blob: 47ccb554f5644b992d9987a0e5f11a3969cbd769 [file] [log] [blame]
###
### Untrusted apps.
###
### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
### directory). The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this
### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
### that are not signed by the platform key. To move
### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
### seapp_contexts.
###
### untrusted_app includes all the appdomain rules, plus the
### additional following rules:
###
type untrusted_app, domain;
app_domain(untrusted_app)
net_domain(untrusted_app)
bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
allow untrusted_app app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
# ASEC
allow untrusted_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
# Execute libs in asec containers.
allow untrusted_app asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(untrusted_app)
# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
# running "adb install foo.apk".
# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow untrusted_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
# cropping or taking user photos.
allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
#
# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
#
# Access to /data/media.
allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow untrusted_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
allow untrusted_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
# allow cts to query all services
allow untrusted_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
allow untrusted_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app radio_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow untrusted_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
')
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
allow untrusted_app self:process ptrace;
# Programs routinely attempt to scan through /system, looking
# for files. Suppress the denials when they occur.
dontaudit untrusted_app exec_type:file getattr;
# TODO: switch to meminfo service
allow untrusted_app proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;
# access /proc/net/xt_qtguid/stats
r_dir_file(untrusted_app, proc_net)
# Cts: HwRngTest
allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
allow untrusted_app sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;
###
### neverallow rules
###
# Receive or send uevent messages.
neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
# Receive or send generic netlink messages
neverallow untrusted_app domain:netlink_socket *;
# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
neverallow untrusted_app debugfs_type:file read;
# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
# services.
neverallow untrusted_app service_manager_type:service_manager add;
# Do not allow untrusted_apps to connect to the property service
# or set properties. b/10243159
neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow untrusted_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
# Do not allow untrusted_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
# and untrusted_app is allowed fork permission to itself.
neverallow untrusted_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
# Do not allow untrusted_app to hard link to any files.
# In particular, if untrusted_app links to other app data
# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted_app never has this
# capability.
neverallow untrusted_app file_type:file link;
# Do not allow untrusted_app to access network MAC address file
neverallow untrusted_app sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
# Do not allow untrusted_app access to /cache
neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
neverallow untrusted_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
# Do not allow untrusted_app to set system properties.
neverallow untrusted_app property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow untrusted_app property_type:property_service set;
# Do not allow untrusted_app to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
# internal storage or sdcard.
# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
# application un-installation.
neverallow untrusted_app {
fs_type
-fuse # sdcard
file_type
-app_data_file # The apps sandbox itself
-media_rw_data_file # Internal storage. Known that apps can
# leave artfacts here after uninstall.
userdebug_or_eng(`
-method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
-coredump_file # userdebug/eng only
')
}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
# Do not allow untrusted_app to directly open tun_device
neverallow untrusted_app tun_device:chr_file open;
# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
neverallow untrusted_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;