9.10. Device Integrity
The following requirements ensure there is transparency to the status of the device integrity. Device implementations:
[C-0-1] MUST correctly report through the System API method
PersistentDataBlockManager.getFlashLockState() whether their bootloader state permits flashing of the system image. The
FLASH_LOCK_UNKNOWN state is reserved for device implementations upgrading from an earlier version of Android where this new system API method did not exist.
[C-0-2] MUST support Verified Boot for device integrity.
If device implementations are already launched without supporting Verified Boot on an earlier version of Android and can not add support for this feature with a system software update, they MAY be exempted from the requirement.
Verified Boot is a feature that guarantees the integrity of the device software. If device implementations support the feature, they:
- [C-1-1] MUST declare the platform feature flag
- [C-1-2] MUST perform verification on every boot sequence.
- [C-1-3] MUST start verification from an immutable hardware key that is the root of trust and go all the way up to the system partition.
- [C-1-4] MUST implement each stage of verification to check the integrity and authenticity of all the bytes in the next stage before executing the code in the next stage.
- [C-1-5] MUST use verification algorithms as strong as current recommendations from NIST for hashing algorithms (SHA-256) and public key sizes (RSA-2048).
- [C-1-6] MUST NOT allow boot to complete when system verification fails, unless the user consents to attempt booting anyway, in which case the data from any non-verified storage blocks MUST not be used.
- [C-1-7] MUST NOT allow verified partitions on the device to be modified unless the user has explicitly unlocked the bootloader.
- [C-SR] If there are multiple discrete chips in the device (e.g. radio, specialized image processor), the boot process of each of those chips is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to verify every stage upon booting.
- [C-1-8] MUST use tamper-evident storage: for storing whether the bootloader is unlocked. Tamper-evident storage means that the bootloader can detect if the storage has been tampered with from inside Android.
- [C-1-9] MUST prompt the user, while using the device, and require physical confirmation before allowing a transition from bootloader locked mode to bootloader unlocked mode.
- [C-1-10] MUST implement rollback protection for partitions used by Android (e.g. boot, system partitions) and use tamper-evident storage for storing the metadata used for determining the minimum allowable OS version.
- [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to verify all privileged app APK files with a chain of trust rooted in partitions protected by Verified Boot.
- [C-SR] Are STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to verify any executable artifacts loaded by a privileged app from outside its APK file (such as dynamically loaded code or compiled code) before executing them or STRONGLY RECOMMENDED not to execute them at all.
- SHOULD implement rollback protection for any component with persistent firmware (e.g. modem, camera) and SHOULD use tamper-evident storage for storing the metadata used for determining the minimum allowable version.
If device implementations are already launched without supporting C-1-8 through C-1-10 on an earlier version of Android and can not add support for these requirements with a system software update, they MAY be exempted from the requirements.
The upstream Android Open Source Project provides a preferred implementation of this feature in the
external/avb/ repository, which can be integrated into the bootloader used for loading Android.
- [C-0-3] MUST support cryptographically verifying file content against a trusted key without reading the whole file.
- [C-0-4] MUST NOT allow the read requests on a protected file to succeed when the read content do not verify against a trusted key.
- [C-0-5] MUST enable the above-described cryptographic file verification protection for all files for the package that is installed with trusted signature files as described here.
If device implementations are already launched without the ability to verify file content against a trusted key on an earlier Android version and can not add support for this feature with a system software update, they MAY be exempted from the requirement. The upstream Android Open Source project provides a preferred implementation of this feature based on the Linux kernel fs-verity feature.
If device implementations support the Android Protected Confirmation API they:
[C-3-1] MUST report
true for the
[C-3-2] MUST ensure that code running in the Android OS including its kernel, malicious or otherwise, cannot generate a positive response without user interaction.
[C-3-3] MUST ensure that the user has been able to review and approve the prompted message even in the event that the Android OS, including its kernel, is compromised.