| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "net/quic/quic_crypto_client_stream.h" |
| |
| #include "net/quic/crypto/crypto_protocol.h" |
| #include "net/quic/crypto/crypto_utils.h" |
| #include "net/quic/crypto/null_encrypter.h" |
| #include "net/quic/quic_client_session_base.h" |
| #include "net/quic/quic_protocol.h" |
| #include "net/quic/quic_session.h" |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl:: |
| ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl(QuicCryptoClientStream* stream) |
| : stream_(stream) {} |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl:: |
| ~ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl() {} |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::Run( |
| scoped_ptr<ChannelIDKey>* channel_id_key) { |
| if (stream_ == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| stream_->channel_id_key_.reset(channel_id_key->release()); |
| stream_->channel_id_source_callback_run_ = true; |
| stream_->channel_id_source_callback_ = NULL; |
| stream_->DoHandshakeLoop(NULL); |
| |
| // The ChannelIDSource owns this object and will delete it when this method |
| // returns. |
| } |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl::Cancel() { |
| stream_ = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl( |
| QuicCryptoClientStream* stream) |
| : stream_(stream) {} |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl:: |
| ~ProofVerifierCallbackImpl() {} |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::Run( |
| bool ok, |
| const string& error_details, |
| scoped_ptr<ProofVerifyDetails>* details) { |
| if (stream_ == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| stream_->verify_ok_ = ok; |
| stream_->verify_error_details_ = error_details; |
| stream_->verify_details_.reset(details->release()); |
| stream_->proof_verify_callback_ = NULL; |
| stream_->DoHandshakeLoop(NULL); |
| |
| // The ProofVerifier owns this object and will delete it when this method |
| // returns. |
| } |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::ProofVerifierCallbackImpl::Cancel() { |
| stream_ = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::QuicCryptoClientStream( |
| const QuicServerId& server_id, |
| QuicClientSessionBase* session, |
| ProofVerifyContext* verify_context, |
| QuicCryptoClientConfig* crypto_config) |
| : QuicCryptoStream(session), |
| next_state_(STATE_IDLE), |
| num_client_hellos_(0), |
| crypto_config_(crypto_config), |
| server_id_(server_id), |
| generation_counter_(0), |
| channel_id_sent_(false), |
| channel_id_source_callback_run_(false), |
| channel_id_source_callback_(NULL), |
| verify_context_(verify_context), |
| proof_verify_callback_(NULL) { |
| } |
| |
| QuicCryptoClientStream::~QuicCryptoClientStream() { |
| if (channel_id_source_callback_) { |
| channel_id_source_callback_->Cancel(); |
| } |
| if (proof_verify_callback_) { |
| proof_verify_callback_->Cancel(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::OnHandshakeMessage( |
| const CryptoHandshakeMessage& message) { |
| QuicCryptoStream::OnHandshakeMessage(message); |
| |
| if (message.tag() == kSCUP) { |
| if (!handshake_confirmed()) { |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_CRYPTO_UPDATE_BEFORE_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // |message| is an update from the server, so we treat it differently from a |
| // handshake message. |
| HandleServerConfigUpdateMessage(message); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Do not process handshake messages after the handshake is confirmed. |
| if (handshake_confirmed()) { |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_AFTER_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| DoHandshakeLoop(&message); |
| } |
| |
| bool QuicCryptoClientStream::CryptoConnect() { |
| next_state_ = STATE_INITIALIZE; |
| DoHandshakeLoop(NULL); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| int QuicCryptoClientStream::num_sent_client_hellos() const { |
| return num_client_hellos_; |
| } |
| |
| bool QuicCryptoClientStream::WasChannelIDSent() const { |
| return channel_id_sent_; |
| } |
| |
| bool QuicCryptoClientStream::WasChannelIDSourceCallbackRun() const { |
| return channel_id_source_callback_run_; |
| } |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::HandleServerConfigUpdateMessage( |
| const CryptoHandshakeMessage& server_config_update) { |
| DCHECK(server_config_update.tag() == kSCUP); |
| string error_details; |
| QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached = |
| crypto_config_->LookupOrCreate(server_id_); |
| QuicErrorCode error = crypto_config_->ProcessServerConfigUpdate( |
| server_config_update, |
| session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(), |
| cached, |
| &crypto_negotiated_params_, |
| &error_details); |
| |
| if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails( |
| error, "Server config update invalid: " + error_details); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // kMaxClientHellos is the maximum number of times that we'll send a client |
| // hello. The value 3 accounts for: |
| // * One failure due to an incorrect or missing source-address token. |
| // * One failure due the server's certificate chain being unavailible and the |
| // server being unwilling to send it without a valid source-address token. |
| static const int kMaxClientHellos = 3; |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::DoHandshakeLoop( |
| const CryptoHandshakeMessage* in) { |
| CryptoHandshakeMessage out; |
| QuicErrorCode error; |
| string error_details; |
| QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached = |
| crypto_config_->LookupOrCreate(server_id_); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| const State state = next_state_; |
| next_state_ = STATE_IDLE; |
| switch (state) { |
| case STATE_INITIALIZE: { |
| if (!cached->IsEmpty() && !cached->signature().empty() && |
| server_id_.is_https()) { |
| // Note that we verify the proof even if the cached proof is valid. |
| // This allows us to respond to CA trust changes or certificate |
| // expiration because it may have been a while since we last verified |
| // the proof. |
| DCHECK(crypto_config_->proof_verifier()); |
| // If the cached state needs to be verified, do it now. |
| next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF; |
| } else { |
| next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case STATE_SEND_CHLO: { |
| // Send the client hello in plaintext. |
| session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel(ENCRYPTION_NONE); |
| if (num_client_hellos_ > kMaxClientHellos) { |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_CRYPTO_TOO_MANY_REJECTS); |
| return; |
| } |
| num_client_hellos_++; |
| |
| if (!cached->IsComplete(session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow())) { |
| crypto_config_->FillInchoateClientHello( |
| server_id_, |
| session()->connection()->supported_versions().front(), |
| cached, &crypto_negotiated_params_, &out); |
| // Pad the inchoate client hello to fill up a packet. |
| const size_t kFramingOverhead = 50; // A rough estimate. |
| const size_t max_packet_size = |
| session()->connection()->max_packet_length(); |
| if (max_packet_size <= kFramingOverhead) { |
| DLOG(DFATAL) << "max_packet_length (" << max_packet_size |
| << ") has no room for framing overhead."; |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (kClientHelloMinimumSize > max_packet_size - kFramingOverhead) { |
| DLOG(DFATAL) << "Client hello won't fit in a single packet."; |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return; |
| } |
| out.set_minimum_size(max_packet_size - kFramingOverhead); |
| next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ; |
| SendHandshakeMessage(out); |
| return; |
| } |
| session()->config()->ToHandshakeMessage(&out); |
| error = crypto_config_->FillClientHello( |
| server_id_, |
| session()->connection()->connection_id(), |
| session()->connection()->supported_versions().front(), |
| cached, |
| session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(), |
| session()->connection()->random_generator(), |
| channel_id_key_.get(), |
| &crypto_negotiated_params_, |
| &out, |
| &error_details); |
| if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| // Flush the cached config so that, if it's bad, the server has a |
| // chance to send us another in the future. |
| cached->InvalidateServerConfig(); |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details); |
| return; |
| } |
| channel_id_sent_ = (channel_id_key_.get() != NULL); |
| if (cached->proof_verify_details()) { |
| client_session()->OnProofVerifyDetailsAvailable( |
| *cached->proof_verify_details()); |
| } |
| next_state_ = STATE_RECV_SHLO; |
| SendHandshakeMessage(out); |
| // Be prepared to decrypt with the new server write key. |
| session()->connection()->SetAlternativeDecrypter( |
| crypto_negotiated_params_.initial_crypters.decrypter.release(), |
| ENCRYPTION_INITIAL, |
| true /* latch once used */); |
| // Send subsequent packets under encryption on the assumption that the |
| // server will accept the handshake. |
| session()->connection()->SetEncrypter( |
| ENCRYPTION_INITIAL, |
| crypto_negotiated_params_.initial_crypters.encrypter.release()); |
| session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel( |
| ENCRYPTION_INITIAL); |
| if (!encryption_established_) { |
| encryption_established_ = true; |
| session()->OnCryptoHandshakeEvent( |
| QuicSession::ENCRYPTION_FIRST_ESTABLISHED); |
| } else { |
| session()->OnCryptoHandshakeEvent( |
| QuicSession::ENCRYPTION_REESTABLISHED); |
| } |
| return; |
| } |
| case STATE_RECV_REJ: |
| // We sent a dummy CHLO because we didn't have enough information to |
| // perform a handshake, or we sent a full hello that the server |
| // rejected. Here we hope to have a REJ that contains the information |
| // that we need. |
| if (in->tag() != kREJ) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE, |
| "Expected REJ"); |
| return; |
| } |
| error = crypto_config_->ProcessRejection( |
| *in, session()->connection()->clock()->WallNow(), cached, |
| server_id_.is_https(), &crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details); |
| if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(error, error_details); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (!cached->proof_valid()) { |
| if (!server_id_.is_https()) { |
| // We don't check the certificates for insecure QUIC connections. |
| SetCachedProofValid(cached); |
| } else if (!cached->signature().empty()) { |
| // Note that we only verify the proof if the cached proof is not |
| // valid. If the cached proof is valid here, someone else must have |
| // just added the server config to the cache and verified the proof, |
| // so we can assume no CA trust changes or certificate expiration |
| // has happened since then. |
| next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID; |
| break; |
| case STATE_VERIFY_PROOF: { |
| ProofVerifier* verifier = crypto_config_->proof_verifier(); |
| DCHECK(verifier); |
| next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE; |
| generation_counter_ = cached->generation_counter(); |
| |
| ProofVerifierCallbackImpl* proof_verify_callback = |
| new ProofVerifierCallbackImpl(this); |
| |
| verify_ok_ = false; |
| |
| QuicAsyncStatus status = verifier->VerifyProof( |
| server_id_.host(), |
| cached->server_config(), |
| cached->certs(), |
| cached->signature(), |
| verify_context_.get(), |
| &verify_error_details_, |
| &verify_details_, |
| proof_verify_callback); |
| |
| switch (status) { |
| case QUIC_PENDING: |
| proof_verify_callback_ = proof_verify_callback; |
| DVLOG(1) << "Doing VerifyProof"; |
| return; |
| case QUIC_FAILURE: |
| delete proof_verify_callback; |
| break; |
| case QUIC_SUCCESS: |
| delete proof_verify_callback; |
| verify_ok_ = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE: |
| if (!verify_ok_) { |
| client_session()->OnProofVerifyDetailsAvailable(*verify_details_); |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails( |
| QUIC_PROOF_INVALID, "Proof invalid: " + verify_error_details_); |
| return; |
| } |
| // Check if generation_counter has changed between STATE_VERIFY_PROOF |
| // and STATE_VERIFY_PROOF_COMPLETE state changes. |
| if (generation_counter_ != cached->generation_counter()) { |
| next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_PROOF; |
| } else { |
| SetCachedProofValid(cached); |
| cached->SetProofVerifyDetails(verify_details_.release()); |
| next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID; |
| } |
| break; |
| case STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID: { |
| next_state_ = STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID_COMPLETE; |
| channel_id_key_.reset(); |
| if (!RequiresChannelID(cached)) { |
| next_state_ = STATE_SEND_CHLO; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl* channel_id_source_callback = |
| new ChannelIDSourceCallbackImpl(this); |
| QuicAsyncStatus status = |
| crypto_config_->channel_id_source()->GetChannelIDKey( |
| server_id_.host(), &channel_id_key_, |
| channel_id_source_callback); |
| |
| switch (status) { |
| case QUIC_PENDING: |
| channel_id_source_callback_ = channel_id_source_callback; |
| DVLOG(1) << "Looking up channel ID"; |
| return; |
| case QUIC_FAILURE: |
| delete channel_id_source_callback; |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE, |
| "Channel ID lookup failed"); |
| return; |
| case QUIC_SUCCESS: |
| delete channel_id_source_callback; |
| break; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| case STATE_GET_CHANNEL_ID_COMPLETE: |
| if (!channel_id_key_.get()) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE, |
| "Channel ID lookup failed"); |
| return; |
| } |
| next_state_ = STATE_SEND_CHLO; |
| break; |
| case STATE_RECV_SHLO: { |
| // We sent a CHLO that we expected to be accepted and now we're hoping |
| // for a SHLO from the server to confirm that. |
| if (in->tag() == kREJ) { |
| // alternative_decrypter will be NULL if the original alternative |
| // decrypter latched and became the primary decrypter. That happens |
| // if we received a message encrypted with the INITIAL key. |
| if (session()->connection()->alternative_decrypter() == NULL) { |
| // The rejection was sent encrypted! |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT, |
| "encrypted REJ message"); |
| return; |
| } |
| next_state_ = STATE_RECV_REJ; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (in->tag() != kSHLO) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE, |
| "Expected SHLO or REJ"); |
| return; |
| } |
| // alternative_decrypter will be NULL if the original alternative |
| // decrypter latched and became the primary decrypter. That happens |
| // if we received a message encrypted with the INITIAL key. |
| if (session()->connection()->alternative_decrypter() != NULL) { |
| // The server hello was sent without encryption. |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails(QUIC_CRYPTO_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT, |
| "unencrypted SHLO message"); |
| return; |
| } |
| error = crypto_config_->ProcessServerHello( |
| *in, session()->connection()->connection_id(), |
| session()->connection()->server_supported_versions(), |
| cached, &crypto_negotiated_params_, &error_details); |
| |
| if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails( |
| error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details); |
| return; |
| } |
| error = |
| session()->config()->ProcessPeerHello(*in, SERVER, &error_details); |
| if (error != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| CloseConnectionWithDetails( |
| error, "Server hello invalid: " + error_details); |
| return; |
| } |
| session()->OnConfigNegotiated(); |
| |
| CrypterPair* crypters = |
| &crypto_negotiated_params_.forward_secure_crypters; |
| // TODO(agl): we don't currently latch this decrypter because the idea |
| // has been floated that the server shouldn't send packets encrypted |
| // with the FORWARD_SECURE key until it receives a FORWARD_SECURE |
| // packet from the client. |
| session()->connection()->SetAlternativeDecrypter( |
| crypters->decrypter.release(), ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE, |
| false /* don't latch */); |
| session()->connection()->SetEncrypter( |
| ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE, crypters->encrypter.release()); |
| session()->connection()->SetDefaultEncryptionLevel( |
| ENCRYPTION_FORWARD_SECURE); |
| |
| handshake_confirmed_ = true; |
| session()->OnCryptoHandshakeEvent(QuicSession::HANDSHAKE_CONFIRMED); |
| session()->connection()->OnHandshakeComplete(); |
| return; |
| } |
| case STATE_IDLE: |
| // This means that the peer sent us a message that we weren't expecting. |
| CloseConnection(QUIC_INVALID_CRYPTO_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void QuicCryptoClientStream::SetCachedProofValid( |
| QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) { |
| cached->SetProofValid(); |
| client_session()->OnProofValid(*cached); |
| } |
| |
| bool QuicCryptoClientStream::RequiresChannelID( |
| QuicCryptoClientConfig::CachedState* cached) { |
| if (!server_id_.is_https() || |
| server_id_.privacy_mode() == PRIVACY_MODE_ENABLED || |
| !crypto_config_->channel_id_source()) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| const CryptoHandshakeMessage* scfg = cached->GetServerConfig(); |
| if (!scfg) { // scfg may be null when we send an inchoate CHLO. |
| return false; |
| } |
| const QuicTag* their_proof_demands; |
| size_t num_their_proof_demands; |
| if (scfg->GetTaglist(kPDMD, &their_proof_demands, |
| &num_their_proof_demands) != QUIC_NO_ERROR) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < num_their_proof_demands; i++) { |
| if (their_proof_demands[i] == kCHID) { |
| return true; |
| } |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| QuicClientSessionBase* QuicCryptoClientStream::client_session() { |
| return reinterpret_cast<QuicClientSessionBase*>(session()); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace net |
