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page.title=Security Enhancements in Android 4.3
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<p>
Every Android release includes dozens of security enhancements to protect
users. The following are some of the security enhancements available
in Android 4.3:
</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Android sandbox reinforced with SELinux.</strong>
This release strengthens the Android sandbox using the SELinux
mandatory access control system (MAC) in the Linux kernel. SELinux
reinforcement is invisible to users and developers, and adds robustness
to the existing Android security model while maintaining compatibility
with existing applications. To ensure continued compatibility this release
allows the use of SELinux in a permissive mode. This mode logs any policy
violations, but will not break applications or affect system behavior.</li>
<li><strong>No setuid/setgid programs.</strong>
Added support for filesystem capabilities
to Android system files and removed all setuid/setguid programs.  This
reduces root attack surface and the likelihood of potential security
vulnerabilities.</li>
<li><strong>ADB Authentication.</strong>
Since Android 4.2.2, connections to ADB are
authenticated with an RSA keypair. This prevents unauthorized use of
ADB where the attacker has physical access to a device.</li>
<li><strong>Restrict Setuid from Android Apps.</strong>
The /system partition is now mounted
nosuid for zygote-spawned processes, preventing Android applications
from executing setuid programs. This reduces root attack surface and
the likelihood of potential security vulnerabilities.</li>
<li><strong>Capability bounding.</strong>
Android zygote and ADB now use prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP) to drop
unnecessary capabilities prior to executing applications.
This prevents Android applications and applications launched from
the shell from acquiring privileged capabilities.</li>
<li><strong>AndroidKeyStore Provider.</strong>
Android now has a keystore provider that allows
applications to create exclusive use keys. This provides applications
with an API to create or store private keys that cannot be used by
other applications.</li>
<li><strong>KeyChain isBoundKeyAlgorithm.</strong>
Keychain API now provides a method
(isBoundKeyType) that allows applications to confirm that system-wide keys
are bound to a hardware root of trust for the device. This provides
a place to create or store private keys that cannot be exported off the
device, even in the event of a root compromise.</li>
<li><strong>NO_NEW_PRIVS.</strong>
Android zygote now uses prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) to block addition
of new privileges prior to execution application code. This
prevents Android applications from performing operations which can
elevate privileges via execve. (This requires Linux kernel version 3.5
or greater).</li>
<li><strong>FORTIFY_SOURCE enhancements.</strong>
Enabled FORTIFY_SOURCE on Android x86 and MIPS
and fortified strchr(), strrchr(), strlen(), and umask() calls. This
can detect potential memory corruption vulnerabilities or unterminated
string constants.</li>
<li><strong>Relocation protections.</strong>
Enabled read only relocations (relro) for
statically linked executables and removed all text relocations in Android
code. This provides defense in depth against potential memory corruption
vulnerabilities.</li>
<li><strong>Improved EntropyMixer.</strong>
EntropyMixer now writes entropy at shutdown /
reboot, in addition to periodic mixing. This allows retention of all
entropy generated while devices are powered on, and is especially useful
for devices that are rebooted immediately after provisioning.</li>
<li><strong>Security Fixes.</strong>
Android 4.3 also includes fixes for Android-specific
vulnerabilities. Information about these vulnerabilities has been provided
to Open Handset Alliance members and fixes are available in Android Open
Source Project. To improve security, some devices with earlier versions
of Android may also include these fixes.</li>
</ul>