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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H
#define _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H 1
#include <linux/bpf.h> /* for enum bpf_reg_type */
#include <linux/btf.h> /* for struct btf and btf_id() */
#include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
#include <linux/tnum.h>
/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
/* size of tmp_str_buf in bpf_verifier.
* we need at least 306 bytes to fit full stack mask representation
* (in the "-8,-16,...,-512" form)
*/
#define TMP_STR_BUF_LEN 320
/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
* "one of this state's descendants read this reg" (and therefore the reg is
* relevant for states_equal() checks).
* Write marks collect downwards and do not propagate; they record that "the
* straight-line code that reached this state (from its parent) wrote this reg"
* (and therefore that reads propagated from this state or its descendants
* should not propagate to its parent).
* A state with a write mark can receive read marks; it just won't propagate
* them to its parent, since the write mark is a property, not of the state,
* but of the link between it and its parent. See mark_reg_read() and
* mark_stack_slot_read() in kernel/bpf/verifier.c.
*/
enum bpf_reg_liveness {
REG_LIVE_NONE = 0, /* reg hasn't been read or written this branch */
REG_LIVE_READ32 = 0x1, /* reg was read, so we're sensitive to initial value */
REG_LIVE_READ64 = 0x2, /* likewise, but full 64-bit content matters */
REG_LIVE_READ = REG_LIVE_READ32 | REG_LIVE_READ64,
REG_LIVE_WRITTEN = 0x4, /* reg was written first, screening off later reads */
REG_LIVE_DONE = 0x8, /* liveness won't be updating this register anymore */
};
/* For every reg representing a map value or allocated object pointer,
* we consider the tuple of (ptr, id) for them to be unique in verifier
* context and conside them to not alias each other for the purposes of
* tracking lock state.
*/
struct bpf_active_lock {
/* This can either be reg->map_ptr or reg->btf. If ptr is NULL,
* there's no active lock held, and other fields have no
* meaning. If non-NULL, it indicates that a lock is held and
* id member has the reg->id of the register which can be >= 0.
*/
void *ptr;
/* This will be reg->id */
u32 id;
};
#define ITER_PREFIX "bpf_iter_"
enum bpf_iter_state {
BPF_ITER_STATE_INVALID, /* for non-first slot */
BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE,
BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED,
};
struct bpf_reg_state {
/* Ordering of fields matters. See states_equal() */
enum bpf_reg_type type;
/* Fixed part of pointer offset, pointer types only */
s32 off;
union {
/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
int range;
/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
*/
struct {
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
/* To distinguish map lookups from outer map
* the map_uid is non-zero for registers
* pointing to inner maps.
*/
u32 map_uid;
};
/* for PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
struct {
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id;
};
struct { /* for PTR_TO_MEM | PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL */
u32 mem_size;
u32 dynptr_id; /* for dynptr slices */
};
/* For dynptr stack slots */
struct {
enum bpf_dynptr_type type;
/* A dynptr is 16 bytes so it takes up 2 stack slots.
* We need to track which slot is the first slot
* to protect against cases where the user may try to
* pass in an address starting at the second slot of the
* dynptr.
*/
bool first_slot;
} dynptr;
/* For bpf_iter stack slots */
struct {
/* BTF container and BTF type ID describing
* struct bpf_iter_<type> of an iterator state
*/
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id;
/* packing following two fields to fit iter state into 16 bytes */
enum bpf_iter_state state:2;
int depth:30;
} iter;
/* Max size from any of the above. */
struct {
unsigned long raw1;
unsigned long raw2;
} raw;
u32 subprogno; /* for PTR_TO_FUNC */
};
/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
* the actual value.
* For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
* from the pointed-to object, and is shared with all bpf_reg_states
* with the same id as us.
*/
struct tnum var_off;
/* Used to determine if any memory access using this register will
* result in a bad access.
* These refer to the same value as var_off, not necessarily the actual
* contents of the register.
*/
s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
s32 s32_min_value; /* minimum possible (s32)value */
s32 s32_max_value; /* maximum possible (s32)value */
u32 u32_min_value; /* minimum possible (u32)value */
u32 u32_max_value; /* maximum possible (u32)value */
/* For PTR_TO_PACKET, used to find other pointers with the same variable
* offset, so they can share range knowledge.
* For PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL this is used to share which map value we
* came from, when one is tested for != NULL.
* For PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL this is used to identify memory allocation
* for the purpose of tracking that it's freed.
* For PTR_TO_SOCKET this is used to share which pointers retain the
* same reference to the socket, to determine proper reference freeing.
* For stack slots that are dynptrs, this is used to track references to
* the dynptr to determine proper reference freeing.
* Similarly to dynptrs, we use ID to track "belonging" of a reference
* to a specific instance of bpf_iter.
*/
u32 id;
/* PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK could be a ptr returned
* from a pointer-cast helper, bpf_sk_fullsock() and
* bpf_tcp_sock().
*
* Consider the following where "sk" is a reference counted
* pointer returned from "sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();":
*
* 1: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp();
* 2: if (!sk) { return 0; }
* 3: fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);
* 4: if (!fullsock) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
* 5: tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);
* 6: if (!tp) { bpf_sk_release(sk); return 0; }
* 7: bpf_sk_release(sk);
* 8: snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd; // verifier will complain
*
* After bpf_sk_release(sk) at line 7, both "fullsock" ptr and
* "tp" ptr should be invalidated also. In order to do that,
* the reg holding "fullsock" and "sk" need to remember
* the original refcounted ptr id (i.e. sk_reg->id) in ref_obj_id
* such that the verifier can reset all regs which have
* ref_obj_id matching the sk_reg->id.
*
* sk_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->id at line 1.
* sk_reg->id will stay as NULL-marking purpose only.
* After NULL-marking is done, sk_reg->id can be reset to 0.
*
* After "fullsock = bpf_sk_fullsock(sk);" at line 3,
* fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id is set to sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
*
* After "tp = bpf_tcp_sock(fullsock);" at line 5,
* tp_reg->ref_obj_id is set to fullsock_reg->ref_obj_id
* which is the same as sk_reg->ref_obj_id.
*
* From the verifier perspective, if sk, fullsock and tp
* are not NULL, they are the same ptr with different
* reg->type. In particular, bpf_sk_release(tp) is also
* allowed and has the same effect as bpf_sk_release(sk).
*/
u32 ref_obj_id;
/* parentage chain for liveness checking */
struct bpf_reg_state *parent;
/* Inside the callee two registers can be both PTR_TO_STACK like
* R1=fp-8 and R2=fp-8, but one of them points to this function stack
* while another to the caller's stack. To differentiate them 'frameno'
* is used which is an index in bpf_verifier_state->frame[] array
* pointing to bpf_func_state.
*/
u32 frameno;
/* Tracks subreg definition. The stored value is the insn_idx of the
* writing insn. This is safe because subreg_def is used before any insn
* patching which only happens after main verification finished.
*/
s32 subreg_def;
enum bpf_reg_liveness live;
/* if (!precise && SCALAR_VALUE) min/max/tnum don't affect safety */
bool precise;
};
enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
STACK_MISC, /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
STACK_ZERO, /* BPF program wrote constant zero */
/* A dynptr is stored in this stack slot. The type of dynptr
* is stored in bpf_stack_state->spilled_ptr.dynptr.type
*/
STACK_DYNPTR,
STACK_ITER,
};
#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
#define BPF_REGMASK_ARGS ((1 << BPF_REG_1) | (1 << BPF_REG_2) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_3) | (1 << BPF_REG_4) | \
(1 << BPF_REG_5))
#define BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE sizeof(struct bpf_dynptr_kern)
#define BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS (BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE / BPF_REG_SIZE)
struct bpf_stack_state {
struct bpf_reg_state spilled_ptr;
u8 slot_type[BPF_REG_SIZE];
};
struct bpf_reference_state {
/* Track each reference created with a unique id, even if the same
* instruction creates the reference multiple times (eg, via CALL).
*/
int id;
/* Instruction where the allocation of this reference occurred. This
* is used purely to inform the user of a reference leak.
*/
int insn_idx;
/* There can be a case like:
* main (frame 0)
* cb (frame 1)
* func (frame 3)
* cb (frame 4)
* Hence for frame 4, if callback_ref just stored boolean, it would be
* impossible to distinguish nested callback refs. Hence store the
* frameno and compare that to callback_ref in check_reference_leak when
* exiting a callback function.
*/
int callback_ref;
};
struct bpf_retval_range {
s32 minval;
s32 maxval;
};
/* state of the program:
* type of all registers and stack info
*/
struct bpf_func_state {
struct bpf_reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
/* index of call instruction that called into this func */
int callsite;
/* stack frame number of this function state from pov of
* enclosing bpf_verifier_state.
* 0 = main function, 1 = first callee.
*/
u32 frameno;
/* subprog number == index within subprog_info
* zero == main subprog
*/
u32 subprogno;
/* Every bpf_timer_start will increment async_entry_cnt.
* It's used to distinguish:
* void foo(void) { for(;;); }
* void foo(void) { bpf_timer_set_callback(,foo); }
*/
u32 async_entry_cnt;
struct bpf_retval_range callback_ret_range;
bool in_callback_fn;
bool in_async_callback_fn;
bool in_exception_callback_fn;
/* For callback calling functions that limit number of possible
* callback executions (e.g. bpf_loop) keeps track of current
* simulated iteration number.
* Value in frame N refers to number of times callback with frame
* N+1 was simulated, e.g. for the following call:
*
* bpf_loop(..., fn, ...); | suppose current frame is N
* | fn would be simulated in frame N+1
* | number of simulations is tracked in frame N
*/
u32 callback_depth;
/* The following fields should be last. See copy_func_state() */
int acquired_refs;
struct bpf_reference_state *refs;
/* The state of the stack. Each element of the array describes BPF_REG_SIZE
* (i.e. 8) bytes worth of stack memory.
* stack[0] represents bytes [*(r10-8)..*(r10-1)]
* stack[1] represents bytes [*(r10-16)..*(r10-9)]
* ...
* stack[allocated_stack/8 - 1] represents [*(r10-allocated_stack)..*(r10-allocated_stack+7)]
*/
struct bpf_stack_state *stack;
/* Size of the current stack, in bytes. The stack state is tracked below, in
* `stack`. allocated_stack is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE.
*/
int allocated_stack;
};
#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
/* instruction history flags, used in bpf_jmp_history_entry.flags field */
enum {
/* instruction references stack slot through PTR_TO_STACK register;
* we also store stack's frame number in lower 3 bits (MAX_CALL_FRAMES is 8)
* and accessed stack slot's index in next 6 bits (MAX_BPF_STACK is 512,
* 8 bytes per slot, so slot index (spi) is [0, 63])
*/
INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK = 0x7, /* 3 bits */
INSN_F_SPI_MASK = 0x3f, /* 6 bits */
INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT = 3, /* shifted 3 bits to the left */
INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS = BIT(9), /* we need 10 bits total */
};
static_assert(INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES);
static_assert(INSN_F_SPI_MASK + 1 >= MAX_BPF_STACK / 8);
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry {
u32 idx;
/* insn idx can't be bigger than 1 million */
u32 prev_idx : 22;
/* special flags, e.g., whether insn is doing register stack spill/load */
u32 flags : 10;
};
/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES)
struct bpf_verifier_state {
/* call stack tracking */
struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent;
/*
* 'branches' field is the number of branches left to explore:
* 0 - all possible paths from this state reached bpf_exit or
* were safely pruned
* 1 - at least one path is being explored.
* This state hasn't reached bpf_exit
* 2 - at least two paths are being explored.
* This state is an immediate parent of two children.
* One is fallthrough branch with branches==1 and another
* state is pushed into stack (to be explored later) also with
* branches==1. The parent of this state has branches==1.
* The verifier state tree connected via 'parent' pointer looks like:
* 1
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 1
* 1 bpf_exit.
*
* Once do_check() reaches bpf_exit, it calls update_branch_counts()
* and the verifier state tree will look:
* 1
* 1
* 2 -> 1 (first 'if' pushed into stack)
* 1
* 1 -> 1 (second 'if' pushed into stack)
* 0
* 0
* 0 bpf_exit.
* After pop_stack() the do_check() will resume at second 'if'.
*
* If is_state_visited() sees a state with branches > 0 it means
* there is a loop. If such state is exactly equal to the current state
* it's an infinite loop. Note states_equal() checks for states
* equivalency, so two states being 'states_equal' does not mean
* infinite loop. The exact comparison is provided by
* states_maybe_looping() function. It's a stronger pre-check and
* much faster than states_equal().
*
* This algorithm may not find all possible infinite loops or
* loop iteration count may be too high.
* In such cases BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS limit kicks in.
*/
u32 branches;
u32 insn_idx;
u32 curframe;
struct bpf_active_lock active_lock;
bool speculative;
bool active_rcu_lock;
/* If this state was ever pointed-to by other state's loop_entry field
* this flag would be set to true. Used to avoid freeing such states
* while they are still in use.
*/
bool used_as_loop_entry;
/* first and last insn idx of this verifier state */
u32 first_insn_idx;
u32 last_insn_idx;
/* If this state is a part of states loop this field points to some
* parent of this state such that:
* - it is also a member of the same states loop;
* - DFS states traversal starting from initial state visits loop_entry
* state before this state.
* Used to compute topmost loop entry for state loops.
* State loops might appear because of open coded iterators logic.
* See get_loop_entry() for more information.
*/
struct bpf_verifier_state *loop_entry;
/* jmp history recorded from first to last.
* backtracking is using it to go from last to first.
* For most states jmp_history_cnt is [0-3].
* For loops can go up to ~40.
*/
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *jmp_history;
u32 jmp_history_cnt;
u32 dfs_depth;
u32 callback_unroll_depth;
};
#define bpf_get_spilled_reg(slot, frame, mask) \
(((slot < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \
((1 << frame->stack[slot].slot_type[0]) & (mask))) \
? &frame->stack[slot].spilled_ptr : NULL)
/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled register. */
#define bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(iter, frame, reg, mask) \
for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask); \
iter < frame->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; \
iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask))
#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(__vst, __state, __reg, __mask, __expr) \
({ \
struct bpf_verifier_state *___vstate = __vst; \
int ___i, ___j; \
for (___i = 0; ___i <= ___vstate->curframe; ___i++) { \
struct bpf_reg_state *___regs; \
__state = ___vstate->frame[___i]; \
___regs = __state->regs; \
for (___j = 0; ___j < MAX_BPF_REG; ___j++) { \
__reg = &___regs[___j]; \
(void)(__expr); \
} \
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \
if (!__reg) \
continue; \
(void)(__expr); \
} \
} \
})
/* Invoke __expr over regsiters in __vst, setting __state and __reg */
#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(__vst, __state, __reg, __expr) \
bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(__vst, __state, __reg, 1 << STACK_SPILL, __expr)
/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list {
struct bpf_verifier_state state;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *next;
int miss_cnt, hit_cnt;
};
struct bpf_loop_inline_state {
unsigned int initialized:1; /* set to true upon first entry */
unsigned int fit_for_inline:1; /* true if callback function is the same
* at each call and flags are always zero
*/
u32 callback_subprogno; /* valid when fit_for_inline is true */
};
/* Possible states for alu_state member. */
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC (1U << 0)
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST (1U << 1)
#define BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE (1U << 2)
#define BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER (1U << 3)
#define BPF_ALU_IMMEDIATE (1U << 4)
#define BPF_ALU_SANITIZE (BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC | \
BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST)
struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
union {
enum bpf_reg_type ptr_type; /* pointer type for load/store insns */
unsigned long map_ptr_state; /* pointer/poison value for maps */
s32 call_imm; /* saved imm field of call insn */
u32 alu_limit; /* limit for add/sub register with pointer */
struct {
u32 map_index; /* index into used_maps[] */
u32 map_off; /* offset from value base address */
};
struct {
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type; /* type of pseudo_btf_id */
union {
struct {
struct btf *btf;
u32 btf_id; /* btf_id for struct typed var */
};
u32 mem_size; /* mem_size for non-struct typed var */
};
} btf_var;
/* if instruction is a call to bpf_loop this field tracks
* the state of the relevant registers to make decision about inlining
*/
struct bpf_loop_inline_state loop_inline_state;
};
union {
/* remember the size of type passed to bpf_obj_new to rewrite R1 */
u64 obj_new_size;
/* remember the offset of node field within type to rewrite */
u64 insert_off;
};
struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta;
u64 map_key_state; /* constant (32 bit) key tracking for maps */
int ctx_field_size; /* the ctx field size for load insn, maybe 0 */
u32 seen; /* this insn was processed by the verifier at env->pass_cnt */
bool sanitize_stack_spill; /* subject to Spectre v4 sanitation */
bool zext_dst; /* this insn zero extends dst reg */
bool storage_get_func_atomic; /* bpf_*_storage_get() with atomic memory alloc */
bool is_iter_next; /* bpf_iter_<type>_next() kfunc call */
bool call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr; /* {this,per}_cpu_ptr() with prog percpu alloc */
u8 alu_state; /* used in combination with alu_limit */
/* below fields are initialized once */
unsigned int orig_idx; /* original instruction index */
bool jmp_point;
bool prune_point;
/* ensure we check state equivalence and save state checkpoint and
* this instruction, regardless of any heuristics
*/
bool force_checkpoint;
/* true if instruction is a call to a helper function that
* accepts callback function as a parameter.
*/
bool calls_callback;
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
#define MAX_USED_BTFS 64 /* max number of BTFs accessed by one BPF program */
#define BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE 1024
struct bpf_verifier_log {
/* Logical start and end positions of a "log window" of the verifier log.
* start_pos == 0 means we haven't truncated anything.
* Once truncation starts to happen, start_pos + len_total == end_pos,
* except during log reset situations, in which (end_pos - start_pos)
* might get smaller than len_total (see bpf_vlog_reset()).
* Generally, (end_pos - start_pos) gives number of useful data in
* user log buffer.
*/
u64 start_pos;
u64 end_pos;
char __user *ubuf;
u32 level;
u32 len_total;
u32 len_max;
char kbuf[BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE];
};
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 1
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 2
#define BPF_LOG_STATS 4
#define BPF_LOG_FIXED 8
#define BPF_LOG_LEVEL (BPF_LOG_LEVEL1 | BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
#define BPF_LOG_MASK (BPF_LOG_LEVEL | BPF_LOG_STATS | BPF_LOG_FIXED)
#define BPF_LOG_KERNEL (BPF_LOG_MASK + 1) /* kernel internal flag */
#define BPF_LOG_MIN_ALIGNMENT 8U
#define BPF_LOG_ALIGNMENT 40U
static inline bool bpf_verifier_log_needed(const struct bpf_verifier_log *log)
{
return log && log->level;
}
#define BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS 256
struct bpf_subprog_arg_info {
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type;
union {
u32 mem_size;
};
};
struct bpf_subprog_info {
/* 'start' has to be the first field otherwise find_subprog() won't work */
u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
bool has_tail_call: 1;
bool tail_call_reachable: 1;
bool has_ld_abs: 1;
bool is_cb: 1;
bool is_async_cb: 1;
bool is_exception_cb: 1;
bool args_cached: 1;
u8 arg_cnt;
struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS];
};
struct bpf_verifier_env;
struct backtrack_state {
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
u32 frame;
u32 reg_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
u64 stack_masks[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
};
struct bpf_id_pair {
u32 old;
u32 cur;
};
struct bpf_idmap {
u32 tmp_id_gen;
struct bpf_id_pair map[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
};
struct bpf_idset {
u32 count;
u32 ids[BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE];
};
/* single container for all structs
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
*/
struct bpf_verifier_env {
u32 insn_idx;
u32 prev_insn_idx;
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
int stack_size; /* number of states to be processed */
bool strict_alignment; /* perform strict pointer alignment checks */
bool test_state_freq; /* test verifier with different pruning frequency */
bool test_reg_invariants; /* fail verification on register invariants violations */
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_state; /* current verifier state */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_states; /* search pruning optimization */
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *free_list;
struct bpf_map *used_maps[MAX_USED_MAPS]; /* array of map's used by eBPF program */
struct btf_mod_pair used_btfs[MAX_USED_BTFS]; /* array of BTF's used by BPF program */
u32 used_map_cnt; /* number of used maps */
u32 used_btf_cnt; /* number of used BTF objects */
u32 id_gen; /* used to generate unique reg IDs */
u32 hidden_subprog_cnt; /* number of hidden subprogs */
int exception_callback_subprog;
bool explore_alu_limits;
bool allow_ptr_leaks;
/* Allow access to uninitialized stack memory. Writes with fixed offset are
* always allowed, so this refers to reads (with fixed or variable offset),
* to writes with variable offset and to indirect (helper) accesses.
*/
bool allow_uninit_stack;
bool bpf_capable;
bool bypass_spec_v1;
bool bypass_spec_v4;
bool seen_direct_write;
bool seen_exception;
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux_data; /* array of per-insn state */
const struct bpf_line_info *prev_linfo;
struct bpf_verifier_log log;
struct bpf_subprog_info subprog_info[BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS + 2]; /* max + 2 for the fake and exception subprogs */
union {
struct bpf_idmap idmap_scratch;
struct bpf_idset idset_scratch;
};
struct {
int *insn_state;
int *insn_stack;
int cur_stack;
} cfg;
struct backtrack_state bt;
struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *cur_hist_ent;
u32 pass_cnt; /* number of times do_check() was called */
u32 subprog_cnt;
/* number of instructions analyzed by the verifier */
u32 prev_insn_processed, insn_processed;
/* number of jmps, calls, exits analyzed so far */
u32 prev_jmps_processed, jmps_processed;
/* total verification time */
u64 verification_time;
/* maximum number of verifier states kept in 'branching' instructions */
u32 max_states_per_insn;
/* total number of allocated verifier states */
u32 total_states;
/* some states are freed during program analysis.
* this is peak number of states. this number dominates kernel
* memory consumption during verification
*/
u32 peak_states;
/* longest register parentage chain walked for liveness marking */
u32 longest_mark_read_walk;
bpfptr_t fd_array;
/* bit mask to keep track of whether a register has been accessed
* since the last time the function state was printed
*/
u32 scratched_regs;
/* Same as scratched_regs but for stack slots */
u64 scratched_stack_slots;
u64 prev_log_pos, prev_insn_print_pos;
/* buffer used to generate temporary string representations,
* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string
*/
char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN];
};
static inline struct bpf_func_info_aux *subprog_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
{
return &env->prog->aux->func_info_aux[subprog];
}
static inline struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
{
return &env->subprog_info[subprog];
}
__printf(2, 0) void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const char *fmt, va_list args);
__printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const char *fmt, ...);
__printf(2, 3) void bpf_log(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const char *fmt, ...);
int bpf_vlog_init(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 log_level,
char __user *log_buf, u32 log_size);
void bpf_vlog_reset(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u64 new_pos);
int bpf_vlog_finalize(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, u32 *log_size_actual);
__printf(3, 4) void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
u32 insn_off,
const char *prefix_fmt, ...);
static inline struct bpf_func_state *cur_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
return cur->frame[cur->curframe];
}
static inline struct bpf_reg_state *cur_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
return cur_func(env)->regs;
}
int bpf_prog_offload_verifier_prep(struct bpf_prog *prog);
int bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx);
int bpf_prog_offload_finalize(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
void
bpf_prog_offload_replace_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
struct bpf_insn *insn);
void
bpf_prog_offload_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt);
/* this lives here instead of in bpf.h because it needs to dereference tgt_prog */
static inline u64 bpf_trampoline_compute_key(const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
{
if (tgt_prog)
return ((u64)tgt_prog->aux->id << 32) | btf_id;
else
return ((u64)btf_obj_id(btf) << 32) | 0x80000000 | btf_id;
}
/* unpack the IDs from the key as constructed above */
static inline void bpf_trampoline_unpack_key(u64 key, u32 *obj_id, u32 *btf_id)
{
if (obj_id)
*obj_id = key >> 32;
if (btf_id)
*btf_id = key & 0x7FFFFFFF;
}
int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
const struct bpf_prog *prog,
const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
u32 btf_id,
struct bpf_attach_target_info *tgt_info);
void bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(struct bpf_kfunc_btf_tab *tab);
int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno);
#define BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(BPF_BASE_TYPE_BITS - 1, 0)
/* extract base type from bpf_{arg, return, reg}_type. */
static inline u32 base_type(u32 type)
{
return type & BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK;
}
/* extract flags from an extended type. See bpf_type_flag in bpf.h. */
static inline u32 type_flag(u32 type)
{
return type & ~BPF_BASE_TYPE_MASK;
}
/* only use after check_attach_btf_id() */
static inline enum bpf_prog_type resolve_prog_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT ?
prog->aux->dst_prog->type : prog->type;
}
static inline bool bpf_prog_check_recur(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
switch (resolve_prog_type(prog)) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
return prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_ITER;
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
#define BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS (MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED | NON_OWN_REF)
static inline bool bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(u32 type)
{
return type_flag(type) & ~BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS;
}
static inline bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
{
return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC;
}
static inline bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type)
{
return type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) && type_flag(type) & NON_OWN_REF;
}
static inline bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
type = base_type(type);
return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
}
static inline bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON ||
type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK ||
type == PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK;
}
static inline void mark_reg_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
{
env->scratched_regs |= 1U << regno;
}
static inline void mark_stack_slot_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 spi)
{
env->scratched_stack_slots |= 1ULL << spi;
}
static inline bool reg_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno)
{
return (env->scratched_regs >> regno) & 1;
}
static inline bool stack_slot_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u64 regno)
{
return (env->scratched_stack_slots >> regno) & 1;
}
static inline bool verifier_state_scratched(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
return env->scratched_regs || env->scratched_stack_slots;
}
static inline void mark_verifier_state_clean(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
env->scratched_regs = 0U;
env->scratched_stack_slots = 0ULL;
}
/* Used for printing the entire verifier state. */
static inline void mark_verifier_state_scratched(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
env->scratched_regs = ~0U;
env->scratched_stack_slots = ~0ULL;
}
const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type);
const char *dynptr_type_str(enum bpf_dynptr_type type);
const char *iter_type_str(const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id);
const char *iter_state_str(enum bpf_iter_state state);
void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_func_state *state, bool print_all);
void print_insn_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_func_state *state);
#endif /* _LINUX_BPF_VERIFIER_H */