blob: 23af91c75787c06964b62ea5ea1ee393e6deb19d [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "extensions/common/csp_validator.h"
#include <vector>
#include "base/strings/string_split.h"
#include "base/strings/string_tokenizer.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
#include "extensions/common/constants.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
namespace extensions {
namespace csp_validator {
namespace {
const char kDefaultSrc[] = "default-src";
const char kScriptSrc[] = "script-src";
const char kObjectSrc[] = "object-src";
const char kSandboxDirectiveName[] = "sandbox";
const char kAllowSameOriginToken[] = "allow-same-origin";
const char kAllowTopNavigation[] = "allow-top-navigation";
struct DirectiveStatus {
explicit DirectiveStatus(const char* name)
: directive_name(name)
, seen_in_policy(false)
, is_secure(false) {
}
const char* directive_name;
bool seen_in_policy;
bool is_secure;
};
// Returns whether |url| starts with |scheme_and_separator| and does not have a
// too permissive wildcard host name. If |should_check_rcd| is true, then the
// Public suffix list is used to exclude wildcard TLDs such as "https://*.org".
bool isNonWildcardTLD(const std::string& url,
const std::string& scheme_and_separator,
bool should_check_rcd) {
if (!StartsWithASCII(url, scheme_and_separator, true))
return false;
size_t start_of_host = scheme_and_separator.length();
size_t end_of_host = url.find("/", start_of_host);
if (end_of_host == std::string::npos)
end_of_host = url.size();
// A missing host such as "chrome-extension://" is invalid, but for backwards-
// compatibility, accept such CSP parts. They will be ignored by Blink anyway.
// TODO(robwu): Remove this special case once crbug.com/434773 is fixed.
if (start_of_host == end_of_host)
return true;
// Note: It is sufficient to only compare the first character against '*'
// because the CSP only allows wildcards at the start of a directive, see
// host-source and host-part at http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-syntax
bool is_wildcard_subdomain = end_of_host > start_of_host + 2 &&
url[start_of_host] == '*' && url[start_of_host + 1] == '.';
if (is_wildcard_subdomain)
start_of_host += 2;
size_t start_of_port = url.rfind(":", end_of_host);
// The ":" check at the end of the following condition is used to avoid
// treating the last part of an IPv6 address as a port.
if (start_of_port > start_of_host && url[start_of_port - 1] != ':') {
bool is_valid_port = false;
// Do a quick sanity check. The following check could mistakenly flag
// ":123456" or ":****" as valid, but that does not matter because the
// relaxing CSP directive will just be ignored by Blink.
for (size_t i = start_of_port + 1; i < end_of_host; ++i) {
is_valid_port = IsAsciiDigit(url[i]) || url[i] == '*';
if (!is_valid_port)
break;
}
if (is_valid_port)
end_of_host = start_of_port;
}
std::string host(url, start_of_host, end_of_host - start_of_host);
// Global wildcards are not allowed.
if (host.empty() || host.find("*") != std::string::npos)
return false;
if (!is_wildcard_subdomain || !should_check_rcd)
return true;
// Allow *.googleapis.com to be whitelisted for backwards-compatibility.
// (crbug.com/409952)
if (host == "googleapis.com")
return true;
// Wildcards on subdomains of a TLD are not allowed.
size_t registry_length = net::registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
host,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
return registry_length != 0;
}
bool HasOnlySecureTokens(base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
Manifest::Type type) {
while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
std::string source = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&source);
// We might need to relax this whitelist over time.
if (source == "'self'" ||
source == "'none'" ||
source == "http://127.0.0.1" ||
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(source, "blob:") ||
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(source, "filesystem:") ||
LowerCaseEqualsASCII(source, "http://localhost") ||
StartsWithASCII(source, "http://127.0.0.1:", true) ||
StartsWithASCII(source, "http://localhost:", true) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source, "https://", true) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source, "chrome://", false) ||
isNonWildcardTLD(source,
std::string(extensions::kExtensionScheme) +
url::kStandardSchemeSeparator,
false) ||
StartsWithASCII(source, "chrome-extension-resource:", true)) {
continue;
}
// crbug.com/146487
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Manifest::TYPE_LEGACY_PACKAGED_APP) {
if (source == "'unsafe-eval'")
continue;
}
return false;
}
return true; // Empty values default to 'none', which is secure.
}
// Returns true if |directive_name| matches |status.directive_name|.
bool UpdateStatus(const std::string& directive_name,
base::StringTokenizer& tokenizer,
DirectiveStatus* status,
Manifest::Type type) {
if (status->seen_in_policy)
return false;
if (directive_name != status->directive_name)
return false;
status->seen_in_policy = true;
status->is_secure = HasOnlySecureTokens(tokenizer, type);
return true;
}
} // namespace
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(const std::string& policy) {
// We block these characters to prevent HTTP header injection when
// representing the content security policy as an HTTP header.
const char kBadChars[] = {',', '\r', '\n', '\0'};
return policy.find_first_of(kBadChars, 0, arraysize(kBadChars)) ==
std::string::npos;
}
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(const std::string& policy,
Manifest::Type type) {
// See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm.
std::vector<std::string> directives;
base::SplitString(policy, ';', &directives);
DirectiveStatus default_src_status(kDefaultSrc);
DirectiveStatus script_src_status(kScriptSrc);
DirectiveStatus object_src_status(kObjectSrc);
for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) {
std::string& input = directives[i];
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
if (!tokenizer.GetNext())
continue;
std::string directive_name = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&directive_name);
if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &default_src_status, type))
continue;
if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &script_src_status, type))
continue;
if (UpdateStatus(directive_name, tokenizer, &object_src_status, type))
continue;
}
if (script_src_status.seen_in_policy && !script_src_status.is_secure)
return false;
if (object_src_status.seen_in_policy && !object_src_status.is_secure)
return false;
if (default_src_status.seen_in_policy && !default_src_status.is_secure) {
return script_src_status.seen_in_policy &&
object_src_status.seen_in_policy;
}
return default_src_status.seen_in_policy ||
(script_src_status.seen_in_policy && object_src_status.seen_in_policy);
}
bool ContentSecurityPolicyIsSandboxed(
const std::string& policy, Manifest::Type type) {
// See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#parse-a-csp-policy for parsing algorithm.
std::vector<std::string> directives;
base::SplitString(policy, ';', &directives);
bool seen_sandbox = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < directives.size(); ++i) {
std::string& input = directives[i];
base::StringTokenizer tokenizer(input, " \t\r\n");
if (!tokenizer.GetNext())
continue;
std::string directive_name = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&directive_name);
if (directive_name != kSandboxDirectiveName)
continue;
seen_sandbox = true;
while (tokenizer.GetNext()) {
std::string token = tokenizer.token();
base::StringToLowerASCII(&token);
// The same origin token negates the sandboxing.
if (token == kAllowSameOriginToken)
return false;
// Platform apps don't allow navigation.
if (type == Manifest::TYPE_PLATFORM_APP) {
if (token == kAllowTopNavigation)
return false;
}
}
}
return seen_sandbox;
}
} // namespace csp_validator
} // namespace extensions