diff --git a/original/linux/capability.h b/original/linux/capability.h
index c421123..ba478fa 100644
--- a/original/linux/capability.h
+++ b/original/linux/capability.h
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
  * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
  */
 
-#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
-#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+#define _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
@@ -84,27 +84,6 @@
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S     _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
 
-#else
-
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
-#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
-
-extern int file_caps_enabled;
-
-typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
-	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-} kernel_cap_t;
-
-/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
-struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
-	__u32 magic_etc;
-	kernel_cap_t permitted;
-	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
-};
-
-#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
-#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
-
 #endif
 
 
@@ -198,7 +177,7 @@
 /* Allow modification of routing tables */
 /* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
    sockets */
-/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW) */
 /* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
 /* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
 /* Allow clearing driver statistics */
@@ -210,6 +189,7 @@
 
 /* Allow use of RAW sockets */
 /* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */
 
 #define CAP_NET_RAW          13
 
@@ -359,8 +339,11 @@
 
 #define CAP_WAKE_ALARM            35
 
+/* Allow preventing system suspends */
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_WAKE_ALARM
+#define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND    36
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
@@ -371,186 +354,5 @@
 #define CAP_TO_INDEX(x)     ((x) >> 5)        /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
 #define CAP_TO_MASK(x)      (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
 
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
 
-struct dentry;
-struct user_namespace;
-
-struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
-
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
-extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
-
-/*
- * Internal kernel functions only
- */
-
-#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
-	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
-
-/*
- * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
- *
- * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
- * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
- *
- * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
- *
- * We could also define fsmask as follows:
- *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
- *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
- */
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
-			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
-
-# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-
-#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
-# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
-#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
-
-# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
-# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
-# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
-				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
-
-#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
-
-# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
-
-#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
-
-#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
-do {                                                                \
-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
-		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
-	}                                                           \
-} while (0)
-
-#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
-do {                                                                \
-	unsigned __capi;                                            \
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
-		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
-	}                                                           \
-} while (0)
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
-				       const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					 const kernel_cap_t b)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
-				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
-	return dest;
-}
-
-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	unsigned __capi;
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
-		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
-			return 0;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
- */
-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t dest;
-	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
-	return cap_isclear(dest);
-}
-
-/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
-
-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return cap_combine(a,
-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
-	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
-}
-
-static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
-					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
-	return cap_combine(a,
-			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
-}
-
-extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
-			      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern bool capable(int cap);
-extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
-
-/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
-extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
-
-#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
-
-#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */