181 do
182 {
183 printf("Platform server listening on port %d\n", PortNumber);
184
185 // blocking accept
186 length = sizeof(HerAddress);
187 serverSocket = accept(listenSocket,
188 (struct sockaddr*) &HerAddress,
189 &length);
190 if(serverSocket == SOCKET_ERROR)
191 {
192 printf("Accept error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
193 return -1;
194 };
195 printf("Client accepted\n");
196
197 // normal behavior on client disconnection is to wait for a new client
198 // to connect
199 continueServing = PlatformServer(serverSocket);
200 closesocket(serverSocket);
201 }
202 while(continueServing);
203
204 return 0;
205 }
D.3.3.4. PlatformSignalService()
This function starts a new thread waiting for platform signals. Platform signals are processed one at a
time in the order in which they are received.
206 int
207 PlatformSignalService(
208 int PortNumber
209 )
210 {
211 HANDLE hPlatformSvc;
212 int ThreadId;
213 int port = PortNumber;
214
215 // Create service thread for platform signals
216 hPlatformSvc = CreateThread(NULL, 0,
217 (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)PlatformSvcRoutine,
218 (LPVOID) (INT_PTR) port, 0, (LPDWORD)&ThreadId);
219 if(hPlatformSvc == NULL)
220 {
221 printf("Thread Creation failed\n");
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222 return -1;
223 }
224
225 return 0;
226 }
D.3.3.5. RegularCommandService()
This funciton services regular commands.
227 int
228 RegularCommandService(
229 int PortNumber
230 )
231 {
232 SOCKET listenSocket;
233 SOCKET serverSocket;
234 struct sockaddr_in HerAddress;
235
236 int res, length;
237 BOOL continueServing;
238
239 res = CreateSocket(PortNumber, &listenSocket);
240 if(res != 0)
241 {
242 printf("Create platform service socket fail\n");
243 return res;
244 }
245
246 // Loop accepting connections one-by-one until we are killed or asked to stop
247 // Note the TPM command service is single-threaded so we don't listen for
248 // a new connection until the prior connection drops.
249 do
250 {
251 printf("TPM command server listening on port %d\n", PortNumber);
252
253 // blocking accept
254 length = sizeof(HerAddress);
255 serverSocket = accept(listenSocket,
256 (struct sockaddr*) &HerAddress,
257 &length);
258 if(serverSocket ==SOCKET_ERROR)
259 {
260 printf("Accept error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
261 return -1;
262 };
263 printf("Client accepted\n");
264
265 // normal behavior on client disconnection is to wait for a new client
266 // to connect
267 continueServing = TpmServer(serverSocket);
268 closesocket(serverSocket);
269 }
270 while(continueServing);
271
272 return 0;
273 }
D.3.3.6. StartTcpServer()
Main entry-point to the TCP server. The server listens on port specified. Note that there is no way to
specify the network interface in this implementation.
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274 int
275 StartTcpServer(
276 int PortNumber
277 )
278 {
279 int res;
280
281 // Start Platform Signal Processing Service
282 res = PlatformSignalService(PortNumber+1);
283 if (res != 0)
284 {
285 printf("PlatformSignalService failed\n");
286 return res;
287 }
288
289 // Start Regular/DRTM TPM command service
290 res = RegularCommandService(PortNumber);
291 if (res != 0)
292 {
293 printf("RegularCommandService failed\n");
294 return res;
295 }
296
297 return 0;
298 }
D.3.3.7. ReadBytes()
This function reads the indicated number of bytes (NumBytes) into buffer from the indicated socket.
299 BOOL
300 ReadBytes(
301 SOCKET s,
302 char *buffer,
303 int NumBytes
304 )
305 {
306 int res;
307 int numGot = 0;
308
309 while(numGot<NumBytes)
310 {
311 res = recv(s, buffer+numGot, NumBytes-numGot, 0);
312 if(res == -1)
313 {
314 printf("Receive error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
315 return FALSE;
316 }
317 if(res==0)
318 {
319 return FALSE;
320 }
321 numGot+=res;
322 }
323 return TRUE;
324 }
D.3.3.8. WriteBytes()
This function will send the indicated number of bytes (NumBytes) to the indicated socket
325 BOOL
326 WriteBytes(
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327 SOCKET s,
328 char *buffer,
329 int NumBytes
330 )
331 {
332 int res;
333 int numSent = 0;
334 while(numSent<NumBytes)
335 {
336 res = send(s, buffer+numSent, NumBytes-numSent, 0);
337 if(res == -1)
338 {
339 if(WSAGetLastError() == 0x2745)
340 {
341 printf("Client disconnected\n");
342 }
343 else
344 {
345 printf("Send error. Error is 0x%x\n", WSAGetLastError());
346 }
347 return FALSE;
348 }
349 numSent+=res;
350 }
351 return TRUE;
352 }
D.3.3.9. WriteUINT32()
Send 4 bytes containing hton(1)
353 BOOL
354 WriteUINT32(
355 SOCKET s,
356 UINT32 val
357 )
358 {
359 UINT32 netVal = htonl(val);
360 return WriteBytes(s, (char*) &netVal, 4);
361 }
D.3.3.10. ReadVarBytes()
Get a UINT32-length-prepended binary array. Note that the 4-byte length is in network byte order (big-
endian).
362 BOOL
363 ReadVarBytes(
364 SOCKET s,
365 char *buffer,
366 UINT32 *BytesReceived,
367 int MaxLen
368 )
369 {
370 int length;
371 BOOL res;
372
373 res = ReadBytes(s, (char*) &length, 4);
374 if(!res) return res;
375 length = ntohl(length);
376 *BytesReceived = length;
377 if(length>MaxLen)
378 {
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379 printf("Buffer too big. Client says %d\n", length);
380 return FALSE;
381 }
382 if(length==0) return TRUE;
383 res = ReadBytes(s, buffer, length);
384 if(!res) return res;
385 return TRUE;
386 }
D.3.3.11. WriteVarBytes()
Send a UINT32-length-prepended binary array. Note that the 4-byte length is in network byte order (big-
endian).
387 BOOL
388 WriteVarBytes(
389 SOCKET s,
390 char *buffer,
391 int BytesToSend
392 )
393 {
394 UINT32 netLength = htonl(BytesToSend);
395 BOOL res;
396
397 res = WriteBytes(s, (char*) &netLength, 4);
398 if(!res) return res;
399 res = WriteBytes(s, buffer, BytesToSend);
400 if(!res) return res;
401 return TRUE;
402 }
D.3.3.12. TpmServer()
Processing incoming TPM command requests using the protocol / interface defined above.
403 BOOL
404 TpmServer(
405 SOCKET s
406 )
407 {
408 UINT32 length;
409 UINT32 Command;
410 BYTE locality;
411 BOOL ok;
412 int result;
413 int clientVersion;
414 _IN_BUFFER InBuffer;
415 _OUT_BUFFER OutBuffer;
416
417 for(;;)
418 {
419 ok = ReadBytes(s, (char*) &Command, 4);
420 // client disconnected (or other error). We stop processing this client
421 // and return to our caller who can stop the server or listen for another
422 // connection.
423 if(!ok)
424 return TRUE;
425 Command = ntohl(Command);
426 switch(Command)
427 {
428 case TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_START:
429 _rpc__Signal_Hash_Start();
430 break;
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431
432 case TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_END:
433 _rpc__Signal_HashEnd();
434 break;
435
436 case TPM_SIGNAL_HASH_DATA:
437 ok = ReadVarBytes(s, InputBuffer, &length, MAX_BUFFER);
438 if(!ok) return TRUE;
439 InBuffer.Buffer = (BYTE*) InputBuffer;
440 InBuffer.BufferSize = length;
441 _rpc__Signal_Hash_Data(InBuffer);
442 break;
443
444 case TPM_SEND_COMMAND:
445 ok = ReadBytes(s, (char*) &locality, 1);
446 if(!ok)
447 return TRUE;
448
449 ok = ReadVarBytes(s, InputBuffer, &length, MAX_BUFFER);
450 if(!ok)
451 return TRUE;
452 InBuffer.Buffer = (BYTE*) InputBuffer;
453 InBuffer.BufferSize = length;
454 OutBuffer.BufferSize = MAX_BUFFER;
455 OutBuffer.Buffer = (_OUTPUT_BUFFER) OutputBuffer;
456 // record the number of bytes in the command if it is the largest
457 // we have seen so far.
458 if(InBuffer.BufferSize > CommandResponseSizes.largestCommandSize)
459 {
460 CommandResponseSizes.largestCommandSize = InBuffer.BufferSize;
461 memcpy(&CommandResponseSizes.largestCommand,
462 &InputBuffer[6], sizeof(UINT32));
463 }
464
465 _rpc__Send_Command(locality, InBuffer, &OutBuffer);
466 // record the number of bytes in the response if it is the largest
467 // we have seen so far.
468 if(OutBuffer.BufferSize > CommandResponseSizes.largestResponseSize)
469 {
470 CommandResponseSizes.largestResponseSize
471 = OutBuffer.BufferSize;
472 memcpy(&CommandResponseSizes.largestResponse,
473 &OutputBuffer[6], sizeof(UINT32));
474 }
475 ok = WriteVarBytes(s,
476 (char*) OutBuffer.Buffer,
477 OutBuffer.BufferSize);
478 if(!ok)
479 return TRUE;
480 break;
481
482 case TPM_REMOTE_HANDSHAKE:
483 ok = ReadBytes(s, (char*)&clientVersion, 4);
484 if(!ok)
485 return TRUE;
486 if( clientVersion == 0 )
487 {
488 printf("Unsupported client version (0).\n");
489 return TRUE;
490 }
491 ok &= WriteUINT32(s, ServerVersion);
492 ok &= WriteUINT32(s,
493 tpmInRawMode | tpmPlatformAvailable | tpmSupportsPP);
494 break;
495
496 case TPM_SET_ALTERNATIVE_RESULT:
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497 ok = ReadBytes(s, (char*)&result, 4);
498 if(!ok)
499 return TRUE;
500 // Alternative result is not applicable to the simulator.
501 break;
502
503 case TPM_SESSION_END:
504 // Client signaled end-of-session
505 return TRUE;
506
507 case TPM_STOP:
508 // Client requested the simulator to exit
509 return FALSE;
510 default:
511 printf("Unrecognized TPM interface command %d\n", Command);
512 return TRUE;
513 }
514 ok = WriteUINT32(s,0);
515 if(!ok)
516 return TRUE;
517 }
518 return FALSE;
519 }
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D.4 TPMCmdp.c
D.4.1. Description
This file contains the functions that process the commands received on the control port or the command
port of the simulator. The control port is used to allow simulation of hardware events (such as,
_TPM_Hash_Start()) to test the simulated TPM's reaction to those events. This improves code coverage
of the testing.
D.4.2. Includes and Data Definitions
1 #define _SWAP_H // Preclude inclusion of unnecessary simulator header
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3 #include <stdio.h>
4 #include <stdint.h>
5 #include <setjmp.h>
6 #include "bool.h"
7 #include "Platform.h"
8 #include "ExecCommand_fp.h"
9 #include "Manufacture_fp.h"
10 #include "DRTM_fp.h"
11 #include "_TPM_Init_fp.h"
12 #include "TpmFail_fp.h"
13 #include <windows.h>
14 #include "TpmTcpProtocol.h"
15 static BOOL s_isPowerOn = FALSE;
D.4.3. Functions
D.4.3.1. Signal_PowerOn()
This function processes a power-on indicataion. Amoung other things, it calls the _TPM_Init() hangler.
16 void
17 _rpc__Signal_PowerOn(
18 BOOL isReset
19 )
20 {
21 // if power is on and this is not a call to do TPM reset then return
22 if(s_isPowerOn && !isReset)
23 return;
24
25 // If this is a reset but power is not on, then return
26 if(isReset && !s_isPowerOn)
27 return;
28
29 // Pass power on signal to platform
30 if(isReset)
31 _plat__Signal_Reset();
32 else
33 _plat__Signal_PowerOn();
34
35 // Pass power on signal to TPM
36 _TPM_Init();
37
38 // Set state as power on
39 s_isPowerOn = TRUE;
40 }
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D.4.3.2. Signal_PowerOff()
This function processes the power off indication. Its primary funtion is to set a flag indicating that the next
power on indication should cause _TPM_Init() to be called.
41 void
42 _rpc__Signal_PowerOff(
43 void
44 )
45 {
46 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
47
48 // Pass power off signal to platform
49 _plat__Signal_PowerOff();
50
51 s_isPowerOn = FALSE;
52
53 return;
54 }
D.4.3.3. _rpc__ForceFailureMode()
This function is used to debug the Failure Mode logic of the TPM. It will set a flag in the TPM code such
that the next call to TPM2_SelfTest() will result in a failure, putting the TPM into Failure Mode.
55 void
56 _rpc__ForceFailureMode(
57 void
58 )
59 {
60 SetForceFailureMode();
61 }
D.4.3.4. _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn()
This function is called to simulate activation of the physical presence pin.
62 void
63 _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn(
64 void
65 )
66 {
67 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
68 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
69
70 // Pass physical presence on to platform
71 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOn();
72
73 return;
74 }
D.4.3.5. _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff()
This function is called to simulate deactivation of the physical presence pin.
75 void
76 _rpc__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff(
77 void
78 )
79 {
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80 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
81 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
82
83 // Pass physical presence off to platform
84 _plat__Signal_PhysicalPresenceOff();
85
86 return;
87 }
D.4.3.6. _rpc__Signal_Hash_Start()
This function is called to simulate a _TPM_Hash_Start() event. It will call
88 void
89 _rpc__Signal_Hash_Start(
90 void
91 )
92 {
93 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
94 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
95
96 // Pass _TPM_Hash_Start signal to TPM
97 Signal_Hash_Start();
98 return;
99 }
D.4.3.7. _rpc__Signal_Hash_Data()
This function is called to simulate a _TPM_Hash_Data() event.
100 void
101 _rpc__Signal_Hash_Data(
102 _IN_BUFFER input
103 )
104 {
105 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
106 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
107
108 // Pass _TPM_Hash_Data signal to TPM
109 Signal_Hash_Data(input.BufferSize, input.Buffer);
110 return;
111 }
D.4.3.8. _rpc__Signal_HashEnd()
This function is called to simulate a _TPM_Hash_End() event.
112 void
113 _rpc__Signal_HashEnd(
114 void
115 )
116 {
117 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
118 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
119
120 // Pass _TPM_HashEnd signal to TPM
121 Signal_Hash_End();
122 return;
123 }
Command interface Entry of a RPC call
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124 void
125 _rpc__Send_Command(
126 unsigned char locality,
127 _IN_BUFFER request,
128 _OUT_BUFFER *response
129 )
130 {
131 // If TPM is power off, reject any commands.
132 if(!s_isPowerOn) {
133 response->BufferSize = 0;
134 return;
135 }
136 // Set the locality of the command so that it doesn't change during the command
137 _plat__LocalitySet(locality);
138 // Do implementation-specific command dispatch
139 ExecuteCommand(request.BufferSize, request.Buffer,
140 &response->BufferSize, &response->Buffer);
141 return;
142
143 }
D.4.3.9. _rpc__Signal_CancelOn()
This function is used to turn on the indication to cancel a command in process. An executing command is
not interrupted. The command code may perodically check this indication to see if it should abort the
current command processing and returned TPM_RC_CANCELLED.
144 void
145 _rpc__Signal_CancelOn(
146 void
147 )
148 {
149 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
150 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
151
152 // Set the platform canceling flag.
153 _plat__SetCancel();
154
155 return;
156 }
D.4.3.10. _rpc__Signal_CancelOff()
This function is used to turn off the indication to cancel a command in process.
157 void
158 _rpc__Signal_CancelOff(
159 void
160 )
161 {
162 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
163 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
164
165 // Set the platform canceling flag.
166 _plat__ClearCancel();
167
168 return;
169 }
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D.4.3.11. _rpc__Signal_NvOn()
In a system where the NV memory used by the TPM is not within the TPM, the NV may not always be
available. This function turns on the indicator that indicates that NV is available.
170 void
171 _rpc__Signal_NvOn(
172 void
173 )
174 {
175 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
176 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
177
178 _plat__SetNvAvail();
179 return;
180 }
D.4.3.12. _rpc__Signal_NvOff()
This function is used to set the indication that NV memory is no longer available.
181 void
182 _rpc__Signal_NvOff(
183 void
184 )
185 {
186 // If TPM is power off, reject this signal
187 if(!s_isPowerOn) return;
188
189 _plat__ClearNvAvail();
190 return;
191 }
D.4.3.13. _rpc__Shutdown()
This function is used to stop the TPM simulator.
192 void
193 _rpc__Shutdown(
194 void
195 )
196 {
197 RPC_STATUS status;
198
199 // Stop TPM
200 TPM_TearDown();
201
202 status = RpcMgmtStopServerListening(NULL);
203 if (status != RPC_S_OK)
204 {
205 printf_s("RpcMgmtStopServerListening returned: 0x%x\n", status);
206 exit(status);
207 }
208
209 status = RpcServerUnregisterIf(NULL, NULL, FALSE);
210 if (status != RPC_S_OK)
211 {
212 printf_s("RpcServerUnregisterIf returned 0x%x\n", status);
213 exit(status);
214 }
215 }
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D.5 TPMCmds.c
D.5.1. Description
This file contains the entry point for the simulator.
D.5.2. Includes, Defines, Data Definitions, and Function Prototypes
1 #include <stdlib.h>
2 #include <stdio.h>
3 #include <stdint.h>
4 #include <ctype.h>
5 #include <windows.h>
6 #include <strsafe.h>
7 #include "string.h"
8 #include "TpmTcpProtocol.h"
9 #include "..\tpm\include\TpmBuildSwitches.h"
10 #include "..\tpm\include\prototypes\Manufacture_fp.h"
11 #define PURPOSE \
12 "TPM Reference Simulator.\nCopyright Microsoft 2010, 2011.\n"
13 #define DEFAULT_TPM_PORT 2321
14 void* MainPointer;
15 int _plat__NVEnable(void* platParameters);
16 void _plat__NVDisable();
17 int StartTcpServer(int PortNumber);
D.5.3. Functions
D.5.3.1. Usage()
This function prints the proper calling sequence for the simulator.
18 void
19 Usage(
20 char *pszProgramName
21 )
22 {
23 fprintf_s(stderr, "%s", PURPOSE);
24 fprintf_s(stderr, "Usage:\n");
25 fprintf_s(stderr, "%s - Starts the TPM server listening on port %d\n",
26 pszProgramName, DEFAULT_TPM_PORT);
27 fprintf_s(stderr,
28 "%s PortNum - Starts the TPM server listening on port PortNum\n",
29 pszProgramName);
30 fprintf_s(stderr, "%s ? - This message\n", pszProgramName);
31 exit(1);
32 }
D.5.3.2. main()
This is the main entry point for the simulator.
main: register the interface, start listening for clients
33 void __cdecl
34 main(
35 int argc,
36 char *argv[]
37 )
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38 {
39 int portNum = DEFAULT_TPM_PORT;
40 if(argc>2)
41 {
42 Usage(argv[0]);
43 }
44
45 if(argc==2)
46 {
47 if(strcmp(argv[1], "?") ==0)
48 {
49 Usage(argv[0]);
50 }
51 portNum = atoi(argv[1]);
52 if(portNum <=0 || portNum>65535)
53 {
54 Usage(argv[0]);
55 }
56 }
57 _plat__NVEnable(NULL);
58 if(TPM_Manufacture(1) != 0)
59 {
60 exit(1);
61 }
62 // Coverage test - repeated manufacturing attempt
63 if(TPM_Manufacture(0) != 1)
64 {
65 exit(2);
66 }
67 // Coverage test - re-manufacturing
68 TPM_TearDown();
69 if(TPM_Manufacture(1) != 0)
70 {
71 exit(3);
72 }
73 // Disable NV memory
74 _plat__NVDisable();
75
76 StartTcpServer(portNum);
77 return;
78 }
Family "2.0" TCG Published Page 561
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