###
### AutoPlay apps.
###
### This file defines the security policy for apps with the autoplay
### feature.
###
### The autoplay_app domain is a reduced permissions sandbox allowing
### ephemeral applications to be safely installed and run. Non ephemeral
### applications may also opt-in to autoplay to take advantage of the
### additional security features.
###
### PackageManager flags an app as autoplay at install time.
type autoplay_app, domain;

# allow JITing
allow autoplay_app self:process execmem;
allow autoplay_app ashmem_device:chr_file execute;

# Define and allow access to our own type for ashmem regions.
# Label ashmem objects with our own unique type.
tmpfs_domain(autoplay_app)
# Map with PROT_EXEC.
allow autoplay_app autoplay_app_tmpfs:file execute;

# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow autoplay_app zygote_tmpfs:file read;

# Send logcat messages to logd.
write_logd(autoplay_app)

# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
allow autoplay_app zygote:fd use;

# Notify zygote of death;
allow autoplay_app zygote:process sigchld;

# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow autoplay_app zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;

# App sandbox file accesses.
allow autoplay_app autoplay_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow autoplay_app autoplay_data_file:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;

# For /acct/uid/*/tasks.
allow autoplay_app cgroup:dir { search write };
allow autoplay_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;

# For art.
allow autoplay_app dalvikcache_data_file:file { execute r_file_perms };
allow autoplay_app dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow autoplay_app dalvikcache_data_file:dir getattr;

# Grant GPU access. autoplay_app needs that to render the standard UI.
allow autoplay_app gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# Use the Binder.
binder_use(autoplay_app)
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
binder_call(autoplay_app, surfaceflinger)
binder_call(autoplay_app, system_server)

# Allow read access to ion memory allocation device
allow autoplay_app ion_device:chr_file { read open };

# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
allow autoplay_app system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow autoplay_app system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
allow autoplay_app system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };

# Inherit or receive open files from system_server.
allow autoplay_app system_server:fd use;

# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
allow autoplay_app surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };

# Read files already opened under /data.
allow autoplay_app system_data_file:file { getattr read };
allow autoplay_app system_data_file:lnk_file read;

# System file accesses. Check for libraries
allow autoplay_app system_file:dir getattr;

# services
allow autoplay_app accessibility_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app activity_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app assetatlas_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app connectivity_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app display_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app graphicsstats_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app input_method_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app input_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow autoplay_app textservices_service:service_manager find;

###
### neverallow rules
###

# Receive or send uevent messages.
neverallow autoplay_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;

# Receive or send generic netlink messages
neverallow autoplay_app domain:netlink_socket *;

# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
neverallow autoplay_app debugfs:file read;

# execute gpu_device
neverallow autoplay_app gpu_device:chr_file execute;

# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
neverallow autoplay_app sysfs:file *;