blob: b8b9066c17ef6b410731c65a6b97637b3988b597 [file] [log] [blame]
###
### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
###
### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
###
# Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
allow appdomain self:process execmem;
allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
allow appdomain zygote:fd use;
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
allow appdomain self:process ptrace;
# Read system properties managed by zygote.
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;
# Notify zygote of death;
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;
# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;
# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };
# Communication with other apps via fifos
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
# App sandbox file accesses.
allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open execmod };
# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
allow appdomain keychain_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain keychain_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Access to OEM provided data and apps
allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
# Execute the shell or other system executables.
allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;
# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };
# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };
# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };
# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
# They need that to render the standard UI.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app } gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
# Use the Binder.
binder_use(appdomain)
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
# are examined.
allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };
# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };
# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
allow appdomain radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };
# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
# cropping or taking user photos.
allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
# Access SDcard via the fuse mount.
allow appdomain fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
allow appdomain fuse:file create_file_perms;
# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
allow appdomain vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain vfat:file r_file_perms;
# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };
# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
# /data/dalvik-cache/profiles
allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:dir { search getattr };
allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };
# /data/resource-cache
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
###
### CTS-specific rules
###
# For cts/tools/device-setup/TestDeviceSetup/src/android/tests/getinfo/RootProcessScanner.java.
# Reads /proc/pid/status and statm entries to check that
# no unexpected root processes are running.
# Also for cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/VoldExploitTest.java
# Reads /proc/pid/cmdline of vold.
allow appdomain domain:dir { open read search getattr };
allow appdomain domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.
# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
selinux_check_access(appdomain)
selinux_check_context(appdomain)
# Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
allow appdomain domain:process getattr;
# logd access
read_logd(appdomain)
control_logd(appdomain)
# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
allow appdomain keystore:keystore_key { test get insert delete exist saw sign verify };
use_keystore(appdomain)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
###
# Superuser capabilities.
# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;
# Block device access.
neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# Access to any of the following character devices.
neverallow appdomain {
audio_device
camera_device
dm_device
radio_device
gps_device
rpmsg_device
}:chr_file { read write };
# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };
neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
{ read write };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
{ read write };
neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };
# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
neverallow appdomain
self:{
netlink_socket
netlink_firewall_socket
netlink_tcpdiag_socket
netlink_nflog_socket
netlink_xfrm_socket
netlink_audit_socket
netlink_ip6fw_socket
netlink_dnrt_socket
} *;
# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
# of rooting vulns in the past.
neverallow appdomain self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };
# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;
# Unix domain sockets.
neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow appdomain installd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app -nfc }
property_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;
# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;
# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;
# signal access to non-app domains.
# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
# All others prohibited.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
{ sigkill sigstop signal };
# Transition to a non-app domain.
# Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, etc.
neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:process
{ transition dyntransition };
# Write to rootfs.
neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to /system.
neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to entrypoint executables.
neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
# that should be writable by apps.
# Exception for system_app for Settings.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Write to various other parts of /data.
neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -shell }
shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
# Access to factory files.
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;
# Write to various pseudo file systems.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow appdomain
proc:dir_file_class_set write;
# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell }
kernel:system syslog_read;
# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;
# Ability to set system properties.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth -nfc }
property_type:property_service set;