9.11. Keys and Credentials

The Android Keystore System allows app developers to store cryptographic keys in a container and use them in cryptographic operations through the KeyChain API or the Keystore API. Device implementations:

  • [C-0-1] MUST allow at least 8,192 keys to be imported or generated.
  • [C-0-2] The lock screen authentication MUST rate-limit attempts and MUST have an exponential backoff algorithm. Beyond 150 failed attempts, the delay MUST be at least 24 hours per attempt.
  • SHOULD not limit the number of keys that can be generated

When the device implementation supports a secure lock screen, it:

  • [C-1-1] MUST back up the keystore implementation with an isolated execution environment.
  • [C-1-2] MUST have implementations of RSA, AES, ECDSA and HMAC cryptographic algorithms and MD5, SHA1, and SHA-2 family hash functions to properly support the Android Keystore system's supported algorithms in an area that is securely isolated from the code running on the kernel and above. Secure isolation MUST block all potential mechanisms by which kernel or userspace code might access the internal state of the isolated environment, including DMA. The upstream Android Open Source Project (AOSP) meets this requirement by using the Trusty implementation, but another ARM TrustZone-based solution or a third-party reviewed secure implementation of a proper hypervisor-based isolation are alternative options.
  • [C-1-3] MUST perform the lock screen authentication in the isolated execution environment and only when successful, allow the authentication-bound keys to be used. Lock screen credentials MUST be stored in a way that allows only the isolated execution environment to perform lock screen authentication. The upstream Android Open Source Project provides the Gatekeeper Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) and Trusty, which can be used to satisfy this requirement.
  • [C-1-4] MUST support key attestation where the attestation signing key is protected by secure hardware and signing is performed in secure hardware. The attestation signing keys MUST be shared across large enough number of devices to prevent the keys from being used as device identifiers. One way of meeting this requirement is to share the same attestation key unless at least 100,000 units of a given SKU are produced. If more than 100,000 units of an SKU are produced, a different key MAY be used for each 100,000 units.
  • [C-1-5] MUST allow the user to choose the Sleep timeout for transition from the unlocked to the locked state, with a minimum allowable timout up to 15 seconds.

Note that if a device implementation is already launched on an earlier Android version, such a device is exempted from the requirement to have a keystore backed by an isolated execution environment and support the key attestation, unless it declares the android.hardware.fingerprint feature which requires a keystore backed by an isolated execution environment.

9.11.1. Secure Lock Screen

The AOSP implementation follows a tiered authentication model where a knowledge-factory based primary authentication can be backed by either a secondary strong biometric, or by weaker tertiary modalities.

Device implementations:

  • [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to set only one of the following as the primary authentication method:
    • A numerical PIN,
      
    • An alphanumerical password, or
      
    • A swipe pattern on a grid of exactly 3x3 dots.
      

Note that the above authentication methods are referred as the recommended primary authentication methods in this document.

If device implementations add or modify the recommended primary authentication methods and use a new authentication method as a secure way to lock the screen, the new authentication method:

If device implementations add or modify the authentication methods to unlock the lock screen if based on a known secret and use a new authentication method to be treated as a secure way to lock the screen:

  • [C-3-1] The entropy of the shortest allowed length of inputs MUST be greater than 10 bits.
  • [C-3-2] The maximum entropy of all possible inputs MUST be greater than 18 bits.
  • [C-3-3] The new authentication method MUST NOT replace any of the recommended primary authentication methods (i.e. PIN, pattern, password) implemented and provided in AOSP.
  • [C-3-4] The new authentication method MUST be disabled when the Device Policy Controller (DPC) application has set the password quality policy via the DevicePolicyManager.setPasswordQuality() method with a more restrictive quality constant than PASSWORD_QUALITY_SOMETHING.

If device implementations add or modify the recommended primary authentication methods to unlock the lock screen and use a new authentication method that is based on biometrics to be treated as a secure way to lock the screen, the new method:

  • [C-4-1] MUST meet all requirements described in section 7.3.10.2.
  • [C-4-2] MUST have a fall-back mechanism to use one of the recommended primary authentication methods which is based on a known secret.
  • [C-4-3] MUST be disabled and only allow the recommended primary authentication to unlock the screen when the Device Policy Controller (DPC) application has set the keguard feature policy by calling the method DevicePolicyManager.setKeyguardDisabledFeatures() , with any of the associated biometric flags (i.e. KEYGUARD_DISABLE_BIOMETRICS, KEYGUARD_DISABLE_FINGERPRINT, KEYGUARD_DISABLE_FACE, or KEYGUARD_DISABLE_IRIS).
  • [C-4-4] MUST challenge the user for the recommended primary authentication (e.g. PIN, pattern, password) at least once very 72 hours or less.
  • [C-4-5] MUST have a false acceptance rate that is equal or stronger than what is required for a fingerprint sensor as described in section section 7.3.10, or otherwise MUST be disabled and only allow the recommended primary authentication to unlock the screen when the Device Policy Controller (DPC) application has set the password quality policy via the DevicePolicyManager.setPasswordQuality() method with a more restrictive quality constant than PASSWORD_QUALITY_BIOMETRIC_WEAK.
  • [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to have spoof and imposter acceptance rates that are equal to or stronger than what is required for a fingerprint sensor as described in section 7.3.10.
  • [C-4-6] MUST have a secure processing pipeline such that an operating system or kernel compromise cannot allow data to be directly injected to falsely authenticate as the user.
  • [C-4-7] MUST be paired with an explicit confirm action (eg: a button press) to allow access to keystore keys if the application sets true for KeyGenParameterSpec.Built.setUserAuthenticationRequired() and the biometric is passive (e.g. face or iris where no explicit signal of intent exists).
  • [C-SR] The confirm action for passive biometrics is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to be secured such that an operating system or kernel compromise cannot spoof it. For example, this means that the confirm action based on a physical button is routed through an input-only general-purpose input/output (GPIO) pin of a secure element (SE) that cannot be driven by any other means than a physical button press.

If the biometric authentication methods do not meet the spoof and imposter acceptance rates as described in section 7.3.10:

  • [C-5-1] The methods MUST be disabled if the Device Policy Controller (DPC) application has set the password quality policy via the DevicePolicyManager.setPasswordQuality() method with a more restrictive quality constant than PASSWORD_QUALITY_BIOMETRIC_WEAK.
  • [C-5-2] The user MUST be challenged for the recommended primary authentication (eg: PIN, pattern, password) after any 4-hour idle timeout period. The idle timeout period is reset after any successful confirmation of the device credentials.
  • [C-5-3] The methods MUST NOT be treated as a secure lock screen, and MUST meet the requirements that start with C-8 in this section below.

If device implementations add or modify the authentication methods to unlock the lock screen and a new authentication method is based on a physical token or the location:

  • [C-6-1] They MUST have a fall-back mechanism to use one of the recommended primary authentication methods which is based on a known secret and meet the requirements to be treated as a secure lock screen.
  • [C-6-2] The new method MUST be disabled and only allow one of the recommended primary authentication methods to unlock the screen when the Device Policy Controller (DPC) application has set the policy with either the DevicePolicyManager.setKeyguardDisabledFeatures(KEYGUARD_DISABLE_TRUST_AGENTS) method or the DevicePolicyManager.setPasswordQuality() method with a more restrictive quality constant than PASSWORD_QUALITY_UNSPECIFIED.
  • [C-6-3] The user MUST be challenged for one of the recommended primary authentication methods (e.g.PIN, pattern, password) at least once every 72 hours or less.
  • [C-6-4] The new method MUST NOT be treated as a secure lock screen and MUST follow the constraints listed in C-8 below.

If device implementations have a secure lock screen and include one or more trust agent, which implements the TrustAgentService System API, they:

  • [C-7-1] MUST have clear indication in the settings menu and on the lock screen when device lock is deferred or can be unlocked by trust agent(s). For example, AOSP meets this requirement by showing a text description for the “Automatically lock setting” and “Power button instantly locks” in the settings menu and a distinguishable icon on the lock screen.
  • [C-7-2] MUST respect and fully implement all trust agent APIs in the DevicePolicyManager class, such as the KEYGUARD_DISABLE_TRUST_AGENTS constant.
  • [C-7-3] MUST NOT fully implement the TrustAgentService.addEscrowToken() function on a device that is used as a primary personal device (e.g. handheld) but MAY fully implement the function on device implementations that are typically shared (e.g. Android Television or Automotive device).
  • [C-7-4] MUST encrypt all stored tokens added by TrustAgentService.addEscrowToken().
  • [C-7-5] MUST NOT store the encryption key on the same device where the key is used. For example, it is allowed for a key stored on a phone to unlock a user account on a TV.
  • [C-7-6] MUST inform the user about the security implications before enabling the escrow token to decrypt the data storage.
  • [C-7-7] MUST have a fall-back mechanism to use one of the recommended primary authentication methods.
  • [C-7-8] The user MUST be challenged for one of the recommended primary authentication (eg: PIN, pattern, password) methods at least once every 72 hours or less.
  • [C-7-9] The user MUST be challenged for one of the recommended primary authentication (eg: PIN, pattern, password) methods after any 4-hour idle timeout period. The idle timeout period is reset after any successful confirmation of the device credentials.
  • [C-7-10] MUST NOT be treated as a secure lock screen and MUST follow the constraints listed in C-8 below.

If device implementations add or modify the authentication methods to unlock the lock screen that is not a secure lock screen as described above, and use a new authentication method to unlock the keyguard:

9.11.2. StrongBox

The Android Keystore System allows app developers to store cryptographic keys in a dedicated secure processor as well as the isolated execution environment described above.

Device implementations:

  • [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to support StrongBox.

If device implementations support StrongBox, they:

  • [C-1-1] MUST declare FEATURE_STRONGBOX_KEYSTORE.

  • [C-1-2] MUST provide dedicated secure hardware that is used to back keystore and secure user authentication.

  • [C-1-3] MUST have a discrete CPU that shares no cache, DRAM, coprocessors or other core resources with the application processor (AP).

  • [C-1-4] MUST ensure that any peripherals shared with the AP cannot alter StrongBox processing in any way, or obtain any information from the StrongBox. The AP MAY disable or block access to StrongBox.

  • [C-1-5] MUST have an internal clock with reasonable accuracy (+-10%) that is immune to manipulation by the AP.

  • [C-1-6] MUST have a true random number generator that produces uniformly-distributed and unpredictable output.

  • [C-1-7] MUST have tamper resistance, including resistance against physical penetration, and glitching.

  • [C-1-8] MUST have side-channel resistance, including resistance against leaking information via power, timing, electromagnetic radiation, and thermal radiation side channels.

  • [C-1-9] MUST have secure storage which ensures confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, consistency, and freshness of the contents. The storage MUST NOT be able to be read or altered, except as permitted by the StrongBox APIs.

  • To validate compliance with [C-1-3] through [C-1-9], device implementations:

  • [C-1-10] MUST include the hardware that is certified against the Secure IC Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 or evaluated by a nationally accredited testing laboratory incorporating High attack potential vulnerability assessment according to the Common Criteria Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards.

  • [C-1-11] MUST include the firmware that is evaluated by a nationally accredited testing laboratory incorporating High attack potential vulnerability assessment according to the Common Criteria Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards.

  • [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to include the hardware that is evaluated using a Security Target, Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 5, augmented by AVA_VAN.5. EAL 5 certification will likely become a requirement in a future release.

  • [C-SR] are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to provide insider attack resistance (IAR), which means that an insider with access to firmware signing keys cannot produce firmware that causes the StrongBox to leak secrets, to bypass functional security requirements or otherwise enable access to sensitive user data. The recommended way to implement IAR is to allow firmware updates only when the primary user password is provided via the IAuthSecret HAL. IAR will likely become a requirement in a future release.