diff --git a/sepolicy/camera.te b/sepolicy/camera.te
index c4449d2..1c00855 100644
--- a/sepolicy/camera.te
+++ b/sepolicy/camera.te
@@ -37,3 +37,11 @@
 
 allow camera input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow camera input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once Camera HAL is guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Camera HAL os talking over sockets to camera daemon, which is
+# permitted. However, those rules target hal_camera rather than hal_camera_server and thus are also
+# granted to all clients of Camera HAL (e.g., cameraserver) which are core components, and
+# socket communications between system components and vendor components are not permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute camera socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/cnd.te b/sepolicy/cnd.te
index acd87c9..5a7dd92 100644
--- a/sepolicy/cnd.te
+++ b/sepolicy/cnd.te
@@ -34,3 +34,6 @@
 # use for mobile hostspot
 allow cnd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow cnd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# TODO(b/36613996): Remove this once system_app no longer communicates over sockets with cnd
+typeattribute cnd socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/hal_drm_widevine.te b/sepolicy/hal_drm_widevine.te
index c76f3cf..0cf32de 100644
--- a/sepolicy/hal_drm_widevine.te
+++ b/sepolicy/hal_drm_widevine.te
@@ -9,5 +9,8 @@
 # such as mediametrics service it currently attempts to use
 typeattribute hal_drm_widevine binder_in_vendor_violators;
 
+# TODO(b/36601602): Remove this once DRM HAL no longer uses Unix domain sockets to talk to tee daemon
+typeattribute hal_drm_widevine socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
+
 allow hal_drm mediacodec:fd use;
 allow hal_drm { appdomain -isolated_app }:fd use;
diff --git a/sepolicy/hal_gnss.te b/sepolicy/hal_gnss.te
index e945798..5942f55 100644
--- a/sepolicy/hal_gnss.te
+++ b/sepolicy/hal_gnss.te
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #
 # TODO:(b/35757613) - STOPSHIP - HAL cannot have direct inet access
 #
+typeattribute hal_gnss_default socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
 allow hal_gnss dnsproxyd_socket:sock_file write;
 allow hal_gnss fwmarkd_socket:sock_file write;
 allow hal_gnss netd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
diff --git a/sepolicy/ims.te b/sepolicy/ims.te
index 5a3a67f..7ba9217 100644
--- a/sepolicy/ims.te
+++ b/sepolicy/ims.te
@@ -40,3 +40,12 @@
 
 # use fds passed from radio app
 allow ims radio:fd use;
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once Telphony HAL is guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Telephony HAL is talking over sockets to ims daemon, which is
+# permitted. However, those rules target hal_telephony rather than hal_telephony_server and thus
+# are also granted to all clients of Telephony HAL (e.g., radio daemon) which are core
+# components, and socket communications between system components and vendor components are not
+# permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute ims socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/location.te b/sepolicy/location.te
index 9dd7ff4..aaa56a0 100644
--- a/sepolicy/location.te
+++ b/sepolicy/location.te
@@ -49,3 +49,11 @@
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow location diag_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 ')
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once Wi-Fi HAL is guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Wi-Fi HAL is talking over sockets to location daemon, which is
+# permitted. However, those rules target hal_wifi rather than hal_wifi_server and thus are also
+# granted to all clients of these HALs (e.g., system_server) which are core components, and
+# socket communications between system components and vendor components are not permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute location socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/perfd.te b/sepolicy/perfd.te
index 7d18e89..3f0679c 100644
--- a/sepolicy/perfd.te
+++ b/sepolicy/perfd.te
@@ -34,3 +34,11 @@
 # Determining if a process exists does not require the kill capability
 # since a permission denied indicates the process exists.
 dontaudit perfd self:capability kill;
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once HALs are guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Audio HAL, Power and DRM HAL are talking over sockets to perfd,
+# which is permitted. However, those rules target hal_x rather than hal_x_server and thus are also
+# granted to all clients of these HALs (e.g., system_server) which are core components, and
+# socket communications between system components and vendor components are not permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute perfd socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/qmuxd.te b/sepolicy/qmuxd.te
index 10dddb5..59d6c4f 100644
--- a/sepolicy/qmuxd.te
+++ b/sepolicy/qmuxd.te
@@ -7,3 +7,11 @@
 allow qmuxd qmuxd_socket:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow qmuxd qmuxd_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
 allow qmuxd self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once HALs are guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Camera HAL is talking over sockets to qmuxd, which is permitted.
+# However, those rules target hal_camera rather than hal_camera_server and thus are also
+# granted to all clients of these HALs (e.g., cameraserver) which are core components, and
+# socket communications between system components and vendor components are not permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute qmuxd socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/rild.te b/sepolicy/rild.te
index c73c32c..a3fe7df 100644
--- a/sepolicy/rild.te
+++ b/sepolicy/rild.te
@@ -25,3 +25,7 @@
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow rild diag_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 ')
+
+# TODO(b/36613472): Remove this once system_server,  mediaserver, bluetooth, and radio no longer
+# communicate with rild over sockets.
+typeattribute rild socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/system_server.te b/sepolicy/system_server.te
index 3981018..1738e0d 100644
--- a/sepolicy/system_server.te
+++ b/sepolicy/system_server.te
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 allow system_server perfd_data_file:sock_file write;
 allow system_server perfd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 
+# TODO(b/36613917): Remove this once system_server no longer communicates with netmgrd over sockets.
+typeattribute netmgrd socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
 allow system_server netmgrd_socket:dir search;
 unix_socket_connect(system_server, netmgrd, netmgrd)
 
diff --git a/sepolicy/time.te b/sepolicy/time.te
index 259ecbf..189cdea 100644
--- a/sepolicy/time.te
+++ b/sepolicy/time.te
@@ -24,3 +24,6 @@
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow time  diag_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 ')
+
+# TODO(b/36613996): Remove this once system_app no longer communicates over sockets with time daemon
+typeattribute time socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;
diff --git a/sepolicy/wcnss_filter.te b/sepolicy/wcnss_filter.te
index 0d6d3d1..279b314 100644
--- a/sepolicy/wcnss_filter.te
+++ b/sepolicy/wcnss_filter.te
@@ -19,3 +19,12 @@
 
 # Allow reading Bluetooth-related system properties
 get_prop(wcnss_filter, bluetooth_prop)
+
+# TODO(b/34274385): Remove this once Bluetooh HAL is guaranteed to not be run in passthrough mode
+# What's going on here is that Bluetooth HAL is talking over sockets to wcnss_filter, which is
+# permitted. However, those rules target hal_bluetooth rather than hal_bluetooth_server and thus
+# are also granted to all clients of Bluetooth HAL (e.g., bluetooth daemon) which are core
+# components, and socket communications between system components and vendor components are not
+# permted.
+# Once we switch full Treble devices to binderized only mode, this issue will disappear.
+typeattribute wcnss_filter socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;